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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
To my Wife 
Fqreword 
PROFESSOR SCURLOCK'S monograph covers an area of the law which is commonly by-passed in treatises and in classroom instruction. If we could 
merely tear Maitland's "seamless web" of the law and retain 
all the shreds, no part of the legal system would escape us. 
What we actually do, however, is to set up, in a more or 
less arbitrary fashion, numerous centers of legal classification, 
such as contracts, torts, property and constitutional law, to 
which closely related legal materials are attracted as to a 
magnet. But those legal materials which stand midway be-
tween two centers of attraction are likely to be subjected to 
equal magnetic pulls in opposite directions and to be drawn 
to neither. 
These observations are particularly applicable to legal 
doctrines concerning the subject of retroactive legislation 
affecting interests in land. The constitutional law expert has 
left it for the property expert. The property expert has left 
it for the constitutional law expert. Thus, no one has given 
it adequate treatment. 
But the practitioner, the judge and the legislator cannot 
limit the field of their activities to the law which clusters 
about certain arbitrarily selected centers. They must deal 
equally with the borderline areas, because to them law is an 
aspect of life. The scores of reported cases in the law books 
dealing with retroactive statutes concerning land bear silent 
witness to the importance of the subject of this monograph 
and the frequency with which its problems arise. 
The statute books are full of retroactive legislation which 
modifies traditional incidents of property institutions. No 
vii 
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lawyer can safely advise his client concerning the effect of 
such statutes, without some basic notions of their validity 
under state and federal constitutions. Yet up to this time 
there has been no adequate treatment of this problem as a 
unit. Indeed, far from finding any guiding principles in 
standard textbooks, the lawyer may even have serious diffi-
culty in locating all the reported decisions which deal with 
the precise question of constitutionality with which he is con-
fronted. Professor Scurlock's monograph will aid the lawyer 
in both particulars. It will give him guiding principles, and 
it will furnish him with an adequate picture of the case law 
dealing with his own peculiar problem. 
Moreover, this monograph will supply a long felt want 
of the legislator. Everyone who has drafted legislation 
modifying the law of real property has been confronted at 
the outset with the question: Shall I make this applicable 
to interests in property already created? Or shall I limit 
its operation to interests arising under deeds and wills which 
take effect after the legislation is enacted? Professor Scur-
lock's book throws a flood of light upon this question, such 
as will be found in no other treatise or article. 
For the legal philosopher, as well as the practical man of 
affairs, this monograph has its contribution. While it deals 
with a subject matter involving both constitutional law and 
the law of real property, the questions discussed commonly 
turn on the nature of property interests. To the person who 
asks the question what is property, or who is confused by 
the chameleon-hued concept of "vested interests in prop-
erty," this book has something to offer. 
In short, for the lawyer, the judge, the legislator and the 
legal philosopher, this monograph constitutes a valuable 
contribution to the science of law. 
LEWIS M. SIMES 
Preface 
I 
HAVE discussed in the Introduction the method of 
approach and arrangement of materials, to which the 
reader is referred. 
This study was begun while I was a graduate fellow 
at the University of Michigan Law School. It is a great 
pleasure for me to express my appreciation for the guidance 
given by my thesis committee, Mr. Burke Shartel, Mr. Paul 
G. Kauper and Mr. Allan F. Smith, and for the helpful 
criticisms of Mr. Lewis M. Simes. 
School of Law 
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HE Common Law of real property as it was inhented 
from the English system by the states in the eight-
eenth and early nineteenth centuries has undergone 
much statutory modification. Legal institutions which had 
their origin in an altogether different milieu have proved 
unsatisfactory, or have seemed not to be satisfactorily adapta-
ble, and have been abolished or altered. New concepts find 
their way into statutes to replace the Common Law. Statutes 
are repealed, amended, and modified. 
The constitutional difficulties would be minimal if legisla-
tures always designed statutes so that they would operate 
only as to interests thereafter to be created. As to future dis-
positions and acquisitions of interests in land, the sole restric-
tion on the power of the legislature to amend the law is that 
the liberty of individuals to enjoy and to dispose of their 
property shall not be unreasonably restricted. Although the 
courts will strive wherever possible to give a prospective in-
terpretation to a statute, the wording may leave no doubt 
but that the legislature for one reason or the other designed 
the statute to apply to existing interests. In such instances 
expectations may be destroyed in a manner deemed to be 
forbidden by the constitutional guarantees. 
The term retroactive when applied to legislation has been 
used to suggest a variety of meanings, but the sense in which 
the term is employed here is that a statute is retroactive when 
it extinguishes or impairs interests acquired under the previ-
ously existing law. The problem to be dealt with is that of 
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the constitutional limitations on the power of the legislature 
to effect changes in the institutions of real property law and 
to make those changes applicable as to interests arising out 
of these institutions and in existence at the effective date of 
the statute. 
Concern over the validity of a retroactive statute is not 
always confined to those whose interests are immediately af- · 
fected upon enactment. It is erroneous to assume categorical-
ly that the constitutionality of the statute is of practical in-
terest for only a short time after its enactment. If a statute 
is unconstitutional, it confers no rights, and acts done under 
its supposed authority are rendered nugatory, yet a line of 
title may rest upon the assumed validity of the statute. The 
defect may some day come to light and cause misfortune to 
those who did not properly evaluate the validity of the stat-
ute in their search of title. Unusual circumstances, such as 
the longevity of a life tenant, may postpone for half a century 
or more the day of reckoning when the persons whose in~ 
terests the statute purportedly extinguished make their ap-
pearance to claim their property. Although throughout our 
discussion we shall be talking about the rights of the owners 
of interests, it must not be forgotten that the vindication of 
one man's rights can be to another a denial of rights. 
SCOPE 
The legislation to be dealt with is that which affects in-
terests in land by modification or abolition of legal institu-
tions. Legislation regulating land use will be touched upon 
only incidentally and in those areas where differentiation be-
tween the regulation of use and the impairment of static 
interests cannot be made. Although legislation regulating 
use of land is invariably retroactive in the sense that it ex-
tinguishes rights and privileges acquired under previous law 
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(for the legislature cannot suspend the operation of a regu-
latory statute until all persons owning or possessing land at 
the date of enactment have transferred their interests), there 
are good reasons for not undertaking a consideration of regu-
latory legislation along with other aspects of retroactive leg-
islation. The constitutionality of regulatory legislation has 
been widely explored a·nd abundantly written upon, whereas 
the constitutionality of retroactive legislation affecting inter-
ests in land has rarely received treatment. To include all 
phases of retroactivity would be to stake out a field of in-
vestigation which would be too huge to treat adequately. 
Moreover, treatment of legislation affecting static interests 
as a matter separate and distinct from regulatory legislation 
finds considerable justification in the attitude of the courts. 
The courts do not as a general rule conceive of regulatory 
legislation as being retroactive at all, but rather prospective 
in the sense that conduct which was previously privileged on 
the part of the owner of the land is thereafter forbidden by 
the statute. This conception prevails even when the court 
determines that the application of the statute is unconstitu-
tional. The courts simply do not think of the privilege of 
using one's land as a static property interest. If they did, 
then no doubt regulatory statutes such as zoning laws would 
always be considered to be retroactive. 
Only legislation affecting private interests is to be con-
sidered; hence legislation relating to public corporations and 
bodies is excluded. In the field of private interests exclusions 
have been made of areas wherein arise special problems 
meriting separate and extensive treatment: statutes relating 
to mortgages and security interests, statutes introducing pro-
cedural changes, taxation statutes and eminent domain stat-
utes. Curative statutes have been considered only inciden-
tally. 
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MODE OF TREATMENT 
The subject matter has been broken down in accordance 
with the type of interest or legal institution affected. Hence 
the headings refer to specific interests or institutions and the 
discussion thereunder to the various statutes enacted in the 
several jurisdictions which affect these specific interests. Di-
vision of subject according to interest involved is eminently 
justified. Whether a statute may constitutionally be applied 
in a retroactive manner can be determined only in the light 
of the substantiality of the interest. This entails differentia-
tion and classification. 
Treatment according to the interest involved is possible 
because of the common legal heritage of the United States. 
The doctrine of fixed interests excludes innovation and un-
orthodoxy. Similar relations are similarly analyzed by dif-
ferent courts. Legal institutions have a continuing existence; 
consequently past decisions may be looked to as some guide 
for the present. The evolution of an institution tends to 
occur simultaneously in all the jurisdictions where the in-
stitution is recognized so that similarity in approach by the 
courts in the various jurisdictions is not prevented by the 
development of the institution. Although a legal institution 
may be recognized in only one jurisdiction, it is far more 
common for a legal institution to be recognized in a number 
of jurisdictions, or even in all jurisdictions; hence deter-
minations made by the courts of one jurisdiction will have 
significance in other jurisdictions. 
In many instances the writer had to rely upon constitu-
tional decisions of thirty to one hundred years ago for they 
are the only authorities relating to the particular points. 
These older cases unquestionably represent a more protec-
tive attitude toward property rights than prevails today, and 
therefore are not to be relied upon explicitly as indicating 
how the courts would decide now. 
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Appraisals of the results reached by the courts necessitates 
adequate analysis of the nature of the interest involved. For 
this purpose excellent tools are provided in the concepts of 
legal relations popularized by Hohfeld. Certain of the 
Hohfeldian concepts are used throughout: "right" in the 
sense of a claim; "privilege" in the sense of a freedom to 
act; "power" in the sense of an ability to affect legal rela-
tions; "immunity" in the sense of an absence of liability 
to have one's legal relation changed; "duty" in the sense 
of an obligation. Purism in the use of these concepts is 
not necessary and has not been attempted. In fact, if 
purism were made a goal, it would defeat the very pur-
pose for which Hohfeldian terminology has been employed 
by the writer, that is, the achievement of clarity and 
accuracy. By making reasonable use of these several 
Hohfeldian terms, one can avoid the morasses in which 
the courts have often floundered. Many a case has been 
decided by the name which the court applied to the 
particular interest. One of the worst impediments to proper 
analysis is the word "right," which practically invites fallacy. 
Since the proposition that "vested rights may not be im-
paired" is more or less in the mind of a court whenever the 
contention is made that the legislature has unconstitutionally 
deprived someone of property, the court can easily fall into 
a closed circuit of reasoning and conclude that since the in-
terest is a "right" it necessarily is immune from legislative 
impairment. This has occurred a great many times. Avoid-
ance of such pitfalls has been uppermost in the mind of the 
writer. 
A term which is often instrumental in producing obscurity 
is "property." The assertion is frequently made that the 
legislature may not destroy or confiscate property rights. As 
the statement stands it has no particular meaning, for un-
fortunately "property" is used commonly in at least four 
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different senses. Sometimes the term refers to the physical 
object itself, sometimes to ownership of the object (i.e., to 
the bundle of rights, duties, powers, and privileges which 
constitute the legal relation called ownership), sometimes 
to any legally protected interest, and sometimes to any con-
stitutionally protected interest. So far as "property" is used 
in this last sense, the statement that the legislature may not 
destroy property rights has no meaning except as a statement 
of a conclusion reached upon the particular set of facts. 
Where the word "property" is used hereafter in this and 
following chapters it is in reference to the physical object 
itself, real or personal. 
The expression "vested rights" has been avoided as much 
as possible. A "vested right" is an interest which in the opin-
ion of the court is constitutionally protected against impair-
ment. "Vested right" is a label which is attached after 
analysis and weighing of public and private interests. It is 
a conclusion and not a point of departure. 
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE AND DETERMINATION OF 
EXISTENCE OF INTEREST 
It is a matter of legislative intent whether a statute is to 
operate retroactively or only prospectiv.ely. The intention 
that it should apply retroactively must be made clear, for 
generally the courts indulge in the presumption that the leg-
islature intended the statute to have prospective effect only. 
It is a general rule of construction that statutes are to be 
construed to operate prospectively wherever they are sus-
ceptible of such interpretation. However, when the legisla-
ture clearly and unmistakably shows an intention to make 
the statute retroactive, it is the duty of the court to apply it 
thus even though the consequence may be that the statute is 
rendered unconstitutional as applied. 
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As a preliminary to the determination of the constitutional 
question, the court must, of course, ascertain whether the 
alleged interest actually exists. In real property law this is 
usually a matter of construing instruments. Construction 
problems are more or less outside the scope of this treatment. 
For the most part the cases will be taken up at the point 
where the interest has been identified and only the constitu-
tional question remains. Usually there is no doubt about the 
identity of the interest; the controversy centers about the 
true nature or characteristics of the interest. 
It is apparent that a court may avoid the constitutional 
question by refusing to acknowledge the existence of an al-
leged interest. However, there is probably a limit to the 
extent to which a court may do this. The decision of the 
court, it would seem, must rest on a fair basis. If it does not, 
there may be a deprivation of property without due process.1 
1 See Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 32 I U. S. 36, 42 ( 1944) 1 
Sauer v. New York, 206 U.S. 536, 547 (1906). 
CHAPTER 2 
The Constitutional Guarantees 
T
HE conservatism of the courts when passing upon 
the constitutionality of legislation which has an ad-
verse effect upon static interests in property is in 
remarkable contrast to the liberality of the courts when pass-
ing upon the constitutionality of legislation restricting the 
use of land. Since Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.1 the con-
templated use of property, even when the use is not harmful 
in itself or immoral, is subject to restriction in the public 
interest. A small number of cases have even held that a 
present use which is neither immoral nor harmful may be 
prohibited.2 To the owner who purchased in anticipation of 
a certain use which is now forbidden, it is as though some of 
his land were taken from him, yet he is not entitled to com-
pensation for the diminution in value which is the conse-
quence of a reasonable regulatory measure. However, when 
the legislature in the exercise of its police power makes a 
change in the static real property law, the courts are inclined 
to hold that there has been an unconstitutional deprivation 
of property if any interest is extinguished or impaired. In 
contrast to the readiness with which the courts sustain legis-
lation regulating land use, one finds a marked conservatism 
in .the cases concerned with the impingement of legislation 
on static interests. One finds in these cases an inclination to 
concentrate on the private property aspects with little or no 
attempt to balance private and public interests. Of course, 
lVillage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
2 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 2.39 U.S. 394 (1915); Realty Co. v. McDonald, 
168 La. 172.1 12.1 So. 613 (192.9), cert. den. 2.80 U.S. 556 (192.9). 
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it must be admitted that when the legislature modifies or 
abolishes the institutions of real property law, it ordinarily 
does not do so under the pressure of public need for im-
mediate action. Nor is there usually an irreconcilable conflict 
between private and public interests (as so often is the case 
when the legislature undertakes to regulate a private use) 
which calls for immediate modification and consequent sacri-
fice of private interest for the public good. 
The bias against retroactive legislation is more than an 
aversion to the destruction of private interests having eco-
nomic value. It is a bias deeply rooted in Anglo-American 
law.3 Coke established the maxim that "Nova constitutio 
futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis." 4 Blackstone 
declared it to be a matter of justice that statutes should be 
made to operate in the future.5 The American decisions 
abound with condemnations of retroactive legislation. Retro-
active statutes seem to do violence to one's sense of justice 
in a variety of ways. For one thing, they destroy one's feel-
ing of security. Often they are enacted with the knowledge 
and intention that they will affect particular persons in a 
specific manner and thus are personal rather than impersonal 
as legislation is supposed to be. Moreover, a retroactive 
statute gives the person affected no opportunity to avoid the 
consequences by rearranging his affairs. 
The courts do not always indicate the constitutional pro-
vision which they suppose to be applicable when they declare 
a statute valid or invalid; but it cannot be assumed that a 
court does not have in mind a specific constitutional provision 
merely because it does not say so. It is now almost univer-
sally held that a court has no power to declare a statute in-
3 Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of 
Jurisprudence, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 775 (1936); Smith, Retroactive Laws and 
Vested Rights, 5 Tex. L. Rev. 231 (1927); 6 Tex. L. Rev. 409 (1928). 
4 2 Inst. 292. 
5 1 Blackstone, Commentaries, 46. 
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valid unless the statute conflicts with some provision of the 
state or federal Constitution.6 The nineteenth century 
"Vested Rights Doctrine" with the concomitant overtones 
of natural law and natural rights has been pretty much rele-
gated to the past.7 Only now and then does one find a mod-
ern case in which a court professes the view that the legis-
lature is limited by principles of naturallaw.8 And when all 
is said and done, there have really been exceedingly few 
cases in which a statute was actually declared invalid on 
natural law grounds,9 notwithstanding the many discussions 
in the earlier cases concerning natural rights, the social com-
pact, and the inherent incapacity of an American government 
to take away life, liberty, or property except when necessary 
for the general good. 
A suggestion of the Doctrine of Vested Rights in modern 
cases is the equivocal proposition that the legislature is pow-
erless to divest "vested rights." But usually when a court 
speaks of "vested rights" it has no intention of reverting to 
the nineteenth century Doctrine. It means only that in its 
opinion the legislature has attempted to disturb property in-
terests in a manner forbidden by express constitutional guar-
antees. 
6 Gray v. McLendon, I 34 Ga. 2.2.4, 67 S. E. 8 59 (I 9 Io) ; Schmitt v. 
F. W. Cook Brewing Co., I87 Ind. 6z3, 12.0 N. E. I9 (I9I8); Craig v. 
O'Rear, I99 Ky. 553, 251 S. W. 8z8 (I92.3); Ward v. Leche, I89 La. II3, 
I79 So. sz (I938); Burrows v. Delta Transp. Co., Io6 Mich. 58z, 64 N. W. 
50 I (I895); State ex rel. King v. Sherman, 104 Ohio St. 3I7, I35 N. E. 
6zs (192.2.); Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, so Utah 114, 167 Pac. 
2.4I (I917)· 
7 For a general discussion of the Vested Rights Doctrine see Corwin, The 
Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12. Mich. L. Rev. 2.47 (I9I4). 
8 Matter of Estate of Leslie, 92. Misc. 663, I56 N. Y. S. 346 (I9I5); 
Nunnemacher v. State, 12.9 Wis. I9o, 108 N. W. 62.7 (I9o6). 
9 Prof. Thayer stated that there is but one such case: Bowman v. Middleton, 
I Bay (I S. C. L.) zsz (I792); I Thayer, Cases on Constitutional Law, 
p. 53 (I 8 9 5). Another writer cites four cases in which he states that statutes 
were declared void on the ground that they violated the dictates of natural 
law: Gardner v. Newburgh, z Johns. Ch. I6z (N.Y. 18I6); People v. Platt, 
I7 Johns. Rep. 195 (N.Y. 1819); Bradshaw v. Rodgers, zo Johns. Rep. I03 
(N.Y. 1822.); Parham v. The Justices, 9 Ga. 341 (zSsz). 
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In the same order as "vested rights" is the idea expressed 
in some cases that a statute is unconstitutional because it oper-
ates to take the property of one person and transfer it to 
another.10 Probably no legislature has ever literally taken 
one man's property to bestow it on another. The court is 
stating in a roundapout manner that the statute confers on 
one person rights and powers in respect to another's property 
in a manner or degree forbidden by the Constitution. 
While few modern courts would think of expressly basing 
a decision upon the Doctrine of Natural or Vested Rights 
(partly because the Doctrine has so often been renounced, 
and partly because the broad interpretation given to the con-
stitutional provisions makes recourse to a Natural Rights 
.Doctrine uncalled for), the Doctrine of Vested Rights con-
tinues to play a not unimportant role in a metamorphosed 
state. The Doctrine to a large extent has been incorporated 
into the language of the constitution by judicial interpreta-
tion and is flourishing under the disguise of "due process." 
The courts today are building on a concept of limitations on 
legislative power laid down in the Era of Vested Rights/1 
with the qualification, of course, that the courts today harbor 
fewer fears and prejudices against the legislature and are 
more willing, for the most part, to allow some degree of lati-
tude to the legislature. The concern of a court in respect to 
an arbitrary or unreasonable act of legislation is very much 
the same, whether it professes to be bound to look only to 
the written constitution (as today), or whether it professes 
to find natural limitations to the power of the legislature (as 
was once the vogue). 
In the cases arising prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, 
if the given legislative act was held to be constitutionally 
10 E.g., Lawrence E. Tierney Coal Co. v. Smith's Guardian, 180 Ky. 815, 
203 s. w. 731 (1918). 
11 Howe, The Meaning of "Due Process of Law" Prior to the Adoption of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 18 Calif. L. Rev. 583 (1930). 
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forbidden, the prohibition necessarily had to be found in the 
state constitution, except where the impairment of the obliga-
tion of a contract was involved. It was some time after the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment before the courts 
ceased to rely exclusively on the state constitutions in cases 
not involving an impairment of the obligation of contract. At 
present the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
is the favored resort against legislative excesses and has 
greatly overshadowed the Bill of Rights of the state con-
stitutions as a protection against deprivation of property. 
However, the guarantees of the state constitutions have by no 
means been supplanted. 
A provision similar to the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment is to be found in a number of state con-
stitutions; 12 in others the due process concept is stated more 
elaborately.13 The privilege of possessing and acquiring 
property is expressly guaranteed in many states.14 The provi-
sion in some constitutions that the "property of no person 
shall be taken for public use without just compensation 
therefor" has been taken to signify that private property 
may not be taken for private uses even if compensation is 
paid and that the legislature may not arbitrarily or unrea-
sonably interfere with property rights.15 In the Pennsylvania 
Constitution it is provided: 
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to be 
heard by himself and his counsel . . . ; he cannot be 
12 E.g., Okla. Const., Art. II, sec. 7: "No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law." 
13 E.g., Tenn. Const., Art. I, sec. 8: "That no man shall be taken or 
imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed 
or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or 
property, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land." 
14 E.g., Me. Const., Art. I, sec. I: "All men are born equally free and 
independent, and have certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights, among 
which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, pos-
sessing and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and 
happiness." 
15Conn. Const., Art. I, sec. II; Linsley v. Hubbard, 44 Conn. I09 (I876). 
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compelled to give evidence against himself, nor can he be 
deprived of his life, liberty or property, unless by the judg-
ment of his peers or the law of the land." 16 
It has been held that if the property of criminals is protected 
in this way, surely everyone's property must be likewise pro-
tected.17 
In spite of the diversity of phraseology, the provisions 
cited above appear to have an identity of meaning. If the 
particular phraseology is significant to the outcome, the sig-
nificance which the courts attach to the precise wording of 
the constitutional provision is certainly not articulated. The 
courts treat the provision, whatever the specific wording, as 
a guarantee against deprivation of property without due 
process, and each case resolves itself into a question of wheth-
er the legislature has acted arbitrarily and unreasonably. 
The constitutions of Georgia, Missouri, Ohio, Texas, 
Colorado, Louisiana, New Hampshire, and Tennessee con-
tain prohibitions against the enactment of retroactive legisla-
tion. The Ohio Constitution, as an example, provides that 
"the general assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive 
laws or laws impairing the obligation of contracts." 18 Such 
prohibitions are not taken literally to prevent the application 
of any legislation to existing interests.19 It was said by the 
Missouri Supreme Court: 
"The constitutional inhibition against laws retrospective in 
operation (section 15, article 2, Constitution of Missouri) 
does not mean that no statute relating to past transactions can 
be constitutionally passed, but rather that none can be al-
16 Pa. Const., Art. I, sec. 9· 
17 Schoenberger v. School Directors, 32 Pa. 34 (I8s8). 
18 Ohio Const., Art. 2, sec. 28. 
19 Denver, etc., Ry. Co. v. Woodward, 4 Colo. I 62 (I 8 7 8) ; Bullard v. 
Holman, I84 Ga. 788, I93 S. E. 586 (I937); Haas v. Haas, I8z La. 337, 
I6z So. 5 (I935); Wallace v. Stearns, 96 N.H. 367, 77 A. 2d I09 (I95o); 
Hamilton County v. Rosche, so Ohio St. Io3, 33 N. E. 408 (I893); Deihl v. 
Jones, I70 Tenn. 2I7, 94 S. W. zd 47 (I936); Downs v. Blount, I70 Fed. 
I5 (sth Cir. I9o9) (referring to Texas Constitution). 
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lowed to operate retrospectively so as to affect such past 
transactions to the substantial prejudice of parties interested. 
A law must not give to something already done a different 
effect from that which it had when it transpired." 20 
The definition of retrospective statutes customarily given by 
courts in the jurisdictions having this type of constitutional 
provision is that laid down by Justice Story in Society for the 
Propagation, etc. v. Wheeler et al.: 
"Upon principle, every statute, which takes away or impairs 
vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new 
obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, 
in respect to transactions or considerations already past, must 
be deemed retrospective; and this doctrine seems fully sup-
ported by authorities." 21 
On the whole the courts seem to come out with about the 
same result whether they apply a provision against retro-
spective laws or whether they refer to a "due process" clause. 
However, the Missouri Supreme Court has indicated that in 
close cases where the court can go either way on the constitu-
tional issue, the express prohibition in the constitution of that 
state against retrospective legislation requires the court to 
hold that the statute is invalid, whereas if a "due process" 
clause were applicable the court might sustain the statute.22 
Retroactive statutes have been declared unconstitutional 
on the ground that they impair the obligation of contracts. 
Impairment of the obligation of contract is likely to be the 
basis of decision where the statute affects an inter vivos trust, 
a leasehold estate, or a mortgage, since the legal relations 
here are contractual in nature or have contractual aspects. On 
20Willhite v. Rathburn, 332 Mo. 1208, 1217, 61 S. W. 2d 708, 711 
( 19 3 3). The provision against retroactive legislation is now Mo. Const, 
1945, Art. I, sec. 13. 
21 22 Fed. Cas. 756 at 767, No. 13, 156 (C. C. D. N.H. 1814). 
22Leete v. State Bank, 115 Mo. 184, 202, 21 S. W. 789, 792 (1893). 
See also in this regard Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37, 3 S. W. 249 
(1887). 
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the theory that a deed is a contract, or an instrument sound-
ing in contract, it is sometimes held that the interests created 
by a deed are contract obligations within the meaning of the 
contracts clause of the federal Constitution.23 A will, how-
ever, is said. not to be within the purview of that clause.24 
The view that interests created by deed are necessarily 
contract obligations is an unwarranted extension of Fletcher 
v. Peck 25 wherein it was held that a grant from a state is a 
contract which is immune, by virtue of the contracts clause 
of the federal Constitution, from subsequent revocation by 
the legislature. The holding in Fletcher v. Peck probably 
went beyond what was intended to be the scope of the con-
tracts clause, for it is doubtful whether the framers of the 
Constitution were thinking of contracts in any other than the 
usual legal sense of an agreement between two or more 
parties.26 Certainly the holding in Fletcher v. Peck should 
not be extended beyond the issue in the case. The principle 
laid down is applicable when a legislature is seeking, with-
out justification, to reinvest the state with title to land which 
it previously granted or patented. Apparently the contracts 
clause also would be invocable where a statute purports to 
extinguish the effect of a conveyance between private parties 
by divesting the title of the grantee in whole or in part and 
restoring it to the grantor, or by re-establishing privileges, 
rights, or powers in the grantor which he had relinquished 
by the conveyance. Justice Marshall said so in Fletcher v. 
Peck. Also he remarked that: 
23 Inter alia Cress v. Hamnet, 144 Kan. 128, 58 P. 2d 61 (1936); Evans v. 
Cropp, 141 Ky. 514, 133 S. W. 221 (1911); Berdan v. Van Riper, 16 N.J. 
L. 7 (Sup. Ct. 1837); Gilmore v. Bright, 101 N.C. 313, 7 S. E. 751 (1888). 
24 Clarke v. Van Surlay, 15 Wend. 436 (N. Y. 1836); Cochran v. Van 
Surlay, 20 Wend. 365 (N.Y. 1838). 
25 6 Cranch 87 (U. S. 1809). 
26 Kauper, What Is a «Contract'' Under the Contracts Clause of the Federal 
Constitution? 31 Mich. L. Rev. 187, 193 (1932). 
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"A contract executed, as well as one which is executory, con-
tains obligations binding on the parties. A grant, in its own 
nature, amounts to an extinguishment of the right of the 
grantor, and implies a contract not to reassert that right. A 
party is, therefore, always estopped by his own grant." 27 
Naturally, the contracts clause is applicable when there is 
an impairment of an actual contract subsisting between 
grantor and grantee. The clause is no less applicable because 
the terms of the contract happen to be stated in the deed. 
However, when a statute modifies or abolishes a legal 
institution under which an interest exists, there is ordinarily 
no impairment of the legal effect of the deed between the 
grantor and grantee nor a restoring to the grantor of some-
thing which he is estopped to claim. If the grantor has in no 
manner gained by the grantee's loss of an interest, can it be 
logically and reasonably said that a contract has been 
impaired? If any constitutional guarantee is infringed, it 
would seem to be that against deprivation of property with-
out due process. Even in regard to those interests which can 
be classified either as interests in land or as contract relations, 
depending on one's viewpoint, such as easements, real cove-
nants, restrictive covenants, it is submitted that the contracts 
clause is only applicable when the statute purports to affect 
the legal relations flowing out of the grant or agreement as 
between grantor (promisor) and grantee (promisee) or 
third party beneficiary. Be this as it may, legal relations 
which are recognized to be interests in land have character-
istics which set them off from legal relations which are purely 
contractual. Interests in land are relations in rem; they exist 
not only as to the immediate parties to their creation but 
as to all persons. Contract relations involve the making 
of a promise. They are relations in personam; third parties 
are not affected except as to the general duty not to interfere 
27 6 Cranch 87, 137 (U.S. 1809). 
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with the relations between the contracting parties. It is 
contrary to common understanding of what is an interest in 
land to impart to such an interest a contractual quality. 
Possibly what has led some courts to hold that interests 
created by deed are contractual is the ambiguous and inac-
curate reference to the deed itself as a contract. This con-
fusing designation completely obscures the fact that the use 
of a deed in the creation of interests is purely a formalistic 
requirement. The conveyance is perfected through the exe-
cution and delivery of the deed; after these acts the deed is 
spent. 
In the past where the courts have resorted to the contracts 
clause, they have tended not to want to allow any interfer-
ence with property interests whatever, apparently on the 
theory that the prohibition against impairment is not one of 
degree but that any impairment is within the prohibition.28 
But the Supreme Court of the United States in Home Build-
ing & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell 29 made it clear that the police 
power enters into every contract to a degree once not gen-
erally admitted. A completely new concept of the contracts 
clause is evoked by that case; a contract may be impaired 
if there are reasonable grounds. Therefore, even if we are 
willing to accept the contracts clause as a tenable ground on 
which to determine the constitutionality of a retroactive 
statute affecting interests in land we must reconsider the 
older cases applying the contracts clause in the impingement 
of legislation on interests in land. The restrictive determina-
tions once thought to be necessary are no longer deemed to be 
28 It has been said (in cases not involving deeds, however) that the pro-
hibition against impairment is commonly not a question of degree for any 
impairment is within the prohibition. Bank of Minden v. Clement, 256 U. S. 
126 (1921); Norfolk & W. R. Ry. Co. v. Boyle, 12 Fed. Supp. 522 (N.D. 
Ohio 1935); Rorick v. Board of Com'rs, 57 F. 2d 1048 (N. D. Fla. 1932); 
Green v. City of Asheville, 199 N.C. 516, 154 S. E. 8sz (193o). 
29 290 u.s. 398 (1934). 
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required, although perhaps the contracts clause is still more 
inhibitive than the due process clauses. 
Occasionally a statute modifying the existing property 
law will be held to deny equal protection of the laws. But 
it is rather exceptional to find a statute of the type to be 
discussed which operates unequally, however unreasonable 
it may be. 
In some cases it has been contended (and occasionally 
held) that a retroactive statute entails a forbidden intrusion 
of the legislature into the province of the judiciary. This 
argument is based upon the theory that a retroactive statute 
necessarily declares the law for existing cases, which is a 
judicial and not a legislative function. Most of these cases 
appeared in the early nineteenth century and none, appar-
ently, in the last seventy-five years.80 
so See Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 131 et seq. (7th ed. 1903) 
for a discussion of the earlier cases. 
CHAPTER 3 
Acquisition and Disposition of Interests 
In Land 
I. INTER Vrvos TRANSFERS 
THE POWER OF ALIENATION " 'THE right to sell and convey is a property right,' 
and one of the highest privileges and dearest rights 
connected with ownership. In fact it is the one right 
which gives the thing owned its greatest value." 1 
It is of course within the power of the legislature to pre-
scribe the mode of conveying property. There is a difference 
between impairing the power of alienation and prescribing 
the manner in which the power must be exercised. The dis-
tinction becomes difficult of ascertainment at times, yet on 
the whole the difference is apparent enough. A prescription 
relates to form or mode of conveying when the owner of an 
interest is free at any time to alienate that interest, provided 
only that in order to accomplish his purpose he must do 
certain acts which are within his ability.2 There is an 
impairment of the power of alienation when the owner of 
1 Crump v. Guyer, 6o Okla. 222, 224, 157 Pac. 321, 323 (1916). 
2 During the nineteenth century there were statutes in a number of states 
which provided that a married woman could not convey any interest in her 
separate property except by an instrument which she acknowledged upon 
examination separate and apart from her husband. These statutes did not 
prohibit a married woman from disposing of or encumbering all or any part 
of her separate estate upon such terms as she thought proper. Their purpose 
was to throw up a safeguard against undue influence, threats, or fraud, 
without in any degree impairing the power of disposition. Such statutes, it 
was held, could be applied even where the land was acquired before the 
passage of the statute. Marclay v. Love, 25 Cal. 367 (1864); Williamson 
v. Williamson, 57 Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 329 (1857). 
19 
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an interest is deprived of the ability to perform the formal 
acts which are prescribed for the alienation of interests in 
land-as, for example, where the concurrence of another 
person is required, whose consent cannot legally be com-
pelled by the owner of the interest.3 
The jus disponendi may be restrained in the interest of 
the public welfare. A California statute 4 which gave the 
real estate commissioner power to prohibit the sale or lease 
of subdivided land, if he should find that the sale or lease 
"would constitute misrepresentation to or deceit or fraud 
of the purchasers of lots or parcels in such subdivision," was 
upheld. The court concluded that the statute must be sus-
tained for the same reasons which give validity to Securities 
Acts: the prevention of fraud and sharp practices in a type 
3 In Johnson v. Sanger, 49 W.Va. 405, 38 S. E. 645 (r9or), the statute 
provided that where land is held in trust for the use of a married woman, 
while the property "remains in the hands or under the control of such trustee, 
no contract relating to, or conveyance of, any such property by such married 
woman shall be of any force to bind or affect the same, unless her trustee 
join in." W. Va. Code r89r, c. 66, sec. 4· Prior to the enactment of this 
statute a married woman could by deed from herself and her husband convey 
the land held by a trustee and compel the trustee to pass the legal title to her 
alienee by uniting in the deed, or by separate deed. It was held that the power 
of disposition could not thus be taken away or impaired without violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. However, as to land acquired subsequent to 
the adoption of Art. VI, sec. 49, of the Constitution in 1 87 z, the court found 
reason to permit the retroactive application of the Act of r89I, This con-
stitutional provision gave the legislature power to "pass such laws as may 
be necessary to protect the property of married women from the debts, liabil-
ities and control of their husbands." It was held that the Act of I 8 9 I was 
vindicated by this constitutional provision, as the necessity of the trustee's 
consent would be a hindrance in the way of improvident acts of the wife 
instigated by the undue influence of her husband. 
But see Warfield v. Ravesies and Wife, 38 Ala. p8 (I863) in which a 
statute conferring ownership upon the husband of the rents, income, and 
profits of the wife's estate and providing that the wife's property could be 
conveyed only by joint deed of husband and wife, was sustained as a reasonable 
prescription of the mode of conveying the wife's land! In five states a contract 
to sell, a deed, a mortgage, or even a lease of lands owned by the wife may 
require joinder of the husband: Ala., Fla., Ind., N. C., and Pa. 1 Powell, 
Real Property, ~ II8. 
4 Cal. Gen. Laws I937, Act I 12, § zoa et seq. The vendor was obligated 
to deliver title to each parcel free of encumbrance. Violation of the statute 
was made a criminal offense. 
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of transaction particularly open to such abuses.5 The sale 
of residential lots having an area less than a prescribed 
minimum may be prohibited.6 Statutes have been sustained 
5 In re Sidebotham, I2 Cal. 2d 434, 85 P. 2d 453 (I938), cert. den., 
307 U. S. 634 (I938). "The assertion that this is not valid police power 
legislation because it benefits only a special class, the purchasers and lessees 
of subdivided real estate, and not the whole public, is without substance. 
The police power may be, and usually is, exercised for the purpose of protect-
ing particular classes of the public in need of such protection, and it is rare 
indeed that a single law includes everyone in the scope of its regulations. 
The object of the present law, prevention of fraud and sharp practices in 
a type of real estate transaction peculiarly open to such abuses, is obviously 
legitimate, and the method, including investigation and disclosure of certain 
essential facts, and a protection for the innocent purchaser against loss of 
his land by foreclosure of the underlying mortgage is perfectly reasonable. 
A safeguard against arbitrary action is provided in the requirement of a 
public report of the commissioner's investigation and a public hearing on any 
contemplated prohibitory order. The decisions sustaining regulatory legisla-
tion to prevent fraud are numerous, and they fully support the law herein 
attacked." (12 Cal. zd 434, 436, 85 P. 2d 453, 454.) 
In a vigorous dissent (p. 456), Edmonds, J., said: "· .. [T]he sale of 
a security created by an individual stands in a different category from a sale 
of tangible property and the regulations of the sale of securities rests upon 
the principle that it is within the power of government to prevent deception 
concerning them because their value consists in what they represent." The 
dissenting judge believed that the statute deprived the owner of the inalienable 
right of "acquiring, possessing, and protecting property" which is guaranteed 
by Article I, section I of the California Constitution. Police power regula-
tions are upheld only where they are reasonably related to the health, morals 
or safety of the public. Even a purpose to protect people from their own 
folly will not overcome constitutional rights, he wrote. The police power 
may not be invoked under the guise of the general welfare " 'to interfere with 
the sale by an individual of his own property when the acquiring and posses-
sion of such property is not contrary to law' " (p. 45 7). 
6 Clemons v. City of Los Angeles, 222 P. zd 439 (Cal. I950). The 
ordinance in question provided that no lot "held under separate ownership" 
at the law's effective date and "used . . . for dwelling purposes" shall be 
"reduced in any manner below the minimum lot area, size or dimensions" 
prescribed-"a minimum average width of fifty (so) feet and a minimum 
area of five thousand (5ooo) square feet." Another ordinance, however, 
permitted the construction of rental units with a lot area of 8oo feet per 
dwelling unit on sooo square foot lots under single ownership. The majority 
found that the ordinance in question had a sufficient relation to the health 
and welfare of the public in that it was designed inter alia to avoid over-
crowding and congestion. A dissenting judge strongly attacked the position 
of the majority as a mere subservience to the whims of a city council. He 
pointed out that when the plaintiff purchased the property in question there 
were nine bungalows thereon, which had been built many years before the 
ordinance went into effect. The plaintiff subdivided the property into nine 
parcels and sold them to individual purchasers; these lots averaged 92 5 
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which prohibit the sale or lease of agricultural lands to aliens 
ineligible for United States citizenship.7 A reasonable zoning 
ordinance which promotes the general welfare is not ren-
dered unconstitutional because it has the effect of prohibit-
ing an investor from selling the land for a particular use 
even though he bought the land intending to sell it for this 
use.8 
The legislature may curtail the power of alienation of 
persons who need to be protected against their own indiscre-
square feet. Since the ordinance in question applied to the ownership of lots 
of a certain size and not to the use, plaintiff could rent the bungalows and 
lots but could not convey them! The dissenting opinion charged the majority 
with failure to make it clear just how, under these circumstances, the ordi-
nance could accomplish any of the supposed results. 
Zoning ordinance prescribing minimum area of lots and minimum frontage 
have been sustained in other jurisdictions. Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 
Mass. s6o, 42 N. E. 2d 516 (1942); Greenway Homes v. Borough of River 
Edge, 137 N.J. L. 453, 6o A. 2d 8u (Sup. Ct. 1948). 
7 People v. Oyama, 29 Cal. 2d 164, 173 P. 2d 794 (1946); Cockrill v. 
People of State of California, 268 U. S. 258 (1925); State v. Hirabayashi, 
133 Wash. 462, 233 Pac. 948 (1925), aff'd White River Gardens, Inc. v. 
State, 277 U. S. 572 (1928). The rationalization of these decisions is that 
aliens ineligible for United States citizenship (Chinese and Japanese are 
primarily concerned) are so unlikely to practice good husbandry that the 
legislature, acting for the preservation of agricultural lands, may deny to 
such persons the privilege of owning or leasing farm land and may deny 
to owners of land the privilege of conveying or leasing to such ineligible 
aliens. In Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197 (1923), the United States 
Supreme Court held that it was not a denial of equal protection of the laws 
for a state to adopt a classification, which Congress has set up to determine 
who may become a citizen, for the purpose of ascertaining who may not 
acquire title to land. Recently, however, there has been a change of judicial 
opinion as to the validity of such legislation. In Oyama v. State of California, 
332 U. S. 633 (1948), the United States Supreme Court raised conjecture 
whether it will continue to follow Terrace v. Thompson. In two states the 
alien land laws have been declared to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Fujii v. State, 242 P. 2d 617 (Cal. 1952); Kenji Namba v. McCourt, 
r85 Ore. 579, 204 P. 2d 569 (1949). 
California was the first state to bar ineligible aliens from owning or leasing 
agricultural lands. Following the lead of California a number of states 
adopted legislation restricting the ownership of land by "ineligible aliens": 
Ariz., La., N. M., Idaho, Mont., Ore., Kan., and Utah. McGovney, The 
Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California and Ten Other States, 35 Calif. L. 
Rev. 7 (1947). An excellent review of such legislation is given in a Comment, 
The Alien Land Laws: A Reappraisal, 56 Yale L. Rev. 1017 (1947). Gen-
erally on the subject of restrictions on the capacity of aliens to acquire land 
interests, see r Powell, Real Property, ~ 101 et seq. 
8 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
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tions. Statutes authorizing the appointment of a guardian 
for persons who have been shown to the satisfaction of a 
court to be incapable of managing their own affairs (whether 
because of senility, alcoholism, idiocy, or other cause) have 
been declared not to deprive the incompetent of his property 
without due process.9 It has been held that where the power 
of alienation has been conferred upon minors, the power may 
be taken away again at any time by a statute changing the 
age of majority, provided that such modification is reasonable 
and that rights of others have not intervened as a conse-
quence of the exercise of the power invested in the minor 
while such power was in existence.10 An Oklahoma case, 
however, holds that a minor's power to convey is a vested 
right which once conferred cannot be taken away by the 
legisla ture.11 
9 Shapter v. Pillar, 28 Colo. 209, 63 Pac. 302 (Igoo); Kutzner v. Meyers, 
I82 Ind. 669, 108 N. E. II5 (I9I5); Flewwellin v. Jeter, I38 Fla. 540, 
I89 So. 65I (I939). 
lO Coleman v. Coleman, 5 I Ohio App. 22 I, 200 N. E. I97 ( I935). The 
court set aside deeds which the plaintiffs made when they were over I 8 but 
less than 21. The deeds were executed after the statute changing the age of 
majority of women from I8 to 2I. 
In a number of states the disabilities of infancy are by statute removed in 
whole or in part with respect to married infants. 1 Powell, Real Property, 
~ I22. 
11 Crump v. Guyer, 6o Okla. 222, I57 Pac. 32I (Igi6). Irene Steward 
inherited a tract of land while she was a minor. In 1908 she married. Laws 
1897, c. 8, § I, provided that all persons who have been legally married of 
whatever age may convey or make any contract relating to real estate or any 
interest therein. Acting under the authority of this act, she, as a married 
woman, although a minor, conveyed this land in 1909 to plaintiff in error, 
but Sess. Laws xgog, p. I 66, had at that time become operative, and that act 
limited the real estate that a married minor might convey to real estate 
"acquired after marriage." Irene subsequently hired the plaintiffs as attorneys 
to recover the land. She did not offer to return the purchase money; she 
said she didn't have it. Thereafter Irene settled with the plaintiff in error for 
a nominal sum and dismissed the action. This was without the consent of the 
plaintiffs, her attorneys. They then sought to enforce a lien on the land for 
the amount of the fees which they were promised by Irene. Their ability to 
recover depended upon whether Irene could have recovered the land. Held: 
Irene's power to sell and convey was a vested right which the legislature 
could not take away; hence all her interest in the land passed to the plaintiff 
in error and she could not have recovered. 
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On the ground that the legislature cannot impair the 
power of alienation, the courts have held that statutes 
enhancing the marital interests of spouses in each other's 
property cannot be applied in case of land acquired by a 
spouse before the effective date of the act 12 and even that 
such legislation cannot be applied to marriages contracted 
prior to its passage.13 It has been said to be immaterial that 
the interest given the nonowning spouse during coverture 
is inchoate and is not to be presently enjoyed. It is enough 
that after the statute the owning spouse's opportunities for 
conveying without the other spouse's consent are fractionally 
diminished by the prospect facing any purchaser that if his 
grantor fails to outlive the other spouse, the share which 
that spouse will be able to claim in the conveyed property 
will be greater than it previously would have been.14 There 
must be all the more a taking of property without due proc-
ess, if, before the statute, the owning spouse could convey 
absolutely free of any marital right.15 
12 Gerhardt v. Sullivan, I07 N. J. Eq. 374, I 52 Atl. 663 (Ch. I930); 
Sutton v. Askew, 66 N. C. I72 (I872); Harris v. Whiteley, 98 Md. 430, 
56 Atl. 823 ( I 9o4). 
The trend of legislation has been to free both spouses from restrictions for 
the protection of each other's expectations. I Powell, Real Property, ~ I 1 9· 
13Wesson v. Johnson, 66 N.C. 189 (1872). 
14 The New Jersey legislature by amendment to the Dower Act, in 1927, 
increased dower from a life estate in one-third to a life estate in one-half 
of the lands of which the husband is seized during coverture. Laws 1927, 
c. 68; N. J. Rev. Stat. 193 7, 3:3 7-1. It was held in Gerhardt v. Sullivan, 
107 N. J. Eq. 374, I52 Atl. 663 (Ch. I93o) that the amendment could 
apply only to land acquired by the husband after the effective date of the act. 
"That the amendment takes from the husband and gives to the wife an 
additional present and valuable interest in his land permits of no debate. 
That the inchoate dower during coverture is a mere right without enjoyment 
is beside the point. The right taken from the husband is of such a substantial 
nature as to preclude him, during coverture, from conveying the estate he 
had before the enactment. If the legislature has the power to increase the 
inchoate right by fractions it has the authority to increase it so that when 
consummate it will develop into a fee and altogether deprive the husband 
of his right of alienation." (xo7 N. J. Eq. 374, 378, 152 Atl. 663, 665.) 
15 The New Jersey Curtesy Act of 1927, while diminishing the extent of 
curtesy from a life estate in the whole of the wife's land to a life estate in 
one-half of her lands, also gave to the husband a present interest to a degree 
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A dissenting judge in one case involving a statutory 
enlargement of dower saw in the act a proper exercise of 
the legislative function to enact general municipal regula-
tions, carrying out the moral obligations of the marriage, 
and making suitable provision for the support and comfort 
of the widow after her husband's death, which would justify 
the impairment of the husband's jus disponendi.16 This 
appears to be a sensible opinion and may very well find 
acceptance in future cases. The decided cases, after all, are 
he did not have before and imposed an additional burden upon the wife's land 
by removing the common-law requirement of issue born alive. Laws I 927, 
c. 7I; as amended, N.J. Rev. Stat. I937, 3:37-2. It was held that the 
Curtesy Act could operate only on land acquired after its passage, since to 
make it applicable to land previously acquired would be contrary to con-
stitutional inhibition. Stabel v. Gertel, I I N. J. Misc. 247, I65 Atl. 876 
(Sup. Ct. I933), aff'd II I N. J. L. 296, I68 Atl. 645 (Err. and App.); 
Brasko v. Duchek, I27 N.J. Eq. 567, I4 A. 2d 477 (Prerog. I940). 
N. C. Acts I868-69, c. 93, sec. p, restored to widows their common-
law right of dower. Under the pre-existing law the husband was free to 
sell his land without his wife having any claim or interest therein; a widow 
was entitled to dower only in the land of which her husband died seized 
and possessed. In Sutton v. Askew, 66 N. C. I72 (I872), it was held that 
to apply the Act of I868-69 to land acquired before the act would deprive 
the owner of vested rights. Sutton v. Askew was approved in Jenkins v. 
Jenkins, 82 N. C. 208 (I88o) and in Bruce v. Strickland, 8I N. C. 267 
(I879). In Fortune v. Watkins, 94 N. C. 304 (I886), it was held that 
where a vendee made a contract to buy land, bearing date before the passage 
of the Dower Act, but the deed was not made until after the passage, 
the vendor's wife was not entitled to dower in such land. Accord, Outlaw 
v. Barnes, 108 S.C. 45I, 94 S. E. 868 (I9I7). 
Md. Laws I898, c. 457 provided: "Every husband shall acquire by virtue 
of his marriage an estate for his life in one-third of the lands held or owned by 
his wife at any time during the marriage, whether by legal or equitable 
title, or whether held by her at the time of her death or not . . ." Prior 
to this statute the husband had only an expectant or inchoate life interest 
in his wife's land, which would become consummate only in case she died 
intestate and he survived her. It was held in Harris v. Whiteley, 98 Md. 
430, 56 Atl. 823 ( I904), that the Act of I 898 could not be given a 
retroactive operation because to do so would cause it to divest vested rights; 
that to convert the inchoate interest of the husband into a present vested life 
estate subject to claims of his creditors would be an interference with or 
impairment of the vested right of property acquired by the wife in her real 
estate· prior to the date of the passage of the statute. The question in the 
case was whether the husband had such an interest in the real estate of his wife 
as could be attached or reached by creditors. 
16Dick, J., in Sutton v. Askew, 66 N.C. 172 (1872), supra note 15. 
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for the most part old and reflect a nineteenth century point 
of view. 
If the owning spouse has already exercised his or her jus 
disponendi prior to the statute enlarging the marital estate, 
then it is quite apparent that the statute cannot be given 
effect as to the conveyed land for this would be a taking of 
the property of the grantee (or mortgagee) .17 
17 The cases cited in this note are old, but there is no reason to believe that 
the same result would not be reached today. 
It has been held that a statute purporting to increase the interest of 
the wife cannot be applied to a prior conveyance of the husband in which the 
wife did not join so as to affect the interest of the grantee. Morrison v. Rice, 
35 Minn. 436, 29 N. W. 168 (x886) (dower abolished and widow given one-
third in fee); Strong v. Clem, 12 Ind. 37 (1859) (dower abolished and 
widow given one-third in fee). That it would impair the obligation of 
the grantee's deed. Young v. Wolcott, 1 Iowa 174 (1855) (widow given 
one-third in fee instead of a life estate). That it would deprive the grantee 
of natural rights. Davis v. O'Ferrall, 4 G. Greene 168 (Iowa 1853) (dower 
abolished and widow given one-third in fee). 
In McCafferty v. McCafferty, 8 Black£. 218 (Ind. 1 846), it was held that 
a title procured from the husband could not be affected by a subsequently 
enacted statute which provided that whenever a divorce shall be decreed on 
account of the misconduct of the husband, the wife shall be entitled to dower 
in his lands the same as if he were dead. Ind. Rev. Stat. 1843, p. 6o4. To 
apply the statute, it was held, would destroy vested rights and impair the 
obligation of a contract. 
In Wiseman v. Beckwith, go Ind. 18 5 ( 18 8 3), a contract of purchase was 
made with Mr. Wiseman before, and the conveyance was made after, a 
statute which abolished common-law dower and gave the widow one-third 
in fee of the land of which her husband was seized during coverture. Mrs. 
vViseman did not join in the conveyance. Held: The statute could not enlarge 
Mrs. Wiseman's inchoate interest in the conveyed property. By the contract 
of purchase Wiseman was bound to transfer to the purchaser all his interest 
in the land. Any subsequent legislation which attempted to take from Wiseman 
the title which he had at the time of the contract and give it to another, 
thereby disabling him from performing the contract, impaired its obligation; 
for the law existing at the time of the making of a contract silently enters into 
it and constitutes one of the terms and by this law the measure of the 
obligation is determined. 
Also, it has been held that a subsequently enacted statute cannot diminish 
the interest of a judgment purchaser. Taylor v. Sample, 51 Ind. 423 (1875) 
(dower abolished and widow given one-third in fee). Or diminish the 
interest of ,an adverse possessor who has acquired by disseisin the same 
title which he would have acquired by a conveyance from the husband without 
the wife joining. Bowen v. Preston, 48 Ind. 367 (1874). 
It appears, however, that the husband's grantee would not be deprived 
of any constitutional rights by the repeal before the death of the husband 
of a statute under which the wife's dowable capacity is temporarily suspended. 
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The power and privilege of disposing of one's property at 
death, unlike the power of making an inter vivos transfer of 
title, has never been deemed to be a vested interest.18 Thus 
husband and wife may be deprived of the privilege of dis-
inheriting each other. If the inter vivos power of disposition 
is unaffected, there can be no doubt that a statute enlarging 
the share which the surviving spouse shall take as heir may 
be applied to previously acquired property.19 
Heirs apparent and presumptive of the owning spouse do 
not have an interest in his land sufficient to prevent the 
giving of effect to a statute which enlarges the marital inter-
est of the other spouse, even though the land was acquired 
previous to the statute.20 Of course such statute must be in 
effect before the death of the owning spouse, since the inter-
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 24 Wend. I93 (N. Y. I84o). This was an action 
of ejectment for dower. Plaintiff was married to Reynolds in I8oo. They 
lived together until I 8oz, when plaintiff left her husband because of his 
misconduct. Shortly after plaintiff left Reynolds, he took the defendant into 
his house and lived with her as his wife. In I So 5 plaintiff supposing herself 
absolved from the marriage contract married another and continued to live 
with him as his wife until his death. She and Reynolds were never divorced. 
Defendant maintained that plaintiff, having lived in adultery, was not 
entitled to dower. Laws I 7 8 7, c. IV, sec. VII provided in effect that if a 
wife willingly leave her husband and go away and continue to live with her 
adulterer, she shall be barred of an action to demand dower; except that 
if her husband willingly become reconciled with her and allow her to live 
with him, in which case she shall be restored to her action. This statute was 
repealed seven years before Reynolds' death. Defendant contended that plain-
tiff's right to dower was forfeited prior to the repeal. Held: Plaintiff was 
entitled to dower. While her husband lived the plaintiff had no interest in 
the land, no right of action which could be forfeited. Her misconduct vested 
no new interest or title in any third persons and consequently none was taken 
away by the repeal statute. 
A statute enlarging the marital estate cannot be so applied as to impair 
substantially the remedy of existing creditors .of the owning spouse. Hoskins 
v. Hutchings, 37 Ind. 324 (I87I) (mortgagee); Parkham v. Vandeventer, 
82 Ind. 544 (I882) (mortgagee); Davidson v. Richardson, so Ore. 323, 91 
Pac. 1080 (1907) (judgment creditor); Patton v. City of Asheville, 109 
N. C. 685, I4 S. E. 92 (1891) (unsecured creditor). See also the cases 
cited infra note 3 I. 
18 See infra this Chapter, p. 90, et seq. 
19 Stabel v. Gertel, 11 N. J. Misc. :47, 165 Atl. 876 (Sup. Ct. I•H3), 
aff'd III N.J. L. 296, 168 Atl. 645 (Err. and App. 1933). 
20Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37 (1857). See discussion infra p. 111 et seq. 
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est of an heir vests at the moment of the death of the 
ancestor. 21 
The courts have disagreed as to whether the legislature 
may retroactively curtail the power of one spouse to alienate 
a homestead without the concurrence of the other spouse.22 
In Gladney v. Sydnor 23 the Supreme Court of Missouri 
ruled, on the ground that the Missouri Constitution pro-
hibits retroactive legislation which impairs vested rights,24 
that a statute restricting the power of the husband to sell 
or encumber the homestead without his wife's joinder 25 
could not be applied where the homestead had been acquired 
prior to the statute. 
"To us it seems as one of the highest privileges and dearest 
rights that can be bestowed upon the citizen. The law that 
creates the right to deal with your property without being 
compelled to have someone unite with you in the convey-
ance truly confers an inestimable privilege." 26 
21Rowlett v. Moore, 252 Ill. 436,96 N. E. 835 (I9II); Greenough v. 
Greenough, II Pa. 489 (I849); Remington v. Bank, 76 Md. 546, 25 Atl. 
666 (I893). See discussion infra p. 116. 
22 The statutes now in force almost universally provide that the sale or 
mortgage of a homestead may not be accomplished unless both spouses join 
in the instrument. I Powell, Real Property, ~ 121. If either spouse could 
alienate or mortgage without the other's consent, the purpose of the statutes, 
which is to preserve a home for the family, would be largely defeated. 
23172 Mo. 3I8, 72 S. W. 554 (I903). This was a suit brought by husband 
and wife to enjoin a sale under a deed of trust executed by the husband 
alone and to have the deed of trust cancelled. 
24Const. I875, Art. 2, sec. I5: "That no ex post facto law, nor law im-
pairing the obligation of contracts, or retrospective in its operation, or making 
any irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, can be passed by 
the General Assembly." Now with modifications, Const. I945, Art. I, sec. q. 
See supra Chapter 2, p. I3, for a discussion of the significance of this provision. 
25 Mo. Laws I895, p. I85: "The husband shall be debarred from and 
incapable of selling, mortgaging, or alienating the homestead in any manner 
whatever, and every such sale, mortgage, or alienation is hereby declared 
null and void." Now, Mo. Rev. Stat. I949> sec. 5I3-475· 
26 I72 Mo. 3I8, 327, 72 S. W. 554, 557· 
The diminution in the power of the husband to alienate was in fact not very 
extensive. Prior to Laws I895, only where the wife had not filed her claim 
could the husband sell or encumber the homestead (subject to the wife's 
inchoate dower) without the wife joining with him. Rev. Stat. I889, sec. 
5435· After Laws 1895, the joinder of the wife was necessary without any 
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But Gladney v. Sydnor was overruled by Bushnell v. 
Loomis.21 
"We think that the Gladney Case is wrong for a further and 
better reason than the mere voluntary surrender of an abso-
lute right as discussed by the North Carolina court. To our 
mind the State has the right to pass exemption laws limiting 
the right of alienation. If no other source of power could 
be found the police power of the State would justify a rea-
sonable interference with a so-called absolute right. Govern-
ments cannot be maintained without some limitations upon 
absolute rights. The general welfare of the State and of 
its citizens demand at times the cutting off of a portion of 
the so-called absolute rights of the individual. Homestead 
exemptions are granted in the interest of the general welfare 
of our citizens. In such welfare the State has an interest. 
Public policy is opposed to pauperized widows and children. 
need for her to file a claim. Yet it was declared that the husband's power 
was a vested interest, even though in the particular case the husband did not 
avail himself of the power until after Laws I895· "Vested rights may be 
created, either by the common law, by statute, or by contract. And it makes 
no difference as to the method of their creation; they are entitled to the 
same protection." (I72 Mo. p8, p6, 72 S. W. 554, 556.) 
A rather recent Oklahoma case, Barnett v. Sanders, 12 I Okla. I4, 247 
Pac. 55 (1926), follows Gladney v. Sydnor. However this was a situation 
in which a grantor was seeking to recover land he had conveyed. The 
plaintiff's argument was that the deed was void because the land conveyed 
consisted of a homestead and his wife had .not joined him in the deed. 
The sympathy of the court was no doubt with the grantee. Moreover, there 
was considerable evidence that the homestead had been abandoned at the 
time of the conveyance. This was one case in which the owner of a "vested 
right" did not want it to be declared vested. 
27 234 Mo. 371, I37 S. W. 257 (I9I1). The plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. 
Bushnell, sought to have a deed of trust annulled. There was evidence 
that the wife's signature had been obtained by duress. It was necessary to 
determine whether Laws I895 debarred the husband from alienating the 
homestead without the wife joining. The land in question was acquired by 
Mr. Bushnell in I869 and he married his coplaintiff in 187I. From the date of 
the marriage up to the date of the deed of trust, August 26, I905, the land 
in question had been used as a homestead. Held: The wife's signature was 
necessary. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court with reasoning similar to that of the 
Bushnell case sustained, as applied to a homestead previously acquired, a 
statute which took away the power given the husband under the earlier statute 
to sell the homestead without his wife's consent. Massey v. Womble, 69 
Miss. 347, II So. I88 (I89I). 
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Pursuant to such public policy the State withdraws from 
creditors certain portions of the debtor's property-this upon 
the theory that such laws better promote the welfare of all. 
Of course such laws do not benefit the creditor, but they do 
subserve a good purpose and tend to promote the general 
welfare of our citizenship as a whole. The whole tenor and 
spirit of free governments endorse such laws." 28 
"To foster such beneficent purpose the State can within 
reasonable grounds curtail some of the rights of the individ-
ual. We know of no constitutional inhibition to the exercise 
of this power by the State, when exercised for the general 
welfare of its citizenship." 29 
The reasoning of the North Carolina court referred to in 
Bushnell v. Loomis is that when the owner of land has his 
homestead allotted as provided in the statute he must be 
deemed to have made a voluntary surrender of his absolute 
power of alienation.30 
28 234 Mo. 371, 391, 137 S. W. 257, 262. 
29 234 Mo. 371, 392, 137 S. W. 257, 263. 
30 It was held in Castlebury v. Maynard, 95 N. C. 281 (1886) that as 
soon as the homestead is allotted to the husband on his petition, there is a 
dedication by him of the land to all the uses, privileges, and restrictions of a 
homestead, no matter when the land was acquired; consequently inhibition 
attaches to the land and the husband cannot convey it without the wife 
joining in the deed. This was an action on a promissory note given in 
payment for certain land. The defendant set up as a defense that the homestead 
was still a charge on the land and that the plaintiff could not therefore give 
a good title. The plaintiff was married in 1844. He acquired the land prior 
to the adoption of Const. 1868, Art. X, sec. 8, which provided that no deed 
made by the owner of a homestead shall be valid without the voluntary 
signature of the wife. The land in question was allotted to plaintiff as his 
homestead in 1869. Held: Defendant's defense is good. Accord, Gaar, Scott 
& Co. v. Collins, 15 N.D. 622, 110 N. W. 81 (1907). 
The North Carolina court would perhaps not have gone along with the 
Missouri court on the broad ground on which the Bushnell case was decided. 
In Gilmore v. Bright, 101 N.C. 382, 7 S. E. 751 (1881) it was held that 
an owner might surrender his power of alienation by having the land allotted 
and set apart as a homestead, or by acquiescing in such an allotment, but 
that to apply a homestead law requiring the signature of the wife to a 
conveyance of the homestead where the marriage and acquisition of the land 
were prior to the statute would violate the contracts clause of the federal 
Constitution. 
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Another class of persons who also may have reason to 
object to a modification of the homestead statute are the 
creditors of the owner. It is universally held that a home-
stead statute which substantially impairs the remedy of a 
creditor, whose debt was contracted prior to the statute, by 
withdrawing the property of the debtor from his reach is in 
conflict with the contracts clause of the federal Constitu-
tion.31 On the other hand, heirs and devisees of the deceased 
31 Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595 (1877); Wilson v. Brown, 58 Ala. 
62 (r877); Daniel v. Thigpen, 194 La. 522, 194 So. 6 (1940); Lessley 
v. Phipps, 49 Miss. 790 (1874); Gheen v. Summey, 8o N. C. 187 (1879). 
"The remedy subsisting in a State when and where a contract is made and 
is to be performed is a part of its obligation, and any subsequent law of the 
State which so affects that remedy as substantially to impair and lessen the 
value of the contract is forbidden by the Constitution, and is therefore, void." 
Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 607 (1877). 
The legislature cannot deprive a mortgagee or judgment creditor of his 
lien on the homestead premises after the right is perfected. Kener v. La Grange 
Mills, 231 U.S. 215 (1913); Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595 (1877); 
Van Sandt v. Alvis, 109 Cal. 165 (1895); Herrington v. Godbee, 157 Ga. 
343, 121 S. E. 312 (1924); Board of Com'rs, etc. v. Speding, 8 So. 2d 380 
(La. 1942); Dunn v. Stevens, 62 Minn. 38o, 64 N. W. 924 (I895). 
The obligation of the contract is not impaired, however, if there still 
remains a substantial and reasonable mode of enforcing it. Edwards v. 
Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595 (I877). 
The dictum of Taney, C. J., in Bronson v. Kinzie, I How. 3 I I (U. S. 
I 843) led a number of courts to hold that homestead statutes, retroactive 
in effect and withdrawing the property from the reach of creditors whose 
debts were contracted before the passage of the statutes, are not in conflict 
with the contracts clause, on the ground that the remedy only and not the 
obligation is affected. Cusic v. Douglas, 3 Kan. 123 (1865); In re Kennedy, 
z S. C. zr6 (r87o); Hardeman v. Downer, 39 Ga. 42.5 (I869). The 
Supreme Court of the United States laid down the rule which is now univer-
sally followed in Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 6ro (U. S. 187z). Taney's 
statement is as follows: "For undoubtedly, a state may regulate at pleasure 
the modes of proceeding in its courts in relation to past contracts as well as 
future. It may, for example, shorten the period of time within which claims 
shall be barred by the statute of limitations. It may, if it thinks proper, 
direct that necessary implements of agriculture or the tools of the mechanic, 
or articles of necessity in household furniture shall, like wearing apparel, 
not be liable to execution on judgments. Regulations of this description 
have always been considered in every civilized community as properly 
belonging to the remedy, to be exercised or not by every sovereignty, according 
to its own views of policy and humanity. It must reside in every state to 
enable it to secure its own citizens from unjust and harassing litigation, and 
to protect them in those pursuits which are necessary to the existence and 
well-being of every community. And, although a new remedy may be 
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owner are not deprived of property without due process by 
a modification of the homestead statute in the lifetime of 
their ancestor which makes the interest which they received 
from him less beneficial to them than it would have been 
under the previous law.32 Heirs and devisees take property 
subject to the burdens which the legislature has seen fit to 
impose on it. The owner's power of testamentary disposi-
tion may be curtailed by a homestead statute enacted in his 
lifetime.33 
Serious constitutional questions in respect to the extent 
to which the legislature may increase the interest of the 
nonowning spouse in the owning spouse's property arose 
when several states, which had heretofore known only the 
common-law marital estates or statutory estates evolved 
from the common law, enacted community property laws 
in the 1930's and '40's. The motivation was the possibility 
of federal income tax savings for married persons.34 These 
deemed less convenient than the old one, and may in some degree render the 
recovery of debts more tardy and difficult, yet it will not follow that the 
law is unconstitutional. Whatever belongs merely to the remedy may be 
altered according to the will of the state, provided the alteration does not 
impair the obligation of the contract. But if that effect is produced, it is 
immaterial whether it is done by acting on the remedy or directly on the 
contract itself. In either case it is protected by the Constitution." ( 1 How. 
3II, JI5 (U. 8. 1843).) 
32 Brettun v. Fox, Ioo Mass. 234 (I868); Estate of Bump, 152 Cal. 
274, 92 Pac. 643 ( I907). As to the rights of heirs and devisees in general, 
see infra this Chapter, p. I I I et seq. 
33 Brettun v. Fox, Ioo Mass. 234 (I868). This was a petition by a widow 
to have an estate of homestead set off to her in a dwelling house. Defendant 
was an assignee of a devisee. The homestead statute under which the widow 
claimed a privilege to remain in possession during her lifetime was enacted 
after the marriage. The house was owned by the husband prior to marriage. 
Held for petitioner. "The power to dispose of property by will is neither 
a natural nor a constitutional right but depends wholly upon statute, and may 
be conferred, taken away, or limited and regulated, in whole or in part, by the 
legislature. . . ;" (Ibid. at 2 35). 
As to the power of the legislature to curtail the owner's power of testa-
mentary disposition, see infra this Chapter, p. 96 et seq. 
34 The desire to adopt the community system was induced by the decision 
in Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101 (1930), in which it was held that a 
husband and wife, domiciled in a community property state, where both had 
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community property statutes would have been on firm con-
stitutional ground if it had been optional with married 
couples whether they would come under the statutes, but 
an elective provision was held by the Supreme Court of the 
United States to make a community property statute ineffec-
tive for federal tax purposes.35 In order for a community 
property statute to accomplish fully its purpose of reducing 
the tax burden of married persons, it had to apply to income 
accruing to the spouses from property which each had owned 
as separate property prior to the date of the statute. But 
thus applied a statute could not stand the test of constitu-
tionality for under the community property concept income 
acquired by either spouse would become the property of 
both. 
In Willcox v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co.36 the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Community 
equal vested interests from the moment the community property was acquired, 
could file separate tax returns in which each could return one-half of the 
community income. Five states enacted community property statutes after the 
Poe decision: Mich., Neb., Okla., Ore., and Pa. 
35 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Harmon, 323 U. S. 44 and 817 
(1944). It was held that a husband and wife who elected to have the optional 
Oklahoma community property statute apply to them were not entitled to 
divide the community income equally between them for the purpose of federal 
income tax. "The important fact is that the community system of Oklahoma 
is not a system, dictated by State policy, as an incident of matrimony." (323 
u.s. 44> 48 (1944).) 
The optional community property act, Sess. Laws 1939, Art. z, c. 62, 
had been held by the Oklahoma Supreme Court not to be in conflict with any 
provision of the Oklahoma Constitution. Harmon v. Oklahoma Tax Com-
mission, 189 Okla. 475, II8 P. 2d 205 (1941). After the Supreme Court 
of the United States rendered its decision, Oklahoma repealed its optional 
statute and enacted a compulsory community property law. In 1947, Ore., 
Neb., Mich. and Pa. enacted compulsory systems. 1947 Annual Surv. Am. L., 
p. 864. 
36 357 Pa. 581, 55 A. zd 521 (1947). In 1934 a policy of life insurance 
was issued to one Lewis, with the privilege on his part of changing the 
beneficiary. He was married at that time to Mary Lewis and this marriage 
was still in effect when this suit was brought. After the Community Property 
Law went into effect on September 1, 1947, Lewis paid a premium on the 
policy. Part of the money for the premium came from dividends on stock 
which Lewis had owned since 1943, and part was obtained by Lewis on 
September 30, 1947, as life tenant of a trust created many years previously 
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Property Law,37 when applied to the income of a husband 
from property which he had owned previous to the effective 
date of the statute, deprived him of property without due 
process. (It is beyond the power of the legislature to take 
the husband's property and give it to the wife.) 88 
In support of its decision, the Pennsylvania court might 
have cited several cases wherein courts had to decide whether 
separate property acquired by either spouse in a common-law 
state is converted to common property by the act of bringing 
it into a community property state and establishing a domi-
cile there. The California Supreme Court has held that 
such a conversion would be a taking of property in violation 
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.39 
under the will of his grandfather. Lewis then assigned the policy to Willcox 
without consideration. Willcox applied to the insurance company for the 
issuance of a paid-up policy based on the cash surrender value of the assigned 
policy. The company refused the request on the ground that since part of 
the previous premium consisted of community property, Mrs. Lewis had an 
interest therein and consequently her consent was needed. The suit was a 
friendly one to test the constitutionality of the statute. 
37 Pa. Act of I947> P. L. I423. 
38 And also that it violated the Pennsylvania Constitution which provides 
that "all men • • . have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among 
which are those . . . of acquiring, possessing and protecting prop-
erty . . ." Pa. Const., Art. I, sec. I. 
The court did not consider the validity of the statute so far as it applied 
to income from property acquired subsequent to the enactment or as it applied 
to salaried income arising after the statute went into effect. Since the object 
of the statute was to reduce the tax burden, which purpose was thwarted by 
the invalidity of the portion of the statute in issue, the court concluded that 
the entire statute was unconstitutional. 
In addition to the constitutional objections, the court found that the 
Community Property Law was inoperative and impossible of execution by 
reason of its inconsistent failure to give to the wife any real interest in the 
community property under the husband's management and control, although 
it purported to give her a vested interest therein. The statute gave to the 
husband (similarly to the wife) the management and control of the com-
munity property of which he (or she) would have remained the unrestricted 
and exclusive owner as theretofore had the Community Property Law not 
been enacted. Apparently the legislature had feared judicial lightning would 
strike; or perhaps it wanted to give the taxpayers the benefits of the community 
property system without any of the burdens. 
89 Thornton's Estate, I Cal. zd I, 3 3 P. zd I (I 9 34). The personal property 
involved was acquired while the husband and wife were domiciled in Montana, 
and under the laws of that state it was the husband's separate property, subject 
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Likewise in Washington it has been held that personalty 
which is the separate property of one of the spouses will 
only to the wife's dower rights. The husband returned to California in 1919, 
bringing the property with him, and was there domiciled until his death in 
1929. His widow petitioned for distribution of one-half of his estate to 
her on the theory that the property was converted into community property 
when it was brought into this state. Sec. 164 of the Civil Code as amended 
in 1923 (Stats. 1923, p. 746) provided: "All other property acquired after 
marriage by either husband or wife, or both, including real property situated 
in this state, and personal property wherever situated, heretofore or hereafter 
acquired while domiciled elsewhere, which would not have been the separate 
property of either if acquired while domiciled in this state, is community 
property • . ." [Substantially the same provision was in effect when the 
property was brought into the state. See succeeding paragraph.] Sec. 164 
was held to be unconstitutional. The court refused to accept the doctrine that 
a change of domicile to this state, accompanied by an importation of per-
sonalty is an implied consent to a submission to requirements of the statute, 
on the ground that this would be nothing but a subterfuge to get around the 
constitution. Beside the due process aspect of the statute, the court found 
that there would be an abridgement of the privileges and immunities of the 
citizen. Langdon, J., dissenting, expressed agreement with the proposition 
that absolutely owned property brought into the state by the husband cannot 
be taken from him but that this was not the issue in this case. The husband 
here was dead and could have no property rights. The real issue was whether 
California may require that, upon the death of a decedent, certain property 
owned by him and brought into this state shall be subject to the same rules 
of testamentary disposition and succession as community property acquired 
in this state. In Langdon's opinion there was no doubt that it can. 
Prior to 1917 the Supreme Court of California had repeatedly held that 
separate property acquired by either spouse in a common-law state is not 
converted into community property by the mere act of bringing it into 
a community property state and establishing domicile therein. Kraemer v. 
Kraemer, 52 Cal. 302 (1877); Estate of Burrows, 136 Cal. 113, 68 Pac. 
488 (1902); In re Estate of Niccolls, 164 Cal. 368, 129 Pac. 278 (1912). 
In 1 9 1 7 the legislature adopted the following statute: "All other property 
acquired after marriage by either husband or wife, or both, including real 
property situated in this state, and personal property wherever situated, acquired 
while domiciled elsewhere, which would not have been the separate property 
of either if acquired while domiciled in this state, is community prop-
erty ... " (Stats. 1917, p. 827.) It was held in In re Frees' Estate, 187 
Cal. 150, 201 Pac. 112 (1921) that this statute was inapplicable to personal 
property acquired in a common-law state while the couple were domiciled 
there and brought to California prior to the taking effect of the statute. 
Following this decision, the legislature amended the Statute of 1917 by 
inserting the words "heretofore or hereafter" before the words "acquired while 
domiciled elsewhere" in an apparent attempt to give retroactive effect to the 
statute. (Stats. 1923, p. 746.) It has been held in a number of cases that 
the amendment of 1923, if applicable to personal property brought into the 
state prior to the date of the amendment, would deprive the owning spouse 
of his or her property without due process. In re Drishaus' Estate, 199 Cal. 
369, 249 Pac. 515 (1926); In re Bruggemeyer's Estate, 115 Cal. App. 525, 
2 P. zd 534 (1931). 
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continue to be his or her property when brought into the 
state, as will real estate purchased there with it, notwith-
standing the terminology of the community property stat-
ute, since a contrary construction would destroy vested 
rights.40 
The problem considered in Willcox v. Penn Mutual Life 
Insurance Co. is not likely to recur. The rash of community 
property statutes subsided after the Willcox case and after 
Congress did away with the need for state legislation by 
extending the "income-splitting" privilege to spouses in 
noncommunity property states.41 The states which adopted 
community property statutes repealed them.42 The prob-
lems which arose as a result of the repeal of community 
property statutes will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
ADVERSE POSSESSION-STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS 
An interest in land may be acquired by adverse use or 
possession for the period of the statute of limitations.43 It 
40 Brookman v. Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 90 Pac. 914, 915 (1907): "If 
it were the intent of the statute that property acquired in another jurisdiction 
and brought within the state should become community property, its legality 
might be seriously questioned. It would destroy vested rights. It would take 
from one of the spouses property over which he or she had sole and absolute 
dominion and ownership, and vest an interest therein in the other; and, if the 
spouse should be the wife, it would not only take away her absolute title, 
but would take away from her her right to control and manage the property, 
and make it subject to the separate debts of the husband, whether or not 
she derived any benefit from their contracting, or had any legal or moral 
obligation to pay them." A statute then in effect provided: "The husband 
shall have the management and control of community personal property, 
with a like power of disposition as he has of his separate personal property, 
except he shall not devise by will more than one-half thereof." Ballinger's 
Ann. Code, sec. 4490. 
41 62 Stat. 114, c. 168, sec. 301; Int. Rev. Code, sec. 12 (d). 
42 Mich. Comp. Laws 1948, sees. 557.251-557·255; Ore. Laws 1949, c. 349; 
Okla. Laws 1949, Tit. 32; Neb. Laws 1949, c. 129. 
43 Infra p. 39· "The period of limitation varies greatly among the states. 
The period of 20 years . . . has been adopted . . . in a number of the 
states; while in a few the lapse of a greater period is required . . . ; and 
in some a much less period." 4 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 1133 (3d ed.). 
In a number of states there are what is known as "short limitations," con-
siderably reducing the period where the adverse possession is by one claiming 
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was suggested in an early case that a title acquired by adverse 
possession is not a constitutionally protected interest.44 But 
the law is well settled that after a cause of action to recover 
real (or personal) property has been barred by the running 
of the statute of limitations, the legislature cannot remove 
the bar without depriving the adverse claimant of his prop-
erty without due process or extinguishing his vested rights, 
because by operation of law the property has become his.45 
Whether the adverse claimant entered bona fide is of no 
importance. 
A singular distinction is made by many courts between 
property cases and nonproperty cases. There is much author-
ity that the legislature may raise the bar to tort actions and 
actions to recover debts without violating any constitutional 
under "color of title" or by one who is a purchaser at a judicial sale or a 
tax sale, or where the one in possession shall have paid all taxes and 
assessments levied on the land. A summary of American limitation statutes 
may be found in Taylor, "Titles to Land by Adverse Possession," 20 Iowa L. 
Rev. 551 (1935). 
44 Stuber's Road, 2 8 Pa. I 99 ( r 8 57). 
45 Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 62o (r885); Stewart v. Keyes, 295 
U.S. 403 (1934); Turner v. Gregory, 203 S. W. 615 (Tex. 1918); Terrill 
v. Hoyt, 149 Kan. sr, 87 P. 2d 238 (1939); Tennessee Coal, Iron & 
R. R. Co. v. McDowell, roo Tenn. 565, 47 S. W. 153 (r898). 
But the repeal of the statute after the original owner's remedy has been 
barred should under no circumstances be held to impair the obligation of a 
contract. The right of the adverse claimant is not founded on contract but 
derives its force from legislation, usages of government, or from custom. 
Stuber's Road, 28 Pa. 199 (r857). 
Nonpossessory interests may be acquired by adverse user, or, as it is 
commonly termed, by prescription. The concept of prescription antedates the 
appearance of statutes of limitations but with the passage of time the effect 
of the statutes has continuously increased. In this country the courts have 
usually followed the analogy of the statute of limitations applicable to actions 
for the recovery of land, with the effect that one who has exercised as of 
right a user in another's land for the statutory period, is regarded as having 
acquired a privilege of user to that extent, the length of the period of 
prescription changing as the statutory period is changed. 4 Tiffany, Real 
Property, sec. 1191 (3d ed.). Easements acquired in this manner are as 
fully protected under the constitutions as easements acquired by grant. 
Woolever v. Stewart, 36 Ohio St. 146 (r88o) (privilege to maintain dam 
without fish way) ; Attorney General v. Revere Copper Co., r 52 Mass. 444, 
25 N. E. 6os ( r89o) (privilege to control level of water in fish ponds); 
Christenson v. Wikan, 254 Wis. 141, 35 N. W. 2d 329 (1948) (right of way). 
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prohibitions.46 Now, if the defendant in a tort or contract 
action cannot claim an invasion of constitutional rights in 
the loss of a defense to an action against him, how can there 
be any meritorious quality in a property interest asserted to 
have been acquired by lapse of time? Of course, if a statute 
of limitations should explicitly provide that possession for 
the period would vest the adverse possessor with title, there 
would be apparent merit in the proposition that vested inter-
ests had been acquired. However, the typical statute of 
limitations purports merely to bar the owner's right to 
recover possession.47 Adverse possession for the period of 
limitation does not directly confer an interest upon the 
adverse claimant, but only indirectly by the limitation of 
the remedy of the rightful owner. The courts hav~ declared 
that a loss of title through the loss of the most essential 
attribute of ownership-the right to recover possession-
is a necessary logical consequence of the policy underlying 
the limitations statutes.48 
46 Campbell v. Holt, I I5 U. S. 62o; Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 
325 U.S. 304 (I945); Mulligan v. Hilton, 305 Mass. 5, 24 N. E. 2d 676 
(I940); Gallewski v. H. Hentz and Co., 30I N. Y. I64, 93 N. E. 2d 620 
(I950); Orman v. Van Arsdell, I2 N. M. 344, 78 Pac. 48 (I904); Mc-
Eldowney v. Wyatt, 44 W.Va. 71I, 30 S. E. 239 (I898). However, many 
state courts hold that even as to actions not involving title to property, the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and similar provisions in the 
state constitutions prevent the lifting of the bar which the statute of limitations 
imposes. State v. Standard Oil Co., 5 N. J. 28I, 74 A. 2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 
1950); Board of Education v. Blodgett, I55 Ill. 44I, 40 N. E. I025 (I895); 
Ireland v. Mackintosh, 22 Utah 296, 6I Pac. 90I (I9oo). See Annotation, 
Power of Legislature to revive a right of action barred by limitation, 36 
A. L. R. I3I6 (I925) and supp. Ann., I33 A. L. R. 384 (I94I). 
47 Walsh, Title by Adverse Possession, I6 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 532, 534 
(I 9 3 9). But it is almost invariably held that the effect of the statute is not 
only to bar the remedy of ejectment, but also to take away all other remedy, 
right, and title of the former owner. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water 
Power Co., 209 U. S. 447, 450 (I9o8); Steinberg v. Salzman, 139 Wis. I I8, 
I24, 120 N. W. Ioo5, Ioo8 ( I909); Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 
32 Harv. L. Rev. I35, I39 (19I8). See also note 54 infra. 
48 The theory by which an adverse possessor acquires title was explained 
by Ames as follows: True property or ownership consists of possession coupled 
with the unlimited right of possession, and when one person is dispossessed by 
another, only the right of possession remains vested in the former, and the 
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Statutes of limitations have been enacted for the public 
good, it is said, so that after the owner is allowed sufficient 
time in which to pursue and establish his claim, the title to 
property shall not remain forever doubtful and uncertain.49 
Since the matter is one of policy it would seem that within 
reasonable limits the legislature should be free, if it so 
desired, to raise the bar to the bringing of an action after 
the original period has expired. The judicial rationalization, 
however, is that after the lapse of the period, without asser-
tion of a right by the owner, claims .are presumed to have 
been released or title conveyed.50 Title is not transferred 
by the statute, but by a joint operation of the statute and the 
common law. The statute speaks of procedure, but the courts 
have shifted the emphasis to substantive law.51 In short, 
dispossessor has complete ownership except for this outstanding right of 
possession. "When the period of limitation has run, the statute, by forbidding 
the exercise of the right, virtually annihilates it, and the imperfect title 
thereupon becomes perfect." Ames, The Disseisin of Chattels, 3 Harv. L. Rev. 
313, 318 (189o). 
49 Knox v. Cleveland, 13 Wis. 245 ( 186o). 
50 "If one who is dispossessed be negligent for a long and unreasonable 
time, the law refuses afterwards to lend him any assistance to recover the 
possession merely, both to punish his neglect, and also because it is presumed 
that the supposed wrongdoer has in such a length of time procured a legal 
title, otherwise he would sooner have been sued. Statutes of limitation are 
passed which fix upon a reasonable time within which a party is permitted to 
bring suit for the recovery of his rights, and which, on failure to do so, 
establish a legal presumption against him that he has no rights in the premises. 
Such a statute is a statute of repose. Every government is under obligation 
to its citizens to afford them all needful legal remedies; but it is not bound 
to keep its courts open indefinitely for one who neglects or refuses to apply 
for redress until it may fairly be presumed that the means by which the 
other party might disprove his claim are lost in the lapse of time." Wilson 
v. Iseminger, 185 U. S. 55, 62 (1901), quoting Cooley, Constitutional 
Limitations, p. 447 (6th ed.). 
51 This is particularly evident in the requirement in many jurisdictions 
that the possession of the adverse claimant must be under claim of title. If 
acquisition of title by adverse possession were based entirely upon the theory 
that the true owner's action to recover the land is barred after the lapse of the 
statutory period, a claim of title by the adverse claimant would not be 
necessary. The thought is apparently that since adverse possession operates 
to confer title and not merely to bar stale claims, unless a possessor claims 
title there is no reason why title should be conferred upon him. 4 Tiffany, 
Real Property, sec. 1147 (3d ed.). 
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neglect on the part of the owner to assert his title and acqui-
escence in the adverse possession and claim of another is a 
recognized method by which he may lose his title and 
another gain it. It is a method which is legally as effective 
as a transfer by deed. 
An inarticulate premise in the historical development of 
the concept of acquisition of title by adverse possession was 
the encouragement of the development of unused land and 
the enhancement of productivity. But the fact of the dis-
appearance of unused land does not mean that the doctrine 
of acquisition of title by adverse possession no longer per-
forms a desirable service. On the contrary, there are con-
siderations greatly in favor of the doctrine. Whatever may 
have been the situation in pioneer days, most adverse pos-
sessors today are not "land robbers" but persons who enter 
into possession in good faith without knowledge of defect 
in their titles.52 Public policy is promoted by protecting such 
persons. The need in the present age to promote market-
ability of titles will probably lead legislatures to expedite 
the acquisition of title by adverse possession rather than to 
place limitations. The trend seems to be to enhance the 
effectiveness of statutes of limitations to bar claims.53 
Since the total effect of the operation of the statute and the 
common law is the transfer of title, it would seem unques-
tionable that the legislature can directly declare this result. 
Some statutes of limitations do expressly provide that a fail-. 
ure to re-enter or to bring an action to recover the land within 
the statutory period operates to transfer the title to the 
adverse possessor.54 There is an old case holding that a 
52 Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 3 2 Harv. L. Rev. 135 (I 9 I 8) ; 
Basye, Streamlining Conveyancing Procedure, 47 Mich. L. Rev. I097 ( I949). 
53 See Basye, Streamlining Conveyancing Procedure, 47 Mich. L. Rev. 
I097 et seq. (1949). 
54 States with statutes so providing are listed by Walsh, Title by Adverse 
Possession, 16 N.Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 532, 534 n. 6 (1939); Cal., Colo., Ga., 
Ky., Miss., Mont., N. J., N. C., N. D., Okla., Pa., R. I., Tenn. and Texas. 
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statute of limitations is void if it purports to confer title on 
the adverse possessor and not merely to bar the remedy of 
the owner.55 But this idea is not likely to be accepted by a 
modern court. 56 
There is no such thing as a vested interest in a statute of 
limitations. At any time before a cause of action is barred, 
the legislature may amend or repeal the statute or suspend 
its operation, thus defeating the expectations of the adverse 
claimant. 57 
55 Arrowsmith v. Burlingim, I Fed. Cas. I I87, No. 563 (C. C. D. Ill. 
I848). 
56 In Schauble v. Schultz, I37 Fed. 389 (8th Cir. I905), the court held 
that the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated by a retroactive limitations 
statute which read: "All titles to real property vested in any person or 
persons who have been or hereafter may be in the actual open adverse and 
undisputed possession of the land under such title for a period of ten years 
and shall have paid all taxes and assessments legally levied thereon, shall be 
and the same are declared good and valid in law, any law to the contrary 
notwithstanding." N.D. Laws I899, c. I58, p. 230. 
57 Paragould v. Lawson, 8 8 Ark. 4 7 8, I I 5 S. W. 3 79 (I 908) ; Lambert v. 
Slingerland, 25 Minn. 457 (I879); Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal. I (I857); 
Cox v. Berry, I3 Ga. 306 (I853); Keith v. Keith, 26 Kan. 26 (I88I); 
Cole v. Van Ostrand, I3I Wis. 454, IIO N. W. 884 (I9o7). 
In Cox v. Berry the statute provided: "That whenever any case now or 
hereafter pending in any of the Courts of this State; either at law or in equity, 
commenced within the time limited by law, shall be discontinued, dismissed, 
or the plaintiff therein become non-suited, and the plaintiff's claim may be 
barred during the pendancy thereof by any law now of force in this State, 
the plaintiff may, at any time within six months from such termination of 
the case, and not after, renew or re-commence the same ... " (Laws I847, 
p. 2 I 7 .) Plaintiff brought suit in I 849, just six days before the possession of 
the defendants would have protected them under the statute of limitations. 
Plaintiff's case was dismissed. Within six months he commenced the present 
action for the same land against the persons who were in possession. Held: 
Act applicable. No vested rights interfered with. 
In United States v. Nebo Oil Co., 90. F. Supp. 73 (W. D. La. I95o), 
the person who granted the lands in question to the United States reserved 
the mineral rights. Prior to this conveyance the Louisiana courts had held 
that a mineral conveyance created only an incorporeal interest in the nature 
of a servitude and that such mineral rights were subject to prescription by 
ten years nonuser. La. Acts I94o, No. 3 I5, declared that when the United 
States acquires land subject to the prior sale of oil, gas, or other mineral rights, 
the mineral rights so previously sold are imprescriptible. Held: The United 
States had no vested interest in the prescriptive period. At most its claim to 
the minerals was based on a mere expectation that the period of prescription 
would not be interrupted, which could hardly be considered a vested right. 
Aff'd, United States v. Nebo Oil Co., I9o F. zd Ioo3 (5th Cir. I95I). 
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"Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity 
and convenience rather than in logic. They represent expe-
dients, rather than principles. They are practical and prag-
matic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale 
claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after 
memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, 
and evidence has been lost. They are by definition arbitrary, 
and their operation does not discriminate between the just 
and unjust claim, or the voidable and unavoidable delay. 
They have come into the law not through the judicial proc-
ess but through legislation. They represent a public policy 
about the privilege to litigate. Their shelter has never been 
regarded as what now is called a 'fundamental' right or 
what used to be called a- 'natural' right of the individual. 
He may, of course, have the protection of the policy while 
it exists, but the history of pleas of limitation shows them 
to be good only by legislative grace and to be subject to a 
relatively large degree of legislative control." 58 
Likewise the owner has no constitutionally protected right 
that the particular statute of limitations in effect when his 
cause of action first arose should remain in effect. The 
period of limitation for the recovery of land may be short-
ened retroactively, provided a reasonable time is allowed 
after the statute goes into effect to bring actions not yet 
barred under the old period.59 
"It may be properly conceded that all statutes of limitation 
must proceed on the idea that the party has full opportunity 
58 Justice Jackson in Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U. S. 304, 
314 (1945), reh. den. 325 U.S. 896. 
59 Atchafalaya Land Co., Ltd. v. F. B. Williams Cypress Co., 258 U. S. 
190 (1921); Heath v. Hazelip, 159 Ky. 555, 167 S. W. 905 (1914); 
Beal v. Nason, 14 Me. 344 (1837); Baumeister v. Silver, 98 Md. 418, 56 Atl. 
825 (1904); Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318 (1865); Hartvedt v. Maurer, 
359 Mo. 16, 220 S. W. 2d 55 (1949); Horbach v. Miller, 4 Neb. 31 (1875); 
McAuliff v. Parker, 10 Wash. 141, 38 Pac. 744 (1894); Schauble v. Schultz, 
137 Fed. 389 (8th Cir. 1905). See Annotation, Reasonableness of period 
allowed for existing causes of action by statute reducing period of limitation, 
49 A. L. R. 1264 (1927) and supp. Ann., 12o A. L. R. 758 (1939). 
The court must judge whether the period allowed is reasonable, but if the 
legislature fails to prescribe a period, the court will not do so. Ludwig v. 
Stewart, 32 Mich. 27 (1875). 
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afforded him to try his right in the courts. A statute could 
not bar the existing rights of claimants without affording this 
opportunity; if it should attempt to do so, it would not be 
a statute of limitations, but an unlawful attempt to extinguish 
rights arbitrarily, whatever might be the purport of its provi-
sions. It is essential that such statutes allow a reasonable time 
after they take effect for the commencement of suit upon 
existing causes of action; though what shall be considered 
a reasonable time must be settled by the judgment of the 
legislature, and the courts will not inquire into the wisdom 
of its decision in establishing the period of legal bar, unless 
the time allowed is manifestly so insufficient that the statute 
becomes a denial of justice." 60 
The exceptions frequently found in statutes of limitations 
in favor of infants, incompetents, and other persons under 
disabilities can be repealed without violating any constitu-
tional rights, provided ample opportunity is given persons 
under disability at the time of repeal to assert their claims 
through guardians, friends, or relatives.61 While there may 
be instances in which a person under disability might lose 
his interest for want of someone to champion it, such instances 
are likely to be rare. The public has an interest that titles 
shall not remain in uncertainty for indefinite periods.62 
Ordinarily, the statutes of limitations impose no require-
ment as to the character of the conduct of the adverse claim-
ant necessary to make the bar effective, and it is by judicial 
60Wilson v. Iseminger, r85 U.S. 55, 62 (r9or). 
61 There are no cases directly in point, but it has been held that the 
absence of an exception in a statute of limitations in favor of persons non sui 
juris does not affect its validity. Such persons are not deprived of their 
property without due process of law; they can be represented by guardians. 
Vance v. Vance, ro8 U. S. 514 (r883); Collier v. Smaltz, 149 Iowa 230, 
r28 N. W. 396 (r9ro). Generally it is held that where a statute of limitations 
contains no exception in favor of persons under disability, the statute runs 
against such persons. Vance v. Vance, ro8 U. S. 514 ( r 883); Cox v. Von 
Ahlefeldt, ros La. 543, 30 So. 175 (r9oo); Ames v. Department of Labor 
and Industries, r76 Wash. 509, 30 P. 2d 239 (r934). 
62 The policy of excepting persons under disability from the operation 
of statutes of limitation is criticized by Basye, Streamlining Conveyancing 
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legislation that certain requirements have become estab-
lished.63 Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any con-
cept of vested rights hinders the legislature from modifying 
the common law by prov!ding that under other sets of cir-
cumstances the owner's remedies may be barred.64 The time 
preceding the enactment of such legislation ·can be counted 
in the period required under the act to bar the action for 
recovery, provided always that the owner is given a reason-
able length of time and an opportunity to bring his action.65 
Procedure, 47 Mich. L. Rev. 935, I097, at 947 and I099 (I949). He states 
at page I 100 that statutes of limitations providing a maximum period of 
time for those under disabilities have been adopted in some twenty states: 
Ala., Cal., Colo., Fla., Ky., Mich., Minn., Miss., Mo., Neb., N. D., Ore., 
Pa., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Va., Wash., W.Va., Wis. 
63 The courts are agreed that the adverse claimant must be in possession. 
The primary requirements, as evolved at common law, are that this possession 
must be hostile and under claim of title, actual and exclusive, open and 
notorious and continuous. 4 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. I I 3 7 et seq. 
(3d ed.). 
64 Montoya v. Gonzales, 232 U. S. 375 (I9I4); Towson v. Denson, 74 
Ark. 302, 86 S. W. 661 (1905). 
65 Towson v. Denson, 74 Ark. 302, 86 S. W. 66I ( I905); Soper v. 
Lawrence Bros. Co., 201 U.S. 359 (r9o6). 
In Towson v. Denson the statute provided that unimproved and unenclosed 
land shall be in possession of the one who pays taxes thereon, if he have color 
to title thereto. The statute in Soper v. Lawrence, which was on the same 
order as that in the Towson case, was held not to be unconstitutional although 
the fifteen years preceding the enactment were counted in the twenty years 
allowed the owner to bring his action. 
Statutes introducing changes in the common law have been sustained when 
applied prospectively. In Kennebec Purchase, etc. v. Laboree, 2 Greenl. 275 
(Me. I823), prior to the statute there was no such thing as constructive 
possession without a claim of title. The statute provided that the adverse 
claimant does not need to surround the premises by fences or render them 
inaccessible by other obstructions, but it is sufficient if the possession is open, 
notorious, and exclusive, comporting with the ordinary management of similar 
estates in the possession of their owners. In Montoya v. Gonzales, 232 U. S. 
375 (1914), the statute provided that possession for ten years, under a 
deed purporting to convey a fee simple, of any lands which have been granted 
by Spain, Mexico, or the United States, gives a title in fee to the quantity 
of land specified in the deed, if during the ten years no claim by suit in law 
or equity effectually prosecuted shall have been set up. As applied to the 
peculiar facts, the statute enacted that possession for ten years of the front 
and cultivable portion of a strip under a deed carrying the whole of it back 
sixteen miles to the mountains gave title to the whole. 
In Miller v. Town of Corinna, 42 Minn. 391, 44 N. W. 127 (189o), 
it was held that a statute which gives the effect of a dedication to continuous 
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The result is the same as though a new statute of limitations 
had been enacted allowing a shorter period for the recovery 
of land. But if no time is allowed for bringing an action so 
that the owner's title is automatically barred, the legislation 
is unconstitutional.66 It is unjust and confiscatory to take 
away from the owner the protection of the former law upon 
which he may have relied and on account of which he took 
no steps, as he might otherwise have done, to defeat a result 
which he could not have foreseen under the law as it stood 
previous to the new rule. The injustice is particularly pal-
pable where the possession now declared to have been 
adverse was with the owner's express permission.67 This is 
public use over a period of years prior to the adoption of the statute does not 
take property without due process if a reasonable time is afforded for the 
assertion of rights. 
66 Soper v. Lawrence Bros. Co., 201 U. S. 359 (r9o6) (due process); 
Thistle v. Frostburg Coal Co., 10 Md. 129 (1856) (taking of one man's 
property and giving it to another); Kennebec Purchase, etc. v. Laboree, 2 
Greenl. 275 (Me. r823) (Me. Const., Art. r, sec. r, securing to each citizen 
the right of "acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing 
and obtaining safety and happiness," and Art. 1, sec. 2 r, providing that 
"private property shall not be taken for public uses without just compensation; 
nor unless the public exigencies require it"); Mooney v. Miller, r 19 Misc. 
Rep. 134, 195 N. Y. S. 437 (r922) (due process); Webster v. Cooper, 14 
How. 488 (U. S. r852). 
67 Mooney v. Miller, 119 Misc. Rep. 134, 195 N. Y. S. 437 (1922). 
Plaintiff sued in equity for permission to redeem from a mortgage. Defendant's 
answer was that he was a mortgagee in possession and that plaintiff was barred 
of the right of redemption by reason of defendant's continuous occupancy for 
over twenty years. In r878 or r879, when foreclosure proceedings were 
pending, defendant entered into possession with plaintiff's permission as a 
mortgagee in possession. He remained in possession until 1914 when he 
assigned the mortgage to his wife, plaintiff's sister, who remained in possession 
until her death in 1918. Defendant was her son and legatee. Prior to the 
amendment made by N. Y. Laws 1919, c. 281, Code of Civil Procedure, 
sec. 3 7 9 read: "An action to redeem real property from a mortgage . . . 
may be maintained by the mortgagor, or those claiming under him, against 
the mortgagee in possession, or those claiming under him, unless he or they 
have continuously maintained an adverse possession of the mortgaged premises, 
for twenty years after the breach of a condition of the mortgage, or the 
nonfulfillment of a covenant therein contained." The amendment deleted the 
words "an adverse" before the words "possession of the mortgaged premises." 
Held: The legislature had no power to cut off plaintiff's right of redemption 
and transfer title to defendant. The court said that to give the statute. the 
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not a mere change in rules of evidence, in which field the 
legislature necessarily has considerable latitude of action, but 
is· an alteration of substantive rules of property which estab-
lish the operative facts by which an owner may lose his 
title.68 • 
It would be perhaps well to add at this point the admoni-
tion that we are here concerned with the arbitrary oblitera-
tion of a possessory interest in fee simple. The extinguish-
ment of nonpossessory interests presents unique problems, 
varying with the kind of interest involved. Such problems, 
so far as they fall within the scope of this treatment, are 
discussed in succeeding chapters.69 
effect claimed would be to make it a statute for the encouragement of 
fraud-a statute to enable one man to steal the title of :mother by professing 
to hold under it. 
68 It was suggested in an early case that since it is within the province of 
the legislature to alter rules of evidence and remedies, the legislature has some 
power to declare retroactively what acts shall constitute a disseisin even 
though title is thereby barred at the date of the statute. It was surmised, as 
an example, that a statute would be constitutional which merely declares that 
evidence which is sufficient to support a claim to title in equity shall be 
available for the same purpose at law. Thistle v. Frostburg Coal Co., xo 
Md. 129 (1856). The provision in question read: "· •. actual enclosure 
shall not be necessary to prove possession, but acts of user and ownership, 
other than enclosure, may be given in evidence to the jury to prove possession." 
Md. Laws 1852, c. 177, sec. 2. 
It is submitted, however, that this theory may be legitimately resorted to 
only where the change is inconsequential or where it can be said that the 
owner should reasonably have anticipated that a change might be made in 
the law or where (as suggested) the change in the law has merely the effect 
of making available to the adverse claimant in an action brought against 
him at law a rule of evidence which was always available to him in equity 
if he cared to take the initiative by bringing suit to quiet title. Otherwise 
the legislature would be permitted by a circumlocution to do indirectly what 
is forbidden to be done by direct action. 
69 Extinguishment of future interests by retroactive operation of statutes 
of limitations and marketable title statutes is discussed Chapter 4, p. 2 2 7. 
Dower, curtesy, statutory marital rights, and homestead rights are subject to 
broad powers of modification by the legislature. Generally speaking the courts 
have held that the marital interest of the nonowning spouse may be extinguished 
at any time before this interest becomes vested by the death of the owning 
spouse. See Chapter 6 infra. If a marital interest can be extinguished outright, 
there should be no question but that it can be extinguished by the retroactive 
operation of a statute of limitations or by the retroactive modification of the 
law of adverse possession. There is one area in which thia particular problem 
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Whether a statute of limitations operates prospectively or 
retroactively to bar a title, it must appear that the owner 
had means of knowing that another was claiming rights 
inconsistent with his own; otherwise the statute would be 
little more than an instrument for the confiscation of title. 
It is well established at common law that the statutes of 
limitations will not. run in favor of a claimant unless he 1s 
in actual possession of the premises.70 This requirement is 
justified by two considerations. One is that unless there is 
someone in possession, the owner can have no action for 
recovery on which the statute is to operate. The other con-
sideration is that if no one is in possession there is nothing 
to suggest to the owner that he must assert his rights. The 
requirement of possession is not only a matter of judicial 
construction but has been declared to be constitutionally 
has arisen. A number of legislatures have undertaken to eliminate the 
uncertainty in titles which arises from the possibility that there may be 
outstanding interests of spouses who have not joined in conveyances or have 
done so imperfectly. See Basye, "Streamlining Conveyancing Procedure," 47 
Mich. L. Rev. 1097, 1102 (I949). Ordinarily the statute of limitations 
does not begin to run against the dower, curtesy, or statutory right of the 
nonjoining spouse until the death of the conveying spouse. The consequence 
is that land may be rendered unmarketable for a generation and in the great 
majority of cases the nonjoining spouse will die without ever making a 
claim to the land. The legislature could probably be quite arbitrary if it 
so desired and declare that as to all past conveyances (where the marital 
interest had not already matured) the grantee should be deemed to have 
acquired an indefeasible title notwithstanding the nonjoinder of the grantor's 
spouse. In Skelly Oil Co. v. Murphy, I So Ark. 1023, 24 S. W. zd 314 
( 193 o), discussed infra Chapter 6, note 4 I, it was held tltat inchoate dower 
could be so extinguished. But any legislature which feared that such an 
arbitrary statute would be unconstitutional could insure the constitutionality by 
allowing for the preservation of existing interests by recordation within a 
specified period of time. The statutes in a number of states provide that the 
interest of a nonjoining spouse shall be extinguished unless he or she files a 
notice within the time allotted. E.g., Mich. Comp. Laws 1948, sec. 558.81 
et seq. 
Statutes of limitations barring ancient transactional interests (e.g., mort-
gages) are discussed in Basye, "Streamlining Conveyancing Procedure," 47 
Mich. L. Rev. 1097, 1103 (1949). 
704 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 1137 (3d ed.). What is sufficient to con-
stitute actual possession of the land depends upon the character of the land 
and all the circumstances of the case. 4 Tiffany, op. cit. sec. I r 3 8. 
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indispensable. A statute of limitations is very likely to be 
pronounced invalid if under it a person's title may be barred 
without any acts of disseisin or some sort of possession on 
the part of the adverse claimant, even though the owner is 
aware of such adverse claims. A statute of limitations cannot 
create a cause of action, it is said, and impose upon the owner 
in fee simple, who is in actual or constructive possession, an 
affirmative duty to take active steps against opposing claims.71 
While there are a few cases in which it is surmised that a 
requirement of possession is not essential to the validity of 
limitation statutes/2 there are numerous other cases which 
declare that the owner of land who holds by a fee-simple 
title cannot constitutionally be compelled to pay attention 
71 Bowman v. Cockrill, 6 Kan. 3II (1870). In Leavenworth v. Claughton, 
197 Miss. 6o6, 617, 19 So. 2d 8I5, 20 So. 2d 821, 822 (1944)) it was said: 
". . . it is not within legislative power to divest an owner of his land, 
when he holds by a fee simple title with nobody else in possession, and transfer 
it to another; and as this may not be done directly, it may not be done 
indirectly by an enactment the effect of which is to cut down the ownership 
to a mere right of action, and that even that shall be lost unless asserted within 
the grace of a prescribed period." (I97 Miss. 6o6, 617, I9 So. 2d 8r5, 8I6.) 
"There is a wide distinction between that legislation which requires one having 
a mere right to sue, to pursue the right speedily, and that which creates the 
necessity for suit by converting an estate in possession into a mere right of 
action, and then limits the time in which the suit may be brought." "It [the 
legislature] cannot by legislative fiat set up, Don Quixote-like, an imaginary 
windmill and command the property owner to charge and demolish it by 
legal proceedings within a stated time." (I 9 7 Miss. 6o6, 62 1, 20 So. 2d 
Szr, 823.) 
72 Pilkington v. Ford, 18 Ill. 503 (1857); Stearns v. Gittings, 23 Ill. 387 
(I 8 6o) : "Whilst it is usual in framing limitation acts, which bar the entry 
or the right of recovery, to make possession the most important requirement 
in the creation of the bar, yet no decision of which we are aware, has ever 
held that possession is essential to the constitutional validity of such enactments. 
That the act should afford reasonable time and opportunity for the assertion 
of the right, and barring the remedy for laches, and the nonassertion of the 
right, within the limited period, is believed to be all the constitution requires. 
The terms and conditions upon which the bar may become complete, in other 
respects, must necessarily be left to the discretion of the legislature. The 
circumstances demanding the legislative interposition in such enactments, must 
always have a controlling influence in their adoption. While the time and 
opportunity for the assertion of the right must be reasonable, and while the 
act cannot transfer title, yet the constitution has not prescribed, nor can the 
courts prescribe, the provisions which such an act must contain." ( 2 3 Ill. 
332, 335·) 
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to adverse claims unless those claims are asserted by suit or 
by possession.73 In fact, it seems to be only in conjunction 
with wild and uncultivated lands, which are really in no one's 
73 This principle has been enunciated most frequently in tax cases wherein 
a purchaser at a tax sale who has never been in possession seeks to set up the 
bar of a statute of limitations against the right of the owner, who has never 
been out of possession, to contest the validity of the sale. The courts have held 
that the statute of limitations cannot be made to run in favor of the purchaser 
until after he enters into possession. Charbonnet v. State Realty Co., I 55 La. 
1044, 99 So. 865 (1923); Baker v. Kelley, II Minn. 480 (I865); Groesbeck 
v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329 (I865); Leavenworth v. Claughton, I97 Miss. 6o6, 
I9 So. 2d 815, 20 So. 2d 82I (I944); Buty v. Goldfinch, 74 Wash. 532, 
I33 Pac. I057 (I9I3)• See also Shaw v. Robinson, III Ky. 7I5, 64 S. W. 
620 (I 90 I) holding invalid a statute which precluded action for the recovery 
of land unless the plaintiff could show he had paid taxes on the land for at 
least twenty years preceding the bringing of the action. 
Leavenworth v. Claughton arose out of a controversy concerning certain 
lands which had been sold for delinquent taxes in I 9 3 r. The sale was void. 
The plaintiff in this suit, who held a forfeited land patent from the state, 
relied upon a statute enacted three years after the sale, which was to the effect 
that the owner or other persons interested in land sold or forfeited to the 
state for delinquent taxes might bring suit or action to cancel the title of 
the state, or its patentees, "within two years after the date this act becomes 
effective as to lands heretofore sold or forfeited to the state for delinquent 
taxes, and within two years after the period of redemption shall have expired, 
as to lands hereafter sold or forfeited to the state for delinquent taxes, and 
not thereafter." Miss. Laws I934, c. I96, Miss. Code I942, sec. 7!7· Sec. 3 
of the act provided: "The completion of the limitation herein prescribed to 
bar any action shall defeat and extinguish all the right, title and interest, 
including the right of possession in and to such land, of any and all persons 
whatsoever, except the state of Mississippi and its patentees, and it shall vest 
in the state, and its patentees, a fee simple title to such lands." The plaintiff 
had been in actual possession for less than two years before the filing of the 
cross bill. It was held that to bring this statute within constitutional limita-
tions, it must be held that the statute does not begin to run until the possession 
of the true owner is invaded or disturbed by or through a claimant under 
the alleged tax sale, and this by an invasion which amounts to an actual, 
adverse possession of the kind required under the ten years' adverse possession 
statute. The statute was declared to be an effort at forced conveyance by 
legislative fiat, which is not due process of law. 
The significance of the principle that title cannot be barred without suit 
or adverse possession is emphasized by the fact that it has been enunciated in 
tax cases, where usually the overriding necessity of expediting the collection 
of public revenues causes the courts to accept a sizeable degree of arbitrariness 
when the statute leaves them no choice. However, the basis of decision in 
some of the cases seems to have been really that the only procedure then 
recognized by which the owner could contest the validity of a tax sale was 
by bringing an action in ejectment; that being impossible under the circum-
stances, the effect would have been to bar the owner without allowing him 
any remedy at all. Baker v. Kelley supra. In an old case, Robb v. Bowen, 
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possession, that the courts have allowed the legislatures to 
do away with possession altogether as a basis for the running 
of the statute.74 
9 Pa. 7 I (I 848) it was held that the statute of limitations began to run 
against the owner from the time of the tax sale notwithstanding that actual 
possession had not been taken by the tax purchaser. However, the statute 
gave the owner the right to bring ejectment against the purchaser even when 
the latter was not in possession of the premises. 
It would really seem that the fact of sale of one's land for nonpayment of 
taxes would give all the notoriety to which one is constitutionally entitled of 
the fact that an adverse claim is being made to one's land. Certainly if the 
owner of the land is made a party to the proceedings of sale, there should 
be no reason why the statute of limitations should not be made to run from the 
time of the sale without regard to entry by the purchaser, and why the owner 
should not be made to assert the invalidity of the sale within a specified 
period. It has been so held. Whitney v. Wegler, 54 Minn. 235, 55 N. W. 927 
(I893). But in Groesbeck v. Seeley, I3 Mich. 329 (I865) it was said that 
if proceedings to sell for taxes are illegal, no lapse of time can change their 
character; they can therefore never become legal; and that if a tax title is void, 
the true owner cannot be lawfully compelled to incur expense to take active 
measures to get rid of it unless he sees fit. 
In Leavenworth v. Claughton supra the court said that the statute was not 
a curative act but purely a statute of limitations. The defects in a tax sale 
can be mere irregularities or informalities or the defects can be jurisdictional. 
The nature of the claimed defect is important when considering whether the 
right to assert it is barred by a curative act, for the legislature can cure only 
irregularities and informalities. Swanson v. Pontralo, 238 Iowa 693, 27 
N. W. 2d 2 I ( r 94 7). The legislature cannot cure a jurisdictional defect, 
for this, it is held, would be making legal by legislation that which was 
absolutely void, and hence would deprive the party of his property without 
due process. Swanson v. Pontralo, 238 Iowa 693, 27 N. W. 2d 2I (I947); 
Marx v. Hanthorn, I48 U.S. 172 (1893); Dunkum v. Maceck Bldg. Corp., 
256 N.Y. 275, 176 N. E. 392 (I931). But the legislature can by a statute 
of limitations bar the right to assert a jurisdictional defect by one who is not 
in possession of the realty against one who is in possession under the tax deed. 
Swanson v. Pontralo, 238 Iowa 693, 27 N. W. 2d 2I (1947); Saranac Land 
and Timber Co. v. Comptroller, 177 U.S. 3I8 (I899). The owner is not de-
prived of property without due process provided he is given a reasonable period 
in which to assert his claim. Swanson v. Pontralo, 238 Iowa 693, 27 N. W. 
2d 2 I (I 94 7). 
74 The courts have sustained statutes which provide that if a person, having 
color of title, shall pay the taxes on unimproved and unenclosed land for 
a specified number of years, he shall be deemed owner thereof. Towson v. 
Denson, 74 Ark. 302, 86 S. W. 66I (I905); Stearns v. Gittings, 23 Ill. 387 
(I86o) supra note 72. In Saranac Land and Timber Co. v. Comptroller 
of New York, I77 U. S. 3I8 (I899), it was held that a statute, which 
provided that deeds from the state comptroller for lands in the forest preserve 
sold for nonpayment of taxes shall, after having been recorded for two years, 
and illl any action brought more than six months after the act took effect, 
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The concept that the owner of land cannot be compelled 
to pay attention to adverse claims unless those claims are 
asserted by suit or by possession is also of significance to the 
constitutionality of the marketable title statutes recently 
enacted in a number of jurisdictions. The constitutionality 
of these statutes is discussed subsequently.75 
The rule that an owner's title cannot be divested by opera-
tion of the statute of limitations so long as he is not ousted 
from possession by the adverse claimant appears on the whole 
to be salutary. It prevents inadvisable legislation under 
which titles could be surreptitiously barred. But it is clear 
that the principle is properly applied only where the effect 
of the statute is to put an affirmative duty on the owner in 
possession to assert his rights periodically or run the grave 
risk of losing his title. The situation is obviously altogether 
different where the person in possession, alleging himself 
to be the owner, has been made a party to a public or private 
proceeding involving the title and a determination has been 
made against him. The legislature may prescribe the period 
within which the validity of a judgment or determination 
may be attacked.76 Also, it is clear that the situation is alto-
gether different where the legislature imposes a duty upon 
owners of nonpossessory interests to assert their claims if 
they do not wish to forfeit them at the expiration of a fixed 
period. Such a duty may be justifiably imposed for the sake 
of promoting certainty in titles.77 
be conclusive evidence that there was no irregularity in the assessment of 
the taxes, was a statute of limitations, and did not deprive the former owner 
of such lands or property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
75 Page 8o et seq. 
76 Whitney v. Wegler, 54 Minn. 235, 55 N. W. 927 (r893); Merchants' 
Nat. Bank of Bismark v. Braithwaite, 7 N.D. 358, 75 N. W. 244 (r898). 
77 See the .discussion of marketable title statutes infra p. 8o. See the dis-
cussion of the application to future interests of retroactive statutes of limitations 
and marketable title statutes infra Chapter 4, p. 227. See also note 69 supra 
52 RETROACTIVE LAND LEGISLATION 
The adverse possessor does not have a vested interest in 
the law determining the acts which will cause the running of 
the statute through which his possession may ripen into 
ownership. Before the title of the rightful owner is barred 
by the running of the period of limitation, the legislature 
may require additional acts to acquire title by adverse pos-
session and may make these additional requirements appli-
cable to holdings begun before the change in law.78 It would 
this Chapter, commenting inter alia on the extinction of interests arising from 
the marital relationship. 
It would certainly not seem a deprivation of property without due process 
to require the owner of an easement to rebut the inference of an intent to 
abandon arising from his nonuser for a long period of time even though the 
servient owner has committed no acts inconsistent with the existence of the 
easement. A possessory interest in land cannot be lost by mere abandonment 
but an easement can be. Nonuse is one of the facts from which abandonment 
may be inferred. 3 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 825 (3d ed.). See Sheets v. 
Walsh, 2I7 N. C. 32, 6 S. E. 2d 8I7 (I94o), in which streets laid out in 
recorded plats of the premises were held not to constitute an encumbrance 
on title in view of a statute enacted long after the plats were recorded, which 
provided that any land dedicated to public use as a street or road which shall 
not have been actually opened and used by the public within twenty years 
after the dedication thereof, shall be conclusively presumed to have been 
abandoned by the public for street or road purposes, and no person shall have 
any cause of action to enforce any public or private easement therein, unless 
such right shall have been asserted within two years after the passage of the act. 
78 Hardy v. Dunlap, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 339, 26 S. W. 852 (I894). The 
statute reduced the benefits of naked possession without color of title from 
640 acres, as prescribed by the former statute, to I 6o acres. It was held 
that since the defendant had not been in possession for the requisite period 
to entitle him to 640 acres, he was necessarily restricted to I 6o acres, unless 
his possession could be referred to a deed or written memorandum of title, 
and thus include all of the land. 
Snider v. Brown, 48 S. W. 3 77 (Tenn. I 898). This was a bill to enjoin 
judgment creditors of one Byars from selling land under execution. Plaintiff 
relied on a statute which provided that a party holding adversely for seven 
years under a grant purporting to convey an estate in fee is vested with a 
good and indefeasible title. Plaintiff claimed under a grant and he had been 
in possession for over seven years. However, before plaintiff had been in 
possession for the full seven years the statute was amended to provide that 
no title shall be vested by such adverse possession unless the grant shall have 
been registered during the full term of seven years of adverse possession. 
Plaintiff's deed was not registered. Held: Amendment applies. 
Scales v. Otts, I27 Ala. 582, 29 So. 63 ( I9oo). Defendants relied on 
adverse possession for ten years. Their possession was of less than eight 
years' duration when a statute was approved which required parties claiming 
adverse possession of land to give notice. No notice was given by defendants. 
Held: Statute applicable. 
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seem, however, that after the cause of action of the rightful 
owner has been barred, the legislature could not re-establish 
his cause of action against the adverse possessor by retro-
actively imposing new requirements for the acquisition of 
title by adverse possession. This would be a logical deduc-
tion from the cases that hold the legislature may not suspend 
the operation of the statute of limitations after the owner's 
cause of action is barred because by that barring the adverse 
possessor acquires title. It has been held in the case of an 
easement acquired by prescription that after the cause of 
action of the owner of the possessory estate has become 
barred, the legislature cannot destroy the easement by retro-
actively altering the law relating to the evidence necessary 
to establish adverse user.79 
OCCUPYING CLAIMANTS ACTS 
Erections or improvements made on land are fixtures, 
and become the property of the land owner, even though 
annexed by another in the bona fide belief that he owned 
the land.80 Under the common law, the landowner may 
recover possession without any obligation to pay the bona 
fide occupant for improvements made in good faith. 81 The 
79 Christenson v. Wikan, 254 Wis. 141, 35 N. W. 2d 329 (I948). This 
was a suit to quiet title. The defendants claimed a right of way by prescrip-
tion. They had used a portion of the land in question as a driveway contin-
uously for a period of over thirty years. There never was any objection to 
the use of the driveway until this dispute arose. The court held that this 
was a case of an unexplained use for over twenty years and that under 
Wisconsin decisions an unexplained use of an easement for twenty years will 
be presumed to have been under a claim of right and adverse, and will be 
sufficient to establish a right by -prescription. It was argued that Laws I 94 I, 
c. 94 (Wis. Stats. I 9 5 r, sec. 3 3 o. I 2 ( 2)) changed this rule. The statute 
provides: "The mere use of a way over unenclosed land shall be presumed 
to be permissive and not adverse." Held: Statute was not meant to apply in 
a case like this; furthermore it could not affect vested rights acquired by an 
adverse user prior to its enactment. 
80z Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 625 (3d ed.). 
81 Thompson v. Illinois C. R. R. Co., 75 Ind. App. 410, 129 N. E. 55 
(r92o); Bigelow v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 206 Iowa 884, 
221 N. W. 66r (1928); Hardy v. Burroughs, 251 Mich. 578, 232 N. W. 200 
(1930). 
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mJustice of the common law was particularly apparent in 
the pioneer period of our country when titles were frequently 
in a state of confusion and settlers often made valuable and 
lasting improvements on land which they fully believed 
was theirs. But the harshness of the strict common law was 
often relieved by equity.82 It is within a well-established 
sphere of equity jurisprudence to allow an innocent occupant 
to assert a claim for permanent improvements as a means 
of preventing unjust enrichment to the owner of the land.83 
Even courts of law have applied the equitable practice of 
protecting an innocent occupant to the extent that when the 
owner has recovered in ejectment and then seeks to recover 
mesne profits, he is allowed to recover only the excess of 
the rents and profits over the value of improvements, the 
action for mesne profits being deemed equitable in nature.84 
Many of the states now have occupying claimant statutes.85 
The general effect of these statutes (there is considerable 
variation) is to compel the owner of the land to pay to the 
82 Some of the earlier cases are: Bright v. Boyd, 4 Fed. Cas. 1271 No. 1,875 
(C. C. D. Me. 1841); Valle's Heirs v. Fleming's Heirs, 29 Mo. 152 (1859); 
Davis v. Smith, 5 Ga. 274 (1848); Jones' Heirs v. Perry, 10 Yerg. 59 
(Tenn. 1836). 
83 2 Pomeroy, Equality Jurisprudence, sec. 390 (sth ed.). 
There is a divergence of authority as to whether a court of equity may 
allow the occupying claimant to obtain relief as a plaintiff. According to one 
line of authority, even in the absence of fraud, acquiescence with knowledge, 
or other inequitable conduct on the part of the owner of land, one who, 
mistakenly believing himself to be the owner, in good faith makes improve-
ments on premises, may, as plaintiff, recover therefor, by way of lien or 
otherwise, where the circumstances render such relief just and equitable. Other 
cases lay down the proposition that an equitable claim on account of the 
making of improvements can only be asserted against one who himself comes 
into equity for relief, the claim being, at most, allowable as a condition 
attached to the granting of relief to the opposite party, and imposed on the 
principle that he who asks equity must do equity. See Annotation, 104 A. L. R. 
577, s8o, 588 (1936), "Action to recover for improvements made on land, 
etc., by one who mistakenly believed himself the owner." 
84 Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1823); Kerr v. Nicholas, 88 Ala. 346, 
6 So. 698 (1889); Wernke v. Hazen, 32 Ind. 431 (1869); Fenwick v. Gill, 
38 Mo. 510 (t886); Dawson v. Grow; 29 W.Va. 333, I S. E. 564 (x887); 
Huebschman v. Von Cotzhausen, 107 Wis. 64, 82 N. W. 720 (19oo). 
85 2 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 625 (3d ed.). 
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bona fide 86 occupant the value of permanent improvements 
placed on the land (by the occupant) as a condition to the 
owner's recovery of possession, or as a condition to his recov-
ery in a suit against the occupant for removing the improve-
ments. 
While the occupying claimant statutes are not necessarily 
mere codifications of equitable jurisprudence, they have as 
a common basis the same maxim which guides the courts of 
equity in these matters: that he who seeks equity must do 
equity. The statutes do not deny the right of the owner to 
possession. Possession is withheld only until the owner per-
forms the equitable obligation of paying for the improve-
ment to the extent that he is enriched by it. It is true that 
the statutes make a man pay for improvements which he 
did nof ask to be made and it may be that he prefers the land 
without improvements. On the other hand, if he is not 
required to pay, the innocent claimant can well assert that 
he has been deprived of the fruits of his labor without due 
process.87 The parties cannot be placed in statu quo, but 
justice will be nearly accomplished if the value of the 
improvements is correctly estimated.88 After all, the owner 
is often largely responsible for the improvements having 
86 It is usually held that actual notice is the test of the good faith of the 
occupant-that is, either knowledge of an outstanding paramount title or of 
some circumstance from which the court or jury may fairly infer that he had 
cause to suspect the invalidity of his own title. Beard v. Dansty, 48 Ark. I 8 3, 
2 S. W. 701 (1886); Johns v. Gillian, 134 Fla. 575, 184 So. 140 (1938); 
Loeb v. Conley, 160 Ky. 91, 169 S. W. 575 (1914); Ross v. Irving, 14 Ill. 
171 (1852); Richmond v. Ashcraft, 137 Mo. App. 191, 117 S. W. 689 
(1909). 
87 Ross v. Irving, Pryor v. Irving, 14 Ill. 171 (1852). 
88 The amount of compensation allowed for improvements is ordinarily 
the amount by which the value of the land is enhanced by the improvements, 
and not the amount which the improvements cost the occupant. Crowell v. 
Seelbinder, 185 Ark. 769, 49 S. W. 2d 389 (1932); Pakulski v. Ludwiczewski, 
291 Mich. 502, 289 N. W. 231 (1939); Pritchett v. Hibbler, 126 Miss. 379, 
88 So. 882 (1921); Rains v. Moulder, 338 Mo. 275,90 S. W. 2d 81 (1936); 
Mercy v. Miller, 25 Tenn. App. 621, 166 S. W. 2d 628 (1942); Hardgrove 
v. Bowman, 10 Wash. 2d 136, 116 P. 2d 336 (1941). 
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been built by not promptly asserting his claim. If the 
legislature may enact a statute of limitations barring the 
recovery of lands after a given time of adverse possession-
and the length of that tim~ is at the discretion of the legisla- . 
ture-why cannot the legislature say that if the owner is 
guilty of laches and neglects to assert his right until the 
bona fide occupant makes valuable improvements (which 
will usually be a considerable period of time) his right of 
recovery is conditioned? 
It is well settled that the mere allowance of payment for 
improvements does not deprive the owner of any constitu-
tional rights when the statute is applied prospectively.89 
But some statutes have been declared unconstitutional 
because they seemed to favor unduly the adverse claimant. 
Under one statute, which was held to be unreasonable, the 
owner who was successful in the ejectment action and who 
was willing to pay for the improvements could nevertheless 
be compelled to give up the land to the occupant at its 
appraised value.90 Another invalidated statute gave the occu-
89 Griswold v. Bragg, 48 Fed. 5 I 9, 48 Conn. 5 77 (I 8 So) (held: statute 
does not impair obligation of contract nor deprive the owner of property 
without due process); Leighton v. Young, 52 Fed. 439 (3d Cir. I892); 
Fee v. Cowdry, 45 Ark. 4Io (r885) (owner not deprived of vested rights); 
Ross v. Irving, Pryor v. Irving, I4 Ill. 171 (r8sz); Armstrong v. Jackson, 
r Black£. 374 (Ind. r8zs); Barker v. Owen, 93 N. C. 198 (I88s); Van 
Valkenburg v. Ruby, 68 Tex. 139,3 S. W. 746 (r887); Scott v. Mather, 
14 Tex. 235 (r855) (held: no impairment of contract-this was the law 
before the first title to land was issued in the now state of Texas) ; Saunders v. 
Wilson, 19 Tex. 194 (r857); Cahill v. Benson, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 30, 46 
S. W. 888 (r898); Brown v. Storm, 4 Vt. 37 (r8p). 
90 McCoy v. Grandy, 3 Ohio St. 463 (r854). The statute gave the unsuc-
cessful occupying claimant the option of demanding from the owner payment 
of the value of the permanent improvements, or of paying to the owner the 
value of the land without improvements. This, declared the court, was a 
violation of the provision of the Ohio Constitution which declares that "private 
property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the public welfare." 
Accord, Stump v. Hornback, 94 Mo. 26 (r887) (held: the plaintiff in an 
ejectment suit must consent to the occupying claimant's keeping the land. The 
only relief the law gives the occupying claimant is negative). 
The statutes frequently provide that the successful owner shall have the 
option of recovering the premises, subject to the obligation of paying for 
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pying claimant the power to cause an execution to be issued 
against the general property of the owner for the value of 
the improvements.91 It has also been held that the legisla-
ture transcends constitutional limitations when it obliges the 
owner to reimburse the occupant for the purchase money 
he paid to some other person,92 or when it compels the 
the improvements, or of requiring the occupying claimant to take the land at 
its ascertained value aside from improvements. This sort of provision is 
designed to assist the owner who may be financially unable to pay the value 
of the improvements or who may feel that the recovery of the land is not 
worth the effort if improvements must be paid for. There is no deprivation 
of property without due process in requiring the owner to exercise his option 
within a reasonable time. Mills v. Geer, III Ga. 275, 36 S. E. 673 (r9oo); 
Bacon v. Callender, 6 Mass. 303 (I8ro); Flynn v. Lemieux, 46 Minn. 458, 
49 N. W. 238 (r89r); Craig v. Dunn, 47 Minn. 59, 49 N. W. 396 (r89I). 
It is permissible for the legislature to prescribe that if the owner does not pay 
within a stated time the amount awarded to the occupant for improvements, 
title to the land shall vest in the occupant. Flynn v. Lemieux, Craig v. Dunn 
supra. 
A Georgia statute provides that if the plaintiff owner shall fail to exercise 
his option within the time allotted, then the claimant shall have the privilege 
of paying the owner the value of the land and mesne profits due, whereupon 
the court shall either require the plaintiff to convey title to the claimant or 
have the land sold and the proceeds divided between the parties in proportion 
to their respective interests in the property. Ga. Code I933> sec. 33-108. 
This statute has been held not to entail a deprivation of the property of either 
party but to be a reasonable method devised by the legislature to adjust as 
nearly as possible the rights of the respective parties, holding in view the fact 
that both have interests in the property in gross which cannot be separated in 
kind. Ayer v. Chapman, 147 Ga. 715,95 S. E. 257 (1918). 
91 Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa 261 (1865). The court said that this statute 
had neither reason, necessity, nor precedent to support it. 
But it is competent for the legislature to make the value of the improve-
ments a lien on the land itself and to authorize a sale of the specific property 
to pay for such improvements in case the owner fails to pay within the time 
allotted him. Ayer v. Chapman, 147 Ga. 715, 95 S. E. 257 (1918); Leighton 
v. Young, 52 Fed. 439 (3d Cir. 1892). 
92 Madland v. Benland, 24 Minn. 372 (I878). But unquestionably it is 
proper to require the owner to repay all taxes and assessments on the land 
paid by the occupying claimant. 
The statute in the Madland case must be distinguished from the statute 
sustained in Claypoole v. King, 21 Kan. 434 (1879) which provided that: 
"Whenever any land, sold by an executor, administrator, guardian, sheriff or 
commissioner of courts, is afterwards recovered in the proper action by any 
person originally liable, or in whose hands the land would be liable to pay the 
demand or judgment for which, or for whose benefit the land was sold, or 
any one claiming under such person, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to the 
possession of the land until he has refunded the purchase money, with interest, 
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owner to submit the question of payment for improvements 
to arbitrators prior to the institution of action to recover 
possession. 93 
The decisions are abo~t evenly divided as to whether the 
improvement statutes can be applied where the improve-
ments were made before the statute. The courts which have 
allowed a retroactive effect did so on the premise that the 
statutes merely give a remedy which already existed in 
equity and good conscience, but which the law previously 
provided no means of enforcing.94 The premise of the courts 
opposed to permitting a retroactive application of the stat-
ute is that prior to the statute the owner was under no obli-
gation to pay for the improvements erected without his 
consent by a trespasser; to exclude him now from the enjoy-
deducting therefrom the value of the use, rents and profits, and injury done 
by waste and cultivation .... " Kan. Gen. Stats. I868, c. So, sec. 6I3. 
The plaintiff in the Claypoole case, who was seeking to recover the land, 
was an heir. The purchase price which defendants paid discharged the land 
from the lien of the debts of the plaintiff's ancestor. The court felt that if 
the sale was void, the heir ought not to obtain the property in any better 
condition than it was left by his ancestor. The statute, it was held, did not 
take any property from the plaintiff; it allowed him to take only that which 
was justly his. 
93 Hearn v. Camp, I8 Tex. 545 (I857). The statute also required that 
in case an award was rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount be 
tendered to the defendant previous to the institution of the suit. 
94 Beard v. Dansty, 48 Ark. I83, 2 S. W. 70I (I886); Fee v. Cowdry, 
45 Ark. +,Io (I885); Mills v. Geer, III Ga. 275, 36 S. E. 673 (r9oo); 
Bracket v. Norcross, I Greenl. 89 (Me. I82o); Bacon v. Callender, 6 Mass. 
303 (I8ro). See also Albee v. May, I Fed. Cas. 296, No. I34 (C. C. D. 
Vt.I834). 
In Mills v. Geer it was held that the application of the improvement statute 
to improvements made prior to the effective date of the statute did not violate 
the provision in the Georgia Constitution prohibiting retrospective law. "It is 
a matter that may be regarded now as almost an elementary principle in the 
construction of constitutional law upon the subject of retroactive legislation, 
that it does not refer to those remedies adopted by a legislative body for the 
purpose of providing a rule to secure for its citizens the enjoyment of some 
natural right, equitable and just in itself, but which they were not able to 
enforce on account of defects in the law or its omission to provide the relief 
necessary to secure such right." (Ill Ga. 275, 282, 36 S. E. 673, 676.) See 
also Chapter 2, p. IJ. 
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ment of his property, unless he pays for such improvements, 
deprives him of his property as effectively as though he were 
forced to sell. 95 
It is to be noted, however, that there were defects in some 
of the statutes which may have greatly influenced the courts 
in holding that the statute could not be applied retroactively. 
One statute was not limited to improvements in the form of 
structures on the land; the improvements could be in the 
soil and might even be such as would have been deemed 
waste in case of rightful tenancy.96 Other statutes made no 
distinction between improvements made by a trespasser who 
95 Society for Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 Fed. Cas. 756, 
No. 13,156 (C. C. D. N. H. 1814) (held: would violate the 23d article of 
the New Hampshire Constitution which declares: "Retrospective laws are 
highly injurious, oppressive and unjust. No such laws, therefore, should be 
made, either for the decision of civil causes or the punishment of offenses") ; 
Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal. r (r857) (not permissible on grounds of "natural 
justice"); Newton v. Thornton, 3 N. M. (Gild) 287, 5 Pac. 257 (1885) 
(interference with vested rights); Wilson v. Red Wing School District, 22 
Minn. 488 (r876); Townsend v. Shipp's Heirs, Cooke 294 (Tenn. r813) 
(would violate the constitution and the sacred rights of freemen) ; Investment 
Co. v. Hambach, 37 Wash. 629, So Pac. 190 (1905) (held: that if the statute 
were intended to affect established and vested rights, it would be "opposed 
to those principles of jurisprudence which have been universally recognized 
as sound"). 
It is a mistake, said Justice Story in Society v. Wheeler supra, to suppose 
that the demandant has no vested right in the improvements prior to his action. 
All improvements, whether in the form of an amelioration of the soil or in 
the form of structures permanently attached to the soil pass with the title to the 
land and vest with it; they are not acquired but merely reduced to possession 
by the suit. The statute, then, not merely extinguishes a vested right in all 
the improvements on the land, but it also impairs the value of the vested 
right of the party in the land itself, inasmuch as it subjects the remedy to 
burdens, which might render the right not worth pursuing. 
It was in Society v. Wheeler (p. 767) that Story gave his famous definition 
of a retroactive statute: "Upon principle, every statute, which takes away or 
impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, 
imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions 
or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective . . ." See Chap-
ter 2, p. 14. 
96 Society v. Wheeler supra. Story admitted that the argument that there 
are moral or equitable obligations which should compel the plaintiff to pay 
for the improvements might have been more persuasive if the statute had been 
limited to improvements in the form of structures on the land. 
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made unlawful and violent entry upon lands of another and 
improvements made by a good faith occupant.97 
TITLE BY ACCRETION 
"Except as pr'ivate rights have been acquired by express 
grant or prescription or by relinquishment under local stat-
utes ," it is well settled in the United States that 
the title to land under navigable waters (as defined by each 
state) is in the sovereign.98 Where the line between water 
and shore of land bounded by a navigable body of water 
gradually changes either by the accumulation of material 
or by the gradual recession of the water, the owner of the 
land becomes the owner of the new land formed.99 Acquisi-
tion of land by either process is commonly called accretion.100 
97 Billings v. Hall (Calif. Stats. I856, c. XLVII); Newton v. Thornton 
(N. M. Laws I878, Prince's Stat. 486). 
98 Patton, Titles, sec. 8 3. 
99 4 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. I2I9 (3d ed.). 
The doctrine of accretion is only applicable where title to the bed of the 
body of water or stream is in the state. If the riparian proprietor is owner 
of the bed, any land forming within the area of the bed belonging to him is 
his, and not by virtue of accretion but because his ownership extends upwards 
as well as downwards, as it does in case of land completely dissociated from 
water. 
A governing principle which is sometimes confused with the doctrine of 
accretion is that which obtains when land is bounded on the center of a non-
navigable stream as a monument. The center of the stream is still the bound-
ary, although the location thereof is substantially changed by the gradual 
change of the bed of the stream. 4 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. I 22 I (3d ed.). 
If the stream changes its course by a gradual process, the persons who own 
the bed of the stream acquire the bed in its new location. This new acquisition 
being of land covered by water cannot be based upon any doctrine of accretion. 
The rule that the boundary moves with the stream is apparently based upon 
the presumed intent of the parties. 2 Walsh, Real Property, sec. 227. The 
rule does not apply if the boundary is fixed independently of the stream. 
The rules to the effect that ownership follows changes in the location of 
water do not apply in case of sudden and perceptible changes and such changes 
do not bring about a change in the ownership of the status quo. The distinction 
between a sudden and perceptible change on one hand and an imperceptible 
and gradual change on the other is often very hard to apply. 
100 Technically "accretion" applies only to the acquisition of additional 
land by deposit of soil. When land is formed by recession of water, the process 
is properly termed "reliction." However the term "accretion" is frequently 
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Conversely, where land bordering on navigable water is 
gradually washed away (erosion), the sovereign ordinarily 
acquires title to the land thus encroached upon.101 
The cases do not discuss whether the legislature might 
abolish or modify the rule that title may be lost by erosion. 
Of course, the owner whose land is being eroded will not 
object to a change which is to his benefit. Attention has 
naturally been directed, where alleged constitutional rights 
are impinged upon, to the loss of the right to accretion 
rather than to modifications of the erosion rule. Thus we 
shall confine our discussion to the problem of whether the 
owner of littoral or riparian land has a vested interest in the 
rule that title may be acquired by accretion. 
At the outset it may be acknowledged that after land has 
formed by accretion, the courts will not allow the legislature 
to divest title out of the owner of the bank or shore or to 
substitute a mere preference to claim title in place of an 
unconditional claim.102 A Minnesota statute 103 was held to 
applied to both processes, and it is so applied by the writer for the sake of 
convenience. 
101 4 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. I2I9 (3d ed.). 
102 Anderson-Tully Co. v. Murphree, I5 3 F. 2d 874 (8th Cir. I946). 
Ark. Acts I90I, p. I97, sec. I provided that "all lands [sic] which has 
formed or may hereafter form, in the navigable waters of this state and within 
the original boundaries of a former owner of land upon such stream, shall 
belong to and the title thereto shall vest in such former owner, his heirs or 
assigns, or in whoever may have lawfully succeeded to the right of such former 
owner therein." The land in question was an island which reappeared in the 
Mississippi River within the bounds of a former tract of land. The plaintiffs 
claimed the title by virtue of the Act of I90I and also by virtue of their having 
paid taxes for fifteen years. The defendant argued that any rights the plain-
tiffs may have had under the Act of I 90 I were lost by failure to assert their 
rights as provided by a statute enacted in I9I7. Ark. Acts I9I7, p. I468, 
Act 2 8 z, sec. 5: "All bona fide claimants of lands of the character described 
in sec. I hereof, [islands] shall have a preference right of one year after 
passage of this Act to apply for the survey and purchase of lands claimed by 
them, etc." Held: The Act of I 9 I 7 was not intended to apply to a situation 
like this and if it were it would not satisfy the requirements of due process. 
A state cannot take away a right which it has previously granted uncondi-
tionally and give a mere preference in its place. 
103 Laws I897, c. 257. The statute provided that all lakes of less than one 
hundred and sixty acres, and such as are not capable of any beneficial use to 
62 RETROACTIVE LAND LEGISLATION 
be unconstitutional because it declared that the bed of a dried-
up lake belonged to the abutting owners as tenants in com-
mon.104 Since under the common-law rule of that state the 
boundary of the shore owner on a lake of this sort extended 
from the shore or meander line on lines converging to a 
point in the center of the lake bed (thus creating a pie-shaped 
piece of land), the court felt that the legislature had made 
an undisguised attempt to sever fixed and vested interests 
by turning ownership in severalty into ownership m com-
mon:.lo5 
There is some conflict in the decisions as to the right of 
the riparian owner to future accretions. It was held in an 
old case that the right to future alluvial formations is inher-
ent in the riparian property itself and forms an essential 
attribute of it, resulting from natural law in consequence 
of the local situation of the land, just as much as the natural 
the public are declared private waters. The lake in question, under this 
definition, was a private water. Sec. 2 of the statute declared that the bed of 
a private water which has been meandered shall belong to the abutting owners 
as owners in common, and in case of partition the rights of the respective 
shore owners shall be in proportion to the length· of the meander line upon 
the tract or tracts owned by each. 
104 Shell v. Matteson, 81 Minn. 38, 83 N. W. 491 (1900). This was an 
action brought under Laws 1897 to have a lake bed subdivided into tracts, 
as provided for by the statute. The complaint set up ownership of the plain-
tiffs and defendants of lands adjoining a lake, which in recent years had so 
dried up that it was no longer of sufficient depth to be of any beneficial use. 
105 "When the legislature interferes with the title to one's property, or with 
his independent enjoyment thereof, its action is to be judged by those principles 
of civil liberty and constitutional protection which are guaranteed in our 
system of laws." 81 Minn. 38, 41, 83 N. W. 491, 492 (1900). 
"The act in question is not confined to a method or course of procedure 
for the settlement or adjustment of the boundary lines between the different 
owners of such lake beds, but is an attempt to fix and determine the rights of 
property therein; declaring, contrary to the settled law of the land, that the 
shore owners are owners in common of the bed of the lake. Instead of pro-
viding a method for establishing and locating the boundary lines between such 
owners, the act cuts the matter short by declaring a joint ownership, and 
providing for a subdivision thereof on lines at variance with the legal and 
vested rights of the parties." (Ibid.) 
"The most that the legislature can do in the matter of such lakes is to 
provide a procedure or method for determining the boundary line between 
the shore owners." (Ibid.) 
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fruits of a tree belong to the owner of the land. Conse-
quently, an attempt to deprive the owner of future increase 
by alluvion, would be as legally absurd as if the government 
should confiscate the fruits of all the private orchards within 
its jurisdiction.106 On the other hand, a more recent deci-
sion/07 in which the court was obviously less influenced by 
106 Municipality No. 2 v. Orleans Cotton Press, r8 La. 122 (r84r). The 
City of New Orleans claimed certain alluvial lands upon which the defendants 
had erected buildings. The alluvion had formed after the land in question 
was laid out in suburbs. Prior to I 8o 5 the land was a part of a plantation 
abutting upon the Mississippi River. In that year in pursuance of a statute 
the land comprising the plantation was incorporated into the city. It was 
contended by the city that the right to alluvion pertains only to rural land 
and not to urban land, that consequently when the plantation was incorporated 
into the city the right to future alluvion was lost to the owners of the fast 
land and became the property of the city. Held: The legislature could not 
shear the land of its legal attributes by putting it into a new classification 
without the consent of the owner. 
A number of courts have stated by way of dictum that the right to future 
accretion is a vested interest. See inter alia St. Clair County v. Lovington, 2 3 
Wall. 46 (U.S. r874); Stevens v. Arnold, 262 U.S. 266 (1923); Brundage 
v. Knox, 279 Ill. 450, 117 N. E. 123 (r9r7). 
107 Western Pacific R. R. Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 151 Fed. 376 (9th 
Cir. 1907). Appellee owned land bounded by the low-tide line of 1852. 
It claimed that land added by accretion became its property. The accretion 
consisted of land dredged from the channel at various times since r882, which 
the ebb and flow of the tide had evenly distributed. Cal. Civil Code, adopted 
in 1873, defined in sec. 1014 the right to alluvion as follows: "Where, from 
natural causes, land forms by imperceptible degrees upon the bank of a river 
or stream, navigable or not navigable, either by accumulation of material or 
by the recession of the stream, such land belongs to the owner of the bank, 
subject to any existing right of way over the bank." It was contended by 
the appellee that if the section quoted were construed to exclude the right to 
alluvion in this instance, it would be unconstitutional. It was argued that the 
predecessors in interest of the appellee had a vested right to future alluvion, 
a right to all alluvion that might be deposited upon its shore land in all time 
to come. The court held that no vested rights would be impaired in the 
application of the statute and also expressed some doubt whether under the facts 
of the case there was alluvion in the proper sense. 
In Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 26 Pac. 539 (r89r) the court, in 
speaking of the right to future alluvion, expressed its inability to see how 
anyone could have a present vested interest in something which does not exist 
and which may never exist. 
In Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 190 F. 2d 191 (5th Cir. 
19 5 r), there is dictum to the effect that no riparian owner has a vested interest 
in the general law of accretion, except as to land formed while the law is in 
effect. 
The California and Washington cases were criticized as being unsound in 
Manry v. Robison, 122 Tex. 213, 56 S. W. 2d 438 (1932) infra note 115. 
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natural analogies, holds that there is no unconstitutional 
deprivation of property in applying a statutory modification 
of the right to alluvion in case of tide land acquired from the 
state before the enactment of the statute. The court said 
that if the purchaser of tide land from the state were held 
to acquire therewith a vested right to all possible future 
accretion, this would impose a restriction on the power of 
the state to occupy or improve for the public benefit the 
adjacent submerged land. The right to future accretion 
was held to be clearly expectant within Cooley's definition 
of vested and contingent rights: 
"Rights are vested, in contradistinction to being expectant 
or contingent. They are vested when the right to enjoyment, 
present or prospective, has become the property of some 
particular person or persons as a present interest. They are 
expectant when they depend upon the continued existence 
of the present condition of things until the happening of 
some future event. They are contingent, when they are 
only to come into existence on an event or condition which 
may not happen or be performed until some other event 
may prevent their vesting." 108 
It is stated by one writer that the doctrine of acquisition 
of title by accretion is a rule of law premised upon the policy 
of preserving the adjoining owner's access to the navigable 
water and justified by the corollary rule that the owner 
loses title to land when the water encroaches.109 Another 
writer maintains that the doctrine should more appropriately 
be considered a general rule for the ascertainment of bound-
aries, a rule of construction, in effect, that if the boundary 
of land is determinable with reference to the sea or any body 
or stream of water, the boundary is presumably intended to 
108Western Pacific R. R. Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 151 Fed. 376, 399· 
Cooley, Principles of Constitutional Law (2d ed.), 332. 
109 2 Walsh, Real Property, sec. 227. 
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vary as the particular physical feature referred to may vary, 
provided that the variation is gradual.110 
If the doctrine is in fact a rule of construction, then it is 
indeed difficult to conceive of anyone's having a vested 
interest in the doctrine's continued existence, for rules of 
construction are merely legal crutches to aid the courts in 
arriving at decisions. Calling the doctrine a rule of law may 
appear at first .blush to give substantiality to the view that 
the riparian or littoral owner has a vested interest in future 
accretions, yet it is well established that one cannot have a 
vested interest in a rule of law, but only in interests acquired 
while such rule is in existence. Since, moreover, acquisition 
of title by accretion is the legal effect given to a natural 
phenomenon which is not certain to occur, how, before this 
phenomenon has actually taken place, can there be said to 
be a vested interest? 
It has been held that the riparian owner's right to accre-
tion is lost when the state reclaims the submerged land in 
front of his land, or when the submerged land is reclaimed 
by another individual under a grant from the state.111 Also, 
it has been held that when a railroad constructs its road upon 
the bed of a navigable river under authority from the state, 
the riparian owners are precluded from acquiring title by 
accretion to land formed between the land appropriated by 
the railroad and the new highwater mark of the river.112 If 
the legislature may destroy the right to future accretion by 
these means, why may it not accomplish the result directly 
through statutory declaration? 
110 4 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 1220 (3d ed.). Tiffany's theory would 
seem to be contradicted by those cases which held that one whose nonriparian 
land has become riparian by the gradual encroachment of water may claim 
land subsequently formed by the action of the water. For an extreme case of 
this sort see Welles v. Bailey, 55 Conn. 292, 10 Atl. 565 (r887). 
111 Stevens v. Arnold, 262 U.S. 266 (1922); Sage v. New York, 10 App. 
Div. 294, 41 N.Y. S. 938 (1st Dept. 1896). 
112Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Porter, 72 Iowa 426,34 N. W. 286 (1887). 
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While there seems little justification for holding that the 
riparian owner has a constitutional right to future accretion, 
this does not preclude the possibility that the riparian owner 
may suffer an economic loss for which he is constitutionally 
entitled to compensation,. as a result of the abolition of the 
rule that a proprietor of land bounded by navigable water 
becomes owner of accreted land. The real issue might not 
be at all whether the riparian owner has a vested interest in 
future accretions as such, but whether by fiat the legislature 
can in effect destroy his easement of access to navigable water 
without which his land may be substantially diminished in 
value. It is well to bear in mind the often affirmed thesis 
that the premise of the rule relating to accreted land is the 
necessity of preserving the riparian owner's access to the 
navigable water. The riparian owner's easement of access 
has been held in eminent domain cases to be a property 
interest which ·is secured by constitutional provisions for 
the protection of private property.113 This would seem to 
indicate that the legislature cannot arbitrarily deny to the 
erstwhile riparian owner access over the accreted land to 
navigable water without compensating him for loss actually 
suffered by loss of access to the water. But, on the other 
hand, it is also well settled by the eminent domain cases that 
the riparian owner is not entitled to compensation for loss 
of egress and ingress caused by the erection on behalf of the 
state or the federal government of improvements for naviga-
tion.114 Thus we may assume that to the extent at least that 
113Brickell v. Trammell, 77 Fla. 544, 82 So. 221 (1919). 
114 Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (19oo); Gibson v. United States, 
166 U.S. 269 (1897); City of New Port Beach v. Fager, 39 Cal. App. 2d 23, 
102 P. 2d 438 (1949); Peck v. Alfred Olsen Construction Co., 216 Iowa 519, 
245 N. W. 131 (1932). 
In support of this view it was said in Peck v. Alfred Olsen Construction Co. 
supra: "· • • it would seem reasonable to say that, if a state assume a 
trusteeship for the public, which carries no proprietary rights of property, 
and which brings no emoluments and promises no future revenues, the perform-
ance of such trusteeship by the state should not ordinarily be barred or impeded 
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legislation abolishing the doctrine of accretion has some rea-
sonable relation to a program for the regulation or improve-
ment of navigation, no compensation need be paid to the 
erstwhile riparian owner for his loss of ingress and egress. 
If the legislature abolishes the rule of acquisition of title 
by accretion but retains the rule that the riparian owner 
loses his title as his land is encroached upon by the water, 
an undesirable situation may result. The consequence will 
be that the state does not lose title to land which was once 
part of the bed of a watercourse yet will acquire title to addi-
tional land as it is eroded away. If the watercourse has a 
propensity for shifting its bed (as many of our streams do), 
the state can conceivably acquire title to large tracts of land 
without having to pay for them. This might very well be 
a taking of property without due process.115 
by constructive property rights, which are mere incidents of abutting land. 
If plaintiff's rights are paramount, they were such in the beginning, and they 
necessarily operated as a bar to the performance of the very trust imposed upon 
the state. Why impose upon the state the duty to promote navigation if such 
duty cannot be performed without invading the rights of the riparian owner? 
On the one hand, the state is called upon to promote navigation by appropriate 
improvements in fulfillment of its duty as a trustee; on the other hand, it is 
charged with damages at the suit of the riparian owner for the doing of that 
very duty. The argument in support of the claim for compensation by the 
riparian owner in such case is that his incidental right of ingress and egress 
is property within the meaning of the law; that, because it is property, it 
cannot be taken even for a public use without compensation. The argument 
has its fallacy. Let it be conceded that the right of ingress and egress is 
property. That mere fact does not render it immune from subordination to 
other rights of property. . . . If the right of ingress and egress of a 
riparian owner be deemed subordinate to the interests of navigation and to 
the right and duty of the state to promote the same, that fact does not nec-
essarily destroy its value. It is still property, be it worth more or less. To say, 
therefore, that this right of access is property, furnishes no reason for saying 
that it cannot be subordinate to any paramount right." ( 2 16 Iowa 519, 52 7, 
245 N. w. IJI, 135·) 
115 The difficulty which would be faced by a court in such an event was 
essentially that which was presented in Manry v. Robison, 122 Tex. 213, 
56 S. W. 2d 438 (1932). This case involved a controversy over the owner-
ship of the bed of a Texas river, which the river had abandoned in an avulsive 
change. The question was whether the title to the land formerly occupied by 
the river was in the state or whether title reverted to the persons whose lands 
were riparian before the stream changed its course. The river bed belonged 
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Accretions Due to Shifting of Non-Navigable Streams 
It is to be observed thattitle may also be gained or lost 
by the movement of the water line of a non-navigable 
stream, the bed of which is owned by private persons.116 As 
the edge of the water moves with the shifting of the stream, 
the boundary of the tract moves with it. Here, unlike the 
situation where the state is the owner of the bed, the shifting 
of the stream doesn't initiate title but merely changes the 
water boundary. No contention can be made that the process 
is the result of a rule of law designed to preserve the riparian 
owner's easement of access to the water. The boundary is 
deemed to move with the edge of the water, either because 
the parties expressly stipulated that the edge is to be the 
boundary wherever it might in the future be situated, or 
because of the presumption customarily applied that when 
to the state before the avulsion. The lands which were riparian before the 
avulsion had been originally granted by Mexico prior to the independence of 
Texas. According to Mexican law at the time of the grants, when a river 
abandoned its channel, the abandoned bed became the property of the riparian 
owners. It was urged that the adoption of the Common Law in I 840 made 
a different rule of decision applicable. It was alleged that under the common 
law, beds of abandoned rivers belong to the sovereign, and that since the river 
bed in question was not abandoned until I9I4, the rule of the common law 
should apply and not that of the Mexican law. It was maintained that the 
right of the riparians to succeed to the title of a river bed upon its abandonment 
by the river is not an interest within the protection of the Constitution but a 
mere rule of law under which a property right will not vest until the river 
has actually abandoned its bed. The court disagreed that the adoption of the 
Common Law had introduced a new rule and criticized those cases which 
expound the proposition that right to soil uncovered by reliction is not a 
vested property interest and may be taken away by legislative enactment (see 
note I o 7 supra). The court pointed out that if the rule contended for were 
adopted, the state would acquire property from individuals without having 
to make compensation if a river changed its channel. 
The court attributed to the title of the riparian owners the quality of a 
base fee, determinable upon the occupancy of the soil by the river. From this 
it followed that the title of the state to the river bed was also a determinable 
fee, determinable in favor of the riparian owners upon abandonment by the 
river of its bed. There existed, therefore, a mutuality of burdens and benefits 
between the riparians and the state. The court did not believe that by the 
adoption of the Common Law in I 84o, the legislature intended to convert 
the state's determinable fee into a fee absolute. 
l16 Patton, Titles, sec. I73· See note 99 supra. 
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a boundary is set in reference to the edge or other feature 
of a stream the parties intend that this feature shall remain 
the boundary in spite of future deviations by the stream. 
The writer found no cases dealing with retroactive legisla-
tion at this point. He would surmise, however, on the basis 
of the cases concerning accretion on navigable streams, that 
the courts might well sustain a statute which in the interest 
of certainty of boundaries would declare that as to future 
conveyances, when a feature of a stream is made a boundary, 
the boundary line shall remain in the same location in spite 
of changes in the location of the feature. On the other hand, 
a legislative declaration of similar import, if applied to past 
conveyances so as to effect an extinguishment of title to 
accretions formed prior to the effective date of the statute, 
would undoubtedly be held to deprive the individual, against 
whose land the accretions had formed, of property without 
due process. 
Definitions of Navigability 
Since title to the beds of watercourses is determined with 
reference to navigability, as also is the location of water lines 
as boundaries, the courts have recognized that the riparian 
owner has a vested interest in the definition of navigability 
obtaining and applied at the origin of his title.117 The legis-
117 The question of navigability has two totally diverse aspects. One has to 
do with the regulation of commerce by Congress. The other has to do with the 
location of water boundaries. A given stream may be navigable for one pur-
pose and non-navigable for other purposes. The federal courts hold that a 
watercourse is navigable within the constitutional sense when it is susceptible 
in its natural condition of being used for commerce conducted in the ordinary 
mode, or could be made suitable for commerce by a reasonable expenditure 
of money. United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U. S. 3 77 
( 1940). The state courts apply various tests of navigability for the purpose 
of fixing riparian boundaries and the title to the beds of watercourses. Some 
follow the English rule that only tidal waters are navigable. The fact that as 
a part of the government survey a meander line was run along the bank raises 
a presumption in some states of navigability. The general rule, however, is 
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lature may not adopt a retroactive definition of navigability 
which will destroy the title of the riparian owners to the 
bed of the watercourse and transfer it to the state 118 or will 
alter the rights of the riparian owners inter sese.119 
The legislature may regulate non-navigable waters in the 
interest of the health, welfare, and safety of the public; all 
property is held subject to the police power. But in compari-
son with the power of the legislature over navigable streams 
and bodies of water, the power of the legislature in respect 
that water is navigable in law if it is navigable in fact. The main test of 
navigability in fact is whether the watercourse is capable of being used for 
navigation by usual and ordinary methods. Patton, Titles, sec. 79· 
118 Coovert v. O'Conner, 8 Watts 470 (Pa. 1839); United States v. 
Champlin Refining Co., 156 F. 2d 769 (roth Cir. 1946). 
State v. Brace, 36 N. W. 2d 330 (N. D. 1949) was an action by the state 
of North Dakota to obtain title by eminent domain to land surrounding a 
small lake. As a basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the 
state alleged that it was owner of the lake. The defendant, as riparian owner 
of the land around the lake, claimed title to the bed under the lake. The 
state relied inter alia on a statute providing: "A navigable lake shall include 
any lake which shall have been meandered and its metes and bounds established 
by the government of the United States in the survey of public lands." In a 
United States government survey in 1 8 7 2 meander lines were run around the 
lake. The statute in question came into the law of the state in 1935. Laws 
1935, c. 229. Held: The legislature may not adopt a retroactive definition 
of navigability which will destroy a title already vested under a federal grant 
or transfer to the state a property right in a body of water or the bed thereof 
that had been previously acquired by a private owner. A legislative declaration 
that all meandered lakes are navigable will not make them so if they are not 
navigable in fact, as against the pre-existing rights of riparian owners, unless 
compensation is made to such owners for the property thus injured or taken 
by the state. The state may not assert title, on the ground of navigability, 
to lands lying beneath non-navigable waters unless those waters were in fact 
navigable at the time of statehood, in the absence of subsequent conveyances 
to the state. Where patents were issued to riparian owners prior to statehood, 
rights thereunder with reference to navigable or non-navigable waters will 
be determined as of the date of the patent. 
119 Allen v. Weber, 8o Wis. 531, soN. W. 514 (1891). Held: Where the' 
grantees from owners of a mill dam and pond and of the land on one side 
thereof have acquired title only to low water mark of the stream, a subsequent 
act of the legislature declaring the stream to be navigable cannot affect the 
rights of the owners in the pond, or vest such grantees with title to the middle 
thread of the stream. 
In Wisconsin at this time the presumption prevailed that as to lands which 
extended to and covered the banks of navigable streams, it was the intention 
of the grantor to convey title to the center of the stream. 
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to non-navigable waters is limited.120 Legislatures have fre-
quently sought to enhance the power of control over waters 
of particular streams by adopting a definition of navigability 
which inc;:luded those streams.121 The privileges appertain-
ing to riparian ownership are presumed by the courts to be 
vested property interests which the legislature cannot impair 
by declaring a stream or body of water navigable which is 
120 The rights and privileges of a riparian owner on a navigable body of 
water are subject to the paramount right of the state to make whatever im-
provements are necessary for the public good in promoting better navigation. 
Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497 (U. S. 1870); Leitch v. Sanitary District 
of Chicago, 369 Ill. 469, 17 N. E. 2d 34 (1939); State ex rel. Squire v. 
City of Cleveland, 8o Ohio App. 83, 74 N. E. 2d 438 (1947); Home for 
Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 202 Mass. 422, 89 N. E. 124 (1909). 
The power of the states is circumscribed to the extent that a state may not 
interfere with the federal regulatory power. The regulation of navigable 
streams and bodies of water has to a large extent been taken over by the 
federal government, leaving a comparatively narrow area in which the states' 
regulatory power may operate. All navigable waters are under the control 
of the United States for the purpose of regulating and improving navigation, 
and although the title to the shore and submerged soil is in the various states 
and individuals, it is always subject to the servitude in respect to navigation 
created in favor of the federal government by the constitution. Scranton v. 
Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900). Riparian ownership is subject to the obliga-
tion to suffer without compensation the consequences of the improvement of 
navigation. United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U. S. 386 (1945). 
"Whatever the nature of the interest of a riparian owner in the submerged 
lands in front of his upland bordering on a public navigable water, his title 
is not as full and complete as his title to fast land which has no direct con-
nection with the navigation of such water. It is a qualified title, a bare 
technical title, not at his absolute disposal, as is his upland, but to be held at 
all times subordinate to such use of the submerged lands and of the waters 
flowing over them as may be consistent with or demanded by the public 
right of navigation." Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 163 (1900). But 
Congress may not arbitrarily destroy or impair the rights and privileges of 
riparian owners by legislation which has no real or substantial relation to the 
control of navigation or appropriateness to that end. United States v. River 
Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926). Of course, where fast land 
is taken or rendered useless by inundation, compensation must be paid. United 
States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950). 
121 Congress has never had any need to attempt to modify the definition 
of navigability which the Supreme Court has laid down to delimit the federal 
regulatory power over navigable waters, because the commerce power and 
the navigation power are held to clothe Congress with the power to take 
action in regard to non-navigable streams in order to promote commerce and 
navigation on navigable streams and bodies of water. State of Oklahoma v. 
Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941). 
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not navigable by the definition of the court.122 This prin-
ciple has been used as a ground for holding in favor of a 
riparian owner in a suit brought by a state to enjoin the erec-
tion of a dam 1,23 and as a ground for invalidation of statutes 
authorizing the floating of logs 124 and of statutes requiring 
owners of dams to maintain boat locks and fishways.125 The 
purported effect of such statutes is to create a public ease-
ment without the exercise of the power of eminent domain/26 
While some of the cases cited below would today be decided 
differently because the statute would now be thought per-
missible under the police power, the principle expressed 
therein is no doubt still very much the law. The legislature 
122 Olive v. State, 86 Ala. 88, 5 So. 653 (r888); Middleton v. Flat River 
Booming Co., 27 Mich. 533 (r873); People ex rei. Western New York & 
P. Ry. Co. v. State Tax Commission, 244 N.Y. 596, ISS N. E. 9II (I927); 
Walker v. The Board of Public Works, I 6 Ohio 540 (I 847). 
123 People v. Economy Light and Power Co., 24I Ill. 290, 89 N. E. 760 
(I909), appeal dismissed 234 U. S. 497 (I9I4). It was argued that due 
to the diversion of large amounts of water through canals and other artificial 
waterways the river had become navigable in fact. Held: The state cannot 
take private property without compensation by rendering a stream which is 
not navigable in nature, navigable through artificial means. 
124 De Camp v. Dix, I 59 N. Y. 436, 54 N. E. 63 (I899); Allison v. 
Davidson, 39 S. W. 905 (Tenn. I896); Morgan v. King, 35 N. Y. 454 
(r866). 
125,State v. Glen, 52 N. C. 3:1.I (I859) (fishway); People v. Platt, I7 
Johns. I95 (N.Y. I8I9) (fishway); Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 6 Rand. 
245 (z7 Va. I8z8) (boat locks). The majority of courts, however, who 
have passed upon the validity of statutes which require dams across non-nav-
igable streams to be equipped with fishways, have held that persons erecting 
and maintaining dams do so with the implied obligation to maintain adequate 
fishways for the passage of fish from the lower to the higher levels and that 
consequently the application of the statutes to existing dams does not deprive 
the owners of property without due process. State v. Beardsley, Io8 Iowa 396, 
79 N. W. I38 (I899); West Point Water Power and Land Improvement Co. 
v. State, 49 Neb. ZI8, 66 N. W. 6 (r896); In re Delaware River at Stiles-
ville, IJI App. Div. 403, II5 N.Y. S. 745 (1909). 
126 That the legislature cannot create a public easement in a non-navigable 
stream and thus effectively deprive the owner of a dam of its use without 
compensating him, that is, without exercising the power of eminent domain, 
would seem obvious. But there would seem to be no reason why the legisla-
ture cannot create a public easement if the owners of dams are assured of 
adequate compensation for injuries to their dams. 
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cannot add to its police power by a convenient redefinition 
of navigability. 
RECORDING ACTS 
At common law, an owner who has transferred an interest 
to one person, cannot affect that interest by a subsequent 
purported transfer of the same interest to another person.127 
By his first transfer the transferor has divested himself com-
pletely of the interest; there is nothing left for him to trans-
fer. Priority of title is determined by priority in time. The 
common-law rule, however, has been vitally affected by the 
recording acts. The first transferee must record in order to 
retain his priority against a subsequent conflicting purchaser 
without notice.128 
Since the decision in Jackson ex dem. Hart v. Lamphire/29 
the leading case on retroactive recording statutes, the courts 
have rarely doubted the power of the legislature to pass 
recording acts by which a prior alienee is postponed to a 
later alienee if the prior instrument is not recorded within 
the time limit. This power is not affected by the fact that the 
instrument was executed before the passage of the recording 
act. The cases are almost entirely in accord that recording 
statutes which subordinate or render unrecorded instru-
ments invalid as to designated persons may apply to pre-
existing instruments without violating any constitutional 
provision, provided that a reasonable time is given the hold-
127 Aigler, "The Operation of the Recording Acts," 22 Mich. L. Rev. 405 
(1924). 
l28 Under some statutes the prior grantee can protect his interest by 
recording his conveyance any time prior to the recording of a conveyance 
resulting from a later conflicting purchase. Under other statutes the earlier 
purchaser can protect himself against a subsequent purchaser without notice 
only by recording his conveyance before the later conflicting purchase occurs. 
Pattom, Titles, sec. 9 ( 19 3 8) . 
129 3 Pet. 28o (U. S. 183o). 
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ers of such instruments to comply with the provisions of the 
statute.130 
A very few early judges thought that a recording statute 
must be given prospective operation.131 But most courts have 
not been greatly impressed with the thought that vesting 
the alienor with the power to realienate is something like 
130Vance v. Vance, 108 U.S. 5I4 (I883); Stafford v. Lick, 7 Cal. 479 
(I857); Boston and Gunby v. Cummins, I6 Ga. I02 (I854), 6o Am. Dec, 
7I7; Payne v. Buena Vista Extract Co., I24 Va. 296, 98 S. E. 34 (I9I9). 
Moore v. Chalmers-Galloway Live Stock Co., 90 Colo. 548, Io P. 2d 950 
(I932). It was held that there was no violation of the provision of the 
Colorado constitution which reads: "That no ex post facto law, nor law 
impairing the obligation of contracts, or retrospective in its operation . , , 
shall be passed by the general assembly" (Art. 2, sec. II), and no deprivation 
of property without due process (Fourteenth Amendment; Colo. Const., Art. 
2, sec. 2 5). In this case the question was whether a prior unrecorded deed took 
precedence over a subsequent tax deed. 
Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Talbot, I I3 Ind. 373, I4 N. E. 586 
(I 8 8 7). The question was whether an unrecorded assignment of a mortgage 
was subordina,te to a subsequent mortgage. 
Hopping v. Burnam, 2 Greene 39 (Iowa I849). This case held that 
a judgment lien took precedence over a prior unrecorded deed. 
Farmer's Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Berks County R. E. Co., 333 Pa. 390, 
5 A. zd 94 ( I939). It was held that a statute declaring unrecorded deeds 
to be invalid as against subsequent judgment creditors, did not apply to a 
deed executed prior to the statute; that to give the statute a retroactive 
interpretation would cause it to violate the Fourteenth Amendment and 
Article I, sec. 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, inasmuch as it would 
deprive holders of unrecorded deeds of vested rights in real estate without due 
process of law. However, said the court, it is clear that recording and filing 
statutes which retroact upon pre-existing instruments do not violate any 
constitutional provision, provided that a reasonable time is given the holders of 
such instruments to comply with the provisions of the statute. 
131 The following dictum appears in Varick's Ex'rs v. Briggs, 22 Wend. 
543, 546 (N. Y. I 839): "Deeds valid and perfect at the time of their 
execution, and not then requiring for their full legal effect, any further 
legal sanction, such as recording, are complete and valid executed contracts. 
Now the effect of a subsequent statute enacting that such valid contracts shall 
be adjudged fraudulent and void as against certain persons unless a further 
legal sanction be added, must be in direct hostility to the very words of the 
constitutional inhibition. The contracts themselves are impaired by being 
adjudged void. If a law enacts that any class of contracts now fair and 
valid against the whole world shall hereafter be adjudged fraudulent and 
void against some particular persons, can this be any other than a law 
impairing the obligation of those contracts?" 
See also the opinion of Burnett, J., in Stafford v. Lick, 7 Cal. 479 (I857), 
wherein he points out that the application of the recording statute has the 
effect of reinvesting the grantor with title so he can make another conveyance, 
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throwing the blame on the injured party. The reason why 
recording acts may retroact is variously explained by the 
courts: nondisclosure of claims to land aids and abets 
fraud; 132 the reason and policy of the statute applies with 
as much force to conveyances and assignments made before 
as those made after it took effect; 133 the purchasers who 
are protected by the statute are future purchasers, so that the 
statute cannot really be said to be retroactive in its opera-
tion; 134 the statute merely changes a rule of evidence in 
which no one has a vested interest; 135 the statute must apply 
to all alienations, for a contrary holding would produce a 
state of uncertainty and confusion; 136 a statute cannot be 
said to impair an interest if an additional opportunity is 
afforded the ow:ner to protect effectively his interest and it 
is left to him whether he will pursue this opportunity; 137 
the statute does not really retroact if it does not require deeds 
132 Hopping v. Burnam, 2 Greene 39 (Iowa 1849). 
133 Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Talbot, 113 Ind. 373, 14 N. E. 
s86 (r887). 
134 Payne v. Buena Vista Extract Co., 124 Va. 296, 98 S. E. 34 (1919). 
135 Stafford v. Lick, 7 Cal. 479 (1857); Payne v. Buena Vista Extract 
Co., 124 Va. 296, 98 S. E. 34 (1919). 
The Payne case was a suit to quiet title. Plaintiff's title rested upon a deed 
from one Fitzgerald who was in possession under an executory contract in 
writing for the purchase of the land. By the law as it stood when Fitzgerald 
entered into possession, such possession was constructive notice to subsequent 
purchasers. However, this was changed by statute which declared that 
possession without notice or other evidence of title should not be notice to 
subsequent purchasers. It was argued that under the existing law Fitzgerald 
acquired a vested right of property and that this vested right continued to 
inhere in Fitzgerald until he transmitted it to plaintiff and that Fitzgerald 
could not be deprived of this right by the recording act. Held: Since Fitzgerald 
had seven years after the passing of the act within which to record his contract 
before defendant acquired any rights, the act was not unreasonable as applied 
to him. Fitzgerald elected to rely on the continued existence of a rule of 
evidence that possession gives notice of the existence of a contract of purchase. 
He assumed the risk of a subsequent change of law which might abolish such 
rule of evidence. 
136Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Talbot, 113 Ind. 373, 14 N. E. 
s86 (r887). 
137 Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Talbot, 113 Ind. 373, 14 N. E. 
58 6 ( r 8 8 7). Prior to the maturity of the notes, the. mortgage was assigned. 
The assignment was not recorded. Indeed, it does not appear that there was 
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to have been recorded before it took effect, but only assumes 
a regulation over them from and after that event.138 In 
one case, the court allowed retroactive effect to a recording 
statute in part because of the inequitable position of the 
party contending that the statute could not be applied to his 
deed.139 
A statute requiring that instruments must be re-recorded 
after the destruction of the first registry, and within a speci-
fied time if they are to operate as constructive notice, is to be 
sustained upon the same grounds which sustain a statute 
requiring the initial registration of conveyances executed 
previous to the exercise of such legislative power.140 
Recording of a deed or other instrument of title is not 
ordinarily required in order to make the instrument legally 
effective between the immediate parties, the alienor and 
any provision for recording assignments at this time. In I 8 8 I, without the 
knowledge or consent of the assignee, the administrator of the mortgagee 
released the mortgage as of record. The debt was not paid. A recording 
statute enacted in I 8 77 provided for the recording of mortgage assignments. 
Held: Statute was applicable and assignee's rights were subordinate to that of 
a subsequent mortgagee who relied on the record. 
138 Hopping v. Burnam, 2 Greene 3 9 (Iowa I 849). 
139 Moore v. Chalmers-Galloway Live Stock Co., 90 Colo. 548, IO P. 2d 
9 so (I 9 3 2). This was a quiet title suit. The party resisting application of 
the recording statute was a receiver of a company which had held its deed 
unrecorded, and apparently in strict secrecy, or with the utmost indifference, 
fourteen years, while numerous other persons, with no intimation of the 
existence of such a deed and with every reason for faith in the legality of their 
claims, dealt with this title or litigated concerning it. When the statute became 
operative the company had already held its deed unrecorded for more than 
eight years. The existence of the unrecorded deed was disclosed when the 
receiver moved to reopen the judgment in this quiet title suit, almost two years 
after the passage of the statute. The court assumed, without deciding, that the 
company could have protected its deed had it recorded it at any time prior 
to the trial. The company was thus in the position of one who says: "We can 
easily_ protect our deed and our rights thereunder by the simple act of 
recordation, but we refuse." The statute in question provided that no deeds 
"shall be valid as against any class of persons with any kind of rights, except 
between the parties thereto, and such as have notice thereof, until the same 
shall be deposited with such recorder" for record. Laws I927, c. ISo, p. 590, 
sec. 8. The Colorado Constitution contains a provision forbidding retro-
active legislation. See supra note I 3 o. 
140 Salmon v. Huff, 9 Tex. Civ. App. I64, 28 S. W. I044 (I894). 
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alienee,141 but the instances in which instruments of title are 
not recorded must be rare. The legislature undoubtedly has 
the power to prescribe recordation as one of the acts necessary 
to make the instrument legally effective, as the modes of 
conveyancing are always subject to modification and control 
by the legislature.142 Even a recording statute which would 
retroactively negative, as to the immediate parties, the legal 
effect of existing instruments for failure to record would 
probably stand the test of constitutionality, provided a rea-
sonable time were given in which to perform the additional 
acts necessary to the effectiveness of the instruments.143 A 
reasonable addition to the requirements for conveyancing 
should not be held unconstitutional merely because the acts 
of the parties constituted a completed conveyance under the 
previous law. Yet some courts might be disinclined to allow 
the retroactive operation for the apparent operation of such 
legislation would be to take the property away from the 
alienee and give it back to the alienor because of the non-
action of the alienee.144 
The legislature may legitimately use a recording statute 
as a means of getting rid of stale claims, just as a statute of 
limitations might be used for the same purpose. The after-
141 5 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 1262 (3d ed.). 
142 See Cummings v. Wildman, II6 Md. 307, 8r Atl. 6ro (r9rr), sustain-
ing a statute which required trustees in certain instances to file a bond as a 
condition to passing title. 
143 Myers v. Wheelock, 6o Kan. 747, 57 Pac. 956 (r899). A statute, 
which provided that no assignment of a mortgage should be received against 
the mortgagor, his heirs, personal representatives, or assigns, in any court of 
the state, unless the same should have been recorded within six months after 
the statute went into effect, was sustained as applied to an existing assignment. 
The court looked upon the statute as merely rendering the assignment in-
admissible in evidence but without affecting the validity of the mortgage lien. 
The act was therefore deemed . to be valid for the same reason that a 
retroactive limitation statute can be sustained when a reasonable time is given 
the party to pursue his remedy. This hardly seems a logical analogy, however, 
because a statute of limitations does not impose an affirmative obligation. 
The argumentation of the court tacitly presupposes a power in the legislature 
to extinguish an owner's right because he does not record. 
144 See Vance v. Vance, ro8 U.S. 514,517 (r883). 
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math of worthless contracts for the purchase of land, which 
was left by the collapse of the Florida real estate boom of 
the 1920's, was held to justify a statute under the terms of 
which persons who had contracted to purchase land prior to 
a certain date but had not placed a deed on record or obtained 
a decree and were not in possession, were declared to have 
no interest in the land unless they should have given noto-
riety to their claims in one of several specified ways within 
six months after the adoption of the statute.145 
145 Mahood v. Bessemer Properties, Inc., 154 Fla. 710, 18 So. 2d 775 
(1944). Gen. Acts Fla. 1941, c. 20235 (Fla. Stat. I95I, sec. 695.2.0) 
provides: "Whenever any one shall have contracted to purchase real estate 
in the State of Florida, prior to January I, 1930, by written agreement 
requiring all payments to be made within ten years from the date of the 
contract, or has accepted an assignment of such an agreement, and the fact 
of the existence of such a contract of purchase, or assignment, appears of 
record from the instrument itself or by reference in some other recorded instru-
ment, and shall not have obtained and placed of record a deed to the 
property or a decree of a court of competent jurisdiction recognizing his 
rights thereunto, and is not in actual possession of the property covered by 
the contract or by the assignment, . . . he, his widow, heirs, personal 
representatives, successors and assigns, shall have no further interest in the 
property described in the contract, or the assignment, by virtue thereof, 
and the record of such contract, assignment or other record reference thereto, 
shall no longer constitute either actual or constructive notice to a purchaser, 
mortgagee, or other person acquiring an interest in the property, unless within 
six months after this law shall take effect (approved April z6, I94I), he or 
some one claiming under him shall: (I) Place on record a deed or other 
conveyance of the property from the holder of the record title; or ( 2) 
Place on record a written instrument executed by the holder of the record 
title evidencing an extension or modification of the original contract and 
showing that the original contract remains in force and effect; or (3) 
Institute, or have pending, in a court of competent jurisdiction a suit for the 
enforcement of his rights under such contract." 
The defendant in Mahood v. Bessemer Properties, Inc., which was a 
specific performance suit, refused to accept the deed offered because of an 
alleged cloud in the form of an agreement to sell made by a former owner in 
1925. The court held that the agreement was simply an unperformed contract 
which was cancelled by the act, and that the act could not be held to be 
unreasonable because applied retroactively; after all, the contractee had 
seventeen years in which to record a deed. The court also surmised that an 
abandonment of the agreement could be inferred from the long period which 
had intervened since the last payment without a bona fide effort to perform 
the contract. A dissenting judge thought that the act deprived the contractee 
of I925 of his property without due process. This was true, he thought, 
because a person who contracted to purchase real estate before Jan. I, I930, 
fully performed his contract, and received a good and sufficient deed, but 
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Changing Conditions of Recording 
The legislature may unquestionably impose additional 
conditions for the recordation of an instrument and may 
require adherence to these conditions in the case of instru-
ments executed, but not recorded, at the date of the enact-
ment. However, the newly imposed condition must be 
reasonable; it must not be so imposed that a conveyance pre-
viously valid is rendered ineffective because it is no longer 
within the ability of the alienee to have his instrument 
recorded. Thus a statute forbidding recordation of deeds 
unless the vendor has platted his lands and the plat has been 
approved by a planning commission, it has been held, would 
be in violation of vested contract rights if applied to a con-
tract to purchase entered into before there was any such 
restriction on the vendee's privilege of having his deed 
recorded.146 
Statutes requiring, as a condition precedent to recording, 
the presentation of a certificate showing that taxes have been 
paid on the land for a designated period have been sustained 
when applied to instruments executed subsequent to the 
statute.147 The compelling objection, of course, is that the 
ta4 payment requirement is not a regulation of the manner 
of recording but the imposition of an independent, distinct 
burden upon the privilege and protection afforded by the 
recording act, which may even amount to a prohibition. The 
reasoning of the courts here has been that there. is no unwar-
rantable interference with property rights since the deed is 
effective to pass title without recordation and that at any 
rate it is within the power of the legislature to impose 
failed to record and thereafter lost his deed, would be deprived of his property 
without having had his day in court, and without any notice other than the 
enactment of the statute. 
146 Walker v. Nix, 196 Okla. 365, 165 P. zd 378 (1946). 
147 Van Husen v. Reames, 96 Mich. 504,56 N. W. 22 (1893); State v. 
Register of Deeds, 26 Minn. 521, 6 N. W. 337 (188o). 
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stringent measures for the collection of taxes. However, 
where the tax record is made conclusive evidence of non-
payment of taxes so that the interested party is obligated 
to pay the tax shown to be due in order to get his instrument 
recorded, even if, in fact, the tax has been paid or is void, it 
has been held that the requirement is unconstitutional 
whether applied retroactively or prospectively.148 
MARKETABLE TITLE ACTS 
As the years go by, the task of tracing titles back to their 
sources becomes more and more difficult. The resultant 
multiplication of title defects which hinder the marketability 
of land has induced the enactment in several states of mar-
ketable title statutes.149 While the details vary somewhat, 
148 State ex rel. Baldwin v. Moore, 7 Wash. 173, 34 Pac. 461 (1893). 
The court also held that the statute was rather judicial than legislative in 
character since it in effect declared all taxes shown by the records as a 
charge upon real estate to be lawful and practically authorized the state to 
compel payment of illegal demands. 
149 Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann., Sec. 2-628 et seq. (Supp. 195 r); Mich. Comp. 
Laws 1948, sees. 565.ror to 565.109; Minn. Stat. Ann., sec. 541.023 (Supp. 
1950); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1950, sees. 76-288 to 76-298; N. D. Laws 
1951, c. 28o; S.D. Laws 1947, c. 233, amended Laws 1951, c. 256; Wis. Stat. 
1951, sec. 330.15. Of the same type is also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, c. 83, 
sec. roa; Iowa Code 1950, sec. 614.17, amended Acts 1951, c. 209, sec. 3· 
Excellent discussions of these statutes are to be found in Basye, Streamlining 
Conveyancing Procedure, 47 Mich. L. Rev. 1097, rroo (1949) and Aigler, 
Constitutionality of Marketable Title Acts, so Mich. L. Rev. 185 (1951). 
The Michigan statute provides in part: "Sec. r. Any person, having the 
legal capacity to own land in this state, who has an unbroken chain of 
title of record to any interest in land for 40 years, shall at the end of such 
period be deemed to have a marketable record title to such interest, subject 
only to such claims thereto and defects of title as are not extinguished or 
barred by application of the provisions of succeeding sections of this act 
and subject also to such interests and defects as are inherent in the provisions 
and limitations contained in the muniments of which such chain of record title 
is formed and which have been recorded during said 40 year period: 
Provided, however, That no one shall be deemed to have such a marketable 
record title by reason of the terms of this act, if the land in which such 
interest exists is in the hostile possession of another. 
"Sec. 3. Such marketable title shall be held by such person and shall be 
taken by his successors in interest free and clear of any and all interests, claims, 
and charges whatsoever the existence of which depends in whole or in part 
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the object of all of these statutes is to extinguish old claims 
and interests which do not appear on the public records 
within a specified period and which have not been revived 
on the records so as to call them to the attention of prospec-
tive purchasers and mortgagors.150 The effect is to relieve 
the searcher of title from the necessity of going back more 
than a specified number of years. Marketable title statutes 
have sorrie aspects of the ordinary statute of limitations; both 
are directed to the same objective, the achievement of cer-
tainty in titles. But the idea underlying the ordinary stat-
ute of limitations is not the same as that underlying a mar-
ketable title statute. Statutes of limitations are based upon 
upon any act, transaction, event, or omission that occurred prior to such 40 
year period, and all such interest, claims, and charges are hereby declared to 
be null and void and of no effect whatever at law or in equity: Provided, 
however, That any such interest, claim, or charge may be preserved and kept 
effective by filing for record during such 40 year period, a notice in writing, 
duly verified by oath, setting forth the nature of the claims. No disability 
or lack of knowledge of any kind on the part of anyone shall suspend the 
running of said 40 year period. For the purpose of recording notices of 
claim for homestead interests the date from which the 40 year period shall 
run shall be the date of recording of the instrument, non-joinder in which is 
the basis for such claim. Such notice may be filed for record by the claimant 
or by any other person acting on behalf of any claimant who is: 
(a) Under a disability, 
(b) Unable to assert a claim on his own behalf, 
(c) One of a class but whose identity cannot be established or is uncertain 
at the time of filing such notice of claim for record, 
"Sec. 6. This act shall be construed to effect the legislative purpose of 
simplifying and facilitating land title transactions by allowing persons dealing 
with the record title owner, as defined herein, to rely on the record title 
covering a period of not more than 40 years prior to the date of such dealing 
and to that end to extinguish all claims that affect or may affect the interest 
thus dealt with, the existence of which claims arises out of or depends upon 
any act, transaction, event or omission antedating such 40 year period, unless 
within such 40 year period a notice of claim as provided in section 3 hereof 
shall have been duly filed for record. The claims thereby extinguished shall 
mean any and all interests of any nature whatever, however denominated, and 
whether such claims are asserted by a person sui juris or under disability, 
whether such person is within or without the state, and whether such person 
is natural or corporate, or private or governmental." 
150 The Minnesota and Wisconsin statutes are framed as statutes of limita-
tions. The statutes of Indiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South 
Dakota define what shall constitute a marketable title. 
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the concept that rights of action should be seasonably pur-
sued. The concept behind the marketable title statutes is 
that land titles should be made more freely marketable by 
simplifying title search and thereby making the record title 
safer for the prospective purchaser or mortgagee to rely 
upon. The policy of this legislation is to realize more fully 
the public interest which originally induced the recording 
acts. 
When the marketable title statute goes into effect, ancient 
claims and interests within the purview of the statute will 
be faced with possible extinction. The owners may contend 
that they are being deprived of property without due proc-
ess. Most of the serious constitutional challenges can be 
avoided at the outset if a reasonably remote date or time 
has been selected by the legislature, for then the number 
of subsisting valid claims will be small. But some valid 
interests there may be. In spite of the highly commendable 
object of the statute, it is really very doubtful whether the 
courts would be willing to allow the extinction of substantial 
interests for the sake of promoting marketability. It has 
been the assumption of the framers of the existing market-
able title statutes that existing claims cannot be arbitrarily 
wiped out, even if they are ancient, but that owners of 
ancient claims and interests must be afforded means of pre-
serving them and given a reasonable period within which to 
take the necessary steps.151 
Most of the statutes enacted to date provide for the preser-
vation of existing old interests by recordation. This is simple 
and easy. If the owner fails to take this step, he has only 
himself to blame if his interest is extinguished. The constitu-
tionality of imposing this duty would seem to have been 
15! One year is the time allotted under most of the existing statutes. The 
problem of what is a reasonable time to preserve an interest under a marketable 
title statute is much the same problem as arises when a period of limitations 
is retroactively shortened. See p. 42 supra. 
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settled beyond question by the decisions sustaining retroactive 
recording statutes.152 At least one statute, however, requires 
the commencing of an action to preserve an existing claim 
which would be extinguished by the statute.153 As to owners 
who presently have a mature cause of action, there would 
seem to be no valid objection to this sort of requirement. It 
is like shortening the period of limitations, which offends no 
constitutional rights if a reasonable time is allowed for the 
bringing of the action.154 But if the interest has not become 
possessory, there may not be available any action which the 
owner can bring, with the result that the interest is extin-
guished without the owner's ever having a real opportunity 
to preserve it. This is likely to be held to offend constitu-
tional principles. 
The application of marketable title statutes to future in-
terests is discussed subsequently in Chapter 4.155 
As pointed out previously, there is a considerable body of 
authority holding that an owner of a fee-simple title is con-
stitutionally entitled to ignore assertions to title not in the 
form of a suit or adverse possession.156 This principle, it is 
true, can have little relevancy to most of the existing market-
able title statutes for, generally speaking, they operate only 
in favor of persons in actual or constructive possession 157 who 
can show a connected chain of record title, or in favor of 
purchasers or mortgagees from such persons. In other words, 
only persons not in possession are required to take steps to 
save their interests. But if any legislature should undertake 
152 Supra P· 73· 
153 Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann., sec. z-6 3 7 ( Supp. 19 51). 
154 Supra p. 42. 
155 P. 227 et seq. The comments in note 69 supra this Chapter in respect to 
extinction of marital interests by retroactive statutes of limitations are also 
apropos to marketable title statutes. 
156 Supra p. 47· 
157 The Michigan statute quoted above supra note 149 does not require an 
affirmative showing of possession. It requires only the negative showing of 
no one in hostile possession. 
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to make the record title conclusive evidence of ownership, 
especially if the period beyond which search need not be 
made is relatively short, there could conceivably be instances 
in which the actual owner in possession but who was not the 
record title holder (e.g., one who had acquired his title by 
adverse possession) would find himself about to be divested 
of ownership in favor of the record title holder. Thus the 
above constitutional principle would come directly into play. 
It was upon this very principle that the Supreme Court of 
Kansas 158 held to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment a statute 159 which provided that where plats and deeds 
from the plattors, conveying lots or blocks, had been on rec-
ord for more than 2 5 years prior to the effective date of the 
statute, such deeds should be conclusively presumed to have 
conveyed perfect title notwithstanding any defect in the title 
of the grantor or the failure of the grantor's spouse to join in 
the conveyance. The statute further provided that the pre-
sumption should not be applied in any action brought within 
one year from the date that the statute took effect. The court 
was constrained to hold that the statute was unconstitutional 
because it had the effect of divesting one person of his title 
and tra1_1sferring it to another without regard to the posses-
sion and occupancy of the owner whose title had never been 
alienated, unless his title and ownership were asserted in an 
action within the year allowed by the statute. Said the court: 
158 Murrison v. Fenstermacher, I66 Kan. 568, 203 P. 2d I6o (I949). This 
was a suit to compel defendant to furnish plaintiff with a merchantable title 
and thus perform a contract for the purchase and sale of land between 
plaintiff and defendant. Defendant's abstract showed that a patent had been 
issued by the United States to one Lennon in I 8 6 5 but did not show any 
conveyance from Lennon to any one from whom defendant claimed. The 
land in question was shown to have been platted by one Sheeran in I893 
and recorded Dec. 23, I 893. The plattor conveyed the lots in question to 
defendant's ancestor by warranty deed dated Dec. 5, I895· This deed was 
recorded. 
159 Laws I945, c. 264; Gen. Stat. I949, sec. 67-612, repealed Laws I95I, 
c. 3 7 I, sec. I. 
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"In effect they [the words of the statute] simply provide 
that as between two parties, neither of whose rights to a tract 
of real estate have been adjudicated, one person is the owner 
and the other is not." 160 
" [T] he statute does not purport to run in favor of 
one in possession under deeds such as are described therein 
against one who may be out of possession but is nevertheless 
the holder of a title which so far as the record shows has 
never been alienated. Under its terms such deeds are con-
clusively presumed to convey perfect title irrespective of 
possession and occupancy by the owner of the prior un-
alienated title and even though he may actually have been 
in possession thereunder he is required to come in and defend 
it in order to avoid the presumption and establish his title." 161 
PROCEEDINGS TO QUIET TITLE AND TO REGISTER TITLE 
The legislature has power to provide for special proceed-
ings, in the nature of proceedings in rem, to fix the status of 
land, and to declare the nature of the titles and interests 
therein and the person or persons in whom such titles and in-
terests are at the time vested.162 It has been contended un-
successfully in numerous cases that statutory proceedings for 
quieting title and proceedings for the registration of title 
under the Torrens Acts deprive the owner of his interests 
without due process. When a statute has been declared in-
valid, this was not done because there was a deprivation of 
substantive rights, but because there was a failure to provide 
adequate procedural due process, which may be a matter of 
not assuring adequate notice 163 or of delegating judicial 
160 166 Kan. 568, 572, 203 P. 2d 16o, 163. 
161 r66 Kan. 568, 572, 203 P. 2d 16o, 163. 
162 Robinson v. Kerrigan, 151 Cal. 40, 90 Pac. 129 ( 1907). 
l63State v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575,47 N. E. 551 (1897). 
It is universally held that notice by publication as to unknown and 
nonresident persons satisfies the requirement of due process. Jacob v. Roberts, 
223 U.S. 261 (1912); American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47 (1911); 
Robinson v. Kerrigan, 151 Cal. 40, 90 Pac. 129 (1907); Loring v. Hildreth, 
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functions to administrative officers.164 If the purpose and 
effect of proceedings for quieting title and registration of land 
were to give the petitioner an absolute title, clear of all en-
cumbrances, there would manifestly be a taking of property 
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment, but the purpose 
of such proceedings is merely to empower the court or ad-
ministrative agency to determine the actual status of the title 
170 Mass. 328, 49 N. E. 652 (1898); McFadin v. Simms, 309 Mo. 312, 
273 S. W. 1050 (1925). If notice by publication did not satisfy the con-
stitutional requirement of due process, "a judicial proceeding to clear titles 
against all the world hardly is possible; for the very meaning of such a 
proceeding is to get rid of unknown as well as known claims,-indeed, certainty 
against the unknown may be said to be its chief end,-and unknown claims 
cannot be dealt with by personal service upon the claimant." Tyler v. Judges 
of Court of Registration, 17 5 Mass. 71, 7 3, 55 N. E. 812, 813 ( 1900). The 
problem of adequate notice is also discussed Chapter 4, p. 132 et seq. 
Notice by publication does result occasionally in what appears to be a 
deprivation of substantive rights. The owner of an interest fails to see the 
notice, does not appear, and a judgment is awarded which extinguishes his 
interest. See McFadin v. Simms, 309 Mo. 312, 273 S. W. 1050 (1925), 
discussed Chapter 4, p. 152. 
164 The early Illinois and Ohio Torrens Acts were held unconstitutional 
on the ground that they violated the constitutional mandate of separation of 
powers in that they conferred judicial powers upon registers and examiners 
of title by empowering these officials to make the primary determination 
of the status of the title. People v. Chase, 165 Ill. 527, 46 N. E. 454 
(1895); State v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575, 47 N. E. 551 (1897). Probably 
few courts today would be willing to go along completely with this view. 
Robinson v. Kerrigan, 151 Cal. 40, 90 Pac. I 29 (I 907). In Illinois subsequent 
legislation of the same general character has been sustained. People v. Simon, 
176 Ill. I65, 52 N. E. 9Io (1898); Eliason v. Wilburn, 335 Ill. 352, I67 
N. E. 1oi (I929). 
The conferment of final and conclusive power upon administrative officers 
or quasi-administrative bodies to determine title would probably be held to 
deprive the parties concerned of procedural due process. However, there is 
no constitutional objection if initial determination is confided to an admin-
istrative officer or agency provided that final determination is entrusted to a 
regularly constituted court. Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, I75 
Mass. 7I, 55 N. E. 812 (1900); Robinson v. Kerrigan, 151 Cal. 40, 90 
Pac. 129 (I907); Crowell v. Akin, 152 Ga. 126, 108 S. E. 791 (192.1). 
It has been held not to be a denial of due process, nor an unwarranted 
invasion of the property rights of a land owner, to provide by statute that 
the register of titles shall constitute prima facie proof of ownership. Johnson, 
Inc. v. Warden, 173 P. zd 838 (Cal. 1946). There is a presumption that a 
public official has regularly performed his duty. 
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to the land in question and no more.165 It is, therefore, point-
less to contend that the statute fails to provide adequate 
l65White v. Ainsworth, 62 Colo. 5I3, I63 Pac. 959 (I9I7) (Torrens Act); 
McFadin v. Simms, 309 Mo. 3I2, 273 S. W. I050 (I925) (quieting title); 
Sederquist v. Brown, 225 Mass. 2 I 7, I I4 N. E. 365 ( I916) (land registra-
tion); McCarthy v. Lane, 30I Mass. 125, I6 N. E. 2d 683 (1938) (land 
registration); Petition of Sherman, I06 Misc. Rep. 244, I75 N. Y. S. 627 
( I9I9) (said that Torrens Acts are passed to allow the registration of good 
titles and not for the purpose of making bad titles good). 
A qualification of the statement made in the text above that registration 
proceedings and proceedings for quieting title are not intended to clear the 
title of valid encumbrances must be made in respect to a Massachusetts Land 
Registration Act which authorized the Land Court to register land free of 
equitable restrictions if the court shall find that such restrictions, though they 
are valid and have not become inoperative, illegal, or void because contrary 
to law or injurious to the public interest, ought, nevertheless, not to be 
enforced. A petitioner for registration was required by the act to pay such 
damages as were found would be caused by the nonenforcement of the 
restriction to persons entitled to the benefits of the restriction. Mass. Stat. 
I9I5, c. I I2, sees. I & 2. In Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Chadwick, 
228 Mass. 242, II? N. E. 244 (I9I7) the Supreme Judicial Court declared 
the act to be in violation of the Declaration of Rights. The Land Court had 
found that it would be inequitable to enforce the restrictions in question because 
the original plan to develop the area for expensive residences was no longer 
practicable, but it also had found that removal of the restrictions would cause 
money damages to property owners and render their homes less desirable as 
residences. The Supreme Judicial Court declared that the respondent property 
owners had a property right in the equitable servitude, which, if the act were 
given effect, they would be obliged to surrender and to accept damages in place 
thereof, not because demanded by the public interests, but because a neighbor 
so desired for his private aims. 
The Chadwick case does not seem to have been decided correctly, inasmuch 
as the respondent property owners appeared to be no worse off under the act 
than they would have been had the doctrine of changed conditions been 
invoked as a defense in a suit brought by them to enforce the restrictions. 
The chief difference appears to have been that the servient owners were 
permitted to take the initiative instead of having to wait to be sued by the 
property owners. When a court refuses equitable relief on the ground of 
changed conditions, the result is to compel the dominant owner to sell his 
right to the servient owner for such sum as may be assessed for damages, 
if any. Of course, had the doctrine of changed conditions never been recognized 
by the Massachusetts courts, the restrictions would have been deprived of 
vitality by the act, and unless there were some cogent public interest involved, 
a deprivation of property without due process might seem to be manifest. 
Also, to the extent that the act permitted removal of restrictions beyond 
where the courts would have allowed the defense of changed conditions, the 
constitutionality of the act would be in serious question. 
Under the circumstances in the Chadwick case, it was incorrect for the court 
to say that the public had no interest in the matter. If the restrictions had 
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compensation for property taken.166 Nor is there any uncon-
stitutional taking of property in that the owner may be com-
pelled to spend money to defend his interests against adverse 
claims.167 
When these considerations are borne in mind, it is apparent 
that it cannot be material whether the interests which are 
adjudicated in the statutory proceeding have their inception 
prior to the statute or whether they arose after the statute. 
In the states having the Torrens System or other system of 
land registration, registration is entirely voluntary. Because 
of the great cost of having the status of title adjudicated so 
that the title may be registered, it is doubtful that the legis-
lature could compel present owners of property to register 
their titles.168 Only in case of unusual circumstances would 
ceased to be useful for the purpose for which they were created, it was in the 
public interest that they be extinguished so that the erection of apartment 
houses or buildings for business purposes might be allowed. 
See Note, Effect of Changed Conditions Upon Equitable Servitudes, 31 
Harv. L. Rev. 876 (1918), expressing approval of the decision in the 
Chadwick case. 
166White v. Ainsworth, 62 Colo. 513, 163 Pac. 959 (1917). 
167Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 440 (1916). 
168 The precise point has apparently never been determined by the courts. 
However in Anderson v. Shepard, 285 Ill. 544; 121 N. E. 215 (1918) the 
following statute was held unconstitutional: "It shall be the duty of all 
executors and administrators, appointed after the adoption of this act and 
trustees holding title or power of sale under wills admitted to probate after 
that date, to apply within six months after their appointment, to have 
registered the titles to all nonregistered estates and interests in land (situated 
in any county in which this act at the time is in force), which the several 
decedents they represent might have registered in their lifetime in their own 
right .... " Laws of Ill. 1903, p. 121. It was held that the statute 
deprived the heirs of property without due process in that it sought to invest 
the administrator or executor with the power to register the title to the land 
against the wishes of the heirs who were the owners. Personal property falling 
to the heirs might be expended for the payment of the costs of the proceeding. 
There might be void tax claims or other invalid charges against the land, 
and against which the owner could rest in security because they could not be 
enforced against his property, but upon an application to register title the 
applicant might be compelled by the court to reimburse the claimant. 
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such interference with property rights probably be toler-
ated.169 
On several occasions in American history, emergencies 
have prompted the enactment of legislation authorizing pro-
ceedings for the determination of title. The Burnt Record 
Acts enacted as a result of the Chicago fire and the San 
Francisco fire were specifically designed to remedy the con-
fusion caused by destruction of public records in those holo-
causts. Both the Illinois and the California statutes were 
sustained.170 The Illinois statute limited the time for opening 
a decree made under the statute to one year after its entry. 
This, however, was only a limitation of actions and quite 
within the legislative power. Another example of emergency 
legislation was the legislation adopted in New York shortly 
following the Revolutionary War, which provided for the 
appointment of commissioners with full power to determine 
all controversies respecting titles and claims in a certain 
county (which arose as a result of conflicting patents to war 
169 Compulsory adjudication of water rights has been upheld in the arid 
states on the ground that the welfare of the state is dependent upon certainty 
as to water titles. Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U. S. 440 (1916); 
Eden Irrig. Co. v. District Court, 61 Utah 103, 211 Pac. 957 (1922). 
170Bertrand v. Taylor, 87 Ill. 235 (1877); American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 
219U.S.47 (1910). 
The California statute provides: "Whenever the public records in the office 
of the county recorder have been, or shall hereafter be, lost or destroyed, in 
whole or in any material part, by flood, fire, earthquake . . . , any person 
who claims an estate of inheritance, or for life in, and who is by himself or 
his tenant, or other person, holding under him, in the actual and peaceable 
possession of any real property in such county, may bring and maintain an 
action in rem against all the world . . . , in the superior court for the 
county in which such real property is situate, to establish his title to such 
property and to determine all adverse claims thereto. Any number of 
separate parcels of land claimed by the plaintiff may be included in the same 
action." Stats., Ex. Sess. 1906, p. 78; as amended, Gen. Laws 1944, Act 1026, 
sec. 1 (Deering). This statute was upheld in American Land Co. v. Zeiss. 
Most of the emphasis of the court, however, was placed upon the procedural 
aspects of the statute. 
The Illinois Burnt Record Act was sustained in Bertrand v. Taylor. Laws 
r8p-2, p. 6p; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, c. u6, sec. 5· 
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veterans) and limited the time within which an appeal could 
be taken.171 
However, even in these occasions of emergency, the pro-
ceedings were not compulsory in the sense that an affirmative 
duty was explicitly imposed by the statutes on each property 
owner to assert or register his title if he did not want to lose 
it, but only mandatory in that the property owner would 
probably deem taking of affirmative steps to be the only wise 
course of action lest some other claimant be adjudged to 
have the title in a proceeding in which he failed to assert his 
rights. 
Although no one is required under the Torrens Acts to 
register his land unless he sees fit to do so, when an owner 
does bring his land under the act, he presumptively does so 
with knowledge of all its provisions and requirements, in-
cluding its obligations. He consequently cannot be heard to 
complain that he is deprived of property without due process 
if he loses his title to a bona fide purchaser through the fraud 
of an agent to whom the certificate of title had been en-
trusted.172 
II. TRANSFERS AT DEATH 
Could the legislature repeal the statute of descents and 
distributions, entirely abrogate the power of testamentary 
disposition, and do away altogether with the right to inherit 
property? Obviously the question is academic, but the courts 
have from time to time gratuitously offered their opinions. 
". . . [T]he owner has no right, other than that created 
by statute, to transfer his property at death, either by will or 
intestate succession-no 'right' in that respect, therefore, 
171 Jackson ex dem. Hart v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 2.80 (U. S. 183o). The 
statute was held not to impair the obligation of the deeds. 
172 Eliason v. Wilborn, 335 Ill. 352., 167 N. E. 101 (192.9), aff'd 2.81 
u.s. 457 (1930). 
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which is not subject to change by the Legislature at any 
time." 173 
The Supreme Court of the United States has said that the 
power to dispose of property at death "has always been con-
sidered purely a creature of statute and within legislative 
control:" 174 
"Rights of succession to the property of a deceased, 
whether by will or by intestacy, are of statutory creation, and 
the dead hand rules succession only by sufferance." 175 
The Supreme Court of Iowa tells us that: 
"The legislature may restrict the succession of estates of 
decedents in any manner, and, if it pleased, could absolutely 
repeal the statute of wills and of descent and distribution. It 
could, in the exercise of sovereignty, take any or all property, 
upon the death of the owner, for the payment of decedent's 
debts, and apply the residue to public uses." 176 
In answer to the argument that the privilege of the citizen to 
dispose of his property by will is a constitutional right which 
the legislature cannot destroy or abridge, the Supreme Court 
of Ohio replied: 
"We concede that the right to acquire property implies the 
right to dispose of it. But the inalienable rights here de-
173 Kicey v. Kicey, I 14 N. J. Eq. II6, ll8, 168 Atl. 424, 426 (Err. & 
App. 1933). This case dealt with a statute giving the surviving spouse a 
share in the deceased spouse's estate. 
174 United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 627 (1896). The question 
was whether personal property bequeathed to the United States was subject to 
an inheritance tax under state law. 
175 Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U. S. 556, 562 (1941). This case had 
to do with a New York statute which extended to the surviving spouse the 
privilege of electing to take in lieu of the provision under the deceased spouse's 
will a share in the estate as in intestacy. See infra notes 195, 208, 209. 
176 In re Emerson's Estate, 191 Iowa 900, 905, 183 N. W. 327, 329 (1921). 
The question was as to the power of the legislature to deprive one of the 
right to inherit from the person whom he has killed. Also in In re Evan's 
Will, 193 Iowa 1240, 1243, 188 N. W. 774, 775 ('1922) there is dictum 
to the effect that the legislature can if it wishes abolish the power of testa-
mentary disposition in toto. This case involved the question of whether a 
soldier under lawful age while in actual service can make a valid will. 
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dared, as well as those implied, are possessed by living, not 
by dead men." 177 
Similar language may be found in other cases.178 
With such broad statements the Wisconsin courts have 
taken issue (also in dictum merely) : 
177 Patton v. Patton, 39 Ohio St. 590, 597 (r883). Statute provided that 
a bequest to any benevolent, religious, educational or charitable purpose shall 
be invalid and void if the testator dies within twelve calendar months from 
the execution of the will, leaving issue of his body living or their legal 
representatives. 
17S In Ostrander v. Preece, 129 Ohio St. 625, 63r, 196 N. E. 670, 673 
(1935), appeal dismissed 269 U. S. 543 (1935), it was said: "The right 
to transmit or inherit property is not an inherent or natural right • • . but 
is purely a statutory right and subject to legislative control and restriction." 
This case deals with the constitutionality of a statute prescribing the dis-
position of the property of a decedent when there is no evidence of the order 
of the death of the decedent and the death of the heir or devisee. See footnotes 
212, 2r6, 219, 222 infra. 
In Brettun v. Fox, roo Mass. 234, 235 (1868) the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts declared: "The power to dispose of property by will 
is neither a natural nor a constitutional right, but depends wholly upon a 
statute, and may be conferred, taken away, or limited and regulated, in 
whole or in part, by the legislature . • ." This case held that an estate 
of homestead created by statute could not be affected by the will of the 
householder. 
Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615, 617 (1944): "The right 
to receive or dispose of property by last will and testament is not an inherent 
right, nor is it one that is guaranteed by the fundamental law. Nowhere in 
the federal Constitution is there any attempt to treat of the matter of dis-
position of property by will, no reference being made to the subject of 
testamentary alienation of property, either directly or by implication. . . • 
Therefore, the right of testamentary disposition of property does not emanate 
from the organic law, as contended by counsel, but is a creature of the law 
derived solely from statute without constitutional limitation. Accordingly, 
the right is at all times subject to regulation and control by the legislative 
authority which creates it. The authority which confers the right may 
impose conditions thereon, such as limiting disposition to a particular class 
or fixing the time which must ensue subsequent to the execution of the will 
before gifts to a particular class shall be deemed valid; or the right to dispose 
of property by will may be taken away altogether, if deemed necessary, 
without private or constitutional rights of the citizen being thereby violated." 
The statute involved provided that where testator is survived by issue or spouse, 
a devise or bequest for charitable purposes is void unless the will is duly 
executed at least six months prior to the death of the testator. 
Further quotations would be pointless. Other cases listed according to the 
issues involved are: 
Estate and inheritance tax cases: State ex rei. McClintock v. Guinotte, 
275 Mo. 298, 204 S. W. 8o6 (r9r8); Dillard v. New Mexico State Tax 
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"It [the testamentary power] is not a mere privilege which 
legislatures can directly or unreasonably regulate to destroy. 
It is not an incident of the possession of property which 
courts can deal with in any spirit of mere discretion. It is a 
right, absolute, which every person of mature mind and dis-
posing memory may exercise subject to some regulations to 
prevent abuse of it and to safeguard it, as he sees fit." 179 
In Nunnemacher v. State 180 the court flatly rejected the 
proposition put forth by courts of other jurisdictions that the 
right to take property by devise or descent is purely the 
creature of the law, a benefice, merely, which the state has 
kindly bestowed upon persons and consequently which it may 
take away when and as it pleases. This theory, said the court, 
proceeds from the false assumption that rights flow from 
Comm., 53 N. M. 12, 201 P. 2d 345 (1949); Renwick v. Martin, 126 N.]. 
Eq. 564, ro A. 2d 293 (Ch. 1940); Matter of Del Drago's Estate, 287 N.Y. 
6r, 38 N. E. 2d 131 (1941); In re Inman's Estate, 101 Ore. 182, 199 
Pac. 615 (1921); In re Knowles' Estate, 295 Pa. 571, 145 Atl. 797 (1929); 
In re Tack's Estate, 325 Pa. 545, 191 Atl. 155 (1937); In re Clark's 
Estate, roo Vt. 217, 136 Atl. 389 (1927); In re Sherwood's Estate, 122 Wash. 
648, 211 Pac. 734 (1922). 
Cases involving construction problems: Phillips v. Phillips, 21 3 Ala. 
27, 104 So. 234 (1925); Porter v. Union Trust Co. of Indianapolis, 182 
Ind. 637, ro8 N. E. 117 (1915). 
Cases involving testamentary capacity: In re Sharp's Estate, r 3 3 
Fla. 8o2, r83 So. 470 (1938); Woodville v. Pizzati, 119 Miss. 442, 81 So. 
127 (r919). 
Cases involving defectively executed wills: In re Tyrell's Estate, 
17 Ariz. 418, 153 Pac. 767 (1915); In re Wilkins' Estate, 54 Ariz. 218, 
94 P. 2d 774 (1939); Pfaffenberger v. Pfaffenberger, 189 Ind. 507, 127 N. E. 
766 (1920); In re Noyes' Estate, 40 Mont. 178, 105 Pac. 1013 (r9o9). 
Illegal conditions in wills: Girard Trust Co. v. Schmitz, 129 N. J. Eq. 
444, 20 A. 2d 21 (Ch. 1941); Vestal v. Pickering, 125 Ore. 553, 267 
Pac. 8 2 r ( r 928). 
Further cases are cited in Page, Wills, sec. 2 5 (Lifetime ed.). 
179 Ball v. Boston, 153 Wis. 27, 31, 141 N. W. 8, 10 (1913). The court 
made these observations in pointing out that courts ought to be very hesitant 
to overrule the expressed desires of the testator and should not let themselves 
be carried away by an exaggerated idea of the rights of disappointed relatives. 
lSO 129 Wis. 190, 108 N. W. 627 (r9o6). The question actually involved 
was the validity of an inheritance tax statute, which the court sustained. 
The Wisconsin courts agree, however, that reasonable restrictions on the 
testamentary power and the right to inherit are permissible. Hood's Estate, 
206 Wis. 227, 239 N. W. 448 (1931) infra note 221. The results reached in 
Wisconsin do not actually differ from those reached in other states. 
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the government. While this theory had great vogue in 
Europe, it has never had any place in America. The Declara-
tion of Independence recognizes that rights emanate from 
the people, and that governments are formed, not to give 
rights, but to secure rights which are already inherent in the 
people. The privilege to leave property by will and the right 
of descendants to succeed to the ownership of property has 
been recognized from the dawn of human history: 
"So clear does it seem to us from the historical point of view 
that the right to take property by inheritance or will has ex-
isted in some form among civilized nations from the time 
when the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, and so 
conclusive seems the argument that these rights are a part 
of the inherent rights which governments, under our con-
ception, are established to conserve, that we feel entirely 
justified in rejecting the dictum so frequently asserted by 
such a vast array of courts that these rights are purely statu-
tory and may be wholly taken away by the Legislature." 181 
A middle view, which would not leave the power of the 
legislature untrammelled and yet not surround the power 
to dispose of property or the right to inherit with a kind of 
sanctity, is that expressed by the United States Supreme 
Court in Campbell v. California 182 wherein it was said: 
181 129 Wis. 190, 202, 108 N. W. 627, 629. This language was approved 
in Estate of Wilkins, 192 Wis. 111, I 13, 2 I I N. W. 652, 65 3 ( I927). 
The point in the latter case was whether a beneficiary under a will could 
take if he murdered the testator. See also Beals v. State, 139 Wis. 544, 555, 
I2I N. W. 347, 350 (I909), where it is said that the right to inherit and 
power to dispose of property by will are natural rights which cannot be 
entirely abrogated by the legislature, but that this does not prevent the 
legislature from imposing an inheritance tax. Taxes are frequently levied 
upon transactions or occupations which are matters of inherent and natural 
rights. 
182 200 U. S. 87 (1906). This case involved the validity of a California 
inheritance tax statute imposing a charge on collateral inheritances and on 
bequests and devises. The contention was that the statute was repugnant to 
the Fourteenth Amendment because it subjected brothers and sisters of a 
decedent to the burdens of the tax and did not subject to any burden such 
strangers to the blood as the wife or widow of a son or the husband of a 
daughter of a decedent. 
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" The Fourteenth Amendment does not deprive a 
State of the power to regulate and burden the right to in-
herit, but at the most can only be held to restrain such an 
exercise of power as would exclude the conception of judg-
ment and discretion, and which would be so obviously arbi-
trary and unreasonable as to be beyond the pale of govern-
mental authority." 183 
The courts have been able to make extravagant assertions 
concerning the power of the legislature because the extent 
of the power has never really been put to test. While 
changes in the law of inheritance and testamentary disposi-
tion often seem to be unnecessary and without particular pur-
pose, they rarely offend our sense of justice. Furthermore, 
a generous portion of the statements about unlimited legisla-
tive power has come from cases where such pronouncements 
were in no way germane to the situations concerned, as, for 
example, cases dealing with construction problems, with wills 
alleged to be defectively executed or with inheritance and 
estate taxes. The tax cases, to be sure, come very close to pre-
senting what might appear to be an appropriate occasion for 
the delineation of the legislative power over disposition of 
property at death. Taxes may leave little or nothing to dis-
pose of or to inherit. But the fact that the government may 
absorb most or all of an estate in taxes does not necessarily 
mean that it may confiscate or appropriate the estate.184 The 
183 200 u.s. 87, 95 (1906). 
184 This was pointed out in Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 203, 108 
N. w. 627, 6jO. 
However, some courts have taken the view that an. inheritance tax is not 
a tax at all but simply a taking by the state of a share of the estate. In Strauss 
v. State, 36 N.D. 594, 6o1, 162 N. W. 908, 908 (1917) it was said: "The 
so-called inheritance tax, indeed, is, strictly speaking, not a tax at all. It is 
rather a permission on the part of the state that the heirs and legatees may 
take the bequests which are made to them less certain sums which are retained 
by it. In other words, it is a declaration that the state, instead of claiming 
all of the estate of a decedent, will only retain a certain portion thereof and 
will allow the legatees to receive the remainder and according to the wishes 
of the testator, but less certain sums which it itself reserves. It says, This 
property is ours, but we will allow you certain legatees to take a certain 
portion thereof and under certain conditions." 
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power to tax, after all, is plenary and admits of few limita-
tions other than that the exaction must be for the purpose of 
raising public revenues. It is submitted that if a state were 
actually to engage in a program of abolishing private owner-
ship by taking away absolutely the power to dispose of prop-
erty at death and the right to inherit, or were to enact unjust 
and unreasonable statutes, the courts, so long as they re-
mained free and independent, would refuse to apply such 
statutes. 
But whether the dicta are truly h_yperboles or not, the 
writer has assumed that all constitutional doubts cannot be 
dispelled simply by saying that the legislature is all power-
ful in its control over the disposition of property at death. 
He has undertaken to analyze the decided cases, first from 
the point of view of the constitutional rights of the owner 
of property who desires to dispose of it at death, and secondly 
from the point of view of the constitutional rights of the 
heirs and devisees of the deceased owner. 
THE POWER OF TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION 
It is accepted without dissent that in order for a will to 
be legally effective the formalities prescribed by the statutes 
must be adhered to. Nowhere in the Anglo-American law 
is the power of testamentary disposition recognized in the 
sense that one's bare wishes must be recognized and given 
effect.185 The power of the legislature to prescribe formalities 
is too well established to admit of argument. However, 
there is a palpable difference between requiring the exercise 
of the power to be in accordance with fixed formalities and 
denying the power in whole or in part. To say that no will is 
valid unless its form follows an acceptable pattern does not 
185 For an interesting historical discussion of the will see McMurray, 
Liberty of Testation and Some Modern Limitations Thereon, 14 Ill. L. Rev. 
96 (1920). 
ACQUISITION OF INTERESTS IN LAND 97 
answer the question of the extent of the legislature's power 
to delimit the power of testamentary disposition. And be-
cause a testator may not transgress legislative policy in re-
gard to tying up property, or may not impose certain condi-
tions on his devises and bequests, or may not dispose of his 
property entirely as he pleases, it does not mean that he can 
be prevented altogether from disposing of his property. Rea-
sonable restrictions can be imposed on the enjoyment, use, 
and disposition of property. 
An eminent authority states that the power to make a will 
is not a property right or vested interest: 
"It did not exist for realty at common law, nor at one time 
for more than a fraction of a testator's personalty. It is there-
fore not a right protected by any of the constitutional pro-
visions whereby property is protected, which is sometimes 
expressed by saying that it is not a natural right; nor an 
inherent right; but it is purely a statutory right, subject to 
the complete control of the legislature." 186 
This statement is premised upon the dicta noted above and 
upon dicta in other cases, including some having to do with 
the prescription of formalities. The rationale which he as-
signs for the view that the power of testamentary disposition 
is not a vested interest is not very persuasive. The fact that 
an interest had its origin in a statute rather than in the com-
mon law does not mean that it is not protected by the con-
stitutional guarantees.187 However, a very good position can 
186 I Page, Wills, sec. 25 (Lifetime ed.). 
187 "Vested rights may be created, either by the common law, by statute, or 
by contract. And it makes no difference as to the method of their creation; 
they are entitled to the same protection." Gladney v. Sydnor, I 72 Mo. 3 I 8, 
p6, 72 s. w, 554, 556 (1903). 
Directly contrary to Page's supposition is the recognition by the courts that 
interests arising under community property statutes cannot arbitrarily be 
taken away by subsequent legislation. Cooke v. Cooke, 65 Cal. App. zd 26o, 
150 P. 2d 514 (1944); Wissner v. Wissner, 201 P. 2d 837 (Cal. 1949); 
Pritchard v. Citizens' Bank, 8 La. 130 (I835); Kearse v. Kearse, 276 S. W. 
690 (Tex. 1925); Guye v. Guye, 63 Wash. 340, II5 Pac. 731 (1911). See 
Chapter 6, p. 300, 
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be taken that the power to dispose of property by will is not 
a constitutionally protected interest. The individual whose 
power has been impinged upon will invariably be dead when 
the question of deprivation of constitutional rights arises. 
The dead have no constitutional rights. Thus, so far as the 
testator is concerned, it is hard to see how there can be any 
question of the validity of the statute, even if it is subsequent 
to the acquisition of the land which the decedent sought to 
devise, so that he was retroactively deprived of a power of 
disposition which he would have had if he had died previous 
to the statute. Furthermore, when the execution of the will 
and the death of the testator are both subsequent to the enact-
ment of the statute, nothing more needs to be said than that 
the testator should have taken the statute into account and 
have disposed of his property inter vivos if need be. Anyway, 
it is never the owner of land who complains of the loss of 
the power to will away his property, but the devisee whose 
expectations are thwarted. The devisee's claim to have a 
vested interest will be considered subsequently. 
On the other hand, the concept that the state can do away 
with the power of devising altogether has been strongly con-
demned as an old, antiquated rule of law which came from 
the Norman Conquest and which is out of accord with the 
Bill of Rights: 
"This means that every man has a right to acquire property 
by gift, or purchase; that government is instituted to protect 
the people, and not to rob either the living or the dead. The 
right to acquire and protect property is no greater that the 
right to dispose of it by sale or gift. According to the funda-
mental principles of right, when, by any just means, a person 
acquires title to property, and when he can no longer-use his 
property he has a just right and is under moral obligations to 
devise and transfer it to his heirs. The state does not stand 
in the place of William the Conqueror. It is no lord para-
mount. It is merely a corporate entity which we, the people, 
have devised and created for the purpose of protecting our 
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natural rights. It has no kingly prerogatives. It does not 
exist by divine right. It is not the natural heir of any person, 
and it has no right to rob the citizen who pays his just and 
appropriate share of the public burdens." 188 
The very fact that the courts have on occasion seriously 
considered the contention that the power to dispose of prop-
erty by will is an incident of ownership which the legislature 
is powerless to take away would seem to indicate that they 
are not completely willing to disregard the interests of the 
dead (or, at least, not completely willing to put the claim 
of a devisee upon the basis of a mere sufferance). In Sturgis 
et al. v. Ewing 189 it was objected that the legislature tran-
scended its constitutional powers if the act in question (which 
allowed the widow to elect to take one-half of her husband's 
land in lieu of dower) were to be applied to property ac-
quired by the testator before the passage of the act. The an-
swer of the court was as follows: 
"Mr. Ewing's title to this land was as full, complete and 
absolute after as before the passage of the law. The fee-
simple absolute was still in him, and was as much subject to 
his absolute use, dominion and control as ever." 190 
"The power to control the disposition of our possessions after 
our demise is conferred by municipal laws, and is purely a 
subject of municipal regulation. It is not a part of the right 
of property itself, but is only an incident to it, as the law, for 
188 Robinson, J., dissenting, in Strauss v. State, 36 N. D. 594, 6o9, 161. 
N. W. 9o8, 911 (1917). The majority sustained an inheritance tax graduated 
according to degree of relationship between decedent and devisee. 
18918 Ill. 176 (1856). The statute provided that if a husband die leaving 
no children or descendants of children, his widow may elect to have in lieu 
of dower, one-half of all his real estate absolutely. Rev. Stat. 1845, c. 34, 
sec. 15. William G. Wein, who died subsequent to the statute, devised his 
estate to various parties including his widow. He was survived by no children 
or descendants of children. His widow renounced the provisions of the will 
and elected to take in lieu of dower as provided in the statute. Under the 
law as it stood when the land was acquired, the husband was empowered 
to devise all of his real estate as he pleased, saving to the widow her right of 
dower. 
19018 Ill. 176, 183. 
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the time being, makes it so. Without this power, our title 
may be complete and absolute. By devising our property we 
do not lessen or impair, in the least degree, our title to the 
property devised. We may change the devise, or alienate it, 
at pleasure, at any time during our lives; and, until our de-
mise, the devisee acquires no sort of right or title to it. When 
we acquire property, we do not acquire with it, and as a part 
of it, the right to devise it in any particular mode, or even 
to devise it at all." 191 
Similarly in O'Brien v. Ash et al.192 it was claimed that in-
sofar as the statute deprived the testatrix of the power to 
dispose of any estate which she had at the time of or prior to 
the passage of the same, the statute was null and void because 
it contravened the section of the Missouri Constitution pro-
hibiting retroactive legislation 193 and violated the due proc-
ess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court said: 
"No right of the plaintiff's wife to the land in controversy is 
or can be invoked in this case to call for a discussion of the 
questions of vested rights of the wife. She is dead, and it is 
now a question of how the property belonging to her during 
life, is to be disposed of, and in that subject she could not be 
said to have had a vested interest which the act of I 89 5 in 
191 18 Ill. 176, 184. 
192169 Mo. 283, 69 S. W. 8 (1901). This was an action in partition. 
Plaintiff claimed one-half of the land of his deceased wife. Defendants were 
devisees of deceased. Mrs. O'Brien had acquired the land in 1890. She died in 
1898, without any child or other descendants in being capable of inheriting. 
By will dated 1897 she undertook to devise all of the real estate in controversy 
to the defendants. Laws 1895, p. 169 provided: "When a wife shall die 
without any child or other descendants in being capable of inheriting, her 
widower shall be entitled to one-half of the real and personal estate belonging 
to the wife at the time of her death, absolutely, subject to the payment of 
the wife's debts." Mo. Rev. Stat. 1949, sec. 469.130. 
Accord, Spurlock v. Burnett, 183 Mo. 524, 81 S. W. 1221 (1904); 
Ferguson v. Gentry, 206 Mo. 189, 104 S. W. 104 ( 1907) (marriage and 
acquisition of land both occurred prior to statute). 
193 "That no ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of 
contracts, or retrospective in its operation, or making any irrevocable grant of 
special privileges or immunities, can be passed by the General Assembly." 
Mo. Const. 1875, Art. II, sec. 15; now, with insignificant modifications, Mo. 
Const. 1945, Art. I, sec. 13· See Chapt<:r 2, p. q, for a discussion of the 
meaning given this provision. 
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any way disturbed. The chief difficulty that has arisen in this 
controversy has been in the failure of appellants' counsel to 
recognize the distinction between the right to own and hold 
property and the right to dispose of same by will. The one 
is a natural right of the citizen, which, when acquired under 
existing laws, becomes a vested right, and not subject to be 
defeated by subsequent legislation; the other a creation of 
legislative enactment, and subject at all times to legislative 
regulation and change. So long as plaintiff's wife was alive 
to enjoy the use of her property, it belonged to her, free from 
legislative interference, and the act of I 89 5 could have no 
effect or influence upon it, or of her use or disposition of it 
whatever; but when death came and she could no longer 
enjoy it, her acquisition ceased, and with it the right to direct 
its future use and ownership only as the legislative will was 
indicated by the statute then in force upon that subject." 194 
There are other cases involving statutes which inhibit the 
power of testamentary disposition in which the courts were 
asked to protect the rights of the decedent.195 It is really not 
194169 Mo. 283, 297, 69 S. W. 8, 12 (1901). 
See also Key v. Key, 134 Md. 418, 421, 106 Atl. 744, 746 (1919) wherein 
it was said: "The statute it will be seen operates only upon property owned and 
belonging to a person at the time of his or her death, and does not in any 
way change or divest rights or estates in property already descended or 
vested, nor does it affect the enioyment and ownership of property by the 
owner during his life." The statute in question (Acts r 9 I 6, c. 3 2 5, sec. 3) 
provided: "A surviving husband or widow shall take, as heir, the same share 
or proportion in lands, tenements or hereditaments within this State belonging 
to the deceased spouse, at the time of his or her death, though such deceased 
spouse die testate, which such surviving husband or widow would take in the 
personal property of a resident spouse so dying testate • • ." The testator's 
will made no devise or bequest to his wife. 
195 The legislation involved in the following situations is but a small 
selection from the many statutes to be found in all jurisdictions which 
inhibit the power of testamentary disposition. The cases were selected for 
mention because the courts in determining the validity of the legislation gave 
some consideration to rights the decedent might have had. 
It is within the power of the legislature to declare gifts and devises of lands, 
or any interest therein, in favor of any religious or ecclesiastical organization 
to be null and void. Blackbourn v. Tucker, 72 Miss. 735, 17 So. 737 (I895); 
Patton v. Patton, 3 Ohio St. 590 (I 8 8 3) (bequest to be void when testator 
wrvived by issue, if will executed less than twelve months prior to testator's 
death); Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359, I7 So. 2d 6I5 (I944) (bequest to 
be void when testator survived by issue or spouse, if will executed less than 
six months prior to testator's death); In re Beck's Estate, 44 Mont. 561, 
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surprising that the courts have usually dismissed such matters 
with a flat statement that the statute is valid. The restric-
tions imposed on the testamentary power have not been un-
reasonable; most of them have been imposed to prevent the 
testator from ignoring obligations to the surviving spouse 
and family. 
An examination of the cases indicates that it has not been 
considered to be constitutionally material that the will of the 
decedent was executed prior to the statute which restricts the 
I2 I Pac. 7 84 ( I9I2). The purpose of such legislation, it has been suggested, 
is to prevent one who will not be charitable at his own expense from being 
so at the expense of those who are, or should be, the natural objects of his 
bounty. Taylor v. Payne, I54 Fla. 359, I7 So. 2d 6I5 (I944); Blackbourn 
v. Tucker, 72 Miss. 735, I7 So. 73.7 (I895). 
A legislature may provide that a devise of land can be made only to 
natural persons and to such corporations as are created under the laws of 
the state and are authorized to take by devise. United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 
3 I 5 ( I8 7 6). A statute is valid which declares that, with certain exceptions, 
devises and bequests to foreign countries, cities and bodies politic shall be void. 
Estate of Weeks, I54 Kan. I03, II4 P. 2d 857 (I94I). 
The privilege of disinheriting a spouse may be taken away. Irving Trust 
Co. v. Day, 314 U. S. 556 (I94I) (widow allowed share under statute in 
spite of antenuptial agreement entered into prior to the statute). The legis-
lature, in other words, may continue against the estate of the decedent the 
social obligations and responsibilities of the marriage. The householder may 
be deprived of the power of willing away the homestead. Brettun v. Fox, 
Ioo Mass. 234 (I868); Thomas v. Williams, 51 Fla. 332,40 So. 83I (I9o6). 
The legislature may deprive the testator of the privilege of devising all his 
property to his wife; it may limit the share which the widow can take to a 
child's portion. Leffier v. Leffier, I5I Fla. 455, Io So. 2d 799 ( I942); Adams 
v. Adams, I47 Fla. 267, 2 So. 2d 855 (I94I), appeal dismissed for want 
of a substantial federal question, 3I4 U. S. 572 (I94I). The Leffler and 
Adams cases involved the Florida Step Mother Act, for. which see note 
2oi infra. 
The legislature may limit the time within which application for probate 
of the will may be made. State ex rel. Bier v. Bigger, 352 Mo. 502, I78 
S. W. 2d 347 (I944). 
It has been held not to be a denial of equal protection of the law to restrict 
a married woman's power to dispose of her property without the consent 
of her husband without imposing a similar restriction on the power of a 
married man to devise his property without the consent of his wife. In re 
Mahaffay's Estate, 79 Mont. 10, 254 Pac. 875 (I927). This decision was 
predicated upon the historical differentiation of the property rights of men 
and women and upon the ground that the two classifications are natural and 
reasonable, and that, furthermore, the interpretation of the equal protection 
clause should not be pressed to a dryly logical extreme. 
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testamentary power, provided always that the death of the 
testator occurs subsequent to the effective date of the statute. 
Some courts have declared as a general principle that the law 
in force at the testator's death governs and not the law at 
the time of the execution of the will.196 This is said to be 
because of the ambulatory nature of wills; an executed will, 
unlike an executed deed, affects no interests and creates no 
rights, but takes effect only at the death of the testator.197 It 
has even been suggested that the courts are bound as a mat-
ter of principle to look exclusively to the law obtaining at 
the testator's death for the effect of the will, since otherwise 
new legislation would never begin to take effect until after all 
prior wills had been outlived/98 
Statutes have been applied to previously executed wills 
where the application resulted in partial or complete revoca-
tion of the will.199 Moreover, statutes have been applied to 
196 Estate of Weeks, 154 Kan. 103, 114 P. 2d 857 (1941); Blackbourn 
v. Tucker, 72 Miss. 735, 17 So. 737 (1895); Wakefield v. Phelps, 37 N.H. 
295 (1858); In re Gaffken's Will, 197 App. Div. 257, 188 N. Y. S. 852 
(2d Dept. 1921); De Peyster v. Clendining, 8 Paige 295 (N. Y. 1840); 
In re Ziegner's Estate, 146 Wash. 537, 264 Pac. 12 (1928). Contra, Muilock 
v. Souder, 5 Watts & S. 198, 199 (Pa. 1843). ("A devise of real estate is in 
the nature of a conveyance • . • and a statute will not be considered as 
altering the effect of a conveyance already made, so as to pass more than it 
purported to pass when made. A retroactive effect will not be given to a 
statute so as to affect contracts or property.") 
By the weight of authority, however, the courts construe statutes which 
change the law of wills to apply only to wills which are executed after the 
statute is enacted, unless the intention of the legislature to make the statute 
apply to wills which have already been executed can be found. 1 Page, 
Wills, sec. 29 (Lifetime ed.). 
197 In re Ziegner's Estate, 146 Wash. 537, 264 Pac. 12 (1928); In re 
Elcock's Will, 4 McCord 39 (S. C. 1826); Wakefield v. Phelps, 37 N. H. 
295, 306 (1858); Hamilton and Wife v. Flinn, 21 Tex. 713 (1858). 
198 In re Gaffken's Will, 197 App. Div. 257, 188 N. Y. S. 852 (2d Dept. 
1921). But the weight of authority is contra. See note 196 supra. 
199 The following group of cases is not intended to be exhaustive, but merely 
illustrative. 
Key v. Key, 134 Md. 418, 106 Atl. 744 (1919). Decedent died in 
1917, leaving a will dated April 18, 1913. He made no devise or bequest 
to his wife. A statute enacted in 1916 provided that a surviving husband or 
wife shall take one-third in fee of the lands belonging to the deceased spouse 
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executed wills under circumstances where it was impossible 
or virtually impossible for the testator to have made provi-
sion for other disposition of his property before death. In 
Lejjier v. Lejjier et al.200 the Florida Stepmother Act 201 be-
at death, though such deceased spouse die testate. Prior to this statute, a 
widow was entitled to dower only. 
In re Ziegner's Estate, 146 Wash. 53 7, 2 64 Pac. 12 ( 19 2 8). It was held 
that a statute, providing inter alia that a divorce subsequent to the making of 
a will shall revoke the will as to the divorced spouse, was retroactive and 
operated to revoke a will executed before the statute went into effect. 
In re Goldberg's Estate, 275 N. Y. r86, 9 N. E. 2d 829 (1937). The 
parties were married twelve days after Goldberg made his will. He died 
in 1933, and thereafter his widow elected to take her distributive share in the 
decedent's estate, as provided under a statute effective March 28, 1932, which 
provided that if after making a will, the testator marries, and the husband 
or wife survives the testator, the will shall be deemed revoked as to such 
survivor, unless provision shall have been made for such survivor by an 
antenuptial agreement in writing. The statute expressly provided that it 
should apply only to wills executed prior to Sept. 1, 19 3 o. The testator's 
will gave Mrs. Goldberg $5,ooo. This was in accordance with an oral 
antenuptial agreement whereby Mrs. Goldberg agreed to accept this sum 
in lieu of her dower or any other claim she might have out of his estate. 
The antenuptial agreement was void, however, for noncompliance with the 
statute of frauds. 
Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556 (I94I). For the facts and holding 
see infra notes, 208 and 209. 
Wakefield v. Phelps, 37 N.H. 295 (I858). Testatrix executed her will in 
I 8 5o, by which she devised her real property to her husband. She died in 
I8 56. A statute which went into effect in I8 54 provided that a married 
woman's will shall be valid as against her heirs to pass any estate of which 
she may be seized to any devisee except her husband. 
Elcock's Will, 4 McCord 39 (S. C. I826). The testator in I823 made 
his will of personal property, which was properly executed according to 
the laws at that time. Under a statute enacted in I824, three witnesses 
were required to wills of personal property. The testator died in I 8 24, 
leaving no other will. 
200 151 Fla. 455, 10 So. 2d 799 (1942); Adams v. Adams, I47 Fla. 267, 
2 So. 2d 855 (1941), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal 
question, 3I4 U.S. 572 (1941). 
201 Fla. Gen. Laws 1939, c. 18999: "· •. [P]rovided, however, that if 
a decedent, dying either testate or intestate, be survived by his widow and 
lineal descendants and that none of such lineal descendants are also the lineal 
descendants of such widow, then such widow shall be limited to dower in 
the estate of said decedent irrespective of the terms of the will of said decedent, 
if any, and such dower shall be limited to the portion of the estate of the 
decedent to which the widow is entitled under the law of descent and dis-
tribution, to-wit, a child's part, and in all cases the portion of the widow, 
whether said dower or such child's part or share under the will, shall be 
ratably liable with the remainder of the estate for all estate and inheritance 
taxes and all costs, charges, and expenses of administration • . ." 
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came effective only six days before the testator's death. In 
his lifetime the testator had given two-thirds of his property 
to his two children by a former marriage. His will gave 
practically all of his remaining property to his second wife. 
In accordance with the statute, the devise to her was declared 
void and ~he was held to be entitled to only one-third of the 
estate (or one-ninth of the whole) although this was quite 
manifestly contrary to the testator's intent.202 In a Kansas 
case,203 a bequest in a will executed in 1929 was rendered 
invalid by a statute enacted in I939.204 The rule that the 
controlling statute is the one in force at the death of the testa-
tor, it was argued, should not apply here because of the 
asserted insanity of the testatrix from I 933 to her death in 
I 940. The court found no evidence of insanity of the testa-
trix at any time, but stated: 
"Even if it were true, we do not see how it would affect the 
validity of the will. The statute makes no such exception. 
So far as the statute is concerned, the provision in the will is 
either good or bad without regard to the sanity or insanity 
of the testatrix at some time after the will was executed." 205 
Fair warning to the testator would appear not to be a con-
dition precedent to the validity of legislation limiting the 
power of testamentary disposition. 
Antenuptial Contracts 
While it appears that the courts do not recognize that a 
married person can have a constitutionally protected privilege 
202 In a letter to his attorney Leffler expressly stated that he thought leaving 
only one-ninth of his property to his second wife would be unfair to her. 
203 Estate of Weeks, 154 Kan. 103, 114 P. zd 857 (1941). 
204 Laws 1939, c. 18o, sec. 38; Kan. Gen. Stat. 1949, sec. 59-6oz. The 
statute declares that devises and bequests to foreign countries, cities, bodies 
politic, etc., shall be void, except devises and bequests to institutions created 
and existing exclusively for religious, educational, or charitable purposes. 
The testatrix attempted to make a bequest to the town of Buren-On-Aare in 
the Canton of Bern, Switzerland. 
205 154 Kan. 103, 105, I 14 P. zd 857, 859. 
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to will away his property to other persons to the exclusion 
of his spouse, yet where a statute restricting the testator's 
power to exclude his spouse abrogates a valid and enforce-
able ante- or postnuptial contract, by which the other spouse 
relinquished all claim under the law to his estate, the courts 
may be inclined to hold that the decedent acquired contract 
rights which the legislature is powerless to impair. Here 
there seems to be an outcropping of an inarticulated feeling 
that contract rights are more sacred than property rights; 206 
for on principle it is difficult to see why depriving a decedent 
of a contract right should raise any greater doubts of con-
stitutionality than depriving him of a property interest. 
In Wisconsin (where as will be recalled the courts have 
criticized the notion of legislative omnipotence), it has been 
stated that the obligation of a wife's postnuptial contract 
wherein her husband relinquished all his rights in her estate 
cannot be impaired by subsequent legislation giving the 
husband curtesy in the wife's estate.207 In a New York 
case,208 on the other hand, the court indicated that whatever 
206 See Chapter 2, p. I 7. 
207 In re Nickolay's Estate, 249 Wis. 57 I, 25 N. W. 2d 451 (I936) 
(dictum). The wife, who survived, had waived her rights in her husband's 
estate in consideration of his release of all rights in her estate. After his 
death she discovered he was considerably wealthier than she had supposed. 
She sought to avoid the effect of the agreement on the ground inter alia 
that it was void for want of consideration in that her husband had no 
curtesy to release. In disposing of this contention the court made the statement 
concerning the incapacity of the legislature to abrogate the agreement. 
208 Matter of the Will of McGlone, 284 N. Y. 527, 32 N. E. 2d 539 
( I940), Two days before her marriage with appellant's decedent, John 
McGlone, appellee's decedent, Helena Day Snyder, executed an instrument 
in which she stated that she thereby voluntarily and irrevocably renounced all 
right, title, and interest she might legally or otherwise have in the estate of 
her husband-to-be. The instrument was dated February 4, I922. At the 
time the laws of New York gave to a widow dower rights in her husband's 
real estate, but except for certain restrictions left him free to make testa-
mentary disposition of all his property to strangers. In I 929, section I 8 of the 
New York Decedent Estate Law was adopted. Laws I929, c. 229, sec. 4· 
Section I8-I provides that where a testator dies after August 3I, I930, and 
leaves a will thereafter executed and leaves surviving a husband or wife, a 
personal right of election is given to the surviving spouse to take his or her 
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rights might have accrued to the decedent husband from an 
antenuptial agreement when entered into, a subsequently 
enacted statute could abrogate such an agreement without 
impairing any constitutional rights of the decedent, and this 
for two reasons: first, because the decedent's power to dis-
pos'e of his property to the exclusion of his spouse did not 
in fact stem from the agreement but from the laws of the 
state and thus the power was subject to restriction by the 
legislature in spite of the agreement; secondly, because the 
wife could not waive in advance rights created for her benefit 
if the law did not permit such a waiver. However, the court 
based its decision on the ground that the legislature had not 
in fact destroyed any rights which the decedent in the par-
ticular cases acquired by his agreement, but rather that what 
happened was the result of the decedent's own voluntary act. 
The Supreme Court of the United States,209 in sustaining on 
appeal the New York decision, indicated in general its ap-
share of the estate as in intestacy. Section I 8-9 provides that the husband 
or wife during the lifetime of the other may waive the right of election by an 
instrument subscribed and duly acknowledged. The agreement of I932 would 
not have been effective under section I8-9, because it was not acknowledged. 
The Court of Appeals seems to have thought that it was effective under 
the laws at the time when entered into. A few days before section I 8 went 
into effect, McGlone executed a will in which he devised $z,ooo to Helena. 
On July 6, I934, he executed a codicil to his will, which, although it did not 
disturb the provision made for his wife in his earlier will, had the effect of 
bringing the entire will, modified and republished, within the provisions of 
the new law, and thus according to the terms of section I 8, of giving her 
a right of election to take under the statute and against the will. The Court 
of Appeals pointed out that McGlone by his own voluntary act had given 
Helena the privilege to claim an interest in his estate; of course, he probably 
would not have added a codicil if he had foreseen the consequences, but 
that could not be made the basis of estoppel or other equitable ground for 
denying to the wife her statutory right. 
209 Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 3I4 U.S. 556 (I94I). The federal question 
was whether section 18 worked an impairment of the obligation of contract 
or a deprivation of property without due process. The Court, speaking 
through Jackson, doubted that the instrument signed by Helena was a 
contract within the meaning of the federal Constitution. It nowhere appeared, 
either within the instrument or aliunde, that there was any consideration for 
the waiver. However, lest a decision on this ground should be taken as an 
invitation to further litigation in the New York courts, the Court undertook 
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proval of the statements of the court below but carefully 
avoided a direct decision on whether the legislature could 
have abrogated the antenuptial agreement. 
DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY BY INTESTATE SUCCESSION 
The owner of property who dies intestate also exercises 
by his death a power of disposition as much as does the owner 
who dies testate. The statutes of descent and distribution are, 
after all, a sort of general will and testament enacted for the 
benefit of persons who die without having made wills of their 
own. 
Now, if any such comparison can really be made, one 
would expect the courts to be less inclined to find constitu-
tional objection to modifications of the statute of descents and 
distribution than to legislative restrictions on the testamen-
tary power: first, there is the well-established precept that 
no one can have a vested interest in the continued existence 
of a statute; secondly, the legislature, having gratuitously en-
acted a statute to take care of the affairs of those who neg-
lect to leave instructions for the disposition of their property, 
to dispose of the questions urged. What McGlone did, said the Court, was to 
free Helena of the restraints of her waiver by voluntarily committing an act 
to which the applicable law attached that consequence. "For the purpose 
of considering the application of the contract and due process clauses of the 
Federal Constitution, the case is as if he had made a voluntary legacy to his 
wife despite her waiver. If the obligation of the waiver suffered impairment, 
it was only because he exercised further testamentary privileges with a 
condition attached, and thereby brought those consequences unwittingly or 
intentionally upon himself and his estate. 
"The condition clearly was such as New York might, without restraint 
from the Federal Constitution, annex to the privilege of making a will under 
its law. Its effect was to continue as obligations of his estate social respon-
sibilities which he had assumed during life, unless they had been waived with 
required formality. The State could have conditioned any further exercise 
of testamentary power upon giving a right of election to the surviving 
spouse regardless of any waiver, however formally executed; and having 
recognized the binding effect of a waiver, it could condition that recognition 
upon acknowledgment, which was no doubt considered a desirable safeguard 
against casual, informal, or ill-considered abandonment of statutory protection, 
as well as against overreaching or fraud." (3 14 U. S. 556, 563). 
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is under no obligation to continue to offer the same kind of 
service, or perhaps any service at all. 
However, the only statute ever actually to be held uncon-
stitutional because it impaired the constitutional right of a 
decedent to dispose of his property at death was not one 
which restricted the testamentary power, but one which di-
rected a new course for the intestate succession of property. 
In Stratton's Claimants v. Morris 210 a statute was declared 
unconstitutional because it deprived the decedent of the 
"right to transmit her property by inheritance to her own 
descendants or next of kin." But this statute, unlike the stat-
utes considered above, was extremely narrow in application; 
so narrow in fact as to give rise to an inference that it was 
designed specifically to fit the decedent. This inference was 
further strengthened by the fact that the author and sponsor 
of the bill in the legislature was a person who stood to benefit 
if the statute were given effect. The facts of the case were 
these: Mrs. Morris inherited certain personal property from 
her husband. Shortly after his death she was adjudged in-
sane and incapable of managing her own affairs. She re-
mained insane and under guardianship from this time until 
her death, intestate, unmarried, and without issue. Under 
the statutes in force at the time of Mr. Morris' death, the 
personal estate inherited by Mrs. Morris would have gone 
to her next of kin. However, the act in question was passed 
in her lifetime: 
"If the personal estate, as to which any person dies intestate 
and who was a lunatic or non compos mentis, was derived in 
whole or part from an intestate husband or wife, then in that 
event so much of the personal estate as was derived and re-
210 89 Tenn. 497,15 S. W. 87 (r89o). The action was in the nature of 
an interpleader to determine whether personalvropertv in the hand' ,,f Mrs. 
Morris' administrator should be paid to the next of kin of her deceased husband 
(the Morris claimants) or to her next of kin (the Stratton claimants). 
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mains unexpended or in the possession of any guardian or 
custodian of the estate of said lunatic or non compos mentis, 
shall go to the next of kin of the person from whom it was 
so derived . . ." 211 
It would seem that the practical effect of the statute was 
to turn Mrs. Morris' estate into a life estate with a kind of 
future interest in the husband's next of kin, as to whom un-
der the prior law the entire possibility of descent had become 
extinguished. It is certainly questionable that the legislature 
can retroactively convert fees simple into life estates. How-
ever, this thought does not explicitly appear in the opinion. 
The court's objection was not that Mrs. Morris' next of kin 
were deprived of any property, because they had at most a 
mere expectancy in respect to the property which she in-
herited from her husband, nor that the statute despoiled 
Mrs. Morris of any of her property after her death, but 
rather that during her life it deprived her of the right that 
her personal property should go to her blood relatives and 
not to persons of no blood relation to her. The court was of 
the opinion that such a right is "property" and that Mrs. 
Morris was unconstitutionally deprived of that property. 
The argument was summarily rejected that the state has an 
unqualified power to take the property of decedents and dis-
pose of it as it chooses. 
The Stratton case gives some support to the writer's belief 
that the courts have been so positive in their assertions of an 
unlimited power in the legislature over intestate succession 
and testamentary disposition only because in the particular 
instances they did not feel that the legislation in issue was 
unreasonable. The judicial pronouncements would be quite 
different if the courts were confronted with arbitrary statutes, 
as was the court in Stratton v. Morris. This is not to say that 
the courts in such situations would (or should) act as cham-
211 Acts of Tenn. x885, c. 88. 
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pions of the dead, but the living are justified in looking to the 
courts to see that their interests are vindicated. The courts 
would surely not fail them. 
RIGHTS OF HEIRS AND DEVISEES BEFORE DEATH OF ANCESTOR 
There would be more sense to a court's concern over the 
constitutional rights of the heirs and devisees, who are living 
persons, than to its concern with the constitutional rights of 
the deceased owner, who is really past having any rights. 
The heir or devisee may often have more than a mere senti-
mental claim, having aided the decedent in the accumulation 
of his property. Yet the cases hold that the prospect of in-
heritance or of taking under a will does not constitute a prop-
erty right within the meaning of the constitutional guaran-
tees. At any time before the death of the ancestor or testator 
the hopes and expectancies of the heirs apparent or the pro-
spective devisees may be defeated by a change in the law. 
"There are no heirs, but only heirs apparent, to the living, 
persons with mere expectancies or possibilities of inheritance 
which may be fulfilled or defeated, depending upon various 
contingencies and situations. An heir apparent, therefore, 
has no vested right in the estate of his ancestor prior to the 
latter's death, and consequently no vested property rights 
therein." 212 
"One who, by virtue of the statute of descent as its provisions 
exist today, will become entitled to the ownership of certain 
real estate if the owner dies intestate and without having 
previously conveyed it, has no vested interest, inchoate or 
otherwise, in that real estate-he has nothing more than a 
mere expectancy or hope. The owner may convey the lands 
to others during his lifetime, or may devise it to others, with-
out impairing any right of the 'heir expectant'." 213 
212 Ostrander v. Preece, 129 Ohio St. 625, 632, 196 N. E. 670, 673 ( 1935). 
213 Kicey v. Kicey, 114 N. J. Eq. ll6, ll8, 168 Atl. 424, 426 (Err. & 
App. 1933). 
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"A will does not take effect, nor are there any rights acquired 
under it, until the death of the testator " 214 
"It was in his power to destroy his will at any time, or make a 
new one, and no one could say that he had the least legal 
interest in his property till after his death." 215 
On the basis of such reasoning it is held that statutes 
defeating the expectancies of heirs apparent and prospective 
devisees do not violate guarantees against the deprivation of 
property without due process,216 nor violate constitutional 
inhibitions against retroactive law.217 Even where the heir-
ship is forced, that is, where the heir presumptive cannot be 
disinherited, it has been held that a statute conferring full 
power of disposition on the owner does not deprive the forced 
heir of any constitutional rights.218 
214Wakefield v. Phelps, 37 N.H. 295, 306 (I8s8). 
215Loveren v. Lamprey, 22 N.H. 434,446 (I8p). 
216 Ostrander v. Preece, I29 Ohio St. 625, I96 N. E. 670 (I935), appeal 
dismissed 296 U.S. 543 (I935); O'Brien v. Ash, I69 Mo. 283, 69 S. W. 8 
(I902) j Sayles v. Christie, I87 Ill. 420, s8 N. E. 480 (I9oo) j Cordova v. 
Folgueras y Rijos, 227 U.S. 375 (I9I3). 
217 Loveren v. Lamprey, 22 N. H. 434 (I85I); Wakefield v. Phelps, 37 
N. H. 295 (I858); Hamilton and Wife v. Flinn, 2I Tex. 7I3 (I858); 
Wynne's Lessee v. Wynne, 2 Swan (32 Tenn.) 404 (I8p). These decisions 
use Justice Story's definition of a retroactive statute as one which impairs 
vested rights. See Chapter 2, p. I4. Since heirs apparent and prospective 
devisees are deemed to have no vested rights until the death of the ancestor 
or testator, the statutes under discussion are held not to fall within the con-
stitutional inhibition. 
218 Hamilton v. Flinn, 2 I Tex. 7 I 3 (I 8 58). The court said: "It is very 
clear that the rights of forced heirship . . ., were, although inchoate, but 
a mere expectancy during the life of the ancestor, which did not vest nor 
have vitality until his death; that the status and rights of forced heirs being 
the creatures of law, must derive their existence and force from the law under 
which they vest or are brought into existence, viz.: the law at the death of 
the parent. It is his death which gives life and seizin to the heir of his estate." 
(2I Tex. 7I3, 7I6). 
"If forced heirs had no rights to the property of the ancestor during his 
life, which might not be defeated by a change of the law, they cannot object 
to a repealing statute conferring power on parents not only to dispose, in 
the future, of the whole of their property, but also validating their will, 
made previously, provided the ancestor lived until after the passage of the act. 
There is nothing retrospective in this. The will is not a perfected act, has 
no force and gives no rights until the death of the testator. The heirs having 
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In some cases, as has been remarked upon previously, the 
power of the legislature to change the law governing the 
manner in which property shall descend or be disposed of by 
will is described as if it were absolute and without limita-
tion.219 While the power of the legislature to determine who 
shall inherit or take as devisee may approach the quality of 
being absolute and unlimited, an arbitrary and unreasonable 
exercise of legislative power indicating a lack of judgment 
and discretion on the part of the legislature would surely 
never be sustained. The Supreme Court of the United States 
has said that the due process clauses of the Fourteenth and 
Fifth Amendments would restrain "such an exercise of power 
as would exclude the conception of judgment and discretion, 
and which would be so obviously arbitrary and unreasonable 
as to be beyond the pale of governmental authority." 220 A 
similar feeling has been expressed by a few state courts.221 
It would be pointless to discuss at length the many cases 
which have sustained statutes changing the course of descent 
and distribution and statutes relating to wills. The ra-
no rights cannot complain of an approval by the legislature, expressly or by 
implication, of wills previously made but not fixed by the death of the maker." 
(21 Tex. 713, 717). 
219 Ostrander v. Preece, 129 Ohio St. 625, 196 N. E. 67o (1935), appeal 
dismissed 296 U.S. 543 (1935); Jefferson v. Fink, 247 U. S. 288 (1917); 
Richardson's Adm'r v. Borders, 246 Ky. 303, 54 S. W. zd 676 (1932); 
O'Brien v. Ash, 169 Mo. 283, 69 S. W. 8 (1902). 
220 Campbell v. California, 200 U. S. 87, 95 ( 1906) supra note 182. 
221 In re Smith's Estate, 188 Okla. 158, 107 P. zd 188 (1940). The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court has stated that the right to inherit or to be a 
recipient under a will is subject only to a reasonable regulation by the legisla-
ture. Hood's Estate, 206 Wis. 227, 239 N. W. 448 (1931), This is consistent 
with the view stated in Wisconsin decisions that the privilege of disposing of 
property at death is a constitutionally protected interest. See p. 9 3 supra. 
The Hood case involved a statute which changed the course of descent of the 
property of an adopted child from his kindred of the blood to his adoptive 
parents, their heirs and next of kin. The court held that since the statute 
did not affect the rights of the natural children or lineal descendants of an 
adopted child to inherit his property, it was not an unreasonable legislative 
regulation. 
114 RETROACTIVE LAND LEGISLATION 
tionale of the cases has already been stated. But it would not 
be useless to enumerate briefly below the types of statutes 
which have been sustained, if only to show that the legisla-
tures have not acted unreasonably and arbitrarily.222 
222 Statutes have been sustained which provide that the title shall pass on 
death of the owner intestate to a different person than the one to whom it 
would have passed under the previous law. Legislation legitimating bas-
tard children: Cordova v. Folgueras y Rijos, 227 U. S. 375 (I9I3); 
Deihl v. Jones, I?O Tenn. 2I7, 94 S. W. zd 47 (I936) (marriage annulled 
because of mental incapacity of father; legitimacy of child preserved by 
statute enacted after annulment.) Legislation bestowing Upon adopted 
children the rights of inheritance of natural children: Sayles v. Christie, 
I87 Ill. 420, 58 N. E. 48o (I9oo); Theobald v. Smith, 103 App. Div. zoo, 
92 N.Y. S. 1019 (Ist Dept. 1905); Dodin v. Dodin, I6 App. Div. 42, 44 
N.Y. S. 8oo (znd Dept. I897), aff'd I62 N.Y. 635,57 N. E. IIo8 (1900); 
McFadden v. McNorton, I93 Va. 455, 69 S. E. zd 445 (I952). Legislation 
enhancing the share of the surviving spouse (and thus diminishing 
the share of the decedent's heirs): In re Estate of Phillips, 203 Cal. 1o6, 
263 Pac. IOI7 (I928); Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37 (I857); Kicey v. Kicey, 
I14 N.J. Eq. II6, I68 Atl. 424 (Err. & App. I933). Legislation dimin-
ishing the share which the surviving spouse takes: Hannon v. Southern 
Pac. R. R. Co., 12 Cal. App. 350, I07 Pac. 335 (1909). (At the time the 
homestead in question was acquired, the statute provided that on death of 
either spouse the homestead vested absolutely in the survivor. Prior to death 
of husband the statute was changed so that wife took only one-third and the 
children the other two-thirds.) Legislation excluding persons who under 
the previous law would have been heirs: Richardson's Adm'r v. Borders, 
246 Ky. 303, 54 S. W. 2d 676 ( 1932) (statute declared that in cases where 
a woman shall have been divorced on the ground of pregnancy by another 
man at time of marriage, having concealed her pregnancy from her husband, 
the child born of the pregnancy shall be deemed a bastard for all purposes) ; 
In re Smith's Estate, I88 Okla. 158, I07 P. 2d I88 (I94o) (statute prohibited 
inheritance by persons not of Indian blood from persons of one-half or more 
Osage blood, except spouses of existing marriages); Jefferson v. Fink, 247 
U. S. 288 ( I9 I 7); Hood's Estate, 206 Wis. 227, 239 N. W. 448 ( 193 I) 
(statute changed the descent of the property of an adopted child from his 
kindred of the blood to his adoptive parents, their heirs and next of kin. See 
note 22 I supra). In re Frost's Will, I92 App. Div. 2o6, I 8 N. Y. S. 559 
(1920), aff'd In re Kingsbury, 230 N.Y. 58o, qo N. E. 90I (192o) (statute 
repealed so that adopted child was prevented from inheriting from his foster 
parent). 
Expectancies of heirs have been defeated by the application of statutes 
which gave validity to wills which at the time of their execution were totally 
or partially ineffective. Statutes reducing the formalities necessary to 
the execution of a valid will: In re Spain's Estate, 327 Pa. 226, I93 Atl. 
262 (I937) (will invalid when executed because there were no attesting 
witnesses. Requirement abolished as to wills of the sort involved); Langley v. 
Langley, I8 R. I. 6r8, 30 Atl. 465 (1894) (will attested by only two wit-
nesses. At time of execution three were required; however, at testator's death 
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Contract to Make a Will 
A contract to make a will is a contract within the meaning 
of the contracts clause of the United States Constitution. 
Any change in the law which substantially takes away the 
remedy to enforce the contract impairs the obligation of the 
contract. Thus if an oral contract to make a will was en-
forceable when made, the legislature may not render it m-
valid by requiring a written memorandum.223 
only two were required); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 26 Ala. 535 (1855) (same 
situation as in Langley v. Langley); Long v. Zook, 13 Pa. 400 (1850) (will 
signed only with testator's mark). Statutes removing restrictions pre-
viously preventing the disposal of property by will: Wilson v. Greer, 
50 Okla. 387, 151 Pac. 629 (1915) (full-blooded Indian executed will when 
Indians had no power to devise their allotments. He died after statute which 
provided that Indians can devise their real estate); Hamilton v. Flinn, 21 
Tex. 713 ( 18 58) (when will executed children could not be disinherited). 
Statutes abolishing the common-law rule that land acquired after the 
execution of a will will not pass under will: Loveren v. Lamprey, 22 
N. H. 434 (1851); Wynne's Lessee v. Wynne, 2 Swan (32 Tenn.) 404 
(1852). Antilapse statutes: Bishop v. Bishop, 4 Hil1138 (N.Y. 1843). 
Prospective devisees may also fare badly as a result of statutory changes. 
A legitimation statute may confer upon an illegitimate the capacity of an 
heir so that he may set aside the provisions of the decedent's will. Wadsworth 
v. Brigham, 125 Ore. 458, 266 Pac. 875 (1928), adhering to opinion, 125 
Ore. 428,259 Pac. 299 (1927). A statute may provide that when an heir or 
legatee dies within a short period after the death of the decedent, the estate 
of such first decedent shall pass as though he has survived such heir or' legatee. 
Ostrander v. Preece, 129 Ohio St. 625, 196 N. E. 670 (1935), appeal dis-
missed 296 U. S. 543 ( 1935). An antilapse statute may be repealed, thus 
causing a devise to fall. Bartlett v. Ligon, 135 Md. 62o, 109 Ad. 473 
(1920) (will executed 1904, statute enacted 1910). 
The common-law rule that an heir or devisee is entitled to exoneration of 
the real estate from a mortgage by the payment thereof out of the personal 
estate may be abolished so that lands encumbered by mortgage pass to the 
heirs or devisees subject to the mortgage. Swetland v. Swetland, 100 N. J. Eq. 
196, 134 Atl. 822 (Ch. 1926) (will dated 1922, statute 1924). The right 
of nonresident aliens to take real or personal property or the proceeds thereof 
by succession or testamentary disposition may be abolished. The reason is, it 
is said, that the legislature confers the privilege and right and hence may take 
it away. In re Estate of Bevilacqua, 31 Cal. zd 580, 191 P. zd 752 (1948); 
In re Estate of Knutzen, 31 Cal. 2d 573, 191 P. 2d 747 (1948); Donaldson v. 
State, 67 N. E. 1029 (Ind. 1903), new trial awarded, 167 Ind. 553, 78 N. E. 
182 (1906). 
223 Rubalcava v. Garst, 53 N. M. 295, 206 P. 2d 1154 ( 1949); Doyle v. 
Gleason, 152 Misc. 641, 274 N.Y. S. 183 (1934). 
116 RETROACTIVE LAND LEGISLATION 
RIGHTS OF HEIRS AND DEVISEES AFTER DEATH OF ANCESTOR 
Upon the death of the owner of a devisable or descendible 
interest in land, property rights become fixed in his heirs or 
devisees.224 If the owner leaves a valid will, the title of the 
devisee becomes a vested interest at the moment of the testa-
tor's death. If the owner dies intestate, or his will is invalid, 
at the moment of his death title vests in his heir by descent. 
224 In regard to personal property, the view usually taken is that at the 
decedent's death his title passes to the executor or administrator, but he holds 
it under a quasi trust for those entitled to it as next of kin or legatees, and at 
the decedent's death they acquire a right which ripens into full title and 
enjoyment on distribution (subject, of course, to diminution or destruction 
if necessary to pay claims on the estate or the expenses of administration). 
Hence statutes which change the course of distribution or diminish the interests 
of legatees and next of kin will not ordinarily be applicable when the decedent 
predeceases the effective date of the statute. In re Giordano's Estate, 8 5 Cal. 
App. 2d 588, I93 P. 2d 77I (I948); In re Thramm's Estate, 8o Cal. App. 
2d 756, I83 P. 2d 97 (I947); Parlato v. McCarthy, 136 Conn. I26, 69 A. 2d 
648 (I949); Remington v. Bank, 76 Md. 546, 25 Atl. 666 (I893); In re 
Nossen's Estate, III Mont. 40, I62 P. zd 216 (I945); Ferrie v. Public 
Administrator, 3 Brad£. Sur. 249 (N.Y. I855). 
A different view with respect to the rights of next of kin and legatees before 
final distribution is expressed in Armstrong v. Armstrong, I Ore. 207 (I855). 
The court reasoned as follows: Upon the decedent's death his entire interest 
and title passes to the administrator who holds the estate in trust, not for any 
particular person or persons, but to be disposed of as the law shall direct. 
Now, when an administrator goes to distribute an estate, he must look exclu-
sively to the law for directions, not those directions which the law gave before 
his appointment or any prior time, but to such directions as it gives when 
the distribution is made. Even though at the death of the decedent the law 
promises to give the property to particular persons, this does not bind the 
legislature. The principle is well established that the mere promise to give 
a thing does not, before delivery, bind the promisor or confer any right upon 
the promisee. 
In Parlato v. McCarthy, I36 Conn. I26, 137, 69 A. 2d 648, 654 (1949), 
Jennings, J., dissenting, said: "It may be admitted that a legatee has, in a 
sense, a vested interest in his legacy, but that interest is subject to reduction 
or extinction because of such things as debts, administration charges and 
expenses, funeral expenses and taxes. '· . . we do not regard the full suc-
cession as having taken place upon the death of the decedent. The right to 
the ultimate title and ownership did arise at that time, and may be said to have 
vested in the beneficiary, but that was but one step in the process of succession, 
and the beneficiary does not become the actual and unconditional owner of the 
property until the estate has been administered and legally distributed and 
the succession consummated.'" Blodgett v. Bridgeport City Trust Co., ll5 
Conn. 127, 147, 161 Atl. 83, 89. 
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Since rights are deemed to be vested at the testator's death 
it has been held that a statute passed subsequent to the death 
of the testator, which enlarges the privilege to contest a will, 
deprives the devisees of their property without due process.22~ 
On the other hand, a statute reducing the time for filing 
contest of a will, when applied to cases where the will was 
admitted to probate prior to the statute, does not deprive the 
contestant of a vested right if a reasonable time is allowed 
after the statute within which to contest the wilP26 This is 
analogous to a retroactive shortening ofthe period of limita-
tions.227 
A will which cannot be admitted to probate at the testator's 
death for lack of attesting witnesses, improper execution, or 
225 Havill v. Havill, 332 Ill. II, I63 N. E. 428 (I928). At the death of 
the testator in I 9 I 3 a suit to contest a will abated on the death of the con-
testant. By an amendment effective July I, I9I9 (Ill. Laws 1919, p. 991, 
Ill. Rev. Stat. I 94-9, c. 3, sec. 242) it is provided that a suit to contest a 
will shall not abate on the death of the contestant, but that the cause of 
action shall survive and descend to the heir, legatee, devisee, executor, admin-
istrator, grantee, or assignee of such deceased person. A bill was filed in May, 
I9I9, to contest the will. The complainant died in 1924. After his death 
his widow and heir moved the court to substitute them as complainants in 
his stead. Held: The amendment was not intended to have a retroactive 
effect. It could not have been made retroactive. "The right to hold the 
property under the will free from any liability to contest by any one not 
legally entitled to contest the will at the death of the testator is a vested right, 
which cannot be taken away by legislative enactment." (332 Ill. II, 17, 163 
N. E. 428, 430 ( 1928) .) 
226 McQueen v. Connor, 385 Ill. 455, 53 N. E. 2d 435, 437 (1944) 
("'The right to contest a will is not a vested one. The Legislature, if it saw 
fit, could abrogate all of the provisions of our statutes authorizing will con-
tests.'"); Sharp v. Sharp, 213 Ill. 332, 72 N. E. 1058 (1904) (no time 
allowed after statute went into effect but there was a period of about two and 
one-half months from the time the bill was passed until it went into effect) ; 
Sutton v. Hancock, II8 Ga. 436, 45 S. E. 504 (I903); Kenyon v. Stewart, 
44 Pa. 179 (r863) (statute, which declared that an uncontested probate by 
the register of the proper county of any will devising real estate shall be 
conclusive after five years from its date, held to apply to a will proved before 
its passage) . 
The legislature may shorten the time for contesting will withmat providing 
for extension of time in behalf of persons non compos mentis. Masin v. 
Bassford, 381 Ill. 569, 46 N. E. zd 366 (1943). 
227 See p. 42 supra. 
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for any other invalidating defect, probably cannot be made 
valid by a statute passed subsequent to the testator's death. 
To do so, it has been held, would deprive the heirs unconsti-
tutionally of their property.228 However, none of the deci-
sions are recent. A will invalid at the testator's death must 
be distinguished from a will valid at his death, but subject 
to defeat only by reason of the impossibility of proof under 
the existing law. It is within the power of the legislature 
even after the death of the testator to change the rules relat-
ing to the proof of the existence of a wilJ.229 A will is not 
228 Rowlett v. Moore, 252 Ill. 436, 96 N. E. 835 ( I9I I); Remington v. 
Metropolitan Sav. Bank, 76 Md. 546, 25 Atl. 666 (I893); Camp v. Stark, 
81 Pa. 235 (I875); In re Alter's Appeal, 67 Pa. 34I (I871); Shinkle v. 
Crock, I7 Pa. I59 (I8p); Greenough v. Greenough, II Pa. 489 (I849); 
Giddings v. Turgeon, 58 Vt. Io6, 4 Atl. 7II (I886). 
In Alter's Appeal supra an aged couple having no lineal descendants, and 
each owning property, decided to make their wills in favor of each other, 
so that the survivor should have all they owned. Their wills were drawn 
precisely alike mutatis mutandis and laid down on a table for execution. Each 
signed a paper, which was duly witnessed by three subscribing witnesses. After 
the death of Mr. Alter, it was found that each had by mistake signed the will 
of the other. To remedy this error, the legislature by a special act conferred 
authority upon the Register's Court to take proof of the mistake and proceed 
as a court of chancery to reform Mr. Alter's will and decree accordingly. 
The Register's Court held that there was no will, and that the act to reform 
it was invalid, the estate having passed to and vested in the collateral line of 
kindred. Held: The paper Alter signed was not his will. The mistake was 
the same as if he had signed a blank sheet of paper. He therefore died intestate 
and his property descended as at law. The objection to the validity of this 
act is not a lack of power in the legislature to establish a will upon parol 
proof of the fact of making it and of the intent to execute the proper paper, 
but a lack of power to divest estates already vested at law on the decedent's 
death. There being no will, it is evident that the effect of any subsequent 
legislation is simply to divest estates. 
See, however, Sluder v. Wolf Mountain Lumber Co., I8I N. C. 69, Io6 
S. E. z I 5 (I 92 I) where the will was properly admitted to probate, but only 
one witness was examined instead of both as required by the then statute. 
Held: This defect can be cured. 
229 In re Estate of Patterson, I55 Cal. 626, I02 Pac. 94I (I909); In re 
Alter's Appeal, 67 Pa. 34 I (I 8 7 I) supra note 22 8. 
The Patterson case involved a statute enacted as a result of the San Francisco 
earthquake fire. The testatrix executed a will in 1904 in accordance with 
the law. The will was entrusted to her attorney, who kept it in a safe. It 
was destroyed in the earthquake. The testatrix died thereafter. She had not 
been informed that the will was destroyed and died in ignorance of that fact. 
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brought into legal existence by the judgment admitting it to 
probate. Probate of a will merely declares in a formal way 
the existence of facts which have previously occurred and 
furnishes official evidence of those facts.230 If the ancestor 
has made a valid will, it speaks from the moment of his 
death, and the heir at law never becomes vested with title to 
the estate devised. The litigation attending the probate of 
a will is not prosecuted to divest either the heir or devisee of 
title to property, but to determine which of them is the own-
er of it.231 
The courts have not agreed whether statutes providing for 
the proration of federal estate taxes among heirs and devisees 
can be applied where the testator's death is prior to the en-
actment of the proration statute.232 If at the testator's death 
At the time of the death of the testatrix the Code of Civil Procedure provided 
that no will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will, unless the same shall 
have been proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the 
testator, "or is shown to have been fraudulently destroyed in the lifetime of 
the testator." The Code was amended by addition to the quoted words as 
follows: "or is shown to have been fraudulently or by public calamity de-
stroyed in the lifetime of the testator, without his knowledge." Cal. Stats. 
1 907, p. 122. The will in question could not be proved as destroyed except 
by virtue of this amendment. The contention of the contestants was that the 
will, at the time of the testatrix's death was not merely incapable of proof 
but was absolutely void and that consequently testatrix died intestate. Held: 
The will could be proved under the amendment. The will was not void in 
the sense that it was no will at all. After its destruction it had a potential 
existence, subject to defeat only by reason of the impossibility of proof under 
the law then existing. Destruction, without intention to revoke, did not revoke 
the will. The will could not be admitted to probate under the law as it existed 
at the testatrix's death, because there could be no legal proof of the will. The 
legislature removed this impediment. The heirs had no vested right to have 
this law forbidding the probate of such wills continued in force. This amend-
ment was not retroactive. It applied only to trials which took place after its 
enactment. It could have no effect whatever upon previous trials or judgments. 
230 2 Page, Wills, sec. 561 (Lifetime ed.). 
231 Wills v. Lochnane, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 547 (1873). 
232 The Connecticut Supreme Court holds that to apply the proration 
statute retroactively would deprive the devisees of their property without due 
process. Parlato v. McCarthy, 136 Conn. u6, 69 A. zd 648 (r949). 
A federal decision disagrees with tne Parlato case and holds that the 
Connecticut statute is not repugnant to the federal Constitution when applied 
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federal estate taxes are payable out of the residue, proration 
of taxes will in effect diminish what the devisees received. A 
very important consideration in determining the constitu-
tionality of the retroactive application of a proration statute 
is whether or not it is treated as if it were a taxing statute.233 
This is because the courts, recognizing that the existence of 
government is dependent upon its ability to raise revenues 
by taxation, hold that within limits of fair play retroactive 
in case of decedents who died prior to the statute. Horwitt v. Horwitt, 90 
F. Supp. 528 (D. 'Conn. I95o). 
In Merchants Nat. Bank v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 318 Mass. 563, 62 N. E. 
2d 83 I ( I945), a statute similar to the Connecticut statute was held constitu-
tional when applied retroactively, that is, where the decedent's death occurred 
before the effective date of the statute. Mass. Acts I943, c. 519· The estimated 
federal tax was paid on Dec. 8, I94I, and a deficiency tax paid on Oct. r r, 
I 943· The petition prayed for an apportionment of the deficiency tax among 
the parties respondent in accordance with the provisions of the statute. "It 
may be conceded that in one sense the apportionment statute operates retro-
actively because it reaches back to the transfers made at the death of the 
testator. If no such transfers had then occurred, there would have been 
nothing to which an apportionment of the tax could apply. It must, however, 
be noted that liability for an apportionment of the tax could not arise until 
the tax was paid, and that the last installment of this tax-which is all that 
is sought to be apportioned-was not paid until after the apportionment statute 
had become effective. A taxing statute does not necessarily operate retroac-
tively if the fact upon which the tax is laid occurs after the statute becomes 
operative, even though the antecedents of this fact antedated the statute." 
(318 Mass. 563, 57I, 62 N. E. 2d 83I, 836.) 
In Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Peabody, I90 Misc. 66, 68 
N. Y. S. 2d 256 (I947), the Connecticut statute involved in Parlato v. 
McCarthy supra was held not to be unconstitutional as applied to an inter 
vivos trust, although the settlor's death occurred before the enactment of the 
statute. The New York court had jurisdiction because the trust res and the 
trustee were both in New York. Anyhow, the court found that apart from 
the statute, the language of the settlor's will supported the conclusion that 
he intended that the tax should be apportioned. 
233 In Parlato v. McCarthy, supra note 232, the court concluded that the 
statute was not a taxing statute, because the federal laws fix the primary 
obligation. Nothing the state can do will alter the nature of the obligations 
created by them, or affect in any way the methods of enforcement. All the 
state can do is to determine the way in which the burden so fixed shall ul-
timately be apportioned among the beneficiaries. 
In Horwitt v. Horwitt, supra note 232, it was said: "If retroactive tax 
legislation may be due process under the 'fair play' test, such a statute as this, 
which, although not a taxing statute, does aim to affect the incidence of taxes 
between individuals, may be retroactive to the same extent and also amount 
to 'fair play.'" (90 F. Supp. 528, 530.) 
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tax statutes may be valid even though new burdens are im-
posed in regard to past transactions.234 Estate and inheritance 
taxes are considered to be impositions on the privilege of 
transferring or receiving property; consequently, although 
the decedent died before the passage of the tax statute, the 
tax may constitutionally be imposed with respect to so much 
of his estate as remains undistributed in the hands of the exec-
utor or administrator or under the control of the probate 
court.235 
Where a devise is void, the property right vests immedi-
ately upon the death of the testator in his heirs or residuary 
devisees. It is not within the power of the legislature retro-
actively to validate the devise and thus to divest rights ac-
quired under the will or by descent.236 Nor may the legisla-
ture enhance the estate of a devisee at the expense of the 
heirs.237 
234 Ballard, Retroactive Federal Taxation, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 592 (I935). 
235Levy's Succession, II5 La. 377, 39 So. 37 (I905), aff'd Cahen v. 
Brewster, 203 U. S. 543 (I9o6); Montgomery v. Gilbertson, 134 Iowa 29I, 
III N. W. 964 (I907); De Witt v. Comm., 184 Ky. 437, 212 S. W. 437 
(1919); Magee v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 256 Mass. 512, 153 N. E. 
I ( 1926); State ex rel. Rankin v. District Ct., 70 Mont. 322, 225 Pac. 8o4 
(1924); In re Fotheringham's Estate, I83 Wash. 579, 49 P. 2d 480 (1935). 
236Wilderman v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore, 8 Md. 551 (1855); State v. 
Warren, 28 Md. 338 (1867) (bequest to unincorporated church, such bequests 
being void); Southard v. Central Railroad Co., 26 N. J. L. I 3 (Sup. Ct. 
1856) (attempt to devise power of termination); Hartson v. Elden, so N. J. 
Eq. 522, 26 Atl. 561 (Ch. 1892) (bequest void under rule against perpetu-
ities); Bonard's Will, 16 Abb. Prac. (N. S.) 128 (N. Y. 1872) (devise to 
society which had no authority under its charter to take real property by 
devise). 
But see Dammert v. Osborn, 140 N.Y. 30, 35 N. E. 407 (I893), where 
a citizen and resident of Peru died there leaving a will which contained a 
charitable bequest of securities for the purpose of establishing an institution 
in New York City. The bequest was valid under Peruvian law but void in 
New York under the two lives statute. A special act was passed incorporating 
an institution and conferring upon it power to accept the gift. Held: Statute 
was valid since, under laws of domicile of the testator, the title or beneficial 
interest had not vested in heirs, next of kin, or legatees. 
237 Saxton v. Mitchell, 78 Pa. 479 (I875). Church was devised an easement 
to use twenty acres for a definite purpose. A special act was passed by which 
the elder of the church was authorized to convey a fee. 
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Upon the death of the owner intestate, the title to land in-
terests vests at once in his heirs as defined by the statutes of 
descents and distributions in effect at his death. It is there-
after beyond the province of the legislature to divest the 
rights of the heirs irt part or in whole as by substituting an 
entirely new class, enhancing the portion of the surviving 
spouse, or conferring rights of inheritance upon adopted and 
illegitimate children and aliens.238 
238 Bailes v. Daly, 146 Ala. 628, 40 So. 420 ( 1906) (widow's share en-
larged from life estate to fee) ; Bottorff v. Lewis, I 2 r Iowa 2 7, 9 5 N. W. 2 6 2 
( r 90 3) (widow's share increased from life estate to fee) ; In re Nossen's 
Estate, II8 Mont. 40, r62 P. 2d 216 (1945) (nonresident aliens deprived 
of the right to inherit); Miller v. Miller, ro Met. 393 (Mass. 1845) (statute 
at ancestor's death gave eldest son 2 shares; statute abrogated six months 
after ancestor's death); Luhrs v. Eimer, So N. Y. 171 (188o) (aliens per-
mitted to inherit); Wissel v. Ott, 34 App. Div. 159, 54 N. Y. S. 6os (2nd 
Dept. 1898); In re Barringer's Estate, 29 Misc. Rep. 457, 61 N.Y. S. 1090 
(r889) (legitimation); Re Moynahan's Estate, 158 Misc. 8zr, 287 N.Y. S. 
106 ( 1936); People ex rei. Griffin v. Ryder, 65 Hun 175, 19 N. Y. S. 977 
(r892); Jackson v. Rutherford, 23 Ohio App. so6, 155 N. E. 813 (1926), 
petition dismissed 115 Ohio St. 709, 156 N. E. 217 (1926); Cameron v. 
Goebel & Bettinger, zo Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 268 (1900) (tenant by curtesy 
given power to sell and encumber estate, a power not possessed at decedent's 
death); Norman v. Heist, 5 Watts and S. I 7 I (Pa. I 843); Sheaffer's Estate, 
24 Pa. Dist. 570 (1914); Muldrow v. Caldwell, I73 S. C. 243, 175 S. E. 
501 (1934) (legitimate children allowed to inherit from or through illegit-
imate relatives); Bowman v. Middleton, I Bay (IS. C. L.) 252 (1792). 
Waugh v. Riley, 68 Ind. 482 (1879) presents a very unusual situation. 
John Waugh died in r86o devising a life estate in his land to his wife. As 
to the remainder of his estate he died intestate. He left no child and no parents 
surviving, but he did leave brothers and sisters under whom the appellants 
claimed. A statute approved in 1852 provided that if a husband or wife 
die intestate, leaving no child, and no father or mother, the whole of his or 
her property shall go to the survivor. In I 8 53 this statute was amended to 
provide that if a husband or wife shall die intestate leaving no children or 
father or mother, one-half of his or her property shall go to the brothers 
and sisters of the deceased or their descendants and the other half to the 
surviving spouse. In Langdon v. Appelgate, 51 Ind. 327 (1875) it was held 
that the statute of I 8 52 as amended was unconstitutional. In a case decided 
six years after Waugh's death the Langdon case was expressly overruled. 
Greencastle Southern Turnpike Co. v. State, 2 8 Ind. 3 8 2 ( r 8 6 7) . However, 
before the court got around to deciding this case, the legislature, in anticipation 
of the probable outcome, passed an act which repealed all the laws not in 
conformity with the ruling in the Langdon case. Acts r867, p. 204. The 
statute provided that all the actions arising out of any statute thereby repealed 
should be commenced within ninety days from the passage of the statute. 
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Although the interests of heirs and devisees are fixed at 
the death of the testator it would seem that the legislature is 
not entirely without authority to make some change in the 
rights of the parties before distribution. The Michigan 
Supreme Court ruled in In re Beecher's Estate 239 that a stat-
ute authorizing the compromise of a claim which prevented 
the final distribution of an estate did not deprive the legatees 
of any vested rights. When it is apparent that the best inter-
ests of all concerned would be promoted by the application of 
a statute, a relative diminution in the interests of a few should 
not be permitted to outweigh the probability of loss to all if 
the statute is not applied. Mere procedural changes which 
do not affect substantive rights may be introduced at any time 
whether before or after the decedent's death.240 
Held: The appellants were barred; the validity of the Act of I 8 6 7 was 
unquestionable. 
This decision seems proper in light of the prevailing theory that the 
declaration of constitutionality or of unconstitutionality carries back to the 
moment the statute came into existence. Under the Langdon decision, the Act 
of ·I 8 53 had no legal existence and consequently no rights could have been 
acquired under it at the death of Waugh in I 8 6o. But quaere: What would 
have been the result if the legislature had attempted to repeal the Act of 
I 8 53 subsequent to Greencastle Southern Turnpike Co. v. State, wherein the 
constitutionality of the statute as amended was upheld I Perhaps the statute 
could have been sustained as a statute of limitations provided the period of 
ninety days allowed for bringing suit was considered sufficient. 
239 II3 Mich. 667, p. N. W. II (I897). Compromise statutes are further 
discussed infra Chapter 4, p. I37 et seq. 
240Bull v. Nichols, 15 Vt. 329 (1843) (change of tribunal for making 
partition between claimants); Wills v. Lochnane, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 547 
(I 8 73) (appellate court authorized to reverse verdict of jury on the issue of 
"will or no will"). 
See also Hinton v. Hinton, 6I N. C. 410 (1868), sustaining a North 
Carolina statute, which suspended the operation of the statutes of limitation 
during the emergency of the Civil War, as applied so as to preserve a widow's 
privilege of electing whether to take under the will or to take dower, long 
after her right to dower would have been barred under the law at the dece-
dent's death. It was held that the devisees were deprived of no vested rights 
inasmuch as they took the land subject to the widow's common-law right of 
dower. The statute, said the court, did not extinguish the widow's common-
law right of dower, but simply barred her right of action. Hence it was 
reasoned that the suspending act did not deprive the devisees of land. It only 
took from them the privilege of claiming the benefit of a former statute 
whereby the widow's right would have been barred. 
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It was said by a Montana court that since an alien inherits 
only by grace of statute, the legislature may impose condi-
tions or burdens upon his inheriting, even after the death of 
the decedent so long as the heir has not actually acquired con-
trol of the property.241 The statute involved in the case, how-
ever, was merely a statute of limitations, which barred the 
claim of the heir if he did not make an appearance within a 
specified period after the death of the decedent. 
Statutes Authorizing Sale of Land 
Statutes authorizing the sale of the decedent's land to pay 
his debts, to facilitate distribution of the estate among the 
heirs or devisees, or for other purposes, have been enacted in 
many states.242 In view of the state's comparatively unlimited 
power to control the disposition of property at death, any 
reasonable statute authorizing the sale of the real property of 
the decedent must be sustained when his death occurs subse-
quent to the statute.243 Statutes authorizing the sale of a 
241 In re Colbert's Estate, 44 Mont. 25g, IIg Pac. 7gi (Igii). Colbert 
died intestate in I gog, leaving real and personal property. So far as was 
ascertainable at his death, the deceased left no heirs. In Igog, a number of 
persons who were residents of Germany filed a complaint alleging that they 
were his heirs. The state contended that the petitioners were barred from 
asserting any claim to succeed to the estate by a statute which provided that 
no nonresident alien can take by succession unless he appears and claims his 
succession within five years after the death of the decedent. Held: Petitioners 
were barred. 
242 4 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. I24I et seq. (3d ed.). 
243 Bickford v. Stewart, 55 Wash. 278, I04 Pac. 263, Io6 Pac. I I 15 
(I gog). The Washington statute relating to the distribution of estates of 
deceased persons authorized the appointment of an agent to take charge of any 
estate distributed to any person residing outside the state. It was provided 
that when an estate has remained in the hands of the agent unclaimed for 
one year, it shall be sold under order of the court, and the proceeds, deducting 
the expenses of the sale, shall be paid into the county treasury for the benefit 
of the nonresidents. 
Estate of Porter, I2g Cal. 86, 6I Pac. 65g (Igoo). The statute authorized 
sale when it appears to the satisfaction of the court that it is for the advantage, 
benefit, and best interests of the estate, and of those interested therein, that 
the real estate, or some part thereof be sold. 
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decedent's land have also been sustained when applied in 
the case of decedents whose deaths were prior to the stat-
utes.244 But in order to render the sale proper when a statute 
244 On the ground that heirs and devisees take subject to the decedent's 
debts and that the statute does no more than prescribe a procedure for the 
payment of debts, the courts have generally sustained retroactive statutes, 
special and general, which authorize the sale of a decedent's property to pay 
his debts. Watkins v. Holman's Lessee, 16 Pet. 25 (U. S. 1842); Livingston's 
Lessee v. Moore, 7 Pet. 469 (U.S. 1833); Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627 
(U.S. 1829); Kibby v. Chitwood's Adm'r, 4 T. B. Mon. 91 (Ky. 1826); 
Shehan's Heirs v. Barnett's Heirs, 6 T. B. Mon. 592 (Ky. 1828); Williamson 
v. Williamson, 3 Sm. & M. 715 (Miss. 1844); Cargile v. Fernald, 63 Mo. 
304 (1876); Charlotte Consolidated Construction Co. v. Ada W. Brocken-
brough, 187 N.C. 65, 121 S. E. 7 (1923); Langdon v. Strong, 2 Vt. 234 
(1829). Contra, Jones' Heirs v. Perry, 10 Yerg. 59 (Tenn. 1836). 
In the nineteenth century before enactment of special acts was generally 
inhibited or forbidden by the state constitutions, thousands of special acts 
to authorize the sale of the lands of 'decedents were passed by the various 
legislatures at the petition of executors, administrators, creditors, and other 
interested persons. In many instances no provision was made for bond to 
secure the heirs and devisees, nor for court supervision; nor were any of the 
usual safeguards of the interests of the heirs and devisees observed, which 
we would consider to be indispensable to due process. See Clusky v. Burns, 
120 Mo. 567,25 S. W. 585 (1893); Watson v. Oates, 58 Ala. 647 (1877); 
Kibby v. Chitwood, 4 T. B. Mon. 91 (1826); Hegarty's Appeal, 75 Pa. 
503 (1874). After the passage of many years during which titles had been 
acquired upon the supposition that such special legislation was valid, the courts 
sometimes found it impossible to strike down legislation even when they 
were convinced that the heirs had been denied procedural and substantive due 
process. Watson v. Oates, 58 Ala. 647 (1877); Clusky v. Burns, 12o Mo. 
56 7, 2 5 S. W. 58 5 (I 8 93) . The predicament of the courts was well stated 
in Shipp v. Klinger, 54 Mo. 238, 239 (1873): "It would be entirely safe 
to say, that millions of dollars have been invested upon the strength of these 
titles, and for the courts at this day to declare the acts, and the titles made 
in pursuance of them, void, would be a hazardous undertaking, and would 
unsettle property rights to an alarming extent. 
"We must therefore decline to go into the question, or consider it open to 
discussion." Some courts simply indulged in the presumption that the act 
was passed in the interest of the beneficiaries and that they had requested it 
and that the proceeding was proper in all respects. Florentine v. Barton, 
2 Wall. 210 (U.S. 1864); Leland v. Wilkinson, 10 Pet. 294 (U.S. 1836); 
Watson v. Oates, 58 Ala. 647 (1877); Doe ex dem. Chandler v. Douglass, 
8 Black£. 1o (Ind. 1846); Clusky v. Burns, 120 Mo. 567, 25 S. W. 585 
(r893). 
Not all courts, however, engaged in such presumptions nor hesitated to 
vindicate the rights of the heirs. Rozier v. Fagan, 46 Ill. 404 (r868); 
Davenport v. Young, r6 Ill. 548 (r855); Culbertson v. Coleman, 47 Wis. 
193, 2 N. W. 124 (1879). 
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is thus applied, the liability to sale for the particular purpose 
must have existed at the time of the decedent's death. If the 
property has passed to the heirs or devisees free from liability 
to be sold for particular purposes, a statute which purports 
to authorize a sale for a new purpose will be held to deprive 
the heirs or devisees of their property without due process.245 
245Wood v. Roach, I25 Cal. App. 63I, I4 P. 2d I70 (I932); Jones' 
Heirs v. Perry, IO Yerg. 59 (Tenn. I836). 
Estate of Newlove, I42 Cal. 377, 75 Pac. I083 (I904). Decedent died 
in I889. His land descended liable to sale to pay debts, costs of administration, 
to pay legacies and so forth. Stats. I 893, p. 212, amended the Code of Civil 
Procedure so as to authori4e sale whenever it appeared to the satisfaction of 
the court that it is for the advantage, benefit, and best interests of the estate, 
and those interested therein, that the real estate, or some part thereof be sold. 
Held: The vested rights of the heirs could not be impaired or affected by 
subsequent legislation giving a power of sale for new purposes, different from 
and greater than those conferred by the law in force at the death of the 
deceased. Accord, Estate of Packer, 125 Cal. 396, 58 Pac. 59 (I899); 
Bazzuro's Estate, I6I Cal. 7I, II8 Pac. 414 (I9II). 
Brenham v. Story, 39 Cal. I79 (I87o), involving a private act which 
provided that the administrator of the deceased could sell any portion of the 
decedent's land as in his judgment would best promote the interests of those 
entitled to the estate. 
Johnson v. Brauch, 9 S.D. rr6, 68 N. W. I73 (I896). A special statute 
was passed authorizing the husband of the decedent to "sell and convey, 
either at public or private sale," the property in dispute. Apparently the only 
object sought to be accomplished was to enable the administrator to convert 
property owned jointly by himself and children (but two of whom w~e 
under disability) into money for the purpose of distribution. Held: The act 
was unconstitutional as an invasion by the legislature of the province of the 
judiciary. 
In Hegarty's Appeal, 75 Pa. 503 (I874), the testator devised his land 
to his wife for life and after her death to various charities. The devises to 
the charities were void. The testator's heirs were adults, except one who had 
a guardian. A special act was passed authorizing the executor to sell the land 
to expedite settlement of the estate. Held: The legislature could not confer 
upon an entire stranger power to sell the reversion which descended to the 
testator's heirs. The legislature has no power to authorize the sale of the prop-
erty of parties sui juris and seized of a vested estate in the premises against 
their consent. 
Legislation authorizing the administrator of a decedent to carry out a 
contract of sale of land entered into by the decedent has been sustained where 
the death occurred prior to the statute. Moore v. Maxwell, I 8 Ark. 469 
(I 857). In Lanes v. Bank, etc., 3 N. J. Sup. 593, 67 A. 2d 925 ( I949) it 
was held that a statute empowering an administrator to carry into effect 
terms and conditions of a contract for purchase of realty entered into by 
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However, the legislature may prescribe a new mode of pro-
cedure for making and confirming sales to satisfy or carry 
out such purposes and objects as were provided by the law in 
force at the time of the decedent's death.246 
When the heirs or devisees are minors the legislature has 
additional power to provide for the disposition of the land 
by virtue of its status as parens patriae. In the case of minors, 
there appears to be no constitutional requirement that the 
purpose for which sale is made under the statute was allow-
able when the minor acquired title. The validity of legisla-
tion providing for the sale of an infant's land is discussed in 
the succeeding chapter.247 
The title to the proceeds from the sale of the lands (after 
the payment of debts and deductions for costs, payment of 
legacies and the like) vests in the heirs and devisees accord-
ing to their interests in the land. But this does not prevent 
the legislature from retroactively devising a procedure for 
the distribution of the proceeds according to the interests of 
the heirs and claimants.248 
decedent prior to the adoption of the statute did not impair any vested right 
or interest of decedent's widow as sole heir. 
246 In re Estate of Benvenuto, 183 Cal. 382, 191 Pac. 678 (1920). After 
decedent's death, the Code of Civil Procedure was amended and that part 
omitted which required that a sale of an estate of a deceased person must be 
upon the order of the court. The effect of this was that a preliminary order 
was no longer required in order to authorize the administrator or executor 
to negotiate a sale of the property. However, it was still provided that no 
sale shall be valid unless reported to and confirmed by the court. 
Murphy v. Los Angeles Farmers' Bank, 131 Cal. liS, 63 Pac. 368 (1900). 
At the time of the death of the testator the property of a decedent was liable 
to be sold for the purpose of paying debts of the deceased, expenses of admin-
istration, family allowances and legacies. Subsequent to the death of the 
testator a statute was passed authorizing the mortgaging of the decedent's 
property for the purpose of raising money with which to pay these charges. 
Vaught v. Williams, 177 N. C. 77, 97 S. E. 737 (1918). A curative 
statute was sustained which purported to validate a sale made by an executrix 
who did not file a bond as required by law. 
247 Chapter 4, note 93· 
248 Custer and Lantz v. Commonwealth, 2 5 Pa. 3 7 5 ( 1 8 55) . 
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RIGHTS OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS 
Although an executor or administrator may be in posses-
sion of the lands of the deceased, he has no estate therein.249 
His possession is solely for the purpose of administering the 
estate of the deceased. Administrators and executors are of-
ficers of the probate courts. Their duties are defined by 
statute. They are subject at all times to legislative regula-
tion; it is competent for the legislature to reach existing as 
well as future cases.250 Naturally, a statute defining the du-
ties of an executor or administrator may be so arbitrary and 
unreasonable as not to be sustainable/51 but the ground for 
declaring such legislation unconstitutional cannot be that the 
administrator or executor is deprived of an interest in the 
deceased's lands. He has no vested interests therein. 
Of course, the administrator or executor may also be 
named in a will as devisee or trustee. In such case he will 
have an interest in the decedent's land,252 but not by virtue 
of his office. It has been held that executors named in a non-
249 Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley's Lessee, 2 Pet. 492 (U. S. 1829); 
Weaver's Ex'rs v. Weaver's Creditors, 23 Ala. 789 (1853); Scott v. Jenkins, 
46 Fla. 518, 35 So. 101 (1902); Campau v. Campau, 25 Mich. 127 (1872); 
Keene's Appeal, 64 Pa. z68 (187o). 
250 See cases cited note 249· 
25l See Re Littleton's Estate, 129 Misc. 845, 223 N. Y. S. 470 (1927). 
The application of the statute would have required the executors to retain 
$3o,ooo to secure the payment of a deficiency which might possibly arise, 
should a deed of trust executed by the decedent in her lifetime be foreclosed. 
The loan secured by the deed of trust was to mature Jan. 1, 1960. 
252 In re Estate of Wellings, 197 Cal. 189, 246 Pac. 21 (1925). Held: 
Where a foreign corporation authorized to do a trust business in the state 
was named as residuary trustee and legatee under the will of a person who 
died prior to the statute by which the privilege of foreign corporations to 
act as trustees of wills in this state was withdrawn, the trust estate became 
vested in the corporation upon the testatrix's death and could not be divested 
of such estate or prevented from executing the trust, even though the statute 
was passed prior to the decree of distribution. 
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intervention will are not officers of the probate court but 
rather trustees.253 
253 People ex rel. Phinney v. Superior Ct., 2I Wash. I86, 57 Pac. 337 
(I 899). Decedent left a "non-intervention will" in which several persons 
were named executors. The will was admitted to probate, and the executors 
continued in administration until the enactment of Laws I 897, c. 98, sec. 2, 
which provided that all insolvent estates shall be settled by the court as in 
cases of intestacy and the court shall make an order requiring the executor 
or administrator to make a report of his acts to the court. The liabilities 
of the estate greatly exceeded the assets. After the statute went into effect, the 
probate court, at the instigation of the creditors, ordered that the continued 
administration of the estate should be under the direction of the court. 
However, the statutes in effect at the decedent's death provided that when 
the testator provides in his will that letters testamentary or of administration 
shall not be required, after the probate of such will, the estate shall be 
managed and settled without the intervention of the court. Held: Laws r 897 
deprived the testator of a vested right to appoint his own agent to settle his 
estate. He had a right that the disposition of his property after death should 
be entrusted to agents of his own choosing rather than to agents of the court. 
The law is particularly jealous of invasions of the rights of deceased persons, 
since they have no opportunity to change their business plans to correspond 




HE validity of legislation abolishing future interests 
as such has rarely come before the courts, for the leg-
islatures have not undertaken to do away with any of 
the future interests recognized in modern case law. One 
great exception is in respect to remainders and reversions 
limited after fees tail, which, because of the prevalent aboli-
tion of that form of land tenure, cannot exist in most juris-
dictions. While the legislatures have generally refrained 
from imposing direct restraints upon the privilege of owners 
of land to create future interests, they have enacted a rather 
sizable body of legislation affecting the rights of owners of 
future interests. Our attention in this chapter will be di-
rected largely to legislation investing private individuals with 
the power to impair or destroy future interests, for it is 
around such legislation that most of the constitutional issues 
revolve. 
This chapter has been divided for purposes of convenient 
discussion into three headings, "Remainders, Reversions, 
and Executory Interests," "Powers of Appointment," and 
"Powers of Termination and Possibilities of Reverter." Pos-
sibilities of reverter and powers of termination have been 
treated separately because the constitutional problems which 
have arisen in respect to these interests are quite unlike those 
arising in respect to the other future interests. Powers of 
appointment, while generally present interests, are consid-
ered because they are admittedly of importance in any discus-
sion of future interests. 
130 
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So far as it may be possible or expedient to classify the 
given interest according to conventional terminology, that 
will be done.1 However, classifications employed in the law 
of future interests, important as they are, are not ipso facto 
determinative of constitutional issues. Other factors are very 
important, such as the purpose to be accomplished by the 
legislation, the necessity for the enactment, and the economic 
value of the interests. Statutes are rarely limited in effect 
to particular types of future interests by name. A given 
statute may affect different kinds of future interests. There-
fore the most objective approach (and the one to be used) 
is to discuss individually the various types of statutes whose 
application may impair future interests, rather than to 
attempt to determine individually what constitutional pro-
tection is afforded each type of future interest. 
For the most part, it will not be necessary to distinguish 
equitable from legal future interests. Where it is significant 
in a given case that the interest is equitable in nature, men-
tion will be made of that fact; otherwise, equitable future 
interests will be treated as though they were legal future 
interests. 
1 The usual classification of future interests, of course, consists of re-
mainders, reversions, executory interests, possibilities of reverter, and powers 
of termination. This classification does not include all possible types of future 
interests. There are various kinds of future interests, notably future interests 
of a statutory nature, which do not strictly fit into any of the conventional 
molds. See I Simes, Future Interests, chapter 12 ( 1936), for a discussion 
of future interests of statutory origin. Even in respect to the conventional 
future interests, it appears to be extremely difficult to devise definitions or 
classifications which do not turn out to be more or less inaccurate, more or less 
subject to exceptions, and in practice difficult to apply to factual situations. 
See 1 Simes, Future Interests, chapter 5 (1936), wherein he distinguishes 
vested and contingent remainders; and chapter 6, in which he distinguishes 
contingent remainders from executory interests. Fortunately, for the purpose 
of delineating constitutional issues it is not necessary to undertake a con-
sideration of each and every imaginable kind of future interest. The extent 
to which the conventional or usual future interests are constitutionally protected 
need only be considered. 
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NOTICE AND HEARING 
What is adequate notice and who are necessary parties 
are problems which are beyond the scope of this discussion. 
Nevertheless, procedural due process is so intertwined with 
substantive due process in proceedings affecting future inter-
ests that at least a few general statements must be made in 
regard to parties and notice. To the owner of a future inter-
est it can make little practical difference whether the legisla-
ture directly extinguishes his interest by fiat or whether his 
interest is obliterated in a proceeding in which he is not 
represented. Questions of necessary parties and adequate 
notice can arise in almost any kind of proceeding, but 
inquiries as to who are necessary parties and what is ade-
quate notice especially press for attention when the case is 
one in which future interests are concerned. Whether there 
is a future interest at all is frequently a question fraught with 
much difficulty. So much depends upon the astuteness and 
diligence of the attorneys for the interested parties. If the 
possible owners of future interests are not represented in 
the proceedings, such interests may be eliminated for lack of 
careful consideration. What is said in the succeeding para-
graphs will be applicable to any of the proceedings under 
the statutes to be discussed subsequently. 
In respect to actions or proceedings in which the judgment 
is in personam, it is a fundamental principle of due process 
that the rights of a person may not be determined unless 
he is a party.2 Service of process upon the parties within the 
jurisdiction of a state is often said to be required by due 
process of law in order that a judgment in personam may be 
rendered/ but due process is probably satisfied by any notice 
2 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
3 Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. zzo (1945). 
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which adequately informs the person of what is going on. 
Persons in being generally are necessary parties whether 
their interests are vested or contingent.4 Reversioners and 
persons having absolutely vested remainders are necessary 
parties in nearly all situations.5 If the person is an infant, 
non compos mentis, or suffering from a legal disability, he 
ordinarily must be represented by his guardian or by a 
guardian ad litem appointed especially for the purpose.6 As 
to persons unknown or not yet born who may have an inter-
est in the property, certain generalizations may be made. If 
living persons are joined who are in fact interested in the 
outcome of the suit in the same way as the unknown or 
unborn persons, the latter are bound.7 In case the interests 
4 State v. Woodruff, 170 Miss. 7441 150 So. 76o (1933). "· •• the 
principal situations where this is not the case being where the person is 
represented by a trustee and where the person is a member of a very numerous 
class, so that it is impracticable to join all members." 3 Simes, Future 
Interests, sec. 687 ( 1936). 
53 Simes, Future Interests, sec. 687 (1936). 
6 The failure to appoint a guardian ad litem does not always involve a 
denial of due process. Where the infant or incompetent has been served with 
process and he appears and defends or is represented in the proceedings by an 
attorney, a decree or judgment rendered against him will not be void or 
subject to collateral attack although subject to reversal on appeal. Levystein 
Bros. v. O'Bryan, 106 Ala. 352, 17 So. 550 (1895); Linn v. Collins, 77 
W.Va. 592, 87 S. E. 934 (1916). It has been suggested that in any event 
a guardian ad litem is not indispensable in a jurisdictional sense, since the 
mere filing of a bill against an infant or incompetent is sufficient to make him 
a ward of the court. McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. no, 108 So. 820 (1926). 
This may be quite true in an in rem proceeding such as a proceeding for the 
distribution of the estate of a decedent, but in a strictly in personam proceeding, 
it is extremely doubtful that the solicitation of a court for the interests of the 
incompetent would be sufficient. The adversary principle in judicial disputes 
is so deeply embedded in the Anglo-American legal system that any judgment 
which purports to bind the interests of an incompetent would probably be 
held void as a deprivation of property without due process unless there were 
either an opportunity for the incompetent himself to defend those interests, 
or those interests were represented by a guardian, trustee, executor, or some 
person before the court. 
7 3 Simes, Future Interests, sec. 672 (1936). 
". . . Although this doctrine of virtual representation is a rule of the 
common law, it is founded on convenience and necessity, since to shackle 
estates without the power of relief, unless every person having a contingent 
and possible interest could be brought before the court, as a party complainant 
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of the living persons who are parties to the proceeding are 
antagonistic to the interests of unknown and unborn persons, 
so that the former persons cannot and do not represent the 
latter, ordinarily a guardian ad litem must be appointed by 
the court to represent the interests of the latter.8 
If the proceeding is one in which the j udgtnent is in rem, 
all persons will be bound whether or not they were joined 
as parties and whether or not their interests were actually 
represented, provided that the court has jurisdiction of the 
res and the statutory procedure for giving notice has been 
followed.9 Notice by publication is held not to deny due 
process when the whereabouts of persons to be served cannot 
be readily ascertained or they are out of the state or when 
the persons who may have interests are unknown.10 It is 
or defendant, according to the usual forms and ordinary practice of the court, 
would be to sacrifice the rights and interests of the present generation to those 
of posterity. All possible parties cannot, as a matter of course, be brought 
before the court in person, and it would be highly inconvenient and unjust 
that the rights of all parties in being should be required to await the possible 
birth of new claimants until the possibility of such birth had become extinct. 
In accordance with this doctrine of virtual representation, contingent re-
maindermen and executory devisees not in being may be bound by a judgment 
when the remaindermen in esse are made parties. The principle upon which 
this rule rests is that the tenant of the first estate or party in being having a 
vested interest virtually represents the subsequent estates, because he has a 
common interest with the other parties in defending. He can be depended on 
to bring forward the entire merits of the controversy as a protection to his 
own interest, in like manner as would the remaindermen not in esse if 
they were present. It should be noted that where the reason of the rule 
fails the rule itself will not be enforced. Thus, if, under the actual facts 
of a case, the interests of unborn remaindermen are antagonistic to those of 
the parties who would represent them, the former will not be concluded by a 
judgment against the latter. So where persons not yet born are not repr·esented 
by any party to an action their interests will not be concluded, as for 
example where their rights are not derived by inheritance from parties to 
the record, but by purchase from other parties." 15 Rut. Case Law, p. 1024, 
sec. 499· 
8 Springs v. Scott, 132 N.C. 548, 44 S. E. II6 (1903). 
9 Hobbs v. Lenon, 191 Ark. 509, 87 S. W. 2d 6 (1935); McCormick 
v. Blaine, 345 Ill. 461, 178 N. E. 195 ( 1931). 
10 Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U. S. 261 (1912); American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 
219 u.s. 47 (1911). 
Notice by publication is insufficient as to known persons of known residence. 
"Exceptions in the name of necessity do not sweep away the rule that within 
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quite apparent that persons who have interests may not 
appear and defend their interests simply because they never 
saw the notice and did not learn of the proceeding. For this 
reason there is possibly a limit to the number of classes of 
judgments in rem which may be authorized by statute or 
created by judicial action. The courts have recognized the 
efficacy of such judgments because it is believed to be socially, 
politically, and economically desirable for a state to have 
the power to make final determination of property rights 
which are conceived of as being within her territorial 
domain.11 That is to say, the rule that no one's interests will 
be affected by a proceeding unless he is joined or his inter-
ests are represented is relaxed because of the paramount 
need to make a final determination of the status of the title 
or because of the impossibility of joining all the persons 
who might possibly have some interest in the property. 
This rule should not be relaxed to any greater extent than 
necessity requires. Proceedings which have been held to be 
in rem are proceedings for the probate of wills and the 
distribution of the property of a decedent/2 proceedings to 
quiet title/3 proceedings for the registration of title under 
the limits of practicability notice must be such as is reasonably calculated to 
reach interested parties." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 
339 u.s. 306, p8 (1950). 
It does not appear to have been decided whether it would be a denial of 
due process if the interests of an ascertainable class of unborn persons (e.g., 
where there is a contingent remainder to the heirs of a living person) were 
cut off by a decree or judgment without those interests being represented 
by a living person under the virtual representation principle nor by a 
guardian ad litem. A distinction might plausibly be made between unknown 
claimants, who are bound by the statutory notice even if they were not 
represented, and unborn claimants in an ascertainable class, who may have to 
be represented. 
11 See Schnebly, Extinguishment of Contingent Future Interests by Decree 
and Without Compensation, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 378 (1930). 
12 3 Simes, Future Interests, sec. 677 (1936); Estate of Davis, 151 Cal. 
318, 86 Pac. 183 (1907). 
13Loring v. Hildreth, 170 Mass. p8, 49 N. E. 651. (1898). 
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Torrens Acts,14 proceedings for the sale of land/5 proceed-
ings for the partition of land/6 and proceedings for the sale, 
mortgage, or lease of trust res.17 This list is not intended to 
be complete. 
A WARNING ON THE WORD "VESTED" 
One should be cautioned at the outset against the ambigu-
ous use of the word "vested" which sometimes results in 
confusion in the cases. In Constitutional Law an interest is 
said to be "vested" when it has been determined that the 
particular interest is protected from impairment by a due 
process clause or some other constitutional provision. The 
term is also applied in real property law to interests which 
are ready to vest in possession without the happening of 
any condition precedent except the determination of the 
preceding estate. The sense of the term as it is used in these 
two ways is altogether different. The fact that an interest 
is vested in the property sense does not necessarily mean 
that it is immune from legislative impairment (i.e., that it 
is a "vested interest"). Conversely, it is certainly not cor-
rect to say that an interest which is contingent in the property 
sense is always subject to legislative impairment. Executory 
interests and contingent remainders are constitutionally pro-
tected interests (although not quite in the same degree as 
are technically vested future interests) which the courts 
rarely allow to be completely wiped out. 
I. REMAINDERs, REvERSIONs, AND ExECUTORY INTERESTS 
The statutes to be discussed do not fall into any precise 
groupings. Since each statute presents its own particular 
14 Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, I 7 5 Mass. 7 I, 55 N. E. 
812 (I900). 
15 Lee v. Albro, 9 I Ore. 21 I, I 78 Pac. 784 ( I9I9). 
16Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (I9I4). 
17 Lee v. Albro, 9 I Ore. 2 I I, 17 8 Pac. 7 8 4 ( I 9 I 9) . 
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problems which are not germane to any other statute, the 
order of treatment must necessarily be somewhat arbitrary. 
The general subject matter of the statutes in the order in 
which they will be considered is as follows: I and 2, com-
promises; 3, quieting title; 4, 5, and 6, partition, sale, and 
leasing; 7, allocation of benefits; 8, improvements and 
repairs; 9, legitimation and adoption; IO, rule against per-
petuities; II, rule in Shelley's Case; I2, Worthier Title 
Doctrine;· I 3, destructability rule; I 4, fees tail; I 5, revoca-
tion of grants; I 6, marketable titles and limitations of 
actions. 
I. Statutes Which Authorize Compromise of Claims as to 
Validity or Effect of a Will 
In a number of states, statutes are to be found which 
provide that a court may affirm a compromise in settlement 
of a controversy as to the validity or effect of a will or of 
a provision thereof. 
The constitutionality of such statutes has been considered 
in only a few cases. Consequently, the extent to which future 
interests may be impaired by compromises has not been very 
well determined. To a large extent our conclusions must rest 
upon conjecture. 
The New York statute 18 confers power upon a court to 
authorize executors, administrators, and trustees to ad just 
by compromise any controversy that may arise between per-
sons claiming as devisees or legatees under the will and 
18 N. Y. Dec. Est. Law, sec. 19. The statute provides that all persons 
claiming as devisees or legatees and those claiming the estate to be intestate 
shall be made parties. It is also provided that where lunatics, infants, or 
persons not sui juris are necessary parties to a compromise under this section, 
these shall be represented in the proceedings by a special guardian appointed 
by the court. And if it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the 
interests of persons unknown or the future contingent interests of persons 
not in being are, or might be, affected by the compromise, the court must 
appoint a guardian ad litem to represent those interests. 
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persons entitled to or claiming the estate of the deceased 
under the statutes of descent and distribution. An agreement 
of compromise in writing pursuant to this statute, if found 
by the court to be just and reasonable in its effects upon the 
interests of infants, lunatics, persons of unsound mind, 
unknown persons, or upon the future contingent interests 
of persons not in being, is declared to be valid and binding 
upon such interests as well as upon the interests of adult 
persons of sound mind. 
In Fisher v. Fisher 19 it was held that the statute would 
authorize a compromise, the effect of which would be to 
extinguish the possibility of any future contingent interest 
where, by a fair and reasonable construction of the will, 
there may be no contingent interest, the whole matter being 
one of doubt. 
That the court has no authority to approve a compromise 
which results in the elimination of a tangible right unless 
19 253 N.Y. 26o, 170 N. E. 912 (1930). The testator by his will created 
trusts for his children, the corpus of which was to be paid over to each child 
on attaining the age of forty-five. The testator directed the trust to be 
continued, in the case of the death of any before reaching such age, for any 
issue of such child until the youngest issue of such child in being at the 
testator's death should become thirty years of age, or sooner die, but he failed 
to make any provision where there was no grandchild in existence at the 
time of the testator's death. There were no grandchildren in being at the 
testator's death. After the death of the testator, all of his children and 
his widow entered into a compromise agreement concerning the property left 
under the will, which in effect wiped out the trust provisions in the will 
and vested the property absolutely in the beneficiaries named. This compromise 
was effected under the statute mentioned above. 
There was grave doubt whether the testator meant that, in event no 
grandchildren were living at his death, the child for whom the trust was 
created should take absolutely and in all events, or whether in case of death 
of a child under forty-five without leaving issue in being at the testator's 
death, there should be an intestacy, in which case the interest would descend 
to the testator's heirs, among whom would be the grandchildren. It was 
determined that the possible interests of the grandchildren born after the 
testator's death were so remote, indefinite, and vague as to bring the will 
within the provisions of the statute, even though the effect of the compromise 
in the instant case was to wipe out the trust provisions and vest the property 
absolutely in the beneficiaries. 
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there is some compensating advantage was expressed in In 
re Sidman's Estate 20 where the following language may 
be found: 
"Where, under a will, a person whether adult, infant, 
unknown or unborn, receives a tangible right or interest, 
the absolute elimination of such right or interest without any 
compensating advantage is not a compromise, it is a com-
plete surrender, a making of a present, and such an act is 
beyond the deputed power of the court. So long as there is 
a possibility that any such person may have a right, however 
remote or contingent, the court possesses no authority to 
validate an agreement which totally nullifies it, for the 
reason that no such power has been accorded. Living persons 
who are sui juris may make gifts of their interests if such 
action suits their humor; others may not, and the court, as 
the protector of the interests of the latter, may not do it 
for them." 21 
The limitations upon the power of the courts, which the 
Sidman and Fisher cases attempt to some extent to delineate, 
do not stem, however, from any constitutional provisions 
but from the language of the act which requires that the 
compromise be just and reasonable in its effects upon the 
interests of infants, lunatics, persons of unsound mind, 
unknown persons, or upon the future contingent interests 
of persons not in being. These cases do not determine how 
far the legislature may go in allowing future interests to 
be destroyed. 
The Massachusetts statute 22 is substantially similar to 
the New York statute. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court has intimated that an agreement would not be "just 
and reasonable . . . in its effect upon any future con-
tingent interests that might arise under a will" if it extin-
20 154 Misc. Rep. 675, 278 N.Y. S. 43 (1935). 
21 z78 N.Y. S. 43, 5I (1935). 
22 Mass. Gen. Laws 1932., c. 2.04, sees. 15-18. 
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guished an interest which was more substantial than a "film 
of mist." 
"It is conceivable that future contingent interests may be of 
such tenuous nature that it would be just and reasonable 
to remove them even so far as concerns such interests rather 
than to permit them to remain a cloud upon other rights 
arising in the estate." 23 
However, in the very case in which this language is found, 
the court below had approved a compromise which extin-
guished, without compensating factors, some pretty sub-
stantial interests. The Supreme Judicial Court seems to have 
thought that the agreement was "just and reasonable." By 
the terms of the will offered for probate, a trust was created 
for the benefit of an unmarried son, aged 52, and a married 
daughter of the testator. It was provided that upon the 
death of the son without issue within twenty years after the 
death of the testator, the share of the son should go to his 
heirs at law, and, if he were still living twenty years after 
the testator's death, he should be given his share absolutely. 
At the time of the testator's death the heir presumptive of 
the son was his sister and in case of her death his heirs pre-
sumptive would be her three minor children. There was 
considerable doubt about the testator's testamentary capacity. 
He had been an insane person under conservatorship for 
many years. The compromise agreement gave the son his 
share in the trust property outright, thus cutting off all 
possible benefit which could come to the son's heirs at law 
under the terms of the will. 
In Neafsey v. Chincholo/4 the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court expressed doubt concerning the validity of a 
"compromise" which looked like an agreement of dissatis-
23 Copeland v. Wheelwright, 230 Mass. 131, 137, 119 N. E. 667, 669 
(1918). 
24 225 Mass. 12, 113 N. E. 651 (r9r6). 
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fied devisees, who had simply made over the will to suit 
themselves. In this case, the testator left a life interest in 
certain real estate to two of his daughters with remainder 
to the heirs of the testator at the time of the death of the 
survivor of the daughters. By the terms of the compromise, 
the daughters were given fee interests in the real estate in 
which they were given a life estate by the will, and the 
remainder to the heirs of the testator was obliterated. The 
remainder to the heirs of the testator, although contingent 
because the takers could not be ascertained until the death 
of the survivor of the daughters, was fairly certain to vest 
in possession in someone at some time and therefore ought 
not to have been eliminated except for very good reasons. 
No such reasons appeared in the case. The decree of the 
probate court, however, was set aside on the ground that no 
special guardian had been appointed to represent the future 
contingent interests as the statute requires. 
In Dodge v. Detroit Trust Co. et al.25 the Michigan 
Supreme Court refused, on the ground that the former pro-
ceedings were res adjudicata) to set aside a settlement which 
had been entered into eighteen years previously in anticipa-
tion of the Michigan compromise statute.26 The settlement 
25Dodge v. Detroit Trust Co., 300 Mich. 575, 2 N. W. 2d 509 (1942). 
26 Pub. Acts 192 r, Act No. 249; Comp. Laws 1948, sees. 702.45 et seq. 
Section r (sec. 702.45) provides: "The compromise, settlement or adjust-
ment of any good faith contest of the admission to probate of any instrument 
propounded as the last will and testament of any decedent, or of any good 
faith controversy (a) as to the construction, validity or effect of any such 
provision thereof, whether such controversy shall arise before or after such 
instrument has been admitted to probate, or (b) as to the rights or interests 
in the estate of such decedent of any person as beneficiary under such will, or 
of any child or issue of a deceased child claimed to have been unintentionally 
omitted from such will, or of the widow claiming to exercise any right 
of election, or (c) otherwise arising in or growing out of the administration 
of the estate of any decedent under such will, or of any trust created thereby, 
including any accounting in such administration, or any distribution under 
such will or trust, when there is or may be any person interested who is a 
minor or otherwise without legal capacity to act in person, or whose present 
existence or whereabouts cannot be ascertained, or where there is any in-
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apparently disregarded the interests of unborn persons in a 
trust set up by the will, but the validity of the compromise 
as it affected those interests was not discussed by the court.21 
alienable estate or future contingent estate or interest which will or may be 
affected by such compromise, settlement or adjustment, which compromise, 
settlement or adjustment is made in accordance with the provisions of this 
act, shall be lawful and valid and binding upon all the parties thereto 
including such as are represented therein by trustees, guardians or guardians 
ad litem and upon all trusts created by such instrument, and upon all future 
interests arising thereunder in persons then in being or who may thereafter 
come into being and shall be recognized and so enforced by all courts and 
tribunals whatsoever: . . ." 
Section 2 (sec. 702.46) provides that the probate court shall appoint a 
guardian ad litem to represent persons whose whereabouts cannot be ascertained, 
minors, and incompetents who have no guardian, and unborn persons having 
future contingent interests or estates. It is also provided that a guardian 
ad litem shall be appointed in case of wills purporting to create trusts where 
no trustee has qualified or where the trustee doesn't appear in answer to 
summons. 
Section 3 ( 702-47) provides that if the probate court finds that the contest 
was in good faith, and the effects of such agreement upon the estates and 
interests of the persons and interests represented by any fiduciary or guardian 
ad litem and upon any inalienable estate or interest shall be found to be just 
and reasonable, an order shall be made approving such agreement. 
Section 4 of the original act provided that the act was intended to apply 
to all cases as well where the decedent had died theretofor as where the 
decedent shall have died thereafter. 
27 With the exception of certain specific bequests, the testator devised his 
entire property, which amounted after payment of debts and taxes to 
approximately $2 6,ooo,ooo in trust, the income to be divided five ways, 
one portion going to the wife of the testator and the other portions to be 
paid in equal amounts to each of four of the testator's six children. The 
share of the income of any deceased child was to go to his issue and upon 
the death of the last survivor of the children, the trustees were to convey 
the estate to the heirs of the children. One of the testator's children was not 
yet born when the will was executed and therefore not included under the 
trust. Approximately $2,7oo,ooo was set aside for this child after the 
testator's death as its share in the estate. The remaining child, the plaintiff 
in the Dodge case, was practically disinherited by his father, being given a 
life income of $1 so.oo per month .. After the will was filed for probate, this 
son announced his intention of contesting the will. The four children and 
the disinherited son, John, entered into an agreement, which was immediately 
binding on the adult signatories, but was conditioned upon obtaining within 
six months the consent of the minor children, the unborn, and the contingently 
interested. The compromise statute was pending before the legislature while 
the negotiations were proceeding and had been enacted when the agreement 
was reached. The effective date of the statute, however, was approximately 
two months subsequent to the date of the agreement. Apparently the parties 
contemplated that the statute was necessary to the fulfillment of the agreement. 
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The plaintiff's main contention (there were many) was that 
the trust provisions of the will were null and void ab initio 
because the inclusion of a small amount of real estate caused 
the whole trust to violate the two-lives rule 28 and that 
consequently whatever moneys he had received in the 
attempted settlement were only part of his intestate share 
of the trust property.29 The court cast doubt on the correct-
ness of the contention but did not feel compelled to express 
a definite opinion. Clearly the court thought that the inter-
ests purported to be created by the will did have a legal 
existence at the time of the settlement. 
The cases just discussed indicate the temper of the courts 
but do not aid us very much in setting the constitutional 
limitations to the legislative power. 
We must bear in mind that we are dealing with statutes 
which authorize compromises. The word "compromise" 
connotes a giving and taking. A decision of a majority 
The guardian ad litem to represent future contingent estates was not appointed 
until after the effective date of the statute and he did not sign until after 
the decree approving the settlement. The settlement provided for the payment 
of a lump sum of $I,6oo,ooo plus interest to John and the sum of $I,ooo,ooo 
to the widow and to each of the four other children mentioned in the will. 
It was approved by the circuit court and no ·appeal was taken. At the same 
time the other four children and the widow entered into a supplemental agree-
ment which re-established out of the remaining property the trust provided 
for in the will. 
28 The two-lives rule was applicable to realty but not to personalty. Mich. 
Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 12934: "Every future estate shall be void in its 
creation, which shall suspend the absolute power of alienation for a longer 
period than is prescribed in this chapter; such power of alienation is suspended 
when there are no persons in being, by whom an absolute fee in possession can 
be conveyed." And in Mich. Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 12935: "The absolute 
power of alienation shall not be suspended by any limitation or condition 
whatever, for a longer period than during the continuance of two [2] 
lives in being at the creation of the estate," etc. 
The two-lives statute has been repealed since the Dodge case. Pub. Acts 
1949, Act No. 38. 
29 The doctrine that the inclusion of a small amount of realty would cause 
a whole trust to violate the two-lives rule was recognized long before the 
first litigation in the Dodge case, but was not clearly enunciated until Richards 
v. Stone, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N. W. 657 (1938). 
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forced upon a minority is not a compromise; all parties must 
agree upon the result reached. The statutes presuppose 
that all parties in being will have voluntarily consented to 
the agreement. We may assume without argument that a 
statute allowing the majority of claimants to bind the inter-
ests of the dissenting minority of claimants would be held 
to deprive the latter of their property without due process, 
except, perhaps, if their interests are extremely unsubstantial 
and uncertain. It is also obvious that a statute could not 
make the agreement of the claimants binding upon persons 
who are not parties to the agreement and are in no way 
represented in the proceedings. 
A statute is needed to make a compromise effective only 
where there are interests in persons not of age or suffering 
under a legal disability, or interests in unknown or unborn 
persons. Heirs and devisees not under any disability can 
do as they please with their own interests. Compromise 
statutes will, therefore, normally be unconstitutional only 
so far as they permit persons in being and sui juris to affect 
the interests of persons non sui juris and persons unknown 
or not in being who cannot take part in the agreement. 
The constitutionality of the compromise statutes must first 
of all be considered in this light: Although a compromise 
may obliterate some of the interests created by the will, a 
judicial determination which is even more destructive may 
be avoided. Were it not for the compromise, a contest of 
the will might have resulted in a determination that the will 
is invalid, in which case all of the interests prima facie created 
by the will would have been nullified.30 Or an attack on the 
30 Probate of a will merely declares in a formal way the existence of facts 
which have previously occurred and furnishes official evidence of those facts. 
z Page, Wills, sec. 56 I (Lifetime ed.). If, in point of fact, the will is valid, 
it speaks from the moment of the testator's death, but if it is invalid then 
the devisee never had any rights. The litigation attending the probate 
of a contested will is not prosecuted to divest either the heir or devisee of title 
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validity of a provision might have been successful. Or a 
construction which would eliminate the existence of the 
alleged interests might have been adopted by the court. 
These compromise statutes are founded on the well estab-
lished maxim of public policy, "interest reipublicae ut finis 
sit litium." It is better that "paper" interests be impaired 
than that the property be consumed or diminished by expen-
sive litigation. 
The primary consideration in determining the constitution-
ality of the application of a compromise statute should be 
whether adequate safeguards are established by the statute 
to assure that no compromise will be allowed to affect 
adversely the interests of persons unknown, unborn, or non 
sui juris, except where there is a bona fide uncertainty as to 
the validity or construction of the will or of the provision. 
The technical classification of the extinguished interest 
should be only a secondary concern. Of course, the substan-
tiality of the interest from the point of view of the likeli-
hood that it will ultimately vest in possession or whether 
it is vested or contingent in the real property sense must be 
considered by the court. But the court should consider such 
to property, but to determine which of them is entitled to the property. Wills 
v. Lochnane, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 547 (1873). See Chapter 3, p. 119. 
But even though the probate merely establishes the status of the proffered 
instrument, it might be held to be a taking of property without due process 
to expose future interests set up by a will to a danger not existing at the 
testator's death of losing the foundation upon which their existence depends, 
as by enlarging the grounds for contesting a will, or extending the period 
in which the will may be contested, or adding to the class of persons who may 
contest the will. There are apparently no cases involving future interests. 
However, it has been held, on the ground that a title vested by will is as 
completely vested as if granted by deed, that to extend the right to contest 
a will after the estate has thus vested by the death of the testator and permit 
the property to be taken from the devisees by a contest of the will authorized 
by a statute passed subsequent to the death of the testator, would be to 
deprive the devisees of their property without due process. "The right to 
hold the property under the will free from any liability to contest by any one 
legally entitled to contest the will at the death of the testator is a vested 
right, which cannot be taken away by legislative enactment." Havill v. 
Havill, 332. Ill. II, 17, 163 N. E. 42.8, 430 (192.8). See Chapter 3, p. 117. 
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matters only for the purpose of judging the fairness and 
reasonableness of the compromise. If the interest extin-
guished could, in fact, have been of no value, or in all prob-
ability could never have vested in possession, the court can 
readily approve a compromise effected in accordance with 
the statute. On the other hand, if the eliminated interest 
had a present substantial value or was likely to vest in pos-
session, the court will be reluctant to approve the compromise 
unless the claims present very difficult and doubtful ques-
tions of law and fact. A statute which does not provide for 
some kind of guarantee that the compromise will be fair 
in its effect on the interests of persons not in being or not 
known, or non sui juris, would, in the writer's opinion, be 
unconstitutional. But one should not generalize that certain 
classifications of future interest cannot be eliminated by the 
compromtse. 
A statute allowing disappointed heirs and devisees to 
remake any will to suit their desires would be obviously 
unconstitutional if their agreement could bind the substantial 
interests of nonassenting parties. 
A court which deems the "substantiality" of the extin-
guished interest to be the primary criterion of the constitu-
tionality of the application of the compromise statute must 
necessarily put great weight upon whether the effective 
date of the statute is before or after the death of the testator. 
Such a court will consider the interests to have "vested" 
at the death of the testator or certainly when the will has 
been admitted to probate.31 In Fisher v. Fisher 32 it was 
stated that the New York statute could not be applied to a 
will which was effective before its enactment. On the other 
hand, the will in the Dodge case 33 had been admitted to 
31 See note 3 o supra. 
32 253 N.Y. z6o, 170 N. E. 912 (1930), supra note 19. 
33 Dodge v. Detroit Trust Co., 300 Mich. 575, 2 N. W. 2d 509 (1942), 
supra note 2 5. 
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probate some months before the Michigan statute went into 
effect. The result reached in that case is no doubt correct. 
Unfortunately, the court did not really examine the constitu-
tionality of the application of the statute. 
Where the statute is enacted before the death of the 
testator, although after the execution of the will, few courts 
are likely to find constitutional objection to allowing the 
statute to apply. The disposition of the property of a 
deceased person is largely a matter of statute. The statute 
which is in effect when the testator dies may be made to 
control rather than the one in effect when the will was 
executed, for a will is deemed to be ambulatory during the 
lifetime of the testator.34 The compromise statute should 
be treated as a provision to the effect that the precise extent 
to which a will creating future interests shall be executed, 
in cases where all other parties in interest in the estate make 
an agreement upon that subject, shall depend upon a judicial 
decree entered upon general principles of justice and reason 
after a full investigation.35 The state indubitably has power 
to regulate prospectively the creation of future interests. It 
is within the power of the state to say that, although future 
interests may be created by will, whenever the recipients 
of such interests are non sui juris, or not known or not in 
being, and there is a grave doubt that the will or the pro-
vision is effective, or it is very uncertain upon proper con-
struction of the terms of the will just what interests were 
created, then such putative future interests may, if certain 
safeguards are followed, be cut off. 
34 Estate of Weeks, 154 Kan. 103,114 P. zd 857 (1941); Blackbourn 
v. Tucker, 7z Miss. 735, 17 So. 737 (1895); Ostrander v. Preece, u9 Ohio St. 
625, 196 N. E. 670 (1935), appeal dismissed 296 U.S. 543 (1935); In re 
Zeigner's Estate, 146 Wash. 537, 264 Pac. 12 (1928); I Page, Wills, sec;. 71 
(Lifetime ed.). 
35Copeland v. Wheelwright, 230 Mass. 131, 119 N. E. 667 (1918). 
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2. Statutes Which Authorize the Compromise of Claims 
Against Trust Estates 
A Massachusetts statute enacted in 1861 provided: 
"The supreme judicial court may authorize executors, 
administrators, guardians, and trustees, to adjust by arbitra-
tion or compromise any controversy that may arise between 
different claimants to the estate in their hands, to which 
such executors, administrators, guardians, or trustees, togeth-
er with all other parties in being, claiming an interest in 
such estate, shall be parties. And any award or compromise 
made in writing in such case, shall, if found by the court just 
and reasonable in relation to its effects upon any future 
contingent interests in said estate, be valid and bind such 
interests as well as the interests of the parties in being: pro-
vided, however, that where it shall appear that such future 
contingent interests may be affected, the court may appoint 
some suitable person or persons to represent such interests 
" 36 
In Clarke v. Cordis 37 it was held that merely because the 
statute operated on contingent interests of persons who were 
either not in being, or could not, from the uncertain and 
remote nature of their interests, be made parties to the pro-
ceeding, it did not deprive such persons of their right to 
property in violation of any provision of the Declaration of 
Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution.38 In this case 
36 Acts r86r, c. 174, sec. r, now embodied in Mass. Gen. Laws 1932, 
c. 204, sec. 14. 
37 4 Allen 466 (Mass. r86z). 
38 Article I: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, 
essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of 
enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, 
and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety 
and happiness." 
Article X: "Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by 
it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, according to standing 
laws. . . . but no part of the property of any individual can, with justice, 
be taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that 
of the representative body of the people. . . . And whenever the public 
exigencies require that the property of any individual should be appropriated 
to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor." 
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the testator had devised certain property in trust to his 
executors with directions to pay over the income to the testa-
tor's four sons during their lives, and upon the death of any 
son to pay over to his legal heirs the proportion of the 
income which he would have been entitled to receive. Upon 
the death of the survivor of the sons, the executors were to 
convey and assign all of the property to the heirs of the four 
sons respectively by right of representation. After the pro-
bate of the will, one of the sons died. The remaining sons 
were all alive; some were married and had one or two chil-
dren. After the deceased son's death, two minor children 
appeared and claimed, through their mother, to be his chil-
dren and lawful heirs. The surviving sons denied that this 
woman had ever married their brother or that the children 
were his lawful heirs. In pursuance to the statute quoted 
above, a compromise agreement was finally entered into 
between all the parties (the infants were represented by 
guardians), whereby it was agreed that tpe two children 
should presently receive three-eighths of the income to which 
the deceased was entitled. It was further agreed that they 
should take the same proportion of the decedent's share of 
the principal if they were living at the time of the final 
distribution of the estate. The children relinquished all 
claims to any other or greater share. The surviving sons 
took the remaining five-eighths of the income. 
The statute was sustained on the broad ground that it 
enabled trustees and guardians to enter into expedient and 
beneficial adjustments or settlements of controversies relat-
ing to the property in their hands, just as persons acting in 
their own right may compose and settle disputes affecting 
their own estates. If the trustee has the power to compro-
mise, he may be able to avoid litigation which will absorb 
the value of the ~state or destroy all alleged interests. The 
court believed that the assent of all interested parties might 
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be presumed to such a statute as this, which (in the opinion 
of the court) tended to create in everyone concerned a more 
valuable interest.39 Contingent interests, it was held, were 
adequately protected by the provision which requires the 
court to appoint some suitable person whose duty it shall 
be to represent them in all proceedings and by the provision 
that the court shall not allow a proposed compromise unless 
it is just and reasonable in its effect on all contingent interests. 
The result reached in Clarke v. Cordis is easily justified. 
The outcome of a suit would have been very doubtful. It 
was clearly to the advantage of everyone to prevent litiga-
tion. Moreover, the compromise was probably as advan-
tageous to the interests of the unborn heirs of the surviving 
sons as could be expected. The sons had a present valuable 
interest in the same proportions as their presumptive and 
unborn heirs would some day have in the corpus. They no 
doubt sought to procure a settlement most advantageous to 
themselves and their heirs. The only interest of which the 
heirs of the surviving sons were possibly deprived was the 
interest in the share of the deceased son. But this they would 
have taken only if the claimants were not the heirs of the 
decedent. There was no certainty that the heirs of the sur-
viving sons were actually entitled to any part of the share of 
the deceased. 
The Massachusetts statute has not been given a retroactive 
effect, but it would seem that the reasons which sustain the 
prospective operation of the statute would also amply justify 
its retroactive operation. 
39 This was one of the grounds upon which the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court sustained the retroactive application of Acts 1785, c. 6z, 
sec. 4, which abolished the common-law presumption that a conveyance to 
two or more persons (not husband and wife) creates a joint tenancy. The 
effect of the statute was to turn existing joint tenancies into tenancies in 
common and to abolish the incident of survivorship. Holbrook v. Finney, 
4 Mass. 566 (18o8); Miller v. Miller, 16 Mass. 58 (1819). See infra 
Chapter 7, p. 316. 
FUTURE INTERESTS 
3· Statutes Which Authorize Proceedings to Determine 
the Status of Title to Land and Proceedings to 
Quiet Title: Torrens Acts 
Questions do not ordinarily arise as to the general validity 
of statutes which authorize proceedings to quiet title, or 
to remove clouds upon title, or to determine adverse claims 
to land.40 If the design of such proceedings were to destroy 
or impair future interests in the same manner that interests 
are sometimes adversely affected by the compromise pro-
ceedings under the statutes just discussed, there would be 
grave doubts as to whether the legislature had not violated 
property rights. But the statutes do not vest the plaintiff 
with a new title; they merely enable him expeditiously to 
settle what his title is.41 It appears not to have been seriously 
urged that statutes like these in any way authorize the 
impairment of vested rights.42 Of course, in the application 
of a statute to specific instances it may well happen that 
interests are unconstitutionally destroyed by the improper 
expunction of an instrument from record or it may happen 
that a valid claim is denied, but the general validity of the 
statute is not on that account brought into question. 
In one aspect these statutes are somewhat likely to occa-
sion the destruction of future interests. Proceedings under 
the statutes are often declared to be in rem. Since notice 
by publication is sufficient in proceedings in rem when the 
40 The constitutionality of statutes authorizing proceedings for quieting 
title and registration of title is further discussed in Chapter 3, p. 8 5 et seq. 
41 Arizona Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co., 27 Ariz. 
202, 232 Pac. 545 (1925). 
42 The constitutionality of the statutes has in the past been challenged 
often, but very rarely for denial of substantive due process. The common 
charge has been that the adverse claimants were not adequately advised of the 
proceedings by the statutory scheme of notice by publication. The statutes 
have generally been held not to deny procedural due process. Wehrman v. 
Conklin, 155 U.S. 314 (1894); McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. no, ro8 
So. 820 (1926); Ashton-Jenkins Co. v. Bramel, 56 Utah 587, 192 Pac. 
375 (1920). 
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possible claimants are unknown or nonresident, the owner of 
a future interest may in fact be uninformed of the proceeding 
and may not appear with the evidence which would have 
tipped the scales, so to speak, and have persuaded the court 
that his claim is valid. 
In McFadin v. Simms/3 the failure of persons claiming 
an indefeasibly vested remainder to appear in response to 
the statutory notice given them and to offer proof of their 
title was held to estop them from later making a collateral 
attack on a judgment which declared the plaintiffs in a 
statutory proceeding to quiet title to be the owners in fee of 
the land. The claimants unsuccessfully contended that the 
statute as applied retroactively (the testator whose will 
created the remainder died some 37 years before the statute) 
violated a provision in the state constitution prohibiting retro-
active legislation.44 Now, ordinarily an interest overlooked 
by the court in a quiet-title proceeding will be less con-
spicuous than a vested remainder. One would be inclined 
to answer, if the proposition were put to him abstractly, that 
such an oversight must be the result of gross mistake or of 
fraud and collusion, but in any event utterly unjustifiable. 
However, under the peculiar facts of the case the finding 
that the plaintiffs in the proceeding were the owners in fee 
was reasonable. The gaps in the chain of title were thought 
to be but formal defects, resulting from the loss of a deed 
or deeds or the failure to record them. The will was not 
recorded in the county in which the land was located. The 
plaintiffs' ancestor had lived on the land for more than forty 
43 309 Mo. 312, 273 S. W. 1050 (1925). 
44 Mo. Const. 18 7 5, Art. z, sec. 15: "That no ex post facto law, nor law 
impairing the obligation of contracts, or retrospective in its operation, or 
making any irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, can be 
passed by the General Assembly." Now with insignificant modifications, Const. 
1945, Art. r, sec. 13. See Chapter 2, p. 13 supra, for a discussion of the 
meaning given this provision. 
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years under a deed purporting to convey a fee-simple estate. 
The plaintiffs were in complete ignorance of the fact that the 
grantor to their ancestor was only a life tenant under the 
will by which the claimants asserted an interest in the land. 
The application of the Torrens Acts has given rise to very 
similar constitutional problems. The purpose of these stat-
utes is not to extinguish interests in land but to do away with 
the uncertainty in titles inherent in the conventional system 
of recordation of instruments. By means of a special pro-
ceeding in the nature of a proceeding in rem, the owner of 
land can have the status of the title fixed and have declared 
the nature of the titles and interests therein and the person 
or persons in whom such titles and interests are at the time 
vested. The certificate of title acquired thereby is in theory 
indisputable evidence of the status of the title. A judicial 
proceeding to clear titles against all the world would scarcely 
be possible unless the proceeding got rid of unknown as well 
as known claims. Personal service upon unknown claimants 
is, of course, impossible. The statutes provide for notice by 
publication to all unknown claimants, resident and nonresi-
dent, and sometimes provide only for notice by publication 
to nonresident claimants. Known resident claimants must 
ordinarily be informed of the proceeding by registered mail 
or by some other form of individual notice. The Torrens 
Acts have been often attacked for denying procedural due 
process, but, with the exception of one or two very early 
cases, have always been sustained.45 
45 Eliason v. Wilborn, 335 Ill. 352, 167 N. E. 101, affirmed 281 U. S. 
457 (1929); Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 
55 N. E. 812 (1900); State v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 89 N. W. 175 
(1902); Robinson v. Kerrigan, 151 Cal. 40, 90 Pac. 129 (1907): "The 
state has full control over the subject of the mode of transferring and estab-
lishing titles to property within its limits. For these purposes the state has 
power to provide a special proceeding, in the nature of a proceeding in rem 
to fix the status of the land and declare the nature of the titles and interests 
therein and the person or persons in whom such titles and interests are, at the 
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4· Statutes Which Authorize Compulsory Partition 
To what extent owners of future interests are liable to 
compulsory partition in the absence of a statute has not been 
very well determined by the cases.46 It would seem that 
even in the absence of a statute there should be liability as 
to all future interests when the partition action is brought 
by a possessory cotenant who has a fee simple. Suppose, for 
example, that Blackacre is devised, as to one undivided half, 
to A and his heirs and as to the other undivided half to B 
for life, remainder to C and his heirs. A should not have to 
wait until the death of B before a final partition can be 
made.47 Where the possessory interests are life estates, it 
is less certain that the owners of future interests are liable 
to compulsory partition by the possessory cotenants. It would 
seem, however, that if the life estate of the cotenant seeking 
partition is, or may become, as to any part of its duration, 
concurrent with the future interest against which partition 
is sought, then partition should be allowed.48 
There is very little authority dealing with the constitu-
tionality of statutes under which owners of future interests 
are subject to liability to compulsory partition by the owners 
of possessory interests to which the power of partition is 
incident. But, on principle, the constitutionality of such 
time, vested. It may do this whenever it may be considered necessary, or likely 
to promote the general welfare." (rsr Cal. 40, 46, 90 Pac. 129, 131.) 
46 3 Simes, Future Interests, sec. 658 (1936). 
47 3 Simes, op. cit., sec. 6 58. 
48 E. g., land is conveyed, as to one undivided half to A for life, remainder 
to B and his heirs, as to the other undivided half, to C for life, remainder to 
D and his heirs. If C dies before A, A will hold concurrently with D. 
Therefore, A should be entitled to partition as against D. Restatement, 
Property, sec. 177, Illustration 6 (1936). Although in the example, B's 
remainder can never become concurrent with A's interest, it would be unfair 
to D not to bind B by the partition. 
Outside of California, future interests are not subject to a partition action, 
brought by the sole owner of the entire possessory estate. Powell, Real 
Property, ~ 29 r. The purpose of partition is to sever concurrent interests 
and not to attempt severance of successive interests. 
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legislation is clear even where the statute is applied retro-
actively.49 In the first place, there is a public policy which 
discourages the tying up of property and the prevention of 
its alienation, 5° or, as the principle is sometimes put, everyone 
has the right to enjoy his own in severalty. This particular 
principle would not in itself authorize an interference with 
or impairment of constitutionally protected interests, but if 
the constitutional objections can be further shown to be 
groundless, public policy would probably weigh heavily in 
the opinion of the court. A more fundamental reason, and 
one which does dispel constitutional objections, is to be 
derived from those cases which hold that liability to parti-
tion is one of the inherent characteristics of joint ownership 
of land.51 Where all of the interests are possessory, parti-
tion can be compelled by one of the cotenants against the 
49Wallace v. Stearns, 96 N.H. 367, 77 A. 2d 109 (1950). At testator's 
death in 1943 the three devisees respectively became fee owner of an undivided 
one-half interest, and life tenant and remainderman of the other half. There 
were no testamentary restrictions on the power to partition. By statute effective 
June, 1949, the following provision was added to the powers of the Superior 
Court in partition proceedings: "The holder in possession of a fee simple 
interest in such real estate may have partition, irrespective of the class or 
duration of the estate of any petitionee named in the action." N. H. Rev. Laws 
1942, c. 410, sec. 1, as amended by Laws 1949, c. 266. It was held that 
although the statute was retroactive it did not fall within the interdiction 
of the constitutional provision forbidding retroactive legislation (N. H. 
Const., Bill of Rights, Art. 23) because it was remedial only and was not 
injurious, oppressive, or unjust. The court said that the power of partition 
is remedial in nature and promotes the enjoyment of property and hence 
should be liberally construed. In an initial proceeding by the same petitioner 
it was decided that the court was without power to grant partition save in the 
case of "persons holding with others of the same class." The amending statute 
first became available late in the pendency of the first petition and was not 
called to the notice of the court in connection with that petition and was not 
considered by it in dismissing the petition. The former proceeding was held 
to be no bar to the present action under the section as amended. 
50 Mennig v. Howard, 213 Iowa 936, 240 N. W. 473 (1932). 
51 Richardson v. Monson, 23 Conn. 94 (1854); Metcalf v. Hoopingardner, 
45 Iowa 510 (1877); 2 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 474 (3d ed.). However 
the power is not so absolute that the cotenant cannot preclude himself by 
agreement with his cotenants from exercising it. Also it seems that if the 
grantor expressly prohibits partition during a period named, involuntary 
partition is prevented. 2 Tiffany, op. cit. 
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objections and protests of the other cotenants, and this by 
virtue of a statute which was enacted after the tenancy came 
into being.52 The rights of owners of future interests are 
subject to the existing law the same as the interests of pos-
sessory cotenants. There is no reason why the owner of a 
future interest should be exempted from a liability which is 
imposed upon the owners of possessory interests. A third 
reason in support of the constitutionality of statutes imposing 
liability to partition on owners of future interests is that so 
far as the partition is in kind, the owner of the future interest 
does not suffer any real loss on account of the partition.53 
The net effect of the partition can only be to transform his 
interest from an interest in an undivided share to an interest 
in a determinate portion of the land.54 
Slightly different constitutional issues might be raised 
by statutes which permit the owner of a future interest to 
compel a partition. The wording of some of the statutes is 
broad enough to permit the owner of any kind of future 
interest to compel partition, but probably only the owner of 
52 Richardson v. Monson, 2 3 Conn. 94 ( r 8 54) ; 2 Tiedeman, State and 
Federal Control of Persons and Property, p. 667: "The right of compulsory 
partition of all joint estates, as an invariable incident of these estates, except in 
the case of tenancies in entirety, has come down to us as an inheritance from 
the mother country, and all joint estates in the United States have been 
created in actual or implied contemplation of the possibility of a compulsory 
partition. Consequently, no question can arise as to the constitutionality of 
laws providing for compulsory partition." 
53 Hill v. Sangamon Loan & Trust Co., 302 Ill. 33, 134 N. E. 112 
(1922). 
54 Unquestionably it may often be undesirable to allow a life tenant to 
procure a partition in kind which will be effective beyond his life, especially 
where the future interests are held in different proportions than the possessory 
estates so that the portion set out for the life tenant will not correspond to 
the share to which the owner of the future interest will ultimately be entitled. 
It is easy to imagine situations in which the future interests after the life 
estates are so uncertain that it would be impossible during the lives of the 
tenants to say in what proportions the future owners shall hold the land. 
Making a final partition at the instigation of a life tenant will often be out 
of the question. And, naturally, if the future interest is in the whole of the 
land, it will not at all be affected by a partition in kind of the possessory 
interests. 
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an indefeasibly vested remainder has such power.55 The 
reason for the restriction is apparent. It would be impossible 
to make a permanent or final division where the interest 
of the person asking partition is contingent or defeasible. 
One case has been found which sustains the constitutionality 
of this type of statute (as limited to owners of indefeasibly 
vested remainders). In Gillespie v. Allison/6 the real estate 
was given to a widow "so long as she remained the widow 
of W. A. Owens," with remainders over. The life tenant 
and some of the remaindermen sought to compel partition 
by sale. The defendants, who were also remaindermen, con-
tended that since their rights accrued prior to the enactment, 
the statute 57 under which the other remaindermen sought 
partition could not be applied. Before the act, co-owners in 
remainder or reversion had no power to enforce a compulsory 
partition of land. It was held that the application of the 
statute to estates existing prior thereto did not impair vested 
rights; the statute merely permitted the remaindermen to 
anticipate the time of partition. This was said to be in 
furtherance of the public policy which discourages the tying 
up of property and the prevention of alienation. 
55 3 Simes, Future Interests, sec. 665 ( 1936); 2 Powell, Real Property, 
,-r 290· 
As of January 1, 1952, statutes of thirteen jurisdictions in general em-
powered any joint tenant or tenant in common in an unconditional 
and indefeasible future interest to compel partition of the future interest thus 
held in co-ownership (Ark., Cal., Del., Ill., Minn., Mo., N. H., N. Y., N. C., 
Ore., Pa., Tenn., and Wis.); the statutes of five jurisdictions were so worded 
that probably they had the same effect as the above statutes (Ariz., Md., 
Neb., N. Mex., and S. C.); and the statutes in five other jurisdictions allowed 
co-owners of 'indefeasibly vested remainders to compel partition under 
restricted sets of circumstances (Ala., Conn., Ind., N. J., and Me.,). 2 
Powell, Real Property, ,-r 290. 
56 115 N.C. 542, 20 S. E. 627 (1894). 
57 N.C. Acts 1887, c. 214, sec. 2, now N.C. Gen. Stat. 1950, sec. 46-23: 
"The existence of a life estate in any land shall not be a bar to a sale for 
partition of the remainder or reversion thereof, and for the purposes of 
partition the tenants in common shall be deemed seized and possessed as if no 
life estate existed. But this shall not interfere with the possession of the life 
tenant during the existence of his estate." 
158 RETROACTIVE LAND LEGISLATION 
In the cases in which remaindermen have been held 
entitled to bring an action for partition under the statutes, 
there has been no disturbance of the life estate without the 
life tenant's consent.58 In effect, the remaindermen achieve 
only a partition of title. Permitting persons who do not 
have an immediate right to possession to compel partition 
goes beyond the concept of partition as a means of enabling 
cotenants to enjoy the use of their shares in severalty, but 
there is no reason why partition should not be used as a 
means of determining title, and no reason why this deter-
mination should await the death of the life tenant.59 
Partition by Sale 
The real problems arise when partition in kind is imprac-
ticable and a sale is necessary, or where some of the posses-
sory cotenants desire a sale in order to free the title of the 
encumbrances of future interests. Is a statute constitutional 
which retroactively creates a liability upon the owner of a 
future interest to have his interest in the land extinguished 
58 See Drake v. Merkle, 153 Ill. 318, 38 N. E. 654 (1894); Hanson 
v. Ingwaldson, 77 Minn. 533, 8o N. W. 702 (1899); Hayes v. McReynolds, 
144 Mo. 348, 46 S. W. 161 (1898); Blakely v. Calder, 13 How. Prac. 
476, aff'd 15 N.Y. 617 (1857); Priddy and Co. v. Sanderford, 221 N.C. 
422, 20 S. E. 2d 341 (1942). 
59 Non disturbance of the life estate has not been predicated upon con-
stitutional limitations but upon express or implied limitations in the statutes. 
The fact that life estates are not disturbed no doubt accounts for the almost 
complete absence of constitutional cases at this point. Whether it is uncon-
stitutional to confer upon the remaindermen the power to compel a partition 
which will affect and bind the interests of the life tenant or life tenants is a 
problem which is somewhat unlikely to come up. Suppose that land i~ devised 
to A, B, and C for life, remainders to D and E. D desires partition. If 
partition by metes and bounds is possible, the court can determine which part 
D shall have when the life tenants have died and which part will go to 
E. The life estates are unaffected. Partition statutes do not give the re-
maindermen any right to possession against the life tenant or tenants which 
they do not have under the instrument creating their interests. There is 
ordinarily no occasion to determine the respe~tive shares of the life tenants 
in a proceeding between the remaindermen and no reason why the remainder-
men should want to bind the life tenants. 
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and transferred to the funds arising from the sale of the 
land? Perhaps if partition in kind can be made and the pur-
pose of the sale is solely to free the land of future interests, 
there may be some question as to the constitutionality of 
applying the statute retroactively. But if partition in kind 
is impracticable, the way appears to be clear for the applica-
tion of the statute. The power to compel partition is an 
inherent feature of joint ownership. Sale is a substitute for 
the primary right to have the land set off in severalty where 
partition in kind is not feasible. Since a possessory cotenant 
(where all the interests are possessory) may be compelled 
under a retroactive statute to accept a share of the proceeds 
of sale in lieu of an interest in the land/0 the owner of a 
future interest cannot be said to be deprived of property 
without due process by the commutation of his interest from 
realty into personalty. 
Certainly, where the proceedings are instituted by a pos-
sessory cotenant who has a fee-simple interest, there would 
seem to be no doubt that a sale may properly be ordered not-
withstanding the existence of future interests. In Mennig v. 
60Richardson v. Monson, 23 Conn. 94 (1854); Metcalf v. Hoopingardner, 
45 Iowa 5 ro ( 1877). Supra note 51. 
In Richardson v. Monson the statute gave authority .to the court to order 
a sale of the land and to distribute the proceeds among all persons interested 
in the estate, in proportion to their interests, whenever a sale would, in 
the opinion of the court, promote the interests of all parties better than 
a partition in kind, and whenever the property could not be conveniently 
occupied in common. Conn. Pub. Acts 1853, c. LVII, now embodied in 
Conn. Gen. Stat. 1949, sec. 8236. The estate of the tenants in common 
had come into existence prior to the enactment of the statute. Facts were 
stated in the bill for partition to show that partition in kind was impracticable. 
The defendants argued that to give the statute a retroactive effect would 
impair the obligation of a contract and authorize the taking of property from 
one person and the vesting of it in another, especially in this instance, where 
only a small minority in interest desired a sale. The court held that the 
power to compel a partition enters into the very nature of the title of estates 
held in common and that the only question is how partition can best be made. 
The legislature had supplied the answer by providing for sale where partition 
could not be made to the best advantage of the parties. This statute, it was 
held, introduced no new principle; it only provided for an emergency, when 
a division could not be well made in any other way. 
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H award 61 a testator devised one-half of his realty to his 
wife, Anna, in fee simple, and to his daughter, Helen, he 
bequeathed a life estate so long as she and Anna both lived. 
There was a remainder upon certain conditions in the child 
or children of Helen who should survive her. At the time 
of this partition suit, which was brought by Anna, Helen 
was married but had no children. The plaintiff asked for 
a sale and alleged grounds to show that partition in kind 
was impracticable. A statute enacted subsequent to the crea-
tion of the interests provided that a partition decree should 
be binding on the interests of unborn persons.62 The defend-
ant, Helen, claimed that a sale could not be effective to cut 
off the interests in her unborn heirs. The court in denying 
this contention said: 
"There was no depriving of any one of his property under 
the statute in the instant case. The statute merely changed 
the real estate into a personal estate for the benefit of all 
parties in interest." 
"The primary argument against the instant statute is that 
it might be said that the unborn children had rights to 
specific property, and that a sale deprived them of that 
right and gave them a substitute. As heretofore stated, it 
is the constitutional provisions against the taking of property 
without due process which form the foundation of the argu-
ment against this class of legislation. The possible injury 
to owners of the future interest is small in comparison to 
61 2I3 Iowa 936, 240 N. W. 473 (I932). 
62 Iowa Acts I 9 3 I, c. 2 3 I : "When it appears in the petition for partition 
that a person not in being has an interest, vested or contingent, as a co-tenant 
of the land sought to be partitioned, the court shall have jurisdiction over 
the interest of such person not in being and shall appoint a suitable person 
to act for him in such proceeding. . . . The decree of partition and the 
division or sale thereunder shall be of the same force and effect as to all such 
persons, or persons claiming by, through or under them, as though they were 
in being at the time of entry of the decree, and the property or proceeds 
of the interest of such person shall be subject to the order of the court until the 
right thereto becomes fully vested." Now, with immaterial modifications, 
Iowa Code I95o, c. 6p, p. 2I40. 
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the indisputable benefit resulting from the sale, both to 
the owner of the present estate and also to society at large. 
The interest of society in the free alienation of land has 
received recommendation in many ways for centuries past." 63 
Although the court emphasized that the future interests 
were contingent, it is submitted that the same result would 
have been reached if the statute had purported to bind the 
interests of persons in being, whether the interests were con-
tingent or vested. The New York Court of Appeals has 
allowed an action for partition and sale to be brought by 
the owner of a fee-simple moiety against the life tenant and 
persons who, by the law of New York, had vested remainders 
subject to defeasance.64 
One might surmise that if the cotenant who asks partition 
does not have a fee interest, his power to compel partition 
by sale is not unlimited. Would a retroactive statute be 
valid which gives a life tenant the power to affect by a com-
pulsory partition sale the future interests limited after his 
estate? There are several cases holding that if the statute 
expressly or by necessary implication permits the life tenant 
to maintain partition against his fellow cotenants, he has 
that power as a matter of right, and where the land cannot 
be divided it may be sold and the proceeds divided.65 Judg-
ments for the sale of the land (on suit by a life tenant) have 
been affirmed against the protests of reversioners having ab-
solutely vested interests in the whole 66 and against the pro-
tests of the owners in fee of the undivided moiety.67 In some 
63 213 Iowa 936, 942, 240 N. W. 473, 475 (1932). 
64 Mead v. Mitchell, 17 N.Y. 210 (1858). 
65Shaw v. Beers, 84 Ind. 528 (1882); Carneal v. Lynch, 91 Va. II4, 
20 S. E. 959 (1895). See also, Sparks v. Clay, 185 Mo. 393, 84 S. W. 
40 (1904); Brevoort v. Brevoort, 70 N.Y. 136 (1877) (action by life tenant 
per autre vie) ; Rutherford v. Rutherford, II 6 Tenn. 3 8 3, 92 S. W. II u 
(I 906) (remainders were contingent here). 
66 Shaw v. Beers, supra note 65. 
67 Carneal v. Lynch, supra note 65. 
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of the cases the results may be explained by the fact that the 
interests arose subsequent to the partition statutes. It is very 
significant, however, that the jurisdiction (Virginia) in which 
it is held that a life tenant in one moiety of property may 
compel partition by sale against the fee-simple owners of the 
other half, is one of the very few jurisdictions where it is 
held that a statute giving a life tenant power to sell the prem-
ises upon a showing of necessity cannot even be applied pro-
spectively if vested remaindermen object to the sale.68 
The courts are much more inclined to sustain a statute 
which gives a life tenant holding as a tenant in common or 
joint tenant the power to compel partition by sale against 
his cotenants, which sale will also be binding on the owners 
of future interests, than they are to sustain a statute which 
confers upon a life tenant holding in severalty the power to 
sell the fee without the consent of the owners of the future 
interests. A difference in attitude is to be expected. Where a 
life tenant is authorized to compel partition by sale, the sale 
is a substitute for the primary objective of the life tenant, 
which is to have his portion set off in severalty from the por-
tions of the other possessory cotenants. The law recognizes 
the desirability of enjoyment and use in severalty. But when 
a statute confers upon a life tenant holding in severalty the 
power to proceed against the owners of future interests for 
the sole or primary purpose of compelling a sale of the land 
free of the future interests, it may seem as though the legis-
lature has unduly empowered one private person to interfere 
with the property of others. 
When sale is ordered in lieu of partition in kind, provision 
must be made for the transfer of the property rights of the 
owners of the future interest to the proceeds of the sale.69 
68 Watkins v. Ford, 123 Va. 268, 96 S. E. 193 (1918), infra note 101. 
69 Baker v. Baker, 284 Ill. 537, 120 N. E. 525 (1918); Monarque v. 
Monarque, 8o N.Y. 320 (I88o). 
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The future interests are commuted, not absolutely extin-
guished. Extinguishment of an interest, of course, is not an 
impairment of a vested right, if the interest is clearly in-
substantial and amounts to no more than a cloud on title, 
within the technical meaning of that term, or is extremely 
unlikely to vest in possession.70 On the other hand, it seems 
certain that the substantiality of the future interest is no bar-
rier to its being converted to money. 
In Gillespie v. Allison, discussed above/1 the life tenant 
and some of the remaindermen secured a sale of the land 
under the provisions of a retroactive statute, notwithstanding 
the objections of the other remaindermen. There would 
seem to be no constitutional reason why persons having ab-
solutely vested reversions and remainders, who are entitled 
to partition under a statute, should not be able to compel a 
partition sale which will extinguish the possessory interests 
in the land although the possessory cotenants do not consent. 
However, an objection to the retroactive application of a 
statute giving the power to compel a partition sale might be 
that since owners of future interests cannot have the land in 
severalty (but in effect achieve only partition of title), dis-
turbance of the possessory interests would be an unwarranted 
interference with property rights. 
5. Statutes Which Authorize the Sale or Mortgage of Land 
Even in the absence of statute, courts will direct the sale 
in fee of land in which there are future interests if the land 
is in danger of being lost,72 but there are statutes in many 
70 It will usually be unnecessary to determine whether a given interest 
is so insubstantial that it can be extinguished, since all interests may be 
conveniently preserved in commuted form to await the event that will 
determine which of the interests are valuable. 
71 Supra note 56. 
72 3 Simes, Future Interests, sec. 789 et seq. (1936); Schnebly, "Power of 
Life Tenant or Remainderman to Extinguish Other Interests by Judicial 
Process," 42 Harv. L. Rev. 30, 54 (1928). Such relief will be given also 
when requested by the owners of the future interests. Beliveau v. Beliveau, u7 
Minn. 235, 14 N. W. 2d 360 (1944). 
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states which provide for, or authorize the sale of land in fee 
simple, where, except for the statute, such land could not be 
sold free of interests therein or could not be sold at all.73 
Statutes authorizing the mortgaging of land so as to bind out-
standing future interests are to be found in a number of 
states.74 Quite a few constitutional cases have arisen in re-
spect to statutes authorizing sale but none apparently have 
arisen out of the application of statutes authorizing the execu-
tion of mortgages. The power to mortgage resembles the 
power to sell; indeed, it is not unusual for both powers to be 
conferred by one and the same statute.75 We may surmise 
that on the constitutional issue the courts would approach 
a mortgage case with much the same attitude as a sale case, 
tending perhaps to allow a mortgage where a sale would not 
be permitted on the ground that a mortgage is less destructive 
of the future interests. Discussion will be limited to a con-
sideration of statutes which authorize sale. 
73 2 Powell, Real Property, ~ 292, lists the statutes as follows (as of Jan. I, 
I952). 
Statutes providing for sale of complete ownership of land in which there 
are future interests exist in twenty-four jurisdictions: Cal., Conn., D. C., Ill., 
Ind., Iowa, Ky., Me., Md., Mass., Mich., Mo., N. H., N. J., N. Y., N. C., 
Ohio, Pa., R. I., Tenn., Va., W. Va., Wis., and Wyo. In Ill., Me., Pa., R. I., 
and Tenn., the statute can be invoked only if there is present a future interest 
which is not indefeasibly vested. In D. C., Iowa, Ky., Mass., Mich., Mo., 
N. H. and N. C., the statute can sometimes apply despite the presence of an 
indefeasibly vested future interest. In Cal., Conn., Ind., Md., N. J., N. Y., 
Ohio, Va., W.Va., Wis. and Wyo., the statute becomes available on the presence 
of any future interest. 
Statutes providing for the sale of the complete ownership of trust res for 
reinvestment exist in eighteen jurisdictions: Ala., Conn., Del., Ind., Ky., Mass., 
Mich., Minn., Mont., N. H., N. J., N. Y., Ohio, Ore., Va., W. Va., Wis., 
and Wyo. 
74 On Jan. I, I952, statutes authorizing both mortgages and leases so as 
to bind outstanding future interests existed in eleven states: Ill., Md., Minn., 
Mont., N. Y., N. C., Ore., Pa., Va., W. Va., Wis.; statutes authorizing 
mortgages but not leases existed in seven states: Conn., Ky., Me., Mass., N. H., 
N. J., R. I.; and statutes authorizing leases but not mortgages existed in 
four jurisdictions: D. C., Ind., Ohio, Wyo. 2 Powell, Real Property, ~ 292. 
75 See Massachusetts and New Hampshire statutes quoted infra note 76. 
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The reader will find in the footnote below, the text of a 
few representative statutes currently in force.76 It will be 
observed from the quoted statutes that some are broad 
enough to allow the owners of future interests to compel a 
sale of the possessory estate. Whether or not the owners of 
future interests are actually endowed with this power, they 
very rarely exercise it. The statutes have usually been re-
sorted to by the owners of possessory estates. 
A statute authorizing sale of land, it is apparent, may be 
invalid on other grounds than that it is applied retroactively. 
A statute even when applied prospectively may be unconsti-
76 Mass. Gen. Laws I 932, c. I 8 3, sec. 49: "If land is subject to a vested 
or contingent remainder, executory devise, conditional limitation, reversion 
or power of appointment, the probate court for the county where such land 
is situated may, upon the petition of any person having an estate therein, 
either present or future, vested or contingent, and after notice and other 
proceedings as hereinafter required, appoint one or more trustees and 
authorize him or them to sell and convey land or any part thereof in fee 
simple, if such sale and conveyance appears to the court to be necessary 
or expedient, or to mortgage the same for such an amount, on such terms and 
for such purposes as may seem to the court judicious or expedient; and such 
conveyance or mortgage shall be valid and binding upon all parties." 
D. C. Code 1940, sec. 45-1104: "Whenever one or more persons shall be 
entitled to an estate for life or years, or a base or qualified fee simple, or 
any other limited or conditional estate in lands, and any other person or 
persons shall be entitled to a remainder or remainders, vested or contingent, 
or an interest by way of executory devise in the same lands, on application 
of any of the parties in interest the court may, if all parties in being are 
made parties to the proceeding, decree a sale or lease of the property, if it 
shall appear to be to the interest of all concerned, and shall direct the 
investment of the proceeds so as to inure in like manner as provided by the 
original grant to the use of the same parties who would be entitled to the 
land sold or leased; . . ." 
N. H. Rev. Laws 1942, p. ro85, sec. 28: "When real estate is subject to 
a contingent or vested remainder, executory devise or power of appointment 
the superior court for the county in which said real estate is situated may, 
upon petition of any person who has an estate in possession, remainder or 
reversion in such real estate, and after notice and other proceedings . . • 
appoint one or more trustees, and authorize him or them to sell or mortgage 
and convey such estate, or any part thereof, in fee simple, if such sale, mortgage 
or conveyance appear to the court to be necessary or expedient; and such 
conveyance shall be valid and binding upon all parties." 
Page's Ohio Code Ann., sec. I 19 2 5 : "In an action by the tenant in tail 
or for life, or by the grantee or devisee of a qualified or conditional fee, or 
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tutional in one or more aspects: there may not be adequate 
provision for judicial supervision; 77 the possessory owner 
may be given too unrestricted a power to compel a sale; 78 
of any other qualified, conditional, or determinable interest, or by a person 
claiming under such tenant, grantee, or devisee, or by the trustee or bene-
ficiaries, if the estate is held in trust, courts of common pleas may authorize 
the sale of any estate, whether it was created by will, deed, or contract, or 
came by descent, when satisfied that such sale would be for the benefit of the 
person holding the first and present estate, interest, or use, and do no substantial 
injury to the heirs in tail, or others in expectancy, succession, reversion, or 
remainder. This section shall not extend to estates in dower." 
77 The writer did not find any cases holding that judicial supervision was 
necessary but it would seem a self-evident proposition that, if judicial super-
vision is not provided for, there cannot be due process. It cannot be denied 
that in the past many special acts authorizing the sale of land have been 
sustained where no provision was made for any judicial supervision or any 
provision for the representation of owners of interests. But it is submitted that 
the cases which sustain such acts cannot be taken as authorities by modern 
courts. The courts which sustained such acts often expressed their disapproval 
of what had been done and refrained from striking down the acts only 
because at the time so many titles were derived from sales made under special 
authorization by the legislatures. See Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. 277 (I 845) 
where a list of 900 statutes, in principle like the one there in issue, was laid 
before the court. Since at least I o,ooo titles, said the court, depended on 
legislation of this stamp, "It would be fraught with incalculable mischief 
to let a doubt rest on the power of the legislature." It was stated in Clusky 
v. Burns, 120 Mo. 567, 568, 25 S. W. 585, 586 (I893): "'It would be 
entirely safe to say that millions of dollars have been invested upon the 
strength of these titles; and for the courts of this day to declare the acts, 
and the titles made in pursuance of them, void, would be a hazardous under-
taking, and would unsettle property rights to an alarming extent. We must, 
therefore, decline to go into the question, or consider it open to discussion.' " 
78 The power of the persons holding the present estate to compel a sale 
is in no jurisdiction, irrespective of whether the future interests are vested or 
contingent, as complete as the power of a cotenant to compel partition and 
sale. Schnebly, "Power of Life Tenant or Remainderman to Extinguish Other 
Interests by Judicial Process," 42 Harv. L. Rev. 30, 70 ( 1928). The statutes 
generally provide that the petitioner for sale must allege and prove facts 
which show some necessity for the sale or that the land is not beneficial to 
him. See the statutes quoted supra note 76. Moreover the court is commonly 
directed not to decree a sale unless the interests of all persons will be subserved 
or unless the sale will be for the benefit of the person holding the first and 
present interest and do no substantial injury to the owners of future interests. 
See the statutes quoted supra note 76. See Restatement, Property, sec. I 79, 
'11 I (I 948 Supp.), for an enumeration of statutes classified according to the 
requirements of proof as to need for, or expediency of, sale for reinvestment. 
What degree of necessity must the possessory tenant prove in order to 
entitle himself to a sale? That, of course, depends in the first instance upon 
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or the statute may not provide for the transferring of the in-
terests in the land to the proceeds of the sale. Whether the 
statute is applied retroactively or prospectively the judgment 
must substitute the fund for the land or the interests will not 
be concluded.79 It is only because the interests are merely 
the wording of the particular statute. To what extent the owners of future 
interests are constitutionally entitled to a finding of necessity is more difficult 
to determine. Some finding is undoubtedly necessary. A sale will always 
be justified if the land is about to be lost by the life tenant and remaindermen 
alike because the income is insufficient to preserve the property or to pay taxes 
and encumbrances. Courts of equity often have granted relief in the absence 
of statute. Gavin v. Curtin, I7I Ill. 640, 49 N. E. 523 (I898); Graff v. 
Rankin, 250 F. ISO (7th Cir. I9I8). Where there are future interests in 
unborn persons and all the persons in being consent to the sale, there seems 
to be no denial of due process in ordering a sale merely upon a showing 
that a sale will be advantageous to the present tenant and not unduly 
prejudicial to future interests. Sohier v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 
3 Cush. 483 (Mass. I849); Springs v. Scott, IJ2 N. C. 548, 44 S. E. II6 
(I903); Anderson v. Wilkins, I42 N. C. 154, 55 S. E. 272 (r9o6); Lee 
v. Albro, 9I Ore. 2II, I78 Pac. 784 (t9I9); Geary v. Butts, 84 W. Va. 
348, 99 S. E. 492 ( 19 r 9). Where the future interests are vested, perhaps 
something more needs to be shown than that the sale will be advantageous to 
the life tenant. The Ohio statute (supra note 7 6) is one of the most liberal. 
It permits a life tenant to compel a sale contrary to the wishes of the owner 
of the indefeasibly vested remainder or reversion upon a showing merely that 
he is unable to manage the land, that the income is small, and that if it were 
sold and the proceeds invested, a much larger income could be produced, 
provided that a sale will do no substantial injury to owners of future interests. 
It is possible that the authority purported to be conferred by this statute 
may be held to be in excess of constitutional limitations where the life tenant 
is merely an investor or creditor, or where the land is very likely to have 
a much greater value and command a much higher price at the expiration 
of the life estate. A statute which would clothe a life tenant with the 
power to compel a sale without respect to the effect on future interests 
whenever a sale would be desirable from his point of view would probably 
be declared unreasonable. McConnell v. Bell, I2I Tenn. I98, II4 S. W. 
203 (r9o8). 
79 Sohier v. Mass. Gen. Hospital, 3 Cush. 48 3 (Mass, I 849) ; Clarke 
v. Hayes, 9 Gray 426 (Mass. 1857); Monarque v. Monarque, 8o N. Y. 
320 (I88o); Barnes v. Luther, 77 Hun 234, 28 N. Y. S. 400 (I894); 
Wolford v. Morgenthal, 9I Pa. 30 (I879). If, due to any event, the fund 
should be lost, the original rights of the parties to the property are not thereby 
revived, but remain concluded. Bofil v. Fisher, 3 Rich. Eq. I (S.C. I85o). 
See Restatement, Property, sec. I 79, 11m ( 1948 Supp.) for an enumeration 
of extent to which statutes providing for partition and judicially ordered sales 
provide for commuted money payments to holders of successive interest. 
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commuted by the sale-changed from realty to personalty-
that forced sale can at all be justified. 
Since all interests must be transferred to the proceeds, the 
courts have never found it necessary to decide whether there 
are interests which are so slight that they can be extinguished 
without recompense. All interests may be conveniently pre-
served in commuted form to await the happening of the event 
which will determine which of the interests would have 
vested in possession, or as the situation then stands, who will 
get the money. 
For convenience, the statutes can best be considered under 
the following heads: (I) where the owner of the possessory 
estate seeks to compel a sale of land in which the future in-
terests are contingent; and ( 2.) where the owner of the pos-
sessory estate seeks to compel a sale of land in which the 
future interests are vested. 
Contingent future interests, as they appear in the consti-
tutional cases, may be divided into three classes: (I) interests 
which are contingent because limited to persons not yet in 
being; ( 2.) interests which are contingent because the 
identity of the persons who are to take is uncertain, although 
there are persons in existence to whom one can point as pos-
sible takers if the life estate were to end at once (e.g., a 
remainder to the heirs of a living person where there are 
heirs apparent or presumptive in existence); and (3) inter-
ests which are contingent because the interest of a designated 
person is conditioned upon some uncertain event such as the 
death of the life tenant without issue. 
I have treated both executory interests and contingent 
remainders under the heading of contingent future interests. 
The courts do not seem to have made any distinction between 
the two kinds of interests in passing upon the constitutionality 
of the statutes. At least when the statutes operated prospec-
tively, the courts have allowed life tenants to procure forcible 
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commutation of both common-law contingent remainders 80 
and of contingent executory interests.81 Similarly, owners in 
fee have been permitted to commute executory interests 
limited in total or partial defeasance of their estates.82 Of 
course, in those jurisdictions in which the common-law rule 
of destructibility of contingent remainders still obtains, it 
would be much easier for the courts to permit retroactive 
destruction of contingent remainders than of executory in-
terests. An indestructible contingent remainder does not dif-
fer substantially from an executory interest.83 
(a) Contingent Future Interests. Insofar as the stat-
utes under discussion empower the owner of a freehold estate 
to extinguish through judicial sale contingent interests of 
persons not yet born, they are held constitutional, even as 
applied to contingent interests created before their passage.84 
The courts are faced with the problem of weighing the pos-
sible disadvantage which the unborn persons may suffer 
against the indisputable disadvantage to society if lands are 
80 Remainders to persons unborn or unascertained: McClure v. Crume, 
141 Ky. 361, 132 S. W. 433 (r9ro) (prospective); Sohier v. Mass. Gen. 
Hospital, 3 Cush. 483 (Mass. 1849) (retroactive); Garrison v. Hecker, 128 
Mich. 539, 87 N. W. 642 (r9or) (retroactive); In re Field, 131 N. Y. 
r84, 30 N. E. 48 (r892) (prospective); Geary v. Butts, 84 W. Va. 348, 
99 S. E. 492 (1919) (retroactive); In re Rees, 182 Wis. 239, 196 N. W. 
2 39 ( r 923) (prospective). Remainders to ascertained persons: Linsley v. 
Hubbard, 44 Conn. 109 (1876) (retroactive); Bamforth v. Bamforth, 123 
Mass. 28o (1877) (prospective); Gamble's Estate, 9 Dist. 691 (Pa. 19oo) 
(prospective). It is difficult in many instances to determine whether cases 
should be cited in this note or in that succeeding. 
81 In re Vail, 99 N. J. Eq. 598, 133 Atl. 866 (1926) (prospective); 
Clark v. Clark, 110 Ohio St. 644, 144 N. E. 473 (1924) (prospective); 
Symmes v. Moulton, 120 Mass. 343 ( 1876) (prospective); Burlingham 
v. Vandevender, 47 W.Va. 8o4, 35 S. E. 835 (19oo) (prospective). 
82Whitcomb v. Taylor, 122 Mass. 243 (1877) (retroactive); In re 
Grenawalt's Appeal, 37 Pa. 95 (186o) (prospective). 
83 See 3 Simes, Future Interests, sec. 98 ( 1936). 
84 Sohier v. Mass. Gen. Hospital, 3 Cush. 483 (Mass. 1849); Anderson 
v. Wilkins, 142 N. C. 154, 55 S. E. 272 (1906); Springs v. Scott, 132 
N. C. 548, 44 S. E. II6 (1903); Lee v. Albro, 91 Ore. 2II, 178 Pac. 
784 (1919); Geary v. Butts, 84 W.Va. 348, 99 S. E. 492 (1919). 
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made inalienable for indefinite periods of time. In compari-
son to the benefit resulting from the sale, both to the owner 
of the present estate and also to society at large, the possible 
injury to potential interests of persons who may never be 
born is small. These interests can be adequately protected 
by being transferred to the fund arising from the sale. The 
courts do not seem to have any difficulty in making a choice 
in favor of alienability. In Geary v. Butts 85 it was said: 
"Without such authority as this act bestows an estate subject 
to contingent remainders frequently might be tied up in-
definitely, and a sale thereof rendered impossible, because 
no purchaser could be induced to risk a title which would be 
a source of future litigation, when the interests of remainder-
men, living and unborn, clearly might require a sale owing 
to lack of funds to preserve the corpus of the property at its 
original value or to develop or improve it sufficiently to yield 
the income that it should yield. Without such remedy not 
only is the sale of such property rendered difficult, but its 
value may be greatly diminished or entirely lost to those 
interested therein." 86 
In some of these cases the sale appears to have been allowed 
merely for the reason that sale was advantageous to the life 
tenant (and not too prejudicial to the unborn owners of fu-
ture interests) . 87 
So long as no person is born into the class of possible takers 
there is really no constitutional problem at all in the ret-
roactive application of the statute. The constitutional pro-
visions protect the rights of persons. It is very difficult to see 
how an unborn person can have any constitutional rights. 
However, a person may subsequently be born who will claim 
that his interest in the land was unconstitutionally extin-
85 84 W.Va. 348, 99 S. E. 49:1. (1919), supra notes 8o, 84. 
86 84 W. Va. 348, 354, 99 S. E. 49:1., 494· 
87 Sohier v. Mass. Gen. Hospital, 3 Cush. 483 (Mass. 1 849); Anderson v. 
Wilkins, 14:1. N. C. 154, 55 S. E. :1.7:1. (1906); Geary v. Butts, 84 W.Va. 
348, 99 S. E. 49:1. (1919). Note 84 supra. 
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guished. A sufficient answer to his claim would seem to be 
that his alleged interest in the land was extinguished for good 
reason while it was a mere possibility but that his rights were 
not destroyed as such, having been transferred to the 'fund 
arising from the sale. 
When there are in being possible takers, the question be-
comes more difficult whether the legislature can by retro-
active statute empower the owner of the possessory estate to 
commute the future interests by forced sale. The courts 
recognize that interests of living persons are more substantial, 
and are entitled per se to greater constitutional protection 
than the interests of persons not in esse.88 However, retroac-
tive statutes which apply to contingent future interests of 
living persons have been sustained.89 Generally, in the cases 
sustaining the retroactive application, there has been proof 
that the property is unproductive and useless to the life ten-
ant, but usually proof has been lacking that sale is essential 
to the preservation of the interests of the life tenant and re-
maindermen. It is not clear whether the courts would ap-
prove a retroactive statute which purports to authorize a 
88 Campbell v. Kawananakoa, 34 Haw. 333 (1937). 
89 Clarke v. Hayes, 9 Gray 426 (Mass. 1857) (remainder to heirs of a 
living person); Willhite v. Rathburn, 332 Mo. I2.o8, 61 S. W. 2d 708 
(I 9 3 3) (to A for life, remainder in fee to the heirs of her body) ; Re 
Mersereau, 233 N. Y. 540, 135 N. E. 909 (1922) (devise to A for life, 
remainder to her heirs). But see Rogers v. Smith, 4 Pa. 93 ( 1846) holding 
that the legislature could not confer on a life tenant (who had testamentary 
power of appointment) the power to convey the fee. The remainder was to 
the heirs of the life tenant who had several minor children living at the time 
the statute was passed. The reason, however, that the interests of the minor 
children were held not to be affected by the statute was apparently that 
they were not represented before the legislature. 
In Willhite v. Rathburn supra it was contended that the statute conflicted 
with the provision in the Missouri Constitution prohibiting retroactive legis-
lation (supra note 44) insofar as it affected an estate created prior to its 
enactment. It was held that the statute did not fall within the prohibition, 
which only prevents legislation operating retrospectively to the substantial 
prejudice of the interested parties, for it contemplated only a beneficial change 
from a less fruitful to a more fruitful form of property with no injury 
to the interests of any person. 
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sale upon a showing merely that a sale will be desirable for 
the life tenant. The justification which the courts give for 
allowing a forced sale is that a beneficial change is merely 
wrought in the form of the property without loss or injury 
to any interests. 
When the takers are ascertained and only the event is un-
certain, there appears to be a divergence of opinion as to 
whether the statute may be given retroactive effect. The 
Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a special legislative act 
empowering a life tenant to procure a judicial sale which 
destroyed alternative contingent remainders to ascertained 
persons, notwithstanding the objections of the remainder-
men.90 The New York courts have held, on the other hand, 
that when the owner of the contingent future interest is an 
ascertained living person (as distinguished from a member 
of a class of possible takers), the legislature has no power to 
authorize a sale of lands free of his contingent interest unless 
he assents to the sale, or unless he is disabled on account of 
infancy or lunacy from acting in his behal£.91 Dicta in accord 
90 Linsley v. Hubbard, 44 Conn. I 09 (I 8 7 6) . The land was devised to 
M. for life and upon certain contingencies the life estate was to become 
a fee simple in her and the heirs of her body; otherwise, upon her decease, the 
remainder was to pass to others, among whom were the plaintiffs. The real 
estate was completely or nearly completely unproductive. M. had no other 
means of support except that which she received from relatives. She was 
thirty-seven years old and unmarried. At her request the legislature passed 
a resolution authorizing the sale of the land, the proceeds of which were to be 
invested at interest. The resolution further provided that M. should be 
maintained with the income from the invested proceeds and that upon her 
death the principal should be paid over according to the terms of the will. 
The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the sale of the land on the ground that it 
amounted to a taking of their property in violation of Article I, sec. I I 
of the Connecticut Constitution: "The property of no person, shall be taken 
for public use without just compensation therefor." Held: Plaintiffs are not 
being deprived of their property. It was simply changed from one kind 
of estate to another. If a sale can be made of real estate held in joint tenancy, 
although there is a tenant opposed to the sale, then this resolution surely 
does not deprive plaintiffs of any vested right. 
91 Brevoort v. Grace, 53 N. Y. 245 (I873). Testator devised land to 
his daughter E. for life, the remainder to her issue in fee; in case of her death 
without issue or children of issue surviving, then to such of the children of 
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with the New York view may occasionally be found in the 
cases of other jurisdictions. 92 
The Connecticut and the New York cases cannot be recon-
ciled. The only answer seems to be that some courts are more 
inclined than others to protect property interests against what 
appears to them to be unwarranted encroachments by the 
legislature, and consequently divergent results must be ex-
pected. Even those courts which have allowed the forced 
commutation of contingent interests of living persons would 
probably draw a line somewhere and say thus far the legis-
lature can go but no farther. The Connecticut Supreme Court 
had probably nearly reached that line. 
(b) Vested Future Interests. The courts are reluctant 
to uphold a statute which permits the extinguishment of 
vested interests without the consent of the owners. The gen-
the testator's brother J. as should be living at the time of the testator's 
death and to their heirs. The legislature passed a special act (Laws 1872, 
c. 2 3) authorizing the Supreme Court to order a sale in fee-simple absolute 
upon the petition of E. and her issue. The act provided for the investment 
of the proceeds for the benefit of those entitled under the will. At this time 
E. had one child, an adult. All the children of J. had died, leaving heirs, 
a portion of whom were adults. H. joined with his mother in the petition 
for the sale of land. Their reason for wishing a sale was that the assessments 
for improvements were in excess of the income. Held: The adult heirs of J. 
had an estate in expectancy, contingent upon the death of E. without issue 
surviving, and the statute, so far as it authorized the transfer of such interest 
without their consent, was unconstitutional. The court inferred, however, that 
a sale would have been ordered if it had been necessary for the payment of 
taxes and assessments. Accord, Powers v. Bergen, 6 N. Y. 358 (1852); 
Gedney v. Marlton Realty Co., 258 N. Y. 355, 179 N. E. 766 (1932). 
But see Re Mersereau, 233 N. Y. 540, 135 N. E. 909 (1922), where it 
is held that collateral heirs need not be made parties. 
92 Brown v. Brown, 83 W. Va. 415, 422, 98 S. E. 428, 431 (1919). 
Land was devised to W. for life, with remainder to the heirs of his body, 
but if W. should die without issue living at the time of his death, then the 
land should pass to C. and E. for life, with remainder to their issue. E., who 
was an adult, sui juris, objected to the sale. The court said "But we seriously 
doubt the constitutional right and power of the Legislature to authorize a 
court to sell the lands, or any vested interest therein of a person who is 
sui juris, without his consent, simply for the purpose of reinvesting the funds 
for his benefit. The jus disponendi is a property right which the policy of 
the law has always been to allow the owner, when sui juris, to determine 
for himself." 
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eral view seems to be that statutes which permit the invol-
untary extinguishment of vested future interests cannot be 
applied to interests which were in being prior to the statute.93 
93 Statutes authorizing the sale of lands in which there are future interests 
must be distinguished from statutes which authorize the sale of a decedent's 
land for various purposes such as payment of debts or facilitation of dis-
tribution of the estate among the heirs or devisees. See Chapter 3, p. I 24 
supra. 
A caveat must also be interposed here in respect to statutes authorizing 
the sale of lands belonging to minors, lunatics, and other persons who are 
non sui juris. The power of the legislature to authorize the sale of an infant's 
land is held to be derived from its functions as parens patriae. As general 
guardian of all, it may justly interpose and authorize the property to be sold 
for the benefit of such persons. Otherwise many minors and incompetents 
might suffer for lack of legal capacity to dispose of property which does 
not yield an income. Rice v. Parkman, I6 Mass. 326 (I8zo). Another 
reason often given for the validity of such legislation is that the property of 
the infant is not taken from him; it is merely converted from realty into 
personalty for his benefit. Dosrey v. Gilbert, II Gill and J. 87 (Md. I839); 
Louisville, N. 0. & T. Ry. Co. v. Blythe, 69 Miss. 939, II So. III (I892); 
Clarke v. Van Surlay, IS Wend. 436 (N. Y. 1836). 
The interests which are sought to be sold or extinguished under these 
statutes are frequently future interests, but the broad ground upon which 
statutes relating to the disposition of the land of incompetents are sustained 
renders unnecessary a distinction between future interests which are vested 
and those which are not. It is clear that any interest which an infant has in 
land may be sold, provided only that it is an interest which is alienable under 
the laws by one sui juris. Reversion: Davidson v. Koehler, 76 Ind. 398 
(I88I). Vested remainders: Davis v. Helbig, 27 Md. 452 (I867); Ebling v. 
Dreyer, I49 N.Y. 460, 44 N. E. I55 (I896). Fee simple: Nelson's Heirs v. 
Lee, IO B. Mon. 495 (Ky. I8so); Rice v. Parkman, I6 Mass. 326 (I82o); 
Gannett v. Leonard, 47 Mo. 205 (I87I); Stewart v. Griffith, 33 Mo. 13 
(I862); In re Post, I3 R.I. 495 (I882). 
It is firmly established that the legislature may authorize the guardian or 
trustee of an infant to sell the realty of the infant if such sale is for the infant's 
benefit. The validity of the title under such sale does not depend on the assent 
of the infant; he cannot disaffirm the sale on coming of age. Munford v. 
Pearce, 70 Ala. 452 (I88I); Todd v. Flournoy's Heirs, 56 Ala. 99 (I876); 
Brenham v. Davidson, 51 Cal. 352 ( 1 876); Davidson v. Koehler, 76 Ind. 
398 (I88I); Davis v. State Bank, 7 Ind. 316 (I88s); Davis v. Helbig, 27 
Md.452 (I867); Dorseyv.Gilbert, II Gilland]. 87 (Md. I839); Nelson's 
Heirs v. Lee, IO B. Mon. 495 (Ky. I85o); Clusky v. Burns, 120 Mo. 567, 
25 S. W. 585 (I893); Gannett v. Leonard, 47 Mo. 205 (I87I); Stewart v. 
Griffith, 33 Mo. I3 (I862); Louisville, N. 0. & T. Ry. Co. v. Blythe, 69 
Miss. 939, II So. III (I892); Rice v. Parkman, I6 Mass. 326 (18zo); 
Snowhill v. Snowhill, 3 N. J. Eq. 20 (Ch. 1834); Ebling v. Dreyer, 149 
N.Y. 460, 44 N. E. ISS (I896); Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365 
(N. Y. I838); Clarke v. Van Surlay, 15 Wend. 436 (1836); In re Post, 
13 R. L 495 (1882). 
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It has been so held both in regard to special acts 94 and in re-
gard to general acts.95 
Since the courts distinguish between vested and contingent 
future interests in respect to liability to forced sale under 
a retroactive statute, it is appropriate to ask: "Just what is 
included under the heading of vested future interests?" The 
A statute authorizing the sale of the lands of an infant is not objectionable 
because it was enacted subsequent to the acquisition of the lands by the infant. 
Indeed, in nearly all of the cited cases the statutes were retroacti'Ve. 
In a number of cases involving special statutes (which were necessarily 
retroactive) it was held that sale might properly be for any purpose what-
soever, provided only that it be one which the infant might have approved 
had he been sui juris. Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365 (N.Y. I838); 
Davidson v. Koehler, 76 Ind. 398 (I88I); In re Post, I3 R. I. 495 (I882). 
The burden, it has been held, is on the infant, or the person claiming through 
him, to show that there has been a breach of trust or violation of good faith 
on the part of the person who applied for the special statute, or that there 
was no need for a sale and that the infant was not benefited by it. Snowhill v. 
Snowhill, 3 N.J. Eq. 20 (Ch. I834). 
As to the validity of retroactive legislation authorizing mineral leases which 
will extend beyond the minority of the infant, see note I 2 2 infra. 
Just as the legislature has the power to authorize the sale of an infant's 
property, so it can authorize the guardian of a person non compos mentis to 
sell a part of his ward's real estate. Rider v. Regan, II4 Cal. 667, 46 Pac. 
820 (I896); Davison v. Johonnot, 7 Mete. (48 Mass.) 388 (I884). Statutes 
authorizing the appointment of a guardian for persons who have been shown 
to the satisfaction of a court examining into the matter to be incapable of 
managing their own. affairs, whether because of senility, alcoholism, idiocy, 
or other cause, have been declared not to deprive the incompetent of his 
property without due process. Shapter v. Pillar, 28 Colo. 209, 63 Pac. 302 
(I9oo); Kutzner v. Myers, I82 Ind. 669, I08 N. E. II5 (I9I5); Flewwellin 
v. Jeter, 138 Fla. 540, I89 So. 65I (I939). 
94 Ervine's Appeal, I6 Pa. 256 (I85I); Hegarty's Appeal, 75 Pa. 503 
(I874); Kneass's Appeal, 3I Pa. 87 (I855). 
Pa. Canst. Art. I, sec. I guarantees the privilege to acquire, possess and 
protect property. Art. I, sec. 9 provides that an accused cannot be deprived 
of his life, liberty, or property unless by the law of the land. Sec. 9 has been 
construed to prevent the unreasonable deprivation of anyone's property by the 
legislature. Supra Chapter 2, note I7 and infra note Ioo. 
95 Gilpin v. Williams, 25 Ohio 283 (I874); Ream v. Wolls, 6I Ohio St. 
I3I, 55 N. E. I76 (I899); McConnell v. Bell, I2I Tenn. 198, 114 S. W. 
2.03 ( 1908). 
Ohio Const., Art. z, sec. z8, provides that "the general assembly shall have 
no power to pass retroactive laws or laws impairing the obligation of con-
tracts." The statute in McConnell v. Bell was held not to afford due process 
and was held not to come within the meaning of the expression, "the law of 
the land" (Tenn. Const., Art. 1, sec. 8, supra Chapter z, note 13). 
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courts tend to follow real property classifications closely. 
The following have been held to be "vested" interests in the 
sense that they could not be involuntarily sold: an indefeasi-
bly vested remainder in fee,96 a vested remainder subject to a 
power of sale, 97 a reversion in fee, 98 a reversion subject to a 
contingent remainder,99 and a reversion subject to a testa-
mentary power of appointment.100 Technical classifications 
are useful to the court when it has to make distinctions be-
tween vested and contingent future interests in constitutional 
96 Watkins v. Ford, I23 Va. 268, 96 S. E. I93 (I9I8) (devise toP. for 
life, remainder to testator's nephews and nieces) ; Kneass's Appeal, 3 I Pa. 8 7 
(I 8 55) (testator devised land to wife for life and after her death the estate 
was to be divided equally among the testator's children) ; Curtis v. Hid en, I I 7 
Va. 289, 84 S. E. 664 (I9I5). 
97 Ervine's Appeal, I 6 Pa. 2 56, 2 57 (I 8 51). The testator directed in his 
will that his executors should rent his lands, and support his son Daniel out 
of the proceeds, and "it is further my will and desire that none of my real 
estate should be sold during the life of my said son Daniel, . . . and it is 
further my will and desire that after the death of my said son Daniel, that 
then my real estate shall be sold to the highest bidder, and all my children to 
receive share and share alike." At Daniel's instigation an act was passed 
authorizing a sale and the investment of the proceeds, the interest to be paid 
to Daniel during his life and the principal sum to be subject to the provisions 
of the will. Held: The legislature could not anticipate the time provided in 
the will for the exercise of the power and that the legislature did not have 
the power to direct a sale against the wishes of the . other parties in interest 
(the brothers of Daniel) who were sui juris. A sale would have deprived 
them of the probable increase of the land during Daniel's life and of the 
privilege of taking it as land at his death. 
98 Hegarty's Appeal, 75 Pa. 503 (I874). (Devise to Y. and after her 
death to various charities. Devise to charities held void. Reversionary interest 
passed by intestacy to testator's brothers and sisters.) 
99 Gilpin v. Williams, 25 Ohio 283 (I874). (Devise to Mrs. G. for life, 
and after her death to her children. Mrs. G. was in her late forties and had 
no children. No disposition was made of the inheritance. Defendants were 
the heirs of the testator.) 
100 Shoenberger v. School Directors, 32 Pa. 34 ( I8 58). (Devise to Mrs. S. 
for life, with power to appoint by will amongst her children or grandchildren, 
with remainder over, in default of appointment, to the surviving children 
and issue of deceased children per stirpes.) 
It was held in the Shoenberger case that the act here was the sort prohibited 
by the ninth section of the Bill of Rights, which declares that a person accused 
of crime cannot be deprived of life, liberty, or property, "unless by the 
judgment of his peers, or the law of the land." See Chapter 2, note I6. The 
court said that if the property of criminals was protected in this way, surely 
the property of persons in the position of the heirs must be likewise protected. 
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cases, but it should be careful not to fall a victim to mere 
labels. Should, for example, a vested remainder for life, 
where the remainderman is aged and in poor health and the 
life tenant young and vigorous, be accorded the same degree 
of protection as a vested remainder in fee? Should not an 
executory interest be given the same protection as a vested 
remainder where the event is certain to occur and the takers 
are ascertained persons in being? A very commonplace ex-
ample may be given wherein if property concepts are applied 
without reservation, an undesirable result might be reached. 
Suppose A devises Blackacre to B for life, remainder to B's 
heirs, in a jurisdiction where the rule in Shelley's Case is not 
applicable. B has a numerous progeny. In technical con-
templation the reversion descends to A's heirs, but should it 
not be held that they cannot prevent a sale of the fee by the 
life tenant? 
Life tenants seeking advantage of the statutes have not 
usually attempted to show that the property would probably 
be lost to everyone unless sold-the kind of showing upon 
which equity will, in the absence of a statute, order a sale 
notwithstanding the remainderman's insistence upon his al-
leged rights. Where the situation is such that equity would 
grant relief, there is no reason why the life tenant should not 
be permitted to proceed under a statute enacted after the 
creation of the life estate rather than in equity, if he so pre-
fers. But what the life tenants generally have sought is 
the sale of the land merely for the purpose of investing the 
proceeds in other property which would produce a greater 
mcome. 
The retroactive application of statutes authorizing the in-
voluntary sale in fee of land in which there are vested future 
interests is probably unwarranted in most instances. No 
pressing social policy requires that all such interests be liable 
to sale upon the request of the owner of the freehold. The 
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operation of the statute can, without very serious conse-
quences, be restricted to interests subsequently coming into 
being. 
In Kentucky and Virginia, upon the ground that one who 
is sui juris cannot be compelled to defer his right of disposi-
tion to the judgment of a court, it has been held that even as 
to subsequently created interests, legislation authorizing sale 
deprives the nonconsenting owners of vested future interests 
of property without due process.101 Purely as a policy ques-
tion, it might be unwise to subject vested future interests to 
a liability to be liquidated, but it does not seem reasonable to 
say that .such a liability cannot even be imposed prospectively 
without an unconstitutional taking of private property. When 
the problem arises hereafter in other jurisdictions, this writer 
is inclined to think that most courts will not follow Kentucky 
and Virginia, assuming that the statute in question is ade-
quately drawn, with provision for proper judicial supervision 
and with some restraint upon the power of the owner of the 
freehold interest to compel a sale. New Hampshire, Ohio, 
and Pennsylvania have held contrary to Kentucky and Vir-
ginia.102 Of course, the choice will not be easy to make where 
the life tenant seeking to take advantage of the statute is 
merely an investor or creditor, or where the land is very 
likely to have a much greater value and command a much 
higher price at the expiration of the life estate. Depriving 
101 Gossom v. McFerran, 79 Ky. 2 3 6 (I 8 8 I) ; Curtis v. Riden, 117 Va. 
289, 84 S. E. 664 (1915); Watkins v. Ford, I23 Va. 268, 96 S. E. 193 
(I 9 I 8). In Curtis v. Riden and in Gossom v. McFerran, the life tenants 
had purchased the life estates as investments. When their investment turned 
out to be unprofitable, they tried to compel a sale. This fact probably had 
some influence on the decisions. 
l02 Brierley v. Brierley, 81 N.H. I33> I24 Atl. JII (I923); Nimmons v. 
Westfall, 33 Ohio St. 2I3 (I877); Smith's Estate, 207 Pa. 6o4, 57 Atl. 37 
(I904). (Held: The property in question became vested under a rule of 
law promulgated in the statute by which it and property similarly situated 
might be divested. There is nothing contrary either to natural justice or to 
constitutional right to allow the act so to operate when the fund is substituted 
for the estate.) 
FUTURE INTERESTS 179 
the remaindermen of the anticipated future enhancement of 
the value of their interests is harsh. But if the legislature 
so desires, is there really any constitutional barrier to its in-
vesting the owners of all life tenancies thereafter created 
with the power, upon the conditions and limitations pre-
scribed by the statute, to compel the sale of remainders and 
reversions? Is it not reasonable to assume that the creator 
of the estates intended the benefit to accrue primarily to the 
first donee? When it is made to appear that the estate vested 
in such donee is not beneficial to him, and can be made so in 
another form of investment, why not permit the statute to 
aid the first donee when it can do so without injury to the 
owner of the future interest (other than that sustained in the 
commutation of his interest)? It must not be overlooked that 
the owner of the future interest will always be entitled to an 
interest in the proceeds and that also the owner of the future 
interest will often be in a position to buy in the land at the 
sale or at least to force the bids up. 
(c) Land Held in Trust. In some of the cases previ-
ously discussed the land was held in trust. The courts, in 
allowing or refusing to allow the forced commutation of 
future interests under a statute, have not explicitly distin-
guished between the situation where the possessory interest 
is a legal life estate and the situation where the land is held 
in trust/03 but it seems that a distinction might possibly be 
103 On January r, 1952, statutes treating the situation where a trust exists 
and providing for the sale of complete ownership existed in eighteen jurisdic-
tions. 2 Powell, Real Property, ,-r 292. See note 73 supra. 
E.g., Ore. Comp. L. Ann. 1940, sec. 9-8or, provides: "When any trust in 
real or personal property, or both, shall have heretofore been created, or shall 
hereafter be created by will, deed or otherwise, and the trustee or trustees of 
such trust, or any person interested in said trust or any person interested in 
the property embraced in said trust upon the termination thereof, whether 
such latter interest be by way of a vested or contingent remainder, executory 
devise, conditional limitation, shifting use, or of any other nature, shall deem 
it for the interest of all persons who are or may become interested in said 
property that the same or any part thereof should be sold, mortgaged, im-
proved, exchanged or leased; or otherwise dealt with in any manner, such 
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made. Where there is a legal life estate, a court will not, in 
the absence of a statute, authorize the sale in fee of the land 
against the wishes of the owners of future interests unless 
sale is necessary to prevent the loss of the property.104 But 
courts of equity have inherent power to authorize trustees 
to do what is necessary in order to conserve the trust property 
and to protect all interests, even though the instrument creat-
ing the trust does not give the trustees such power; this is in 
order to carry out the main purpose of the trust.105 Courts 
of equity will direct the sale of the trust lands when lapse 
of time or changes in the condition of the property have made 
it prudent and beneficial to alienate the lands.106 They may 
even allow a trustee to act contrary to the express stipulations 
of the settlor and sell, mortgage, or lease (provided the 
limitations do not create a condition upon the happening of 
which the estate is to be forfeited) where exigencies have 
arisen which make departure from the directions of the set-
tlor necessary to the fulfillment of the purpose of the trust.107 
party or parties may commence a suit for the purpose of obtaining a decree 
for the sale, mortgaging, leasing, improving, exchanging of, or otherwise 
dealing with said property, or any portion thereof. Any court of equity in 
a county in which any of such trust property may be situated shall have 
jurisdiction to hear the cause of suit and enter the proper decree." 
The act further directs that all persons who are living at the time of the 
commencement of such suit, and who are interested whether as trustees or as 
beneficiaries in the property under the trust, or who have any vested, contin-
gent, executory, or reversionary interest therein at the termination of the trust, 
shall be made parties to the suit, as also all persons living at the commence-
ment of suit who have at that time any apparent interest. The act also provides 
for notice to unknown heirs or unknown persons by publication in the same 
manner as in suits against nonresident defendants. 
Sec. 9-805 provides: "All interested persons who are born subsequent to 
the commencement of said suit shall be deemed parties to said suit by being 
represented therein by the defendants served, and shall be bound by any decree 
or decrees therein as fully as if made parties and duly served with process 
therein." 
104 Thompson v. Adams, 205 Ill. 552, 69 N. E. I (I903); Cagle v. 
Schaefer, II5 S.C. 35, I04 S. E. 32I (I92o). 
105 2 Scott, Trusts,. sec. I67; 3 Bogert, Trusts, sec. 742. 
106 2 Scott, Trusts, sec. I 90.4. 
107 2 Scott, op. cit. 
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The settlor's specific desires are subordinated to his general 
intent. 
Thus to the extent that future interests, where there is a 
trust, can be subjected under the present law to the author-
ized acts of the trustee, there will be relatively less objection 
to permitting the trustee to sell, exchange, mortgage, lease, 
or otherwise deal with the corpus as provided in a statute en-
acted subsequent to the creation of the trust than there will 
be to allowing a life tenant to sell in fee under a retroactive 
statute. 
(d) The Effect of Restrictions Against Sale. An inter-
esting problem is whether a statute which otherwise can be 
applied retroactively will override a stipulation in the will 
or deed that the land is not to be sold. One case intimates 
strongly that the testator or grantor may condition the estate 
so that it will terminate if the life tenant procures an order 
of sale.108 There is no good reason why a forfeiture provision 
should not be given effect, notwithstanding the statute. The 
public policy to be furthered by the statute is not only the 
amelioration of the condition of life tenants but also the pro-
motion of alienability by getting rid of future interests. The 
latter objective may be as much accomplished by forfeiture as 
by sale in fee. 
A restraint on the life tenant's power of alienation, which 
is unaccompanied by a forfeiture provision, is generally held 
to be ineffective.109 Yet, even though a stipulation against sale 
is void, it might persuade the court of the inexpediency of a 
sale out of deference to the wishes of the grantor or testator. 
A court once admonished that 
"A just government ought as emphatically to protect wills 
as deeds and contracts. Because, by so doing, not only the 
rights of the living are secured, but also the rights of the 
lOS In re Gaffer's Estate, 254 App. Div. 448, 5 N.Y. S. 2d 671 (3rd Dept. 
1938). 
109 x Bogert, Trusts, sec. 220; 2 Simes, Future Interests, sec. 447 (1936). 
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dead-rights which all civilized nations regard. Those who 
are now the living will shortly be the dead. And we labor 
not only for the present, but for the future, and for those who 
shall be in that future." 110 
Where, however, courts do not sustain retroactive statutes, it 
is because the interests of living persons are unduly disturbed, 
not because the wishes of the dead are flaunted. 
On the other hand, restrictions in a trust instrument 
against sale by the trustee (or mortgaging, leasing, or other 
acts) will be enforced by the court although unaccompanied 
by forfeiture provisions. The trustee has no right to alienate 
or encumber the corpus unless the power is given him under 
the terms of the trust or conferred by the court.111 However, 
restrictions in the trust instrument against sale, mortgaging, 
or leasing do not prevent the trustee's taking advantage of 
a statute authorizing any of those acts,112 provided that the 
limitations do not create a condition upon the happening of 
which the estate is to be forfeited.113 Indeed, the only reason 
why the trustee would need to take advantage of the statute 
would be on account of some supposed defect of power re-
sulting from a limitation expressed or implied in the trust 
instrument. 
6. Statutes Which Authorize a Life Tenant to Execute 
Leases 
At common law, a lease executed by a life tenant auto-
matically expires at his death.114 A statute may constitution-
110 Ervine's Appeal, 16 Pa. 256, 265 (1851), supra note 94· 
111 2 Scott, Trusts, sec. 186 et seq. Of course, the trustee, as owner of the 
fee, has the power to alienate and if he conveys to a bona fide purchaser who 
pays consideration before receiving notice, the corpus will be discharged of 
the trust. 2 Scott, Trusts, sec. 284. 
112 Stanley v. Colt, 72 U. S. (5 Wall.) 119 (1866) (restriction against 
sale); Russell v. Russell, 109 Conn. 1871 145 Atl. 648 (1929) (language 
of will indicated that the testator did not intend that any further encumbrances 
be placed on the property) . 
ns Stanley v. Colt, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 119 (1866). 
114 Standard Metallic Paint Co. v. Prince Mfg. Co., 133 Pa. 474, 19 Atl. 
411 (189o). 
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ally provide that leases which have already been executed by 
life tenants of existing estates shall not expire immediately 
upon the death of the tenant but shall be continued in effect 
for a limited period after the lessor's death. For example, it 
has been held that a statute is constitutional which provides 
that such leases shall be continued until the end of the lease 
year current at the time of the life tenant's death, in lieu of 
emblements, to the end that the lessee may gather the grow-
ing crops.115 
If there is a strong showing of necessity, similar to the 
circumstances under which courts of equity order a sale of the 
premises, it would seem not unconstitutionally deprivative of 
the interests of the remaindermen to permit the life tenant to 
take advantage of a statute enacted after the creation of his 
estate to execute a lease which will not terminate for a long 
period after his death. A remainderman can scarcely be 
heard to complain if the life tenant's execution of a long-term 
lease is the only expedient short of sale to prevent everyone's 
interests from being lost. The power to make leases for the 
preservation of property is like the power of sale, and as a 
matter of fact the power to make leases is sometimes con-
ferred in statutes authorizing sale or mortgage.116 
However, where there is no proof of necessity, a statute 
which would authorize life tenants of existing estates to exe-
cute leases which would endure any substantial period of 
time after the life tenant's death would be of doubtful con-
stitutionality. 
No cases were found which directly passed upon the valid-
ity of a statute which purported to give life tenants power 
to execute long-term leases. However, a similar constitu-
tional issue was considered in a case arising under a statute 
which authorized trustees, with the approval of a court, to 
115King v. Foscue, 91 N.C. 116 (1884). 
116 E.g., D. C. Code 1940, sec. 45-1104, supra note 76. 
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lease real property for such periods as might be deemed 
advantageous to the estate. In Campbell v. Kawananakoa,111 
where this statute 118 was sought to be applied to an existing 
trust (the testator died some thirty years before the enact-
ment), it was held that the trustees could not execute a 
fifty-year lease which would probably endure beyond the life 
of the trust, where some of the remaindermen who stood in 
line to take upon termination of the trust objected to the exe-
cution of a long-term lease. The testator had clearly indi-
cated in his will that he intended a distribution of the res at 
the time designated for the termination of the trust. There 
was no showing in the Kawananakoa case that the execution 
of the lease was necessary to save the res from destruction or 
that the income from the trust in its present condition was too 
small to carry out the plans of the testator.119 The life bene-
ficiaries would have been clearly benefited by the lease. The 
remaindermen might or might not have been, depending 
upon conditions existing when the lease expired, of which the 
court would make no prognostication. It was held that it 
would be unjust to the remaindermen (and also unconstitu-
tional) to deny to them the privilege of choosing for them-
117 34 Hawaii 333 (1937) · 
118 Hawaii Rev. Laws 1945, sec. 12573. 
119 The courts of some jurisdictions will authorize the execution of leases 
to endure well beyond the life of the trust, even when this appears to be 
contrary to the intent of the trustor, if it is shown that by the execution of a 
long term lease the res can be preserved, or that only by this means can the 
purpose of the trust be carried out, or if some other equally pressing reason 
is established. Marsh v. Reed, 184 Ill. 263, 56 N. E. 306 (19oo); Denegre v. 
Walker, 214 Ill. 113, 73 N. E. 409 (1905); Hubbell v. Hubbell, 135 Iowa 
637, 113 N. W. 512 (1907). 
Courts sometimes go to rather extreme lengths to find that the power to 
execute long term leases is implied in the trust arrangement. In Upham v. 
Plankinton, 152 Wis. 275, 140 N. W. 5 (1913) it was held that the trustees 
might execute a ninety-nine year lease, if such term were reasonable under 
all circumstances as the trustor might probably have regarded the matter 
when he created the trust. The court found that the trustor was a capable 
businessman who must have appreciated that the property was especially suited 
for long term business leases. 
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selves, when the time for the exercise of that privilege ar-
rived, what disposition they wished to make of the corpus. 
From the facts as stated in the Kawananakoa case it is im-
possible to determine whether the remainders were vested or 
contingent. The court thought it unnecessary to make any 
distinction. One might surmise, however, that the court be-
lieved the legislature could have made the statute applicable 
to an existing trust at any time before the coming into exist-
ence of any of the class who might take.120 
The statutes of some jurisdictions permit life tenants to 
execute oil and mineralleases.121 Since it is indubitably with-
in the police power of the state to encourage the development 
and exploitation of its natural resources, there can be little 
question of the constitutionality of such statutes if reasonable 
provision is made for safeguarding future interests from un-
necessary diminution in value. In an Arkansas case, Love v. 
McDonald/22 it was determined that the statute of that state 
120 "Upon the birth of this grandchild [the first born of the class of re-
maindermen] there came into existence one of a class of beneficiaries clothed 
with a future interest vested by the terms of the will of the testator in the 
corpus of the estate. Upon the subsequent birth of other grandchildren the 
class opened and they also automatically became members of it. To be sure 
under the terms of the testator's will the right to the enjoyment of the absolute 
ownership and control of the corpus is postponed until the termination of the 
trust. The right itself, however, ceased to be nebulous and merely theoretical 
and became a reality. Whether it is a vested or contingent remainder it is 
unnecessary to decide." 34 Haw. 333, 343· 
121 E.g., W.Va. Code 1949, sec. 3550. This statute permits, under supervi-
sion of a court, the sale or lease of timber, oil, gas, coal, or other minerals 
without the consent of persons in being having vested estates or vested interests 
in such minerals and resources, where such minerals on account of their 
volatile or fugitive nature are clearly in danger of being drawn away, or 
where, in the case of timber and coal, it appears that the coal and timber are 
being removed from adjoining areas and if this coal or timber is not removed 
at the same time as that from adjoining lands, it will be difficult and less 
profitable to mine or produce at any other time and that on account of the 
circumstances such coal or other mineral will probably deteriorate in value 
unless it is sold or leased immediately. 
122 201 Ark. 882, 148 S. W. 2d 170 (1941). 
In Lawrence E. Tierney Coal Co. v. Smith's Guardian, 180 Ky. 815, 203 
S. W. 731 (1918), a statute, which provided that the guardian of an infant 
or incompetent may execute coal, oil, and gas leases for such length of time 
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was applicable to an estate created by deed many years before 
the statute was passed. The Arkansas statute 123 provides 
that one to whom land is devised or granted in fee tail (he 
has a life estate under the laws of that state 124) may petition 
a court for permission to execute an oil and gas lease. It is 
provided that the court shall award the life tenant, as com-
pensation for the use of the surface of the lands for explora-
tion, an absolute title in a proportion of the minerals, not 
exceeding a one-sixteenth interest, and also a proportion of 
the consideration and delay rentals. In the particular case, 
the heirs apparent of the life tenant, her children, who were 
as the guardian may approve, without regard to the time at which the dis-
ability of such infant or incompetent shall be removed (Ky. Acts 1916, c. 99), 
was held, where the infants in question had acquired their interests prior to 
the statute, to deprive them of their inalienable right to acquire, hold, and 
enjoy property. Under the authority of the act a forty year coal lease with 
option to renew for like period had been approved by a lower court. A 
substantial difference was declared to exist between the sale of the lands of 
an infant or incompetent and what was attempted under this statute. "When 
the land of an infant is sold for purposes of reinvestment, there is only a 
change in the character, or perhaps, the location of his estate. The principal 
fund remains intact to come into his possession when he reaches his majority. 
. . . When, however, the whole estate is seized during his infancy, and 
at a time when he is presumed to be incapable of acting for himself, and 
leased for a term of years that will, under ordinary conditions, extend far 
beyond the period of his life, the legislature, through the instrumentality of 
the court, is assuming to exercise a guardianship, for life, over his affairs 
that is only tolerated in cases of infancy and mental unsoundness." ( 1 8o Ky. 
815, 828, 203 S. W. 731, 736.) On rehearing, the court stated that its 
previous decision should be modified so as to exempt oil and gas leases, the 
same involving substantially different problems, I8I Ky. 764, 205 S. W. 951 
(I 918). A number of courts have permitted the execution of oil and gas 
leases for a period of years extending beyond the minority of the infant. 
Cabin Valley Mining Co. v. Mary Hall, 53 Okla. 76o, I55 Pac. 570 (1916); 
Jones v. Prairie Oil and Gas Co., 273 U. S. I95 ( I927). Courts have also 
approved long term leases of infant's lands on the ground that the interests 
of the infant would be benefited. Ricardi v. Gaboury, I IS Tenn. 484, 89 
S. W. 98 (I905) (ninety-nine years); Beauchamp v. Bertig, 90 Ark. 351, 
119 s. w. 75 (I909). 
123 Acts I929, No. 76, now Ark. Stat. Ann. I947, 53-302 to 53-3Io. 
Sec. 4 (b) [53-3o6b] provides that the court shall appoint some suitable 
person as trustee for the benefit of the contingent remaindermen and rever-
sioners and requires that such trustees shall execute bond in such sum as the 
court may deem proper. 
124 Ark. Stat. Ann. I947, sec. so-405. The remainder passes in fee simple 
to the heirs of the body of the life tenant, infra note 20I, 
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all of age, assented to the lease in writing. They also signed 
a statement that their mother had reached an age where she 
probably would not have any more children and their inter-
est on that account reduced. In fact, the only person who 
raised any objection at all was the defendant who was trying 
to get out of his agreement to accept the oil and gas lease 
on the alleged ground that since the interests of the re-
maindermen could not be affected, title was not merchanta-
ble. The lease was held to be valid and binding upon the in-
terests of the remaindermen. The decision proceeded 
partially on the theory that under its police power the state 
may permit the life tenant to execute leases in order to con-
serve the contingent estate from the depletion of minerals 
by production from adjacent territory, but the greater stress 
was laid upon the very dubious theory that the interests of 
the remaindermen were not property within the contempla-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Constitution of 
Arkansas. The court quoted with approval a statement from 
a well known law encyclopedia to the effect: 
"The legislature has no power to alter or destroy by statute 
the nature of vested estates in property. Indeed, authority 
is not wanting to the effect that a contingent remainder may 
not be impaired or destroyed by a statute passed after its 
creation, but the better opinion is that contingent remainders 
may be impaired or abolished at any time before they be-
come vested. . . ." 125 
The court intimated that the result would have been different 
if the remaindermen had been named. 
This case is the only one which the writer has found in 
which it is declared that contingent remainders are not prop-
erty within the meaning of the Constitution. The decisions, 
it is true, permit effects to be wrought on some kinds of con-
tingent remainders which they will not allow in respect to 
125 12 c. J. p. 959, § 496. 
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vested remainders, but they do not hold that contingent re-
mainders as such are not property in a constitutional sense. 
The remainders in the McDonald case were contingent in the 
respect only that the takers after the death of the life tenant 
could not at the time of the suit be absolutely ascertained 
( nemo est haeres viventis), but the interests of the children 
were more than mere expectancies. The only condition to 
their coming into possession was that they outlive the life 
tenant. The Arkansas court pretty surely confused vested 
remainders with vested interests, and contingent remainders 
with contingencies or expectancies. 
What the court said about contingent remainders was 
dictum. The case did not present a situation in which the 
proposition that contingent remainders are not property could 
be tested. All of the persons who in all probability would 
ever have any interest consented. Even if the remaindermen 
had objected, the benefit they derived from having the land 
explored would fairly offset the loss occasioned by payment 
of royalties to the life tenant. There were excellent reasons 
for sustaining the statute as applied to an existing life estate. 
It is well known that oil and gas may be lost by underground 
drainage. If wells are sunk in the vicinity of the land, the 
oil and gas under it may shift to the operating wells and be 
lost to both the life tenant and remaindermen. The latter 
cannot execute a lease. What could be more reasonable than 
a statute which allows the life tenant to execute a lease so 
that wells might be sunk before the oil and gas are depleted? 
7. Statutes Which Alter the Rules for Allocation of Benefits 
Between Life Tenant and Remaindermen 
The primary guide for the allocation of benefits between 
the life tenant or life beneficiary and the remaindermen is, 
of course, the instrument creating the interests. But often 
the instrument is an insufficient guide, and for such cases the 
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courts have devised rules.126 A few legislatures have adopted 
comprehensive statutes on allocation of benefits.127 
A statute embodying a material modification of existing 
rules, it appears, ordinarily cannot constitutionally be applied 
to existing estates. An established rule of allocation, the 
courts hold, is a rule of property. The legislature cannot 
qualify or extinguish the relative interests of the life tenant 
or beneficiary and of the remaindermen as ascertained by the 
rule in existence at the time of the creation of the interests. 
In Franklin et al. v. Margay Oil Corp. et al.128 the appor-
tionment statute went into effect fourteen days after the 
death of the testator whose will created the trust in question. 
The statute provides as follows for the apportioning of 
money received as consideration for the permanent severance 
of natural resources from the land (whether as royalties or 
otherwise). The percentage allowed for depletion under the 
federal income tax laws should be treated as principal, and 
invested or held for the remaindermen, the balance to be 
treated as income subject to be disbursed to the tenant.129 
Two years after the enactment of the statute, the trustees, 
under authority of the power vested in them, executed cer-
tain oil and gas leases. This suit was brought to determine 
(inter alia) the proper allocation of royalties between life 
beneficiary and the remaindermen. Under the rule in force 
at the testator's death, royalties went into the fund to be held 
for the remaindermen and only the interest on the royalty 
fund went to the life beneficiary. It was held that a statute 
126 See 3 Simes, Future Interests, sees. 688-704 (1936). 
127 E.g., Ore. Comp. L. Ann. 1940, sees. 74-101 to 74-114; Purdon's Pa. 
Stat. Ann. Tit. zo, sec. 3470.1 et seq ( 195 x Supp.). These statutes are 
enactments of the Uniform Principal and Income Act. 
128194 Okla. 519, 153 P. 2d 486 (1944). 
129 Okla. Laws 1941, p. 26o, sec. 33, 6o Okla. Stat. Ann., sec. 175·33· The 
statute also provides that if no deduction for depletion is made by the 
federal laws, then twenty per cent of the net proceeds shall be treated as 
principal and the remainder as income. 
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setting up a new rule of apportionment, which has the effect 
of increasing income and correspondingly reducing the prin-
cipal or corpus of the estate which may go to the remainder-
men at the termination of the trust, if applied to existing 
trusts, would deprive the remaindermen of property without 
due process of law. 
In In re West's Estate 130 the question concerned the con-
stitutionality of certain provisions of the New York Personal 
Property Law 131 insofar as the same modified retroactively 
the rules relating to proceeds of sale in mortgage salvage 
operations. The court found there would be no taking of 
property without due process if the statute were applied in 
case of existing trusts, but the ground of decision was that 
rules laid down in the cases prior to the statute were tentative 
only and not intended to be final 132 and that the trustee in 
his discretion might have paid to the life tenant the amount 
which the statute directed: 
"Before a judicial declaration, thus tentatively stated, be-
comes a rule of property, it must have become permanently 
fixed and long continued." 
The statute allots to the life tenant out of the net income 
earned from the operation of real estate in salvage/33 an 
annual amount up to three percent of the face value of the 
mortgage investment, regardless of principal advances for 
expenses of foreclosures, arrears of taxes, and capital im-
130 289 N.Y. 423, 46 N. E. 2d 50I (I943). 
131 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law, sec. I7-c, effective April I3, I940. 
132 The cases primarily referred to were Matter of Chapal's Will, 269 
N.Y. 464, I99 N. E. 762 (I936) and Matter of Otis' Will, 276 N.Y. Ioi, 
I IN. E. 2d 556 (I937 ). 
133 Salvage income is derived generally from three sources: "(I) rents 
received by the trustee as mortgagee in possession, (2) rent received by the 
trustee after foreclosure as owner of the property, (3) interest and amortiza-
tion payment received by the trustee upon resale, where part of the purchase 
price consists of a purchase money mortgage." Skilton, "The Rights of Suc-
cessive Beneficiaries iri Unproductive Trust Assets Bearing Interest," 15 Temp. 
L. Q. 378, 396 (1941). 
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provements.134 Such payments are to be made from the be-
ginning of the salvage operation and are declared to be final 
and not subject to recoupment either from the life tenant or 
from the trustee by way of surcharge.135 Prior to the statute, 
the trustee could, during the salvage period, at his discretion, 
make payments to the life tenant from time to time out of 
the surplus income not necessary for the payment of expenses 
or for the repayment of advances made out of principaJ.l36 
But as a matter of fact, trustees hesitated to exercise their dis-
cretion for fear of possible surcharge in the event of an over-
payment to the life tenant; 137 consequently, the life tenant 
was often left without income during the salvage period. 
The legislature came to the aid of life tenants who presum-
ably are the primary objects of the settlor's beneficence and 
made absolute what formerly was discretionary. It is ques-
tionable whether depriving the remaindermen of a right of 
surcharge against the trustee for overpayment made in con-
scious good faith is a taking without due process even if the 
rule of apportionment is held to have been established. 
The dissenting opinion in the West case strongly attacked 
the position of the majority that the rule of apportionment 
was not settled/38 and vigorously contended that insofar as 
134 Remaindermen are required to advance new principal to pay the expenses 
of the salvage operations. In re Schnitzler's Estate, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 554 (Surr. 
Ct. 1943). Pers. Prop. Law, sec. 17-c (b) (c) provide that principal ad-
vances shall be repaid out of excess income above three per cent and that 
unpaid principal advances shall be a primary lien on proceeds of sale. 
135 Subsec. (a) provides that payments made are to be credited against life 
tenant's income in the final computation. 
136 Matter of Chapal's Will, 269 N.Y. 464, 199 N. E. 762 (1936). 
137 Matter of West, 175 Misc. 1044, 26 N.Y. S. 2d 622 (1941). 
The statute declares that its purpose is to simplify rules of procedure in 
mortgage salvage operations and to eliminate complications which often 
worked disadvantageously to the life tenant who is usually the principal 
object of the testator's or settlor's bounty. It is stated that only equitable 
adjustments and balances are intended to be effected by the provisions. 
138 He quoted as follows from Matter of Chapal's Will, 269 N. Y. 464, 
472, 199 N. E. 762, 764 (1936): " ..• the proceeds should be used first 
to pay the expenses of the sale and the foreclosure costs and next to reimburse 
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the statute retroactively took away the remaindermen's right 
of recoupment from the life tenant-for payments fixed arbi-
trarily and without regard to the demands of justice and 
equity-it was nothing but a mandatory transfer of the re-
maindermen's property to the life tenant, and a taking of 
property without due process.139 On appeal, the Supreme 
Court of the United States 140 agreed with the majority that 
the earlier decisions did not amount to a rule of property. 
The sole question considered by this court was whether the 
New York Court of Appeals had attempted to avoid the con-
stitutional issue by denying on an unsubstantial ground the 
existence of rights claimed to be impaired by the statute. The 
finding by both courts that the remaindermen never possessed 
such a property right as they claimed was taken from them 
the capital account for any advances of capital for carrying charges not 
theretofore reimbursed out of income from the property. Then the balance 
is to be apportioned between principal and income in the proportion fixed by 
the respective amounts thereof represented by the net sale proceeds. In the 
capital account will be the original mortgage investment. In the income 
account will be unpaid interest accrued to the date of sale upon the original 
capital." 
He contended in addition that the statute also violates the rule that the 
legislature may not declare the law in the decision of causes before the courts; 
the courts are required to ignore the law that pending questions of apportion-
ment are to be decided upon equitable principles and directed instead to decide 
according to the legislative mandate. 
139 There could be no constitutional objection if the amount of income 
which was found to be due the life tenant upon the final computation always 
exceeded the amount of income irrevocably paid over during the salvage 
operations. In In re Wacht's Estate, 32 N.Y. S. 2d 871 (Surr. 1942), anum-
ber of hypothetical illustrations are given which show how application of the 
statutory rule may result in the life tenant's getting a greater share than he 
would be entitled to under the Otis-Chapal rule. 
Since the remainderman is required to advance new capital to pay the cost 
of salvage operation, if the entire investment is ultimately lost, the irrevocable 
income payments under I 7-c will be, in effect, an expropriation of the remain-
derman's contributed capital. This happened in In re Schnitzler's Estate, I79 
Misc. 957, 40 N.Y. S. 2d 554 (I943), affirmed In re Schnitzler's Will, 290 
N.Y. 88 5, 5o N. E. 2d 293 (I943). 
140 Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 32 I U. S. 36 ( I944). 
Douglas and Black concurred. They were of the opinion that the record did 
not show a substantial federal question. They would simply have dismissed 
the appeal. 
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disposed of the federal question.141 However, Justice Jack-
son implied that even assuming the contentions of the re-
maindermen, the state did not lack power to devise new and 
reasonable directions to the trustees of existing trusts to en-
able them to meet new conditions such as those the depression 
produced. 
In In re Crawford's Estate 142 it was held that the Uni-
form Principal and Income Act/43 if applied retroactively to 
an existing trust, would deprive the life beneficiary of vested 
141 Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 32I U. S. 36, 47 (I944). 
Jackson, J., remarks that what really seems "to have been taken from the 
remainderman is his right to question the equity of the rule in his individual 
circumstances, a right which he had while it was a rule of court." It should 
be observed that the Chapal.Otis rules were laid several years after the deaths 
of the decedents in question, Property rights would seem to have been settled 
at the death of the testators. 
142 362 Pa. 458, 67 A. zd I24 (I949), Accord, In re Pew's Estate, 362 
Pa. 468, 67 A. zd 129 (I949). In the Crawford case, under the will of 
the testator, who died some ten years before the statute, certain property was 
placed in trust to pay the income to his daughter for life. After the effective 
date of the statute, the trustees received stock dividends from corporations 
whose stock formed part of the trust, and they also sold other corporate stocks 
and rights to subscribe which resulted in large capital gains. The court below 
decided that by long established decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
under the Pennsylvania Rule of Apportionment, the life tenant possessed a 
vested right to receive as "income" the stock dividends and a share of the 
capital gains (representing accumulated unpaid earnings) on sales of the stock. 
The legislature, in adopting the Uniform Principal and Income Act in 
substance, substituted the Massachusetts Rule for the Pennsylvania Rule. Under 
the Massachusetts Rule all cash dividends are payable to the life tenant and 
all stock dividends to the remaindermen. 3 Simes, Future Interests, sec. 693 
(I936). Uniform Principal and Income Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. 3470, sec. 5 (1) 
provides: "All dividends on shares of a corporation forming a part of the 
principal, which are payable in the shares of the corporation itself shall be 
deemed principal. Subject to the provisions of this section all dividends 
payable otherwise than in the shares of the corporation itself, including ordi. 
nary and extraordinary dividends and dividends payable in shares or other 
securities or obligations of corporations other than the declaring corporation, 
shall be deemed income." 
143 Pa. Act of I945, P. L. 4I6, repealed and substantially re-enacted by 
Act of 1947, P. L. 1283. Purdon's Pa. Stat, Ann., Tit. zo, sec. 3470.1 et seq. 
(I 9 51 Supp.). The Act of I 94 5 was construed as being continued in active 
operation as to all rights and liabilities incurred under it. Statutory Construe. 
tion, Act of I937> P. L. IOI9, Art. VI, sec. 82, Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., 
Tit. 46, sec. 58 I. 
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rights, since he would receive a smaller share under the Act 
than he would get under the rule in existence when the trust 
was created. It was argued that the life tenant's property 
right was inchoate or a mere expectancy because the quantum 
of income may vary upon the application of the rule. The 
court disagreed with this. There was no uncertainty as to 
the rule of apportionment. Uncertainty as to the quantum of 
income and the time of receipt, said the court, cannot convert 
a vested interest into a mere expectancy.144 
In Willhite v. Rathburn et al.,145 a case involving the sale 
of unproductive land under a statute, it was held that a de-
cree which directed that the present value of the life estate 
be paid to the· life tenant as her absolute property, could not 
be sustained since the estate had been created prior to the en-
actment of the statute providing for the computation of the 
present value of life estates.146 The statute under which the 
sale was ordered was sustained although it was retroactive; 147 
but insofar as the decree sought to give the life tenant more 
than the interest on the invested proceeds, above the ex-
penses of administration, the court held that it operated to 
enhance and enlarge the life estate with consequent deprecia-
tion and impairment of the remaindermen's interest in a 
manner forbidden by the constitution of the state.148 The 
144 "Appellant asserts that no vested property right exists in a rule of law. 
This is true, except where such rule of law has established a vested property 
interest. Where a decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declares an 
interest to be vested, no retroactive statutory enactment may modify or extin-
guish it." (In re Crawford's Estate, 362 Pa. 458, 467, 67 A. 2d 124, 129.) 
However, if the rule had not been established but was in a process of 
formulation by the courts at the time the legislature declared its rule, it would 
seem that the life beneficiary would have no such interest in the imperfected 
rule as to prevent the application of the statute. This would be the corollary 
of In re West's Estate, supra note 130. 
145 332 Mo. 12o8, 61 S. W. 2d 708 (1933). 
146 Mo. Laws 1905, p. 139, now Mo. Rev. Stat. 1949, sees. 442.530 to 
442·550. 
147 See supra note 89 and the text to which this note is appended. 
148 Mo. Const. 18 7 5, Art. II, sec. I 5, forbidding retroactive legislation. 
See note 44 supra. 
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court stated that under the law existing at the time the life 
estate was created, the life tenant was entitled to the emble-
ments, rents, and income accruing during the continuance of 
the life estate but was in no respect entitled to any part of the 
corpus, nor was she entitled to enforce a sale in fee of the 
land and have a portion of the proceeds set apart to her as her 
absolute property.149 
On the other hand, a statute 150 providing that when money 
is paid into court on foreclosure proceedings the court shall, 
upon request of the owner of any life estate, direct the pay-
ment to him of such gross sum as shall be deemed a just and 
reasonable satisfaction for said estate for life, was held in 
Leach v. Leach et al.151 not to divest vested rights when ap-
plied to existing estates even though the statute did not re-
quire the consent of persons interested in remainder, whether 
vested or contingent. But this situation may be differentiated 
from that in the Willhite case. Where land is converted into 
money under a right superior to life tenant and remainder-
man alike, as in the Leach case, the legislature can determine 
the period when the money resulting from such sale and the 
interest therein shall cease to be held as if it were land. 
". . . the conversion of lands into money under a superior 
right, to which the tenure of the lands was subject, terminates 
ipso facto the precise property right in the lands, and the pro-
ceeds of sale in strict legal theory are held not as lands, but 
rather as in lieu of the lands, for the ultimate purpose of 
compensating the parties interested in the lands." 152 
149 The estate involved was created in 1904. Apparently the court did not 
realize that the law of 1905 was not the first statute relating to the computa-
tion of the present value of life estates. The law of 1905 repealed Laws 1903, 
p. 167. The law of 1903, however, employed the American experience table 
of mortality, whereas the law of 1905 was based on the Carlisle table. 
150 N.J. Laws 1902, c. 158, sec. 6o, now N.J. Rev. Stat. 1937, 2:65-25. 
151 72 N.J. Eq. 571, 66 Atl. 595 (Ch. 1907). 
152 72 N.J. Eq. 571, 574, 66 Atl. 595, 596 (Ch. 1907). It was also stated 
in the opinion that the courts in this jurisdiction had never denied that a 
court in the absence of any statute might direct payment of sums in gross 
where the parties were sui juris and could receive it. 
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The remainders in the Franklin case were described by the 
court as being contingent, but it appears that they were ac-
tually vested subject to a power in the trustees to give to the 
life beneficiary from the principal. The nature of the re-
mainders in the West case does not appear from the facts, but 
they were stated by 1 ustice 1 ackson to be contingent. The re-
mainders in the Willhite case were contingent.153 The object-
ing remaindermen in the Leach case had a remainder for 
life.154 
Before any benefits have actually accrued, the interests of 
both the life tenant and the remaindermen in any such pro-
spective benefits may seem to be inchoate or mere expectan-
cies. Consequently, it may strike _one that there is no basis 
for holding that a statutory change (otherwise equitable) in 
the rule of apportionment cannot be applied to benefits ac-
cruing after the statute if the interests came into being before 
the modification. There may, furthermore, be doubt as to the 
propriety of holding that either the life tenant or remainder-
man has a vested right in a rule of law. All of these sup-
positions ignore, however, the basic premise upon which judi-
cial rules of apportionment are predicated: the property 
(which may be denominated the principal) must, except as 
153 The land was conveyed to "Mattie M. Rathburn and her bodily heirs." 
This con•reyance would have created an estate tail at common law but which 
by statutt was converted into a life estate in the first taker with a remainder 
in fee 01. er to those who should prove to be the heirs of her body at her 
death. 11 [attie's children were the ostensible heirs of her body. Mo. Rev. 
Stat. 194'9, sec. 442.470. 
154 The lands sold in the foreclosure suit belonged to Mrs. Leach. The 
marriage took place in 1878, and issue was born, who, at the time of this 
case, waf still alive. In Leach v. Leach, 69 N.J. Eq. 620, 61 Atl. 562 (Ch. 
190 5) i1 was held that under the decisions declaring the effect of the statutes 
relating to the real estate of married women, the respective interests of the 
husband and wife in the lands sold and their proceeds were as follows: The 
wife ha 1 an estate for her life, with remainder to the husband for his life, if 
he survJVed the wife, and with remainder over to the issue in fee. Mr. Leach 
objectee'. to the payment of a lump sum to his wife. He insisted that only the 
interest on the sum in court should be paid to the wife. 
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directed otherwise by the instrument creating the interests, be 
kept intact for distribution to the remainderman at the ex-
piration of the estate; income is to be paid to the life tenant. 
The principal, according to the prevailing view, consists not 
merely in the value of the property as of the time the re-
mainders were created but in the property itsel£.155 En-
hancement in value accrues, in other words, to the remainder-
men. Benefits either may be income in the ordinary sense or 
may arise as a result of the commutation of the principal. 
The purpose of a rule of apportionment is to ascertain the 
portion of the benefits which is principal in commuted form 
and hence belongs to the remainderman and the portion 
which is income in the proper sense and therefore is to go to 
the life tenant. The interests of the remainderman and life 
tenant, then, do not arise for the first time when the benefit 
accrues; the accrual simply indicates a change in the form of 
the interests. From this process of reasoning it follows that 
a modification of the existing rule, whereby the life tenant 
or remainderman receives a larger proportion of the benefits, 
results in a diminution of the relative interest of the other 
party. Such a shift of relative interests may be deemed a 
taking of property. 
8. Statutes Relating to Improvements and Repairs Made by 
the Life Tenant or His Grantee 
In the absence of statute, the remaindermen or reversioners 
are under no obligation to place improvements on the prem-
ises or to make advances for the upkeep and repair of the 
same, except that the life tenant may complete improvements 
begun by the donor of the estate and demand contribution.156 
155 3 Simes, Future Interests, sec. 689 (1936). 
156 1 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 64 (3d ed.). 
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Nevertheless, permanent improvements annexed to the land 
become a part of the inheritance and the property of the 
remaindermen or reversioners.157 
A statute giving a remainderman a charge or lien on the 
property for advances made to the life tenant for necessary 
repairs, improvements, and support has been declared to de-
prive the other remaindermen of vested rights where the 
advances were made prior to the statute.158 The remainders 
were contingent with a double aspect. The court did not 
explain why the statute could not be applied retroactively 
but said that it would be a mere waste of words and time to 
bother stating the reason. Presumably, the reason was that 
under the existing law the remainderman who made the ad-
vances was a volunteer; she could not create an obligation 
binding the interests of the other remaindermen for expendi-
tures which were not requested by them and which were not 
necessarily beneficial to them. 
It is sometimes held under the occupying claimant statutes 
that the life tenant who makes improvements in the belief 
he is owner in fee is entitled to compensation.159 Generally, 
it is held that one in possession of property, believing himself . 
to be owner in fee, under a conveyance from one who had 
only a life estate, is entitled, as against a remainderman, to an 
allowance for improvements.160 In such jurisdictions, where 
it is held that the existing betterment statute does not extend 
157 Darnell v. Williams, 171 Ga. 6s1, 156 S. E. s84 (1931); Belfield v. 
Findlay, 389 Ill. 526, 6o N. E. 2d 403 (1945); Leininger v. Reichle, 317 
Ill. 625, 148 N. E. 384 (1925); Day v. Day, 18o Minn. ISI, 230 N. W. 
634 (1930), 
158Albertson v. Landon, 42 Conn. 209 (1875). Conn. Pub. Acts 1866, 
c. 89; covered now by Conn. Gen. Stat. 1949, sec. 7043. 
159 Bloom v. Strauss, 70 Ark. 483, 69 S. W. 548 ( 1902); O'Donnell v. 
Mathews, 221 Mo. App. 657, 284 S. W. 204 (1926); Hall v. Hall, 219 
N.C. 8os, ISS. E. 2d 273 (1941). 
16° Fee v. Cowdry, 45 Ark. 410 (1885); Harper v. Durden, 177 Ga. 2!6, 
170 S. E. 45 (1933); Folsom v. Clark, 72 Me. 44 (188o); Plimpton v. 
Plimpton, 12 Cush. 458 (Mass. 1853); Harriett v. Harriett, 181 N. C. 75, 
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to those who are life tenants or the grantees of life tenants, a 
modification of the statute so as to bring such persons, who 
built on the bona fide belief that they were owners in fee, 
within its scope would seem to be a just and equitable act of 
the legislature even when the modification is applicable to 
existing life tenancies. A number of courts in cases not in-
volving life tenancies have allowed the application of better-
ment statutes where the possession of the adverse claimant 
antedated the statute on the ground that a right to better-
ments already existed in equity and good conscience.161 If the 
occupant acted in good faith, it would seem that his equities 
should not be less merely because he turned out to be a life 
tenant or tenant per autre vie instead of a trespasser. 
However, there is an old case holding that a statute which 
purported to allow the grantees of life tenants to obtain com-
pensation for the increased value of the premises by reason of 
all proper and judicious improvements which they or the 
life tenants had placed on the premises, could not be applied 
where the improvements were made and the death of the 
life tenant occurred before the statute.162 This was said to 
follow from the fact that upon the termination of the life 
estate an event had occurred by which the improvements be-
came absolutely the property of the remaindermen. While 
this opinion may be correct as a matter of pure deduction 
ro6 S. E. 22I (I92I); Beardsley's Lessee v. Chapman, I Ohio St. I I8 (I853); 
Whitney v. Richardson, 31 Vt. 300 (I858). 
The measure of damages will be not the cost of the improvements, but only 
the amount to which the improvements have added to the actual and perma-
nent value of the property. Cagle v. Schaefer, II5 S.C. 35, I04 S. E. 32I 
(I920). 
161 Beard v. Dansty, 48 Ark. I83, 2 S. W. 70I (I886); Fee v. Cowdry, 
45 Ark. 4IO (I885); Mills v. Geer, III Ga. 275, 36 S. E. 673 (I9oo); 
Bracket v. Norcross, I Greenl. 89 (Me. I820); Bacon v. Callender, 6 
Mass. 303 (I 8 Io). Contra, Wilson v. Red Wing School District, 22 Minn. 
4 8 8 (I 8 7 6) ; Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal. I (I 8 57) ; Society, etc. v. Wheeler, 2 2 
Fed. Cas. 756, No. I3,I56 (C. C. D. N.H. I8I4). 
162 Austin v. Stevens, 24 Me. 520 (I845). Me. Rev. Stat. I84I, c. I45, 
sees. z6-45· ' 
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from a rule of law, it is not a point of view which is likely 
to be acceptable to a modern court where the grantee appears 
to have acted in good faith. 
9· Legitimation and Adoption Statutes 
Statutes which confer the rights and privileges of natural 
and legitimate children upon illegitimates and adopted chil-
dren, it is said, do not entitle such persons to come in as 
beneficiaries under a will or deed unless the grantor or testa-
tor intended to include such children.163 The courts will give 
effect to the intent of the grantor or testator to include or 
not to include, as that intent may be gathered from the in-
strument, or, in the case of wills, from surrounding circum-
stances. But the courts follow a policy of construing both 
wills and deeds to extend the benefits of the statutes to 
adopted and legitimated children whenever they can do so 
without too obviously disregarding the true intent of the 
maker. Words such as "lawful issue" or "children" which 
would not be construed in the absence of the statutes to in-
clude illegitimate or adopted children, will be construed to 
include them in accordance with the spirit of the statutes. 
Words which can be used technically to describe a class 
(heirs, lawful issue, lawful children, etc.) are sometimes 
conclusively presumed to have been used in their technical 
sense; thus all persons who by virtue of the statute are mem-
bers of that class will be held to take under the instrument, 
whatever the true intent of the maker.164 It follows, there-
l63Butterfield v. Sawyer, 187 Ill. 598, 58 N. E. 6o2 (19oo); Central 
Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Skillin, 154 App. Div. 227, 138 N. Y. S. 884 (2d 
Dept. 1912); In re Truman, 27 R.I. 209, 61 Atl. 598 (1905); Lichter v. 
Thiers, 139 Wis. 481, 121 N. W. 153 (1909). 
164 Dunlavy v. Lowrie, 372 Ill. 622, 25 N. E. 2d 67 (1940) (will); 
Butterfield v. Sawyer, 187 Ill. 598, 58 N. E. 602 (1900) (deed); Sewall v. 
Roberts, Il5 Mass. 262 (1874) (conveyance in trust); Gilliam v. Guaranty 
Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 127, 78 N. E. 697 (1906); McGillis v. McGillis, 154 
N.Y. 532, 49 N. E. 145 (1898) (will); In re Sheffer's Will, 139 Misc. 519, 
24-9 N.Y. S. 102 (1931); Miller's Appeal, 52 Pa. 113 (1866) (will). 
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fore, that although theoretically the court is carrying out 
the intent of the grantor or testator, the statute may actually 
have the effect of altering the will or deed. 
The courts, while giving acknowledgment to the idea that 
it is the intent of the maker which controls, recognize that 
rights may be conferred independently of the intent of the 
maker, for they hold that a legitimation or adoption statute 
may be applied retroactively but only so long as it does not 
divest vested rights.165 This means that persons who would 
have no rights under the instrument as it would have 
been construed at common law can derive no rights 
from a statute which is enacted subsequent to the time when 
the instrument became effective unless the enactment of the 
statute occurs before the takers are absolutely ascertained. 
Thus if a devise were made to A for life, remainder to his 
children, but if he die without issue then to his heirs, an 
adopted child of A cannot take by virtue of the statute un-
less it is enacted in A's lifetime. Who will take must be de-
termined at or before A's death and not thereafter. The 
persons who will take in default of children are said to have 
only an expectancy; their interests are necessarily uncertain 
and liable at any time before the death of the life tenant to 
be diminished or defeated by the coming into existence of 
persons who will take at the life tenant's death. Consequent-
ly, they are not deprived of property without due process if 
adopted or legitimated children are allowed to take.166 It 
probably would also be held that vested remaindermen, 
165 Butterfield v. Sawyer, 187 Ill. 598, 58 N. E. 6o2 (1900); Sewall v. 
Roberts, 115 Mass. 262 (1874); McGillis v. McGillis, 154 N. Y. 532, 49 
N. E. 145 (1898); In re Sheffer's Will, 139 Misc. 519, 249 N. Y. S. 102 
(1931). 
166 Sewall v. Roberts; Butterfield v. Sawyer supra note 165. Gilliam v. 
Guaranty Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 127, 78 N. E. 697 (1906). But see Schafer v. 
Eneu, 54 Pa. 304 ( 1867) where it is intimated that if the takers in default 
of children are named persons, the legislature is powerless to enable the 
adopted child of the life tenant to take. 
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where the remainder is subject to open up, are not uncon-
stitutionally deprived of property if adopted or legitimated 
children are let in. Conversely, at any time before the takers 
are definitely determined, the statute conferring rights of in-
heritance upon illegitimate or adopted children may be re-
pealed so as to prevent such children from taking any in-
terest.167 
I o. Statutes Relating to the Rule Against Perpetuities 
A number of states have enacted modifications of or substi-
tutes for the common-law rule against perpetuities.168 A few 
states have become dissatisfied with the statutory rules and 
have returned to the common law.169 It is probable that the 
courts would not permit a statute adopting the common law 
or supplanting the common law to have the. effect of destroy-
ing an existing interest which was good under the previous 
law. As we have already seen, the extinguishment or im-
pairment of an executory interest or contingent remainder 
is almost never allowed unless the owner is compensated in 
some manner. 
167Frost's Will, I92 App. Div. 206, I82 N.Y. S. 559 (I92o), aff'd In re 
Kingsbury, 230 N.Y. 580, I30 N. E. 90I (I92o). There was a devise in 
trust to the testator's daughter, B., for life and then to the issue of B., or in 
default of issue, to her heirs. In I 9 I 6 B. adopted an adult child, K. B. died 
in I918. Under N. Y. Laws 1915, c. 352, which for the first time in the 
history of the state permitted adoption of adult children, K. would have 
taken under the will as an "heir." In I917, Laws 1915 was amended by 
providing that "nothing in this article in regard to an adult adopted pursuant 
hereto inheriting from the foster parent applies to any will, devise or trust, 
made or created before April twenty-second, nineteen hundred and fifteen, or 
alters, changes or interferes with such will, devise or trust, and as to any 
such will, devise, or trust, an adult so adopted is not an heir so as to alter 
estates or trusts or devises in wills so made or created." N. Y. Laws I9I7, 
c. 149. Held: K. was not an heir. No vested right in the trust fund could 
arise until the death of B., for a living person can have no heirs. 
168 2 Simes, Future Interests, sec. 560 et seq. (I936). See Restatement, 
Property, Appendix on the Statutory Rules Against Perpetuities. 
l69E.g., Ala. Laws I9JI, No. 684; Conn. Pub. Acts I895, c. 249; Mich. 
Pub. Acts 1949, No. 38; Ohio Laws 19]I, p. 470; Wyo. Laws 1949, c. 92. 
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The validity of a future interest under the common-law 
rule against perpetuities or under a statutory rule must ordi-
narily be determined as of the time when the instrument 
purporting to create the interest becomes effective.170 There 
is usually no period of abeyance, therefore, between the time 
the instrument takes effect and the time for vesting of the 
interest, within which the legislature can act to save the in-
terest.171 It has been held that a statute which purports to 
validate a devise void under the rule against perpetuities at 
the time of the testator's death, cannot take from the heirs 
the reversionary interest which passed to them as intestate 
property as a consequence of the invalidity of the devise.172 
In any case where the validity of a future interest under 
the rule againstperpetuities or under a statutory rule is to be 
determined at a time subsequent to the creation of the inter-
est,173 it would seem that in the interim until such time arrives 
the interest could probably be validated by retroactive legis-
lation. The objections of the person who stood to gain by the 
170 2 Simes, Future Interests, sees. 494, 496 ( 1936), as to common-law 
rule against perpetuities and c. 3 2 generally as to the statutory schemes. 
171 It should not be overlooked in this regard that where the common-law 
or statutory rule is applied to present interests whose potential duration is too 
long (o~s distinguished from the situation discussed in the text where the rule 
is applied to prevent the creation of remotely vesting future interests) the 
interes1 may be held to be voidable rather than void. Suppose for example 
that a1 1 indestructible trust is limited to endure beyond lives in being and 
twenty-one years. Assuming that the rule against perpetuities is applicable 
at all, such a trust should not be held void ab initio, but rather the provisions 
for indestructibility should be held subject to attack by the beneficiary. 2 
Simes, Future Interests, sec. 557· While depriving a beneficiary of his power 
to terminate the trust and to compel a conveyance of the res to him might well 
be held to be a taking of property without due process, there would at least 
not be the apparent taking away of the title from persons in whom it had 
vested as the consequence of the invalidity of a devise or bequest under the 
previous law. 
172 Hartson v. Elden, 50 N.J. Eq. 522, 26 Atl. 561 (Ch. 1893). 
l73 Where there is in some individual an unqualified power to destroy the 
future interest, the time at which the validity of the interest is determined is 
not the moment of the creation of tlxe interest but the time at which the power 
to destroy ceases; for until the power to destroy is ended, there has been no 
inconvenient fettering of property. Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, sec. 524.1 
(4th ed. Roland Gray r 9 3 2). Situations of this type might exist where 
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invalidity of the interest would no doubt be met with the 
proposition that under the previous law he had only a chance 
to acquire property and that such chance is not a constitution-
ally protected interest. The maxim would seem to be appli-
cable that no one can have a constitutional right that the law 
shall not be changed. 
I I. Statutes Which Abolish the Rule in Shelley's Case 
The classic statement of the rule in Shelley's Case is that 
of Lord Coke: 
"It is a rule in law, when the ancestor by any gift or convey-
ance takes an estate of freehold, and in the same gift or con-
veyance an estate is limited either mediately or immediately 
to his heirs in fee or in tail; that always in such cases, 'the 
heirs' are words of limitation of the estate, and not words of 
purchase." 174 
The rule has been abolished in most states by statute,175 
and where this is the case the grantee or devisee ordinarily 
takes a life estate with a contingent remainder to his heirs.176 
The statutes have either contained an express provision that 
they are to have only prospective operation or the courts have 
declared that they are not intended (save in certain special 
instances) to apply to instruments executed prior to the date 
of enactment. In the nature of things, the statutes which 
abolish the rule cannot be retroactively applied to perfected 
conveyances and devises. If any legislature or court should 
attempt to do so, titles would be drastically unsettled. 
the future interest is subject to complete destruction by the exercise of a 
general power of appointment or an unrestricted power of revocation, or 
where a future interest after a fee tail is subject to be destroyed by the tenant 
in tail. 
174 I Co. Rep. 93b, at p. I04a (I579-I58I); See I Simes, Future Interests, 
sec. I I4. 
175 For a list of the states in which the rule has been abolished see 3 Powell, 
Real Property, 'If 380. 
176 2 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 355 (3d ed.). 
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The problem of the retroactive operation of the statute 
can, however, arise in the case of wills which were executed 
prior to the statute when the rule obtained but the testator 
died after the effective date of the statute. An executed will, 
unlike an executed deed, is ambulatory and is subject to revo-
cation at the instance of the testator at any time during his 
life. The will does not vest any rights until the death of the 
testator.177 There would appear, therefore, to be no consti-
tutional objection to the application of the statute abolishing 
the rule to a will executed prior to the effective date but 
where the testator dies after it. The only questions would 
be whether the statute was designed to have this limited 
retroactive effect and whether the testator intended his will 
to be given effect according to the law when he executed it 
or according to the law at the date when the will became ef-
fective. In Reynolds v. Love 178 the court held that a statute 
enacted in I 8 52 179 abolishing the rule ought to be applied to 
a will executed in I 849 when the rule was in force. The testa-
trix died in I 8 6 I. She left real estate in trust for the benefit 
of a granddaughter for life, then in trust forever for the 
granddaughter's issue. The question was whether the grand-
daughter took an absolute estate or only a life estate with 
remainder over. The court said that this was a statute which 
was leveled against an abuse, or remedial in its nature, and 
therefore ought to be applied to every case which its words 
could properly include; the abolition of the rule enlarged the 
power of the owner to entail his property, and being bene-
ficial in its nature, would be given a retroactive effect. It 
might also be added that by not applying the rule in Shelley's 
Case the court probably gave to the instrument the effect the 
testatrix intended. 
177 r Page, Wills, sees. 31, 71 (Lifetime ed.), supra note 34· 
178191 Ala. zr8, 68 So. 27 (r9r5). 
179 Ala. Code r852, sec. 1304. 
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12. Statutes Which Abolish the Worthier Title Doctrine 
The Worthier Title Doctrine, or rather its inter vivos 
branch/80 is very well described in a recent law review article: 
"If a person makes an inter vivos conveyance with an ulti-
mate end limitation to his own heirs or next of kin, the end 
limitation is void in the sense that it designates purchasers, 
and the grantor retains a reversionary interest." 181 
Unlike the rule in Shelley's Case, which is now in force in 
only a handful of states, the Worthier Title Doctrine has 
been recognized in one form or another or at least has a 
potential existence, in most jurisdictions.182 A few states 
have statutes abolishing the Doctrine.183 The statutes of sev-
eral other states may have the effect of making the Doctrine 
wholly or partially inapplicable.184 A statute abolishing the 
180 The rule as to wills is that if a testator devises to an heir the precise 
interest in land which the latter would have inherited in the absence of the 
provision in the will, the heir is regarded as acquiring the land by descent and 
not by purchase. I Simes, Future Interests, sec. I44 (1936). The rule as to 
wills is not within the scope of this chapter, since it does not necessarily 
involve the creation of future interests. 
181 Morris, "The Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine," z 
Okla. L. Rev. 13 3, I 34 (I 949). At the time this article was written over 
twenty-four jurisdictions had recognized the Doctrine in one form or another. 
182 Morris, op. cit. at 134. 
183 E.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. I943, sec. 76-I15: "When any property is limited, 
in an otherwise effectiv:e conveyance inter vivos, in form or in effect, to the 
heirs or next of kin of the conveyor, which conveyance creates one or more 
interests in favor of a person or persons in existence, such conveyance operates 
in favor of such heirs or next of kin by purchase and not by descent." Nebraska 
has adopted the Uniform Property Act and this statute is part of the Act. 
The wording of the Minnesota statute abrogating the rule in Shelley's 
Case may be broad enough to encompass also the Worthier Title Doctrine. 
Minn. Stat. 1949, sec. 500.14 (4). The first part of the statute abolishes 
the Rule in Shelley's Case. The latter part which is thought to abolish the 
Worthier Title Doctrine reads: "No conveyance, transfer, devise, or bequest 
of an interest, legal or equitable, in real or personal property, shall fail to 
take effect by purchase because limited to a person or persons howsoever 
described, who would take the same interest by descent or distribution." 
184 E.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. 1950, sec. 41-6: "A limitation by deed, will, or 
other writing, to the heirs of a living person, shall be construed to be the 
children of such person, unless a contrary intention appear by the deed or will." 
Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. zo, sec. 301.14 (1): "A conveyance of real or 
personal property, whether directly or in trust, to the conveyor's or another 
designated person's 'heir', or 'next of kin', or 'relatives' or 'family' or to 'the 
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rule in Shelley's Case does not, it is generally held, have the 
effect of abolishing the Worthier Title Doctrine, as the two 
rules are distinct.185 
The courts have not yet had much occasion to consider the 
constitutionality of statutes abolishing the Doctrine. Since 
the effect of the application of the Doctrine is that the grantor 
retains a reversion or possibility of reverter, the constitu-
tionality of a statute abolishing the Doctrine, if applied 
retroactively, would no doubt be vigorously challenged. The 
decision could conceivably go either way. It might on one 
hand be reasoned that since the Doctrine is a rule of construc-
tion merely/86 no one can have a vested interest in it. Or 
it might be decided that, although it is a rule of construction, 
yet where its application is appropriate, property rights are 
retained which cannot be taken away by legislative declara-
tion. The latter view was that of the Minnesota Supreme 
Court in Shaw v. Arnett; 187 however, as this court declined 
persons thereunto entitled under the intestate laws', or to persons described by 
words of similar import, shall mean those persons, including the spouse, who 
would take under the intestate laws if such conveyor or other designated person 
were to die intestate at the time when such class is to be ascertained, a resident 
of the Commonwealth, and owning the property so conveyed: etc." 
185 Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919); Fidelity and 
Columbia Trust Co. v. Williams, 268 Ky. 671, 105 S. W. 2d 8I4 (1937); 
Wilcoxen v. Owen, 237 Ala. 169, 185 So. 897 (I938); Robinson v. Blankin-
ship, II6 Tenn. 394, 92 S .. W. 854 (I9o6); Morris, "The Inter Vivos Branch 
of the Worthier Title Doctrine," 2 Okla. L. Rev. I 3 3, 172 (I 949). 
186 By far the greatest number of American cases have applied the rule as 
one of construction. This is especially true of the more recent cases. Morris, 
"The Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine," 2 Okla. L. Rev. 133, 
144 (I949). The leading case is Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N. Y. 305, I22 
N. E. 221 (1919). It was there held that to transform into a remainder what 
would ordinarily be a reversion, the intention to work the transformation 
must be clearly expressed. The New York Court of Appeals, however, has 
since stated that the presumption which exists from the use of the common-law 
doctrine has lost much of its force since Doctor v. Hughes; evidence of intent 
need not be very great in order to allow the remainder to stand. Matter of 
Burchell, 299 N.Y. 351, 87 N. E. 2d 293 (1949). 
187 226 Minn. 425, 33 N. W. 2d 6o9 (1948). In 1907, one Arnett con-
veyed the property to his' son for life, remainder to the son's children, but if 
the son should die leaving no children or descendants of children, "then the 
said lands to revert to the heirs of the grantor." Arnett died in 1912. His 
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to determine whether the statute in question 188 really did 
abolish the Doctrine, the case is weak as an authority. 
I 3. Statutes Which Abolish the Destructibility Rule 
The few cases passing on the constitutionality of statutes 
that abrogate the power of the life tenant to destroy contin-
gent remainders 189 unanimously hold that the life tenant's 
power to destroy contingent remainders is not a vested 
right.190 In Jennings v. Capen 191 the court was compelled to 
distinguish between divestible rights and nondivestible or 
vested rights because it failed to realize that what the life 
tenant had was a "power" to destroy contingent remainders 
and not a "right" in the strict sense. The conclusion reached, 
son died in I946 without children or descendants of children and leaving his 
wife as heir at law. The wife claimed a share in the estate as heir of her 
husband, who, she contended, was the owner of an undivided share in the 
reversion which descended from his father. The statute, see supra note I 8 3, 
vvas enacted in I939· Held: The Worthier Title Doctrine applied and the 
grantor consequently retained a reversion. 
188 See note I 8 3 supra. 
l89 E.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. I95 I, c. 30, sec. 40: "That no future interest shall 
fail or be defeated by the determination of any precedent estate or interest 
prior to the happening of the event or contingency on which the future interest 
is limited to take effect." 
S. C. Code I942, sec. 8872: "No estate in remainder, whether vested or 
contingent, shall be defeated by any deed of feoffment, with livery of seizin." 
This act only prevents the destruction of contingent remainders by the life 
tenant's executing a deed of feoffment with livery of seizin and does not 
prevent destruction of contingent remainders by merger. McCreary v. Cog-
geshall, 74 S. C. 42, 53 S. E. 978 (I9o6). 
On Jan. I, I 9 52, twenty states had statutes declaring the complete absence 
of the doctrine of destructibility (Ala., Ariz., Cal., Ga., Idaho, Ill., Iowa, 
Ky., Md., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mont., N. Y., N. D., Ohio, S. D., Va., 
W. Va., Wis.) and five had statutes which denied the power of a life tenant 
by forfeiture, merger or destruction of his estate for life to destroy the con-
tingent interests thereafter (D. C., Me., Miss., R. I., Tex.). 2 Powell, Real 
Property, ~ 3 I4. 
190 Jennings v. Capen, 32I Ill. 29I, I5I N. E. 900 (I926); Wood v. 
Chase, 327 Ill. 9I, I58 N. E. 470 (I927); People's Loan & Exchange Bank v. 
Garlington, 54 S.C. 4I3, 32 S. E. 5I3 (I899). 
191 Supra note I9o. 
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however, was that the life tenant had only an "inchoate 
right" which could be taken from him at any time before he 
had exercised it. It was said in another case: 
" [T] he rule of law authorizing the destruction of 
contingent remainders is not regarded as having its founda-
tion on principles of natural justice. We think that the rule 
is generally regarded as one that does a greater wrong to the 
contingent remaindermen and to the testator whose will is 
thus defeated than the denial of it would do to the parties 
who might desire to defeat such rights, and that there is no 
reasonable ground for holding that the legislature has denied 
any natural or vested right to anyone by abolishing the rule 
in all cases in which such remainders were not destroyed until 
after the law became effective." 192 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina, in holding that a 
life tenant did not have a vested right to bar contingent re-
mainders/93 relied upon two grounds: first, this privilege had 
become part of the law of the state by virtue of an early 
statute and, being thus derived only from the statute law of 
the state, might be withdrawn whenever the law-making-
power saw fit to do so; second, the doctrine that a life tenant 
may bar contingent remainders, which had its origin under 
the feudal system, seems, very generally, to be regarded as 
a means of doing a wrong to the contingent remainderman, 
always defeats the intention of the testator, and cannot there-
fore expect favor of any kind beyond mere support. 
It seems that if the life tenant has already exercised his 
power to destroy the contingent remainders before the stat-
ute goes into effect, the statute cannot be given the effect of 
reviving the remainders.194 
192Wood v. Chase, 327 Ill. 91, IOo, 158 N. E. 470, 473 (1927), supra 
note 190. 
193 People's Loan & Exchange Bank v. Garlington, 54 S. C. 4 I 3, 3 2 S. E. 
513 (1899), supra note 190. 
194 See Wood v. Chase and People's Loan & Exchange Bank v. Garlington, 
supra note 190; McCreary v. Coggeshall, 74 S.C. 42, 53 S. E. 978 (1906). 
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14. Statutes Abolishing the Fee Tail Estate 
The policy of free alienation of property is opposed to 
entailments. Public policy has always been felt in America 
to be strongly against this form of land tenure, which was 
designed to enable landed families to retain their holdings 
within the family. The Bill of Rights of the Constitution of 
North Carolina, stating that "Perpetuities and monopolies 
are contrary to the genius of a free state, and ought not to be 
allowed," was pronounced by one court to impose a direct 
and mandatory obligation on the legislature to rid the people 
of fees tail without delay. 
"We are to recollect that, for many centuries in England the 
establishment of perpetuities in landed estates has been 
deemed a great grievance. An estate tail, in particular, cre-
ated by the statute de donis (which is undoubtedly a per-
petuity, because by possibility it may last forever), has been 
considered a dangerous support of a high aristocratic interest 
attended with numerous evils both public and private, so 
much so that though the statute has never been directly re-
pealed, yet successful evasions of it have been practiced, and 
some of them with the direct sanction of the legislature it-
self. If this act, therefore, has been in such discredit even in 
England, where there exists a government consisting of 
kings, lords, and commons, of course a great aristocratical 
interest, notwithstanding which it has been deemed too aristo-
cratical even for them, well might it excite the jealousy and 
precaution of the representatives of the people of this state, 
assembled to establish a republican form of government, 
founded on the basis of political equality among all the citi-
zens, and to which any aristocratical devices must be particu-
larly detrimental." 195 
There are (or seem to be) cogent reasons that the legisla-
tures should be permitted to abolish existing fee tail estates. 
A serious inconvenience could arise if the statute had to be 
195 Minge v. Gilmour, 17 Fed. Cas. 440, 444, No. 9,631 (C. C. D. N. C. 
1798). 
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limited to affect only estates arising after its enactment. An 
entailment can conceivably last until the extinguishment of 
the line of issue to whom the estate is limited. Many genera-
tions may pass before the entailment is ended. 
The fee tail can no longer be created in most states.196 
Generally, this has been the result of express legislation. Not 
all courts have waited for the legislature to act; some have 
declined to recognize the statute de donis as operating within 
their jurisdictions.197 It has even been held by some courts 
that the statutes on descents put an end to fees taiP98 
196 Fees tail exist in Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island (as 
to wills only), but the estate is obsolescent and infrequently encountered. 
2 Powell, Real Property, ~ I 96. 
Restatement, Property, c. 5, Introductory Note (3) p. 209 ( I936), says 
that in six states (by Jan. I, I 9 3 6), neither statute nor decisive decision has 
been found dealing with fees tail. "This group includes Alaska, Idaho, 
Louisiana, Nevada, Utah and Washington. In these states it is possible that 
estates tail would be recognized, if the question were presented for decision. 
This possibility seems negligible as to Louisiana because of the civil law rules 
applicable therein." (Copyright I936. Printed with permission of the 
American Law Institute.) 
197 Kepler v. Larson, I3I Iowa 438, Io8 N. W. 1033 (I9o6); Yates v. 
Yates, I04 Neb. 678, I78 N. W. z6z (I92o); Rowland v. Warren, IO Ore. 
I29 (I88I); Blume v. Pearcy, 204 S.C. 409, 29 S. E. 2d 673 (I944). In 
these jurisdictions a grant to A. and the heirs of his body vests A. with a 
conditional fee which becomes an absolute fee upon the birth of heirs capable 
of inheriting. The estate conferred upon A. by the grant has the essential 
characteristics of a common-law fee-simple conditional. See extensive note on 
fee-simple conditional, II4 A. L. R. 6o2 to 627. See also Restatement, 
Property, c. 5, Introductory Note, Special Note 1 (I936) and Introductory 
Note, Special Note I (I948 Supp.). 
Fees conditional have now been abolished by statute in Nebraska. Neb. Rev. 
Stat. I943> sec. 76-IIo provides: "The creation of fees simple conditional 
as they existed under the law of England prior to the 'statute de donis' is 
not permitted. The creation of fees tail is not permitted. The use in an other-
wise effective conveyance of property, of language appropriate to create such 
a fee simple conditional or fee tail, creates a fee simple in the person who 
would have taken a fee simple conditional or fee tail. Any future interest 
limited upon such an interest is a limitation upon the fee simple and its 
validity is determined accordingly." This is part of the Uniform Property 
Act which Nebraska adopted in I94I. Laws I94I, c. I53· 
In Connecticut neither the conditional fee nor the statute de donis was ever 
recognized by the courts. It has been held in this jurisdiction from the earliest 
times that words appropriate to the creation of an estate tail vest a fee simple 
in the issue of the first donee in tail; such issue taking no interest in the land 
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The statutes differ in the effect which they have upon a 
limitation which formerly would have operated to create an 
estate tail. In some jurisdictions a limitation formerly suffi-
cient to create an estate tail is declared to create a fee simple 
absolute.199 In some states such a limitation is declared to 
create an absolute fee, but with the additional provision that 
when the language of the instrument would have created a 
remainder in fee after a fee tail according to the previous law, 
this remainder is to be valid as a contingent limitation on a 
fee and shall take effect in possession if the first taker dies 
unsurvived by descendants.200 In other states a life estate 
during the life of the donee and the donee having no alienable interest beyond 
a life interest. Rudkin v. Rand, 88 Conn. 292, 9I Atl. I98 (I9I4). Conn. 
Gen. Stat. I949, sec. 7083, provides that each estate given in fee tail shall be 
an absolute estate in fee simple to the issue of the first donee in tail. 
198 I Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 35 (3d. ed.), citing inter alia, Jewell v. 
Warner, 35 N.H. 176 (I857); Posey's Lessee v. Budd, zi Md. 477 (I863). 
199 E.g., N.J. Rev. Stat., I937, 46:3-I5: "Whenever any conveyance, 
will or instrument in writing shall hereafter be made, whereby any grantee, 
devisee or other person shall become seized in law or in equity of such estate in 
any real estate . . . [as would have been held a fee tail under de donis] 
such conveyance, will or instrument shall vest an estate in fee simple in snch 
grantee, devisee or other person." 
200 E.g., N. Y. Real Property Law, sec. 32: "Estates tail have been abolished; 
and every estate which would be adjudged a fee tail, according to the law 
of this state, as it existed before the twelfth day of July, seventeen hundred and 
eighty-two, shall be deemed a fee simple; and if no valid remainder be 
limited thereon, a fee simple absolute. Where a remainder in fee shall be 
limited on any estate which would be a fee tail, according to the laws of 
this state, as it existed previous to such date, such remainder shall be valid, 
as a contingent limitation on a fee, and shall vest in possession on the death 
of the first taker, without issue living at the time of such death." 
As of Jan. I, I952, jurisdictions included in this group and the preceding 
were Ala., Ariz., Cal., D. C., Ga., Ind., Ky., Md., Mich., Minn., Miss., Mont., 
Neb., N. H., N. J., N. Y., N. C., N. D., Okla., Pa., S. D., Tenn., Va., Vt., 
W. Va., Wis. and Wyo. 2 Powell, Real Property, 'If 200. 
In some jurisdictions the creation of estates in fee tail is prohibited, but 
there is no statutory declaration as to what shall be the consequence of a 
limitation which would have created a fee tail at common law. Included in 
this group are Hawaii and Texas. The Restatement states that under such a 
statute the first taker gets a fee simple except when the manifested purposes of 
the conveyor are to be more nearly attained by creating an estate for life in 
favor of the first taker with a remainder in fee simple in favor of the issue 
of the first taker. Restatement, Property, Introductory Note, Special Note 3 
(I 948 Supp.). 
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only is conferred upon the first taker, with remainder in fee 
to the person or persons to whom the estate tail would pass 
according to the course of the common law.201 In still others, 
the first taker receives a fee tail, but when the estate reaches 
the issue of the first donee, the statute enlarges it into an 
absolute estate in fee simple.202 In some of the states where 
the fee tail is still recognized, the tenant is given by statute 
the power to convey a fee simple.203 
Contrary to their usual tendency to be conservative in 
matters of retroactive legislation, the courts have often been 
rather hasty in permitting the statutes to operate on existing 
fees tail. The courts have been so eager to promote reform 
that they have frequently dealt quite summarily with inter-
ests other than those of the tenant in tail.204 
201 E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. I947, sec. 50-405: "In cases when by common 
law any person may hereafter become seized in fee tail of any lands or tene-
ments, by virtue of any devise, gift, grant or other conveyance, such person, 
instead of being or becoming seized thereof in fee tail, shall be adjudged 
to be and become seized thereof for his natural life only, and the remainder 
shall pass in fee simple absolute to the person to whom the estate tail would 
first pass according to the course of the common law by virtue of such devise, 
gift, grant or conveyance." 
As of Jan. I, I952, states having this type of statute included Ark., Colo., 
Fla., Ill., Kan., Mo., and N. Mex. 2 Powell, Real Property, 11 I99· As to 
conveyances made prior to I934, New Jersey also belongs in this group; 
and Vermont as to conveyances prior to I94I. See note I99 supra for current 
New Jersey statute. 
202E.g., Page's Ohio Gen. Code I05I2-8: "All estates given in tail, by 
deed or will, in lands or tenements lying within this state, shall be and remain 
an absolute estate in fee simple to the issue of the first donee in tail . . ." 
Under such statute, children of the donee have, during the life of the donee, 
a mere possibility which they cannot convey. Dungan v. Kline, 8 I Ohio St. 
37I, 90 N. E. 938 (I9Io). 
As of Jan. I, I952> states in which estates in fee tail were preserved as 
such for a single lifetime only included Connecticut, Ohio and Rhode Island 
(wills only). 2 Powell, Real Property, 11 I98. 
203 E.g., Me. Rev. Stat. I944> p. zo66, sec. 10: "A person seized of land 
as tenant in tail may convey it in fee simple. . . . When land is owned 
by I person for life with a vested remainder in tail in another, they may by 
a joint deed convey the same in fee simple. Such conveyances bar the estate 
tail and all remainders and reversions expectant thereon." 
204 No case was found in which a tenant in tail resisted the effect of a 
statute. We can be reasonably sure, however, that he would not be permitted 
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(a) The Heirs of the Body of the Tenant in Tail. The 
heirs, who would have taken in the line of descent from the 
tenant had it not been for the statutory alteration of the law, 
have been unsuccessful in attacking the statutes on constitu-
tional grounds regardless of the form of the statute. Not 
a single case is to be found in which the interests of the heirs 
of the body are held to be protected from the operation of 
statutes upon estates created before their enactment. Now, 
it is granted that public policy may sufficiently justify this 
result. An early Federal Court in answer to the contention 
of an heir that the statute deprived him of constitutional 
and natural rights replied: 
"The persons to be affected by this act who resided in the 
state, and were citizens of it, might derive more benefit from 
their share of the public property occasioned by the remedy 
against so great an evil, than loss by being deprived of a 
particular estate derived from so obnoxious a source." 
"In a state of society properly regulated it must frequently 
happen that private and public interests in some degree inter-
fere with each other. . . . Yet, clear as this principle is, 
and necessary as in many cases it is that it should be enforced, 
many, from injudicious notions of liberty, speak of the rights 
of each individual as if he subsisted in a state of nature 
unconnected with any other mortal in the universe, and 
deriving no benefits from a well-constituted society, which 
to question, even if he were inclined to, the validity of a statute which elevates 
his estate to a fee simple or which enables him to convey a fee. See Pollock 
v. Speidel, 2 7 Ohio St. 8 6 ( 18 7 5) ; Gilpin v. Williams, 2 5 Ohio St. 2 8 3 
( 1874). No one is likely to complain if his estate were to be made more 
valuable. 
It is equally apparent that those statutes which reduce the estate of the 
first taker to a life estate or to a nonbarrable fee tail during his lifetime 
cannot be applied to existing estates against the wishes of the tenant. One 
of the characteristics of the fee tail estate is the power of the tenant to 
convert his estate into a fee simple. To take this power from the tenant 
and leave him with a life estate, or what amounts to little more than a 
life estate, would surely be to deprive him of property without due process. 
As to the mode in which the tenant can exercise his power to convert his 
interest into a fee simple, see infra note 2 13. 
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are more than an ample compensation for any accidental 
sacrifice which the public interest may occasionally require 
of a subordinate private advantage to a superior public 
good." 205 
However, the courts have not generally based their conclu-
sion upon public policy but upon the ground that during 
the lifetime of the tenant, his issue, who will be the heirs 
of his body if they survive him, have no interest in the 
premises except the mere possibility of acquiring property 
by descent, as heirs of the body, for the maxim is unemo est 
haeres viventis." 206 It is said that before descent casts, the 
legislature has the power, at all times, to change the course 
of the inheritance, and deprive the issue of the capability 
of inheriting.207 
205 Minge v. Gilmour, 17 Fed. Cas. 440, 445, No. 9,631 (C. C. D. N. C. 
1798). 
206 Pollock v. Speidel, 27 Ohio St. 86 (1875). In 1807 the lands in 
question were conveyed to John Pollock, Jr., and the heirs of his body. 
On Dec. 17, I8II, an act (Laws I8II, c. iv) was passed which provided 
that "All estates given in tail shall be and remain an absolute estate in fee 
simple to the issue of the first donee in tail." (Now, Page's Ohio Gen. Code 
10512-8.) In 1836, James, a son of John, conveyed the premises by warranty 
deed to H. from whom defendant claimed. Plaintiffs were the issue and heirs 
of James. It was contended that the act of 181I did not apply to this 
estate tail, and that consequently James could not by his conveyance deprive 
plaintiffs of their interest in the land. Held for defendant. 
207 De Mill v. Lockwood, 7 Fed. Cas. 453, No. 3,782 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 
1 8 53). The legislation here was in the form of a special resolution of a 
legislature which authorized the sale of entailed lands. The resolution 
declared the estate to be a fee simple. 
Jensen v. Jensen, 54 Wyo. 224, 89 P. 2d 1085 (1939). This was a suit 
under a declaratory judgment act for construction of a deed. In 1892 
the grantors executed the deed to Mrs. Murray and the heirs of her body. 
The plaintiffs were the heirs of Mrs. Murray and the present tenants in tail. 
The defendant was the son of one of the plaintiffs. The trial court held 
that the effect of the deed was to create in the grantees a fee tail; that 
defendant would be entitled to the use of the land during his lifetime; that 
the plaintiffs could not bar the entail except by compliance with Wyo. 
Rev. Stat. 1931, sees. 89-3922 to 89-3930, which authorized tenants in tail 
to maintain an action to secure the sale of an estate in fee-simple absolute, 
provided that the court should be satisfied that the sale would cause "no 
substantial injury to the heirs in tail." This statute directed that the proceeds 
of such sale be substituted for the land sold and be subject to the same con-
ditions originally made relative to the land so sold. After the case had been 
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"Naked possibilities or mere expectancies of this character 
are not property in the ordinary sense. They cannot be dis-
posed of by will or deed and are not subject to attachment. 
They are therefore not property, and are not regarded as 
vested rights beyond legislative control." 208 
It is apparent that these courts regarded the entailment 
only as a restriction of the inheritance to lineal heirs, that is, 
that the persons who take as heirs of the body at the death of 
the tenant take only in the manner of heirs and not in any 
way as purchasers under the original grant or devise. This 
would seem not to accord with the historical concept of the 
nature of the fee tail estate. According to the English 
authorities the heir of the tenant takes not by descent but as 
appealed, the legislature passed a statute, Session Laws, I939, c. 92, sec. I, 
which provided that all estates given in tail shall be and remain absolute 
estates in fee simple to the issue of the first donee in tail. Held: Plaintiffs 
were now the owners of a fee simple. The defendant had no vested rights in 
the land. Laws I939, c. 92, sec. I, has since been repealed. The present 
statute provides that language formerly appropriate to create a fee tail 
shall create a fee simple. Wyo. Laws I949, c. 93; Wyo. Comp. Stat. 
I945, sec. 66-I37 (I95I Supp.) 
In Minge v. Gilmour, I Hay 279 (N. C. I796), the statute (Acts I784, 
c. 22, sec. 5) declared that all conveyances in fee simple made in good faith 
by any tenant in tail, in actual possession, shall be effective to bar the 
entailment. The particular tenant in tail had sold the land in I 779 with 
warranty to Gilmour. Minge claimed as heir of the tenant in tail. It was held 
that the plaintiff was bound by the Act of r 7 84, and also by the warranty 
of his ancestor, inasmuch as assets of greater value than the land conveyed 
to Gilmour were devised by the tenant to the plaintiff. 
208 Comstock v. Gay, 51 Conn. 45, 62 (r883). The tenant in tail, believing 
he had a fee simple, sold the land with covenants of seizin and warranty. 
In Comstock v. Comstock, 23 Conn. 349 (I854) it was held he was a 
tenant in tail and could convey only a life estate. Thereafter the legislature 
passed a special act validating and confirming the deeds and making good 
the title in the grantees in fee simple, upon the condition that the tenant hold 
the proceeds in trust for those who might take under the will creating the 
tenancy. After the tenant died his heir sought to recover the land from the 
grantees of his father. Held: He could not recover. 
The provision for holding the funds, which assured the heir of receiving 
his estate in commuted form, was not a controlling factor; in fact it was not 
even considered by the court. General statutes do not usually require the 
tenant to hold the funds for the heirs. See the Maine statute supra note 203. 
An exception was the prior Wyoming statute, Wyo. Rev. Stat. I931, sees. 
89-3922 to 89-3930, supra note 207. 
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a substituted purchaser from the original donor, per formam 
doni, although, of course, he takes because he is heir of the 
body.209 It was the consequence of this principle that in 
England, the heir was held not to be bound by contracts in 
regard to the property made by a previous tenant/10 whereas 
the heir would be bound if he took by descent. The prin-
ciple also had the consequence in England that the tenant 
was incapable of alienating any greater indefeasible interest 
in the land than an estate per autre vie unless he had first 
destroyed the entailment by fine or common recovery.211 
Furthermore, statutory changes of the common-law rules of 
descent have been held by a number of American courts not 
to apply to the fee tail estate on the ground that this estate 
does not pass by descent.212 
However, the decisions to the effect that the heirs of the 
tenant in tail have no interest in the land prior to the death 
of the tenant except a possibility of inheriting, may be 
rationalized upon the ground that the tenant always has 
the power to defeat the entailment or to bar the heirs.213 
209 1 Cruise, Digest, Tit. 2, c. 2, sec. 19 (3d Am. ed. 1827). 
210 Cruise, op. cit. 
211 Cruise, op. cit., Tit. 2, c. 2, sec. 1. 
212 Davis v. Hayden, 9 Mass. 514 (1813); Corbin v. Healy, 20 Pick. 
514 (Mass. 1838); Sauder's Lessee v. Morningstar, 1 Yeates 313 (Pa. 1793); 
Guthrie's Appeal, 3 7 Pa. 9 ( 186o). 
213 A fee tail which could never be barred would doubtless be void as a 
perpetuity. The whole history of the fee tail estate is to the effect that there 
can be no such thing as an unbarrable fee tail. 2 Simes, Future Interests, sec. 
480 (1936); Orndoff v. Turman, 2 Leigh. 200 (Va. 1830). There has been, 
however, a diversity of opinion in this country as to 'the mode in which 
the tenant can exercise his power. In at least one state it has been held that 
an inherent characteristic of the fee tail is the power of the tenant to convert 
his estate into a fee simple by conveyance. Ewing v. Nesbitt, 88 Kan. 
708, 129 Pac. 1131 (1913). In other states the courts have stated that in 
the absence of statute a conveyance by a tenant in tail is ineffective to bar 
the issue or bar the remainder expectant on the estate in tail and that his 
deed confers only a life estate per autre vie or a voidable base fee on the 
grantee. Comstock v. Comstock, 2 3 Conn. 349 ( 18 54) ; Soule v. Soule, 
5 Mass. 61 (1809); Giddings v. Smith, 15 Vt. 344 (1843); Gleeson's Heirs 
v. Scott, 3 Hen. & M. 278 (Va. 18o9). However, at an early date statutes 
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Consequently, the issue can expect to take only if the tenant 
has not disposed of the fee in his lifetime. The statutes, 
then, merely have the effect ( 1) of relieving the tenant 
(whether the first donee or the issue of the first donee) of 
having to take any steps on his own behalf to convert the 
fee tail into a fee simple, and ( 2) of removing the restric-
tions on the line of descent so that collateral heirs can take. 
Looked at from this point of view, the statutes do not add to 
the uncertainty of the interests of the heirs, and, in the case 
of the statutes which cut down the estate of the first taker 
to a life estate and give the fee to the next taker, the heirs 
of the body of the first tenant will be more certain to take 
than they would have been at common law. 
Of course, if the tenant had no power to defeat the inter-
ests of his heirs, their coming into possession of the land 
would be dependent solely on their outliving the tenant. 
Their right to succession would be as vested as the interest 
of the heirs of a life tenant who have a remainder after the 
life estate; and as we have seen it is generally agreed that 
were passed in several states authorizing tenants in tail to bar the entail 
by conveyance. I Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 46 (3d ed.). E.g., Me. Stats. 
1821, c. 36, sec. 4; Mass. Stats. 1791, c. 6o; N.C. Acts 1784, c. 22, sec. 5· 
Where there was no general statute, the legislatures appear to have enacted 
special acts as a matter of course to enable tenants in tail to alienate in fee 
simple. See Comstock v. Gay, 51 Conn. 45 (r883); Pollock v. Speidel, 
27 Ohio St. 86 (1875); Carroll v. Olmsted's Lessee, r6 Ohio 251 (r847); 
De Mill v. Lockwood, 7 Fed. Cas. 453, No. 3,782 (C. C. S.D. N.Y. 1853); 
Orndoff v. Turman, 2 Leigh. 200 (Va. I 8 3 o) . At one time fines and common 
recoveries were recognized as a mode of barring entails in several of the 
colonies and states, r Tiffany, op. cit., sec. 46. In Riggs v. Sally, 15 Me. 408 
(I 8 3 9) it was stated that the common recovery had been recognized in that 
jurisdiction and on this ground it was held that a statute which permitted 
the same result to be accomplished by a conveyance as by suffering a common 
recovery could be applied to existing estates. 
Restatement, Property, sec. 79 (1936): "A person who has an estate in 
fee tail has both the privilege and the power to create any interest in the 
land so held which could be created by a person having an estate in fee 
simple absolute therein, provided he makes an otherwise effective conveyance 
inter vivos which conforms to the special formalities prescribed for a dis-
entailing conveyance, by the law of the state wherein such land is located." 
(Copyright 1936. Printed with permission of the American Law Institute.) 
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the legislature cannot divest the interests of such remainder-
men, except in certain situations where the remaindermen 
are compensated for the loss of the interests in the land. In 
those jurisdictions in which the statute preserves the fee tail 
for the life of the first taker only, with the fee going to his 
issue, the tenant may lack the power to bar the entailment.214 
Where this is true, if a change were to be made to the type 
of statute under which a limitation formerly sufficient to 
create an estate tail creates a fee simple, the new statute 
probably could not be given retroactive effect so as to wipe 
out the interests of the issue. Also, in jurisdictions where 
under the present statute the donee takes a life estate only, 
with a remainder in his issue, the tenant of an existing estate 
probably could not be invested with the fee simple. Nor, 
probably, could he be given the power to convey the fee 
except under those conditions and circumstances where a 
statute authorizing the sale in fee of land in which there 
are future interests could be applied retroactively.215 
(b) The Reversioners and Remaindermen. The remain-
ing question is whether reversions and remainders expectant 
214 Restatement, Property, sec. 89 ( 1936): "A person who has an estate in 
fee tail preserved as such for a single lifetime only, has both the privilege and 
the power to create any interest in the land so held which could be created 
by a person having an estate in fee simple absolute therein, except that the 
interest so created may be defeated, upon the death of the conveyor, by the 
persons entitled after such conveyor, under the form of the limitation which 
created the estate in fee tail." A special note immediately following the 
quoted section states: "This Section states the law applied in both Connecticut 
and Ohio, but the exception is contra to the rule existing in Rhode Island 
as to estates in fee tail created by wills. In Rhode Island the first donee in 
tail has the full power to make a disentailing conveyance (see sec. 7 9) . 
Only when a disentailing conveyance is not made, does the estate become an 
estate in fee simple absolute in the issue of the first donee in tail. The rule 
stated in this Section is preferable because, if the entailment can last not 
more than a single lifetime, there is no sufficient reason for permitting a 
disentailing conveyance, during that single lifetime. So to permit it 
frustrates the desires of the creator of the interest." (Copyright 1936. 
Reprinted with permission of the American Law Institute.) 
215Willhite v. Rathburn, 332 Mo. uo8, 61 S. W. zd 708 (1933), supra 
note 89. 
220 RETROACTIVE LAND LEGISLATION 
on fees tail can be cut off by retroactive legislation. A 
remainder after a fee tail is vested if the remainderman is 
an ascertained person who is ready to come into possession 
whenever and however the particular estate terminates. The 
uncertainty, and even the improbability, that the remainder-
man will in fact ever enjoy the estate in possession does not 
make his interest contingent in the real property sense.216 
However, reversions and remainders after fees tail are not 
necessarily vested interests in the constitutional sense. Their 
vulnerability to defeasance would appear to be the deciding 
factor. The writer does not mean that the legislature can 
abolish an interest simply because it is subject to defeasance 
at the hands of the parties. But if the interest is subject to 
defeasance, and in addition there is a strong policy against 
the particular form of land tenure, the power of the legisla-
ture to abolish the interest will almost certainly be vindicated 
by the courts. 
Cases in point are infrequenL However, in a few decisions 
there is dictum, or statements without authority cited or 
reasons given, that reversions and remainders after fees tail 
can be destroyed by the legislature.217 In Gilpin v. Williams 
et al.218 the interest of the donor was described as a mere 
possibility of reverter, which the court intimated could be 
cut off. However, no express ruling in this respect was made 
because none was required by the facts of the case. In Moore 
216 "What is a vested remainder?" is a matter of definition, in the making 
of which economic realities do not necessarily play a role. 
Gray's classic definition of a vested remainder is that it is "a future estate 
which takes effect as a present estate immediately upon the expiration of the 
preceding estate or estates as originally limited, and is ready at every moment 
during its continuance to come into possession whenever and however the 
preceding estates determine. That is to say, a vested remainder is a future 
estate that is subject to no condition precedent except the termination of the 
preceding estate." Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, sec. 970 (4th ed. 
Roland Gray, 1942). 
217 Carter v. Tyler and Others, 1 Call. 165 (Va. 1797); Orndoff v. Turman, 
2 Leigh. 200 (Va. 183o). 
218 2 5 Ohio St. 2 8 3 ( 1 8 74) . 
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v. Bradley 219 the tenant in tail had conveyed in fee simple 
and had died without issue before the effective date of a 
statute which provided that a conveyance by a tenant in tail 
will be effective to bar the entailment.220 The remainderman 
made an entry before the passage of the act but at the time 
of the enactment the grantee was in actual possession. It 
was held without discussion that the case came within the 
words and spirit of the act and so judgment was given against 
the remainderman in his action in ejectment. 
On the other hand, where the tenant has no power to bar 
the entailment (as may be the case in jurisdictions having 
a statutory type of fee tail which is to exist for a single life-
time only, or as most probably would be the case in juris-
dictions where under the statute the first taker gets only a 
life estate), it is probable that the legislature could not raise 
the tenant's estate to a fee simple nor authorize him to con-
vey a fee except on the conditions and under the limitations 
applicable to the sales of land in which there are remainder 
interests. In Green v. Edwards 221 the court had before it 
a testamentary trust, under the terms of which the bene-
ficiaries took equitable fees tail.222 One of the beneficiaries 
219 3 N.C. 142 (r8or). 
220 N. C. Acts r 7 84, c. 22, sec. 5: "All Sales and Conveyances made bona 
fide, and for valuable Consideration since the first Day of January, in the 
Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-seven, by any 
Tenant in Tail in actual Possession of any real Estate where such Estate hath 
been conveyed in Fee-Simple, shall be good and effectual in Law to bar any 
Tenant or Tenants in Tail, and Tenants in Remainder of and from all Claim 
and Claims, Action and Actions, and Right of Entry whatsoever, of, in and 
to such entailed Estate, against any Purchaser, his Heirs or Assigns, now in 
actual Possession of such Estate, in the same Manner as if such Tenant in 
Tail had possessed the same in Fee-Simple." 
The Act was held in Den ex dem. Lane v. Davis, 2 N. C. 277 (I796) to 
be applicable to tenancies in tail in existence. This case is also without 
opinion. 
221 3 I R. I. I' 77 Atl. I 8 8 (I 9 I 0) 0 
222 The trustees were to pay the income for life to the three children 
of the testator and upon the death of any child to convey such portion to 
his or her lineal descendants in fee simple. If there were no lineal descendants, 
then the trustees were to convey equally to the survivors of the children of 
222 RETROACTIVE LAND LEGISLATION 
executed a deed which purported to convey in fee simple all 
of her interest in the trust property to the complainant. The 
deed stated the grantor's intention to bar the entail, as pro-
vided by a statute, which permitted the barring of equitable 
estates tail and the remainders and reversions expectant 
thereon.223 The complainant sought to compel the trustees 
to convey to him the legal title of his share of the trust estate 
acquired under the conveyance. The court ruled that inas-
much as the doctrine of barring an equitable estate tail had 
never been followed in that state, the reversions or remain-
ders expectant upon the estate in question were vested in the 
constitutional sense and that legislation which attempted to 
cut them off was an unconstitutional exercise of the legislative 
power in violation of the state constitution and of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
It is to be observed that statutes which convert existing 
fees tail into fee-simple estates may indirectly destroy 
remainders limited after the fees tail. A remainder after a 
fee tail is not at common law within the rule against per-
petuities, however remote it may be.224 However, after 
the statute has raised the fee tail to a fee simple, a remainder 
after the fee tail can then be given effect only as an executory 
the testator or their lineal descendants, and in case of the decease of all of the 
children of the testator without issue, to his heirs at law. It was held in 
Paine v. Sackett, 27 R. I. 305, 6r Atl. 753 (r9o5) that the rule in 
Shelley's Case operated to give the beneficiaries equitable fees tail. 
223 R. I. Laws 1906, c. 1346, sec. r6: "Equitable estates-tail in possession 
or remainder, and all remainders and reversions expectant thereon, may be 
barred in the same manner as legal estates-tail and the remainders and 
reversions expectant thereon; and all conveyances of equitable estates-tail 
made since January 31st, 1896, by deed in common form in which the 
intention is expressed of barring the entail and reference is made to the 
specific land by metes and bounds or by other definite description, shall bar 
the estate-tail and all remainders and reversions expectant thereon." 
224 Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, sec. 443 (4th ed., Roland Gray, 1942). 
See Kirk v. Furgerson, 6 Cold. 479 (Tenn. r869). The reason is because the 
future interest is barrable. 
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interest, which will be invalid if by any possibility it may not 
vest in possession within the period of the rule.225 
(c) Effect of Repeal of Statutes. A few words should 
be added in regard to the effect that repeal of the statute 
which modified or abolished fees tail would have upon estates 
tail in existence before the statute. This problem was before 
the court in James v. Dubois.226 In q68 Robert James con-
veyed the premises in question to his son, Robert II, and 
the heirs male of his body. In I 784 the legislature passed 
an act which provided that no entailment shall last longer 
than the life of the first donee.227 Robert II died in I 8oo 
and Robert III entered into possession. In I 820 the legisla-
ture repealed the Act of q84. Thereafter, in I 833, Robert 
III conveyed the premises to one James Cook for valuable 
consideration. Robert III died in I 834. Robert IV, claim-
ing the premises as tenant in tail under the deed of his great-
grandfather, brought an action in ejectment against the 
defendant who claimed under a conveyance from James 
Cook. The court held that the effect of the Act of I 784 was 
to end the entailment immediately on the death of Robert II, 
but that the statute did not confer any estate on Robert III; 
he took whatever interest he had under the conditions of 
the deed of his grandfather. The court then reasoned that, 
since the Act of q84 operated only provisionally to raise 
the interest of Robert III to a fee, when the statute was 
225Hertz v. Abrahams, 110 Ga. 707,36 S. E. 409 (1900). 
At common law a gift over on failure of issue was formerly construed to 
create a fee tail in favor of the first donee. It has been considered that by 
reason of a statute changing an estate in fee tail into an estate in fee simple, 
the common law construction is inadmissible, since it would make the gift 
over invalid as too remote. Also, the fact that an estate tail cannot by reason 
of the statute be created, has been viewed as a reason for regarding the 
failure of issue intended as definite and not indefinite. 1 Tiffany, Real Property, 
sec. 44 (3d ed.). 
22616 N.]. L. z&s (Sup. Ct. 1837). 
227 N.J. Acts 1784, Paton's Rev. 53· 
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repealed he had to look to the deed to ascertain the nature 
and quantity of his estate, and by the terms of that deed he 
was a tenant in tail. 
The defendant, who claimed under the conveyance from 
Cook, should have had, according to this line of reasoning, 
no valid claim to the property as against the plaintiff. How-
ever, the court quite unexpectedly concluded that estates 
tail were so odious that it was best to consider them as having 
been done away with once and for all by the Act of 1784. 
Therefore judgment was entered for the defendant. Most 
courts as a matter of policy would arrive at the same con-
clusion. 
I 5. Statutes Which Authorize the Revocation of Grants 
of Future Interests 
North Carolina enacted in I 893 a statute which provided: 
"That the grantor in any voluntary conveyance in which 
some future interest in real estate is conveyed or limited to 
a person not in esse, may at any time before they come into 
being revoke by deed such interest so conveyed or lim-
ited." 228 
It was held in two cases that the Act of I 893 could have no 
application to deeds made prior to enactment as the rights 
conferred under the deeds were fixed when the deeds were 
registered.229 The Supreme Court of North Carolina sub-
sequently withdrew from its earlier position that the future 
interests of unborn persons are vested rights. In Stanback v. 
228Public Laws of N.C. 1893, c. 498; now as amended, N.C. Gen. Stat. 
1950, sec. 39-6. 
229 Roe v. Journegan, 175 N. C. 2.61, 95 S. E. 495 (1918); Roe v. 
Journigan, 181 N.C. 180, 106 S. E. 68o (192.1). 
A grantor cannot generally derogate from his own inter vivos grant. Lillard 
v. Lillard, 63 Ohio App. 403, z6 N. E. zd 933 (1939); Reed v. Barkley, 
12.3 Misc. 635, 2.05 N.Y. S. 8o3 (1924). 
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Citizens National Bank 230 the maker of a trust sought to 
revoke the trust under the authority of an amendment of 
I 929/31 which extended the provisions of the Act of I 893 
to trusts in real or personal property. The trust had been 
created voluntarily without value in 1927. By the terms of 
the trust, it was to terminate when the cestui que trust 
reached the age of fifty or at his death if he did not reach 
that age. When the trust came to an end the whole interest 
therein was to vest in the cestui if living, but if he died under 
the age of fifty years the trust property should go to his 
issue, if any, per stirpes, and if there were no issue then to 
his next of kin. The maker and the cestui both were agreed 
upon the revocation, but the trustee doubted that the con-
tingent interests could be extinguished. It was held that all 
the future contingent interests in the issue and next of kin 
of the cestui were wiped out. 
"The term 'vested rights' relates to property rights, and 'a 
mere expectancy of future benefit, or a contingent interest 
in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing 
laws does not constitute a vested right. Contingent rights 
arising prior to the enactment of a statute, and inchoate rights 
which have not been acted on are subject to legislative 
control.' " 232 
In a subsequent case the court remarked: 
"Mere expectancies of future contingent interests provided 
for persons not in esse do not constitute vested rights such 
as would deprive the Legislature of the power to enact the 
statute authorizing revocation of a voluntary grant." 233 
230197 N.C. 292, 148 S. E. 313 (1929). Accord, MacMillan v. Branch 
Banking and Trust Co., 221 N.C. 352, 20 S. E. 2d 276 (1942). 
231 N.C. Sess. Laws 1929, c. 305. 
If the settlor has not reserved a power of revocation, he cannot revoke 
the trust unless the power of revocation was omitted by mistake, except with 
the consent of the beneficiaries. 3 Scott, Trusts, sec. 330. The same principles 
are applicable to the modification of a trust. Scott, op. cit., sec. 331. 
232 197 N.C. 292, 296, 148 S. E. 313, 315 (1929). 
233 MacMillan v. Branch Banking and Trust Co., 221 N.C. 352, 355, 20 
S. E. 2d 276, 277 (1946). 
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The legislature of North Carolina subsequently added 
some significant provisions to the statute as amended in I 929. 
With the appearance of federal estate and gift taxes, the 
statute proved to be more detrimental than beneficial. There 
was a great deal of uncertainty in regard to the incidence of 
taxes on trusts in which some future interest was limited 
to a person not in esse and even considerable doubt whether 
the settlor could by any act make a trust irrevocable within 
the contemplation of the federal statutes. To remedy this 
situation the legislature in I 943 added several provisions,234 
the purport of which is that the future interest cannot be 
revoked when the instrument creating the interest expressly 
states that the grantor or trustor cannot revoke such interest. 
In the case of instruments already executed, the grantor or 
trustor was given six months after the effective date of the 
amendment to revoke such future interests, or to file with 
the trustee an 'instrument stating or declaring that it is his 
intention to retain the power to revoke. To have made this 
amendment prospective only, would, in a large measure, 
have defeated its purpose. The amendment was designed 
primarily to remove the uncertainty attending existing trusts. 
In Pinkham v. Unborn Children 235 it was argued that the 
legislature could not take away a grantor's "right" to revoke 
the grant of interests to unborn persons. The court was 
unable to formulate a definition of "vested rights." ·The 
conclusion was that the grantor had merely a personal power 
234 N.C. Sess. Laws 1943, c. 437: "Provided, further, that this section shall 
not apply to any instrument hereafter executed creating such a future 
contingent interest when said instrument shall expressly state in effect that the 
grantor, maker, or trustor may not revoke such interest: Provided, further, 
that this section shall not apply to any instrument heretofore executed whether 
or not such instrument contains express provision that it is irrevocable unless 
the grantor, maker, or trustor shall within six months after the effective date 
of this proviso either revoke such future interest, or file with the trustee an 
instrument stating or declaring that it is his intention to retain the power 
to revoke under this section: . . ." 
235 227 N. C. 72, 40 S. E. 2d 69o ( 1946). 
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or privilege, solely created by statute and reflecting the 
existing public policy, and that this privilege was subject to 
change or withdrawal at the pleasure of the legislature at 
any time before its exercise and before the happening of the 
contingency. 
I 6. Statutes of Limitations and Marketable Title Statutes 
Ordinarily, until a future interest has become possessory 
the period of adverse possession does not begin to run against 
it.236 This is because generally the owner of a future interest 
has no right of action against which the statute of limitations 
can operate. But some statutes of limitations purport, at the 
expiration of the specified period, to confer title upon the 
adverse claimant.237 If this form of language is given literal 
e:ffect,238 serious constitutional questions may be raised when 
the statute is applied retroactively. Admittedly, the immu-
nity of future interests from the operation of the usual stat-
ute of limitations is an impediment to the marketability of 
land. Sometimes a very long period must pass before the 
adverse possessor finally gets title. But it is improbable that 
enhancement of marketability would be accepted by the 
courts as a sufficient reason for obliterating a future interest, 
unless it were an interest very unlikely to vest in possession. 
An indefeasibly vested remainder or reversion could surely 
not be wiped out.239 There would even be question whether 
236 Simes, Future Interests, sec. 776 ( 1936). 
237 Supra Chapter 3, note 54; 2 Restatement, Property, sec. 220, Comment c, 
and Special Note (1948). 
An Illinois statute provides, for example: "Every person in the actual 
possession of lands or tenements, under claim and color of title, made in 
good faith, and who shall for seven successive years, continue in such 
possession, and shall also, during said time, pay all taxes legally assessed on 
such lands or tenements, shall be held and adjudged to be the legal owner 
of said lands or tenements, to the extent and according to the purport of 
his or her paper title." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, c. 83, sec. 6. 
238 For the most part such statutes are construed sooner or later not to 
bar future interests. See Dunlavy v. Lowrie, 372 Ill. 622, 25 N. E. 2d 
67 (1939); McDowell v. Beckham, 72 Wash. 244, 130 Pac. 350 (1913). 
239 In Webster v. Cooper, 14 How. 488 (U. S. 1852), a remainderman 
brought action to recover possession as soon as his interest became possessory. 
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contingent future interests in unborn or unascertained per-
sons could be summarily destroyed. As we have seen, the 
courts are generally reluctant to permit the extinguishment 
of any future interest where the owner does not receive com-
pensation or a substitute for the interest which he loses. 
In order for a statute of limitations which bars future 
interests to be capable of retroactive application without 
serious doubt of constitutionality, some provision must be 
made for allowing the owners of existing interests to pre-
serve their interests, and a reasonable period of time must 
be allotted for this purpose. Recordation as a method of 
preservation would be easy and inexpensive and in keeping 
with the policy of the recording statutes.240 In the case of 
future interests in unascertained or unborn persons, some 
difficulty might yet be experienced because such persons 
(when born or ascertained) would not have had a real 
opportunity to protect their interests. Perhaps these instances 
could be passed off as an occasional sacrifice that must be 
made for social progress. The statute would be on safer 
ground if provision were made for recordation on behalf of 
persons who cannot record for themselves.241 
Another method of preserving existing interests would be 
by bringing action. The obvious objection to this method is 
While his action was pending the following statute was passed. "No real 
or mixed action for the recovery of any lands . . . shall be commenced or 
maintained against any person in possession of such lands, where such person 
or those under whom he claims, have been in actual possession for more than 
forty years, and claiming to hold the same in his or their own right, and which 
possession shall have been adverse, open, peaceable, notorious, and exclusive." 
Me. P. L. 1848, c. 8 7. If the statute had been given retroactive effect, plain-
tiff's cause of action would have been extinguished. 
240 See supra Chapter 3, p. 7 3 et seq. 
241 The Michigan Marketable Title Statute, for example, provides that 
"Such notice may be filed for record by the claimant or by any other person 
acting on behalf of any claimant who is: (a) Under a disability, (b) Unable 
to assert a claim on his own behalf, (c) One of a class whose identitv 
cannot be established or is uncertain at the time of filing such notice of clai~ 
for record." Mich. Comp. Laws 1948, sec. 565.103. 
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that the owner of a future interest may have no right of 
action against the possessor. If there is no available action, 
the owner of the future interest would be given only an 
illusory remedy. He would have reason to complain of 
deprivation of property without due process. Of course, a 
cause of action could be created for the purpose. The owner 
of the future interest, for example, might be permitted to 
maintain a suit to quiet title.242 As a mode of preserving a 
future interest this would be considerably more expensive 
than recordation and might be objectionable on that account. 
Decisions in Kansas 243 and Pennsylvania 244 indicate that in 
some jurisdictions it may be held unconstitutional for the 
legislature to create a new cause of action and force the owner 
of an interest to pursue this cause of action if he does not 
wish to lose his interest. 
The same constitutional problems which arise from the 
retroactive application of statutes of limitations to existing 
future interests also arise when the marketable title statutes, 
242 An Iowa statute authorizes the owner of a future interest to bring an 
action to quiet title. Iowa Code 1950, sec. 649.1. It has been held under 
this statute that the period of adverse possession runs against future interests, 
since the statute affords owners of future interests a present remedy to contest 
the right of the adverse possessor. Ward v. Meredith, 186 Iowa IIo8, 173 
N. W. ~46 (1919). 
243 Murrison v. Fenstermacher, 166 Kan. 568, ~03 P. ~d 160 (1949), 
supra Chapter 3, p. 84. , 
244 Girard Trust Co. v. Pa. R. Co., 71 Pa. D. & C. 553 (C. P. 5 Phila.), 
aff'd 364 Pa. 576, 73 A. zd 371 (1950). The statute provided inter alia 
that in case of money paid or to be charged against land under any ground 
rent where a period of fifty years has elapsed and no proceeding or action 
has been instituted within this period for payment or collection of such 
ground rent, then there shall be a conclusive presumption of payment, release, 
or satisfaction thereof, and that no such ground rent shall be enforceable 
unless within one year after effective date of this act a proceeding to enforce 
payment, or to preserve, revive, or continue such charge shall be instituted. 
Act of May 23, 1949, P. L. 169~, Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 68, sec. 451 
(Supp. 1949). It was held that the act could not apply to an existing 
ground rent because this would allow the legislature to so affect the remedy 
as "substantially to impair and lessen the value of the contract." The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared the statute to be so conflicting and 
irreconcilable in its various provisions and so unsusceptible of rational inter-
pretation as a whole as to be incapable of judicial enforcement. 
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discussed in Chapter 3,245 are applied to existing future 
interests. But as pointed out, the present marketable title 
statutes are drafted so that the instances will be infrequent 
where valid interests are subject to extinction. Quite gen-
erally speaking, the present statutes operate in favor of per-
sons in possession who can show a chain of title back a rather 
large number of years. Where a person has both possession 
and a record title for the specified period, the probabilities 
are remote that there are any outstanding ancient future 
interests which are still valid. As a means of preserving 
such valid ancient future interests as there may be, most of 
the existing marketable title statutes have provided for 
recordation within a specified time although one statute does 
provide for the bringing of an action.246 In Lane v. Travelers 
Insurance Co./47 the Iowa Supreme Court apparently 
245 Supra Chapter 3, p. 8o et seq. 
246 Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. I933, sec. 2-63 7 (Supp. I95I). 
247 230 Iowa 973, 299 N. W. 553 (I94I). The statute provided: "No 
action based upon any claim arising or existing prior to January I, I92o, 
shall be maintained . • . in any court to recover any real estate . . . or 
to recover or establish any interest therein or claim thereto . . . against the 
holder of the record title . . . in possession, when such holder of the 
record title and his grantors • . . are shown by the record to have 
held chain of title •.. since January I, I92o, unless such claimant, by 
himself, or by his attorney or agent, or if he be a minor or under legal 
disability, by his guardian, trustee, or either parent shall within one year from 
and after July 4, I9 3 I, file in the office of the recorder of deeds • • . a 
statement in writing . • . definitely describing the real estate involved, 
the nature and extent of the right or interest claimed, and stating the facts 
upon which the same is based . . ." Iowa Code I935, sec. I Io24; now 
with different dates, Iowa Code 1950, sec. 6I4.I7, amended Acts I95I, c. 
209, sec. 3· The testator, who died in I 895, devised his farm to his son 
Patrick Lane for life with remainder to the heirs of the son. Patrick 
mortgaged the land in I9o6. In I9IO the mortgage was foreclosed and the 
land was sold to one Kinney, who in I9 I 3 conveyed to Patrick's wife in fee 
simple. Thus Mrs. Lane held record title as of I9I3. In I923 she instituted 
an action to quiet title and a decree was entered in her favor. In I926 Mr. 
and Mrs. Lane mortgaged the land to the defendant insurance company, 
which later foreclosed and claimed full title. After July 4, 1932 (the 
final date for recording under the above statute), the remaindermen brought 
an action to establish their interests in the land. Two of the remaindermen 
were minors, born before I92o. The interests of the adult remaindermen were 
held to be barred by the running of the statute of limitations on the right to 
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assumed the constitutionality of the recordation require-
ment. Contingent remainders were held to have been barred 
"by the plain provisions" of the statute because no preserv-
ing statement had ever been recorded. Unfortunately, the 
constitutional question was not raised or argued. 
II. PowERS oF APPOINTMENT 
A discussion of future interests would not be complete 
without mention of powers of appointment, even though 
most powers are strictly present interests. By their exercise, 
future interests may be created. The instrument which 
creates the power of appointment may also create future 
interests which will be affected by the exercise of the power. 
In some jurisdictions the law of powers of appointment 
has been materially modified by statute.248 Conclusions as 
to what would be the result if a statute were to be applied 
in case of existing powers of appointment can be only a 
matter of conjecture in view of the paucity of authority. 
For constitutional purposes, the courts would undoubtedly 
treat a general power of appointment as virtually tantamount 
to ownership of the property which is subject to the power, 
since the donee can appoint in favor of himself, or, if the 
power is limited to an appointment by will, he can appoint 
in favor of his estate or his creditors.249 Beyond this, I do 
set aside the decree of I 9 2 3 quieting title in Mrs. Lane. The interests of the 
minor remaindermen were held to be extinguished under the statute quoted 
above, for whether the rights of these remaindermen were deemed to have 
arisen at the time of their grandfather's death or at the time of their births, 
the interests had certainly arisen prior to Jan. I, I92o. The defendant, in 
the opinion of the court, had filled all the requirements of the statute. 
248 I Simes, Future Interests, sec. 292 ( I936); Restatement, Property, sec. 
320, Comment e and Special note (I948 Supp.); 3 Powell, Real Property, 
1111 386, 390· 
249 Statutes may be found, notably statutes in aid of creditors, which treat 
property subject to a general power as part of the donee's assets, even when 
the power is unexecuted. The Federal Bankruptcy Act provides: "The trustee 
of the estate of a bankrupt . . . shall . . . be vested by operation of 
law with the title of the bankrupt • . . powers which he might have exer-
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not believe any general statement can be made concerning 
the extent to which the power of the donee would be con-
sidered a constitutionally protected interest. Possibly not 
even a special power would be considered to be a mere 
privilege which the legislature can take away, especially if 
the power is created by contract.250 Quite certainly, the legis-
lature would not be permitted to take away the power if it 
is of demonstrable value to the donee or if it is connected 
with some other interest the donee has in the subject matter 
of the power. 
With some degree of assurance, it may be stated that until 
an appointment is made, the prospective appointees would 
be deemed by most courts to have only a mere possibility of 
acquiring property in case the donee chooses to exercise his 
power and elects to appoint in their favor. It was held in 
Thomson's Ex'rs v. Norris,251 where the donee was given 
the power to appoint among the testator's sisters and their 
children, that the legislature could probably validate a com-
promise whereby the donee, in consideration of a share in 
the estate outright, agreed with the adult prospective 
appointees not to exercise the power. At any rate, in this 
case the compromise agreement so confirmed was held to 
be effective to cut off all interests of the minor prospective 
cised for his own benefit, but not those which he might have exercised soldy 
for some other person; ... " 11 U. S. C. A. sec. 1 Ioa. 
A Michigan statute provides: "When an absolute power of disposition, 
not accompanied by any trust, shall be given to the owner of a particular 
estate, for life or years, such estate shall be changed into a fee, absolute 
in respect to the rights of creditors and purchasers, but subject to any future 
estates limited thereon, in case the power should not be executed, or the 
lands should not be sold for the satisfaction of debts." Mich. Comp. Laws 
1948, sec. 556.9. See 3 Powell, Real Property, ~ 390 for a discussion and 
enumeration of statutes. 
For computation of federal estate taxes, the appointive assets in case of 
powers created subsequent to October 21, 1942, are to be included in the 
gross estate of the decedent whether the power is exercised or not. Int. Rev. 
Code, sec. 811 (f). 
250 See Shoenberger v. School Directors, 32 Pa. 34 (1858). 
25120 N.J. Eq. 489 (Err. and App. 1869). 
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appointees who did not consent to or participate in the com-
promise. 
The interest of the prospective appointees, especially 
where the power is general, has been compared to the expect-
ancy of an heir.252 However, where the power is in favor of 
a limited class of persons, and a duty is imposed upon the 
donee to exercise it, the prospective appointees do have an 
interest which may be more substantial than a mere expect-
ancy. In default of appointment, courts of equity will give 
the property to the members of the class in equal shares. 
Whether the prospective appointees would here be held to 
have a constitutionally protected interest, would be much 
influenced by the theory which the court adopted to explain 
the result reached by the equity courts. It is Professor Simes' 
theory (the constructive trust theory) that equity simply 
imposes a remedy in view of the impossibility of the bene-
ficiaries taking in the precise manner intended, to prevent 
the unjust enrichment of the donor's heirs or of other per-
sons into whose hands the property may have come.253 Pro-
fessor Gray, on the other hand, believed that the courts are 
merely enforcing an implied gift in default of appoint-
ment.254 The theory indicated by the Restatement of Trusts 
is that the donee is a trustee of the power and the power is 
252 I Simes, Future Interests, sec. 2 86 ( I93 6). 
However, where the power is special, courts of equity will set aside fraud-
ulent appointments at the instance of a prospective appointee, thus recognizing 
that the prospective appointee may have something more than a mere ex-
pectancy. Simes, op. cit., sec. 290. 
If the exercise of the power were treated as a mere event named in the 
original limitation, the interest of a prospective appointee would be very much 
like an executory interest or a contingent remainder. But the act of the donee 
is not treated by the cases like other events. It involves too much uncertainty. 
The courts avoid, as a rule, calling the expectancy of an appointee either 
a contingent remainder or an executory interest. Simes, op. cit., sec. z86. 
253 I Simes, Future Interests, sec. 287 ( I936). 
254 Gray, "Powers in Trusts and Gifts Implied in Default of Appointment," 
25 Harv. L. Rev. I (t9tt). 
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the subject matter of the trust.255 If Professor Simes' view 
is adopted, then it is somewhat difficult to see how the mem-
bers of the class can have much more than an expectancy 
before the appointment is made or the constructive trust 
enforced. Gray's view might suggest that the members of 
the class have some kind of present interest from the time 
the power is created, analogous, perhaps, to a contingent 
remainder or executory interest. The Restatement theory 
would also seem to presuppose a present interest in the mem-
bers of the class as beneficiaries of the trust. 
As a consequence of the federal estate tax legislation of 
I 942, making property over which a decedent has at the 
time of his death a power of .appointment includable in his 
gross estate/56 statutes have recently been enacted in many 
states permitting the release of powers of appointment.257 In 
order for such statutes to be fully effective for avoiding taxes, 
it is necessary that they be retroactive and most of them are. 
J:hey are probably constitutional, except perhaps insofar as 
they are applicable to powers in trust, but their constitu-
tionality has not yet been passed on. It appears that as a 
matter of common law all powers are releasable except 
powers in trust.258 
255 Restatement, Trusts, sees. 27, 4I4 (I936). This is also the view of 
Professors Bogert and Scott. I Bogert, Trusts, sec. II 6; I Scott, Trusts, 
sec. 27. 
256 Int. Rev. Code, sec. 8II (f) (Sec. 403a, Rev. Act of I942). The 
law was changed again in I951, 65 Stat. 91. As to powers created on or 
before Oct. 21, I942, the I951 amendment restores in general the law as it 
existed prior to I942. The impact of the law is now limited to general 
powers. 
257 3 Powell, Real Property,~ 394· 
258 I Simes, Future Interests, sec. 280 (I936); 3 Powell, Real Property, 
~ 393· Restatement, Property, sec. 334 ( I936) states: "All general powers 
[whether presently exercisable or exercisable only by will] can be released by 
the donee." Restatement, Property, sec. 335 (I948 Supp.) states "All special 
powers can be released by the donee unless the donor in creating the power 
manifests an intent that it shall be non-releasable." (Copyright I 948. Printed 
with permission of the American Law Institute.) 
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There is no authority at all as to how far the interests 
of the takers in default before the exercise of the power are 
constitutionally protected. Categorical statements are haz-
ardous because the substantiality of the interests of the takers 
in default must depend upon the wording of the instrument, 
upon whether the power is general or special, and upon other 
factors. However, in view of the fact that the gift in default 
is in the nature of a remainder and the takers in default pur-
chasers under the donor's will or deed/59 it is safe to say the 
courts are not likely to permit the legislative extinction of 
the interests of the takers in default unless the statute merely 
accomplishes what the donee could and would have done 
had there been no statute. 
Where property has been devised to one for life and after 
his death to such person as he shall appoint by will and no 
provision is made in the donor's will for takers in default of 
appointment, the reversion (a technically vested interest) 
descends to the heirs of the testator subject to complete 
divestment by the exercise of the power. The heirs, however, 
have no such certain interest in the property as to prevent 
the application of a statute enacted after the testator's death 
but before that of the life tenant, under which the will of 
the life tenant is effective to exercise the power, although 
the will would not have been effective to do so at the time 
of the execution.260 
259 A remainder in default of appointment is vested in the absence of 
language which would make it contingent; that is, the fact that a remainder 
is subject to a power does not prevent its being vested. 1 Simes, Future 
Interests, sec. 8o (1936). 
26°Aubert's Appeal, 109 Pa. 447, 1 Atl. 336 (1885). 
But it was held in an older Pennsylvania case that a life tenant donee of a 
special testamentary power could not be allowed to convey the fee inter vivos 
under the purported authority of a retroactive statute, where the reversioners 
were opposed. Shoenberger v. School Directors, 32 Pa. 34 (1858) supra 
note 100. 
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III. PossiBILITIEs oF REvERTER AND PowERS oF 
TERMINATION 
Several articles in recent years have pointed out the grave 
danger to security of titles arising from grantors' conveying 
the fee to land subject to conditions or limitations so that 
upon breach of the condition or happening of the event, the 
title either reverts automatically to the grantor, or the 
grantor has the power by taking the proper steps to cause 
a forfeiture of title.261 The in terrorem aspect of powers of 
termination and of possibilities of reverter has, perhaps, been 
exaggerated. It is unlikely that present day courts will 
enforce forfeiture or termination if enforcement will cause 
a loss to the grantee out of all proportion to any loss the 
grantor may suffer from breach of condition or the happen-
ing of the event, or if changing conditions have rendered 
enforcement inequitable, although few courts, it appears, 
have expressly applied equitable notions to the enforcement 
of possibilities of reverter and powers of termination.262 
But possibilities of reverter and powers of termination do 
add undesirably to confusion of titles. Since these interests 
are generally held to be descendible and devisable and in 
many jurisdictions alienable inter vivos,263 and since neither 
261 See Cook, "Rights of Entry, Possibilities of Reverter, Resulting Trusts 
and the Rule Against Perpetuities," IS Temple Law Q. 509 (I94I); Goldstein, 
"Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use 
of Land," 54 Harv. L. Rev. 248 (I94o). 
262 Goldstein, op. cit. supra note 2 6 I. 
263 Generally possibilities of reverter and powers of termination pass on 
intestacy of the owner exactly on the same basis as his present interests. 
These interests are also generally held to be devisable. 2 Powell, Real Property, 
1T 284. Powers of termination are not generally alienable inter vivos except 
by release or conveyance with a reversion or between the heirs of the grantor. 
3 Simes, Future Interests, sec. 716 ( I93 6). The authorities are about equally 
divided on the question of whether a possibility of reverter is alienable inter 
vivos. 3 Simes, op. cit. sec. 7 I 5. Many states have enacted statutes permitting 
alienation of any estate or interest in property [E. g., Ala. Code Ann. I940, 
Tit. 47, sec. q] and at least nine states specifically authorize alienation of 
the power of termination [E.g., Cal., Conn., Idaho, Md., Mich., Mont., N. J., 
N. M., R.I.]. See Note, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 375 (1946). 
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interest is subject to the rule against perpetuities,264 over 
long periods of time the ownership of a power of termination 
or possibility of reverter may come to be shared by a large 
number of persons who have no real hope ever to compel 
forfeiture, but some of whom may nevertheless attempt liti-
gation or may try to capitalize on the nuisance value of their 
claims. Such threats hinder the use and development of 
the land. Alienation is indirectly restrained. 
There would appear to be need for remedial legislation. 
Yet despite the repeated warning of the writers, statutes 
have been enacted in only a few states. The legislation in 
existence takes four general patterns: (I) statutory time limit 
imposed in the absence of a differing time stipulation by the 
parties/65 ( 2) prohibition against trivial conditions annexed 
to a conveyance/66 (3) a combination of time limit and pro-
hibition against trivial conditions,267 (4) a statutory time limit 
264 2 Simes, Future Interests, sees. 506, 507 ( 1936). 
265 Mass. Gen. Laws 1932, c. 184, sec. 23: "Conditions or restnctwns, 
unlimited as to time, by which the title or use of real property is affected, 
shall be limited to the term of thirty years after the date of the deed or other 
instrument or the date of the probate of the will creating them, except in 
cases of gifts or devises for public, charitable or religious purposes." [Act 
declared not applicable to conditions existing at the date of enactment.] 
266 Mich. Comp. Stat. 1948, sec. 554-46: "When any conditions annexed to 
a grant or conveyance of lands are merely nominal, and evince no intention 
of actual and substantial benefit to the party to whom or in whose favor 
they are to be performed, they may be wholly disregarded, and a failure to 
perform the same shall in no case operate as a forfeiture of the lands conveyed 
subject thereto." Same: Wis. Stat. 1951, sec. 230-46; Ariz. Code Ann. 1945, 
sec. 71.123. 
267 Minn. Stat. 1949, sec. 500.20 ( r) : "When any conditions annexed to 
a grant, devise or conveyance of land are, or shall become, merely nominal, 
and of no actual and substantial benefit to the party or parties to whom or 
in whose favor they are to be performed, they may be wholly disregarded; 
and a failure to perform the same shall in no case operate as a basis of 
forfeiture of the lands subject thereto." (2) "All covenants, conditions, or 
restrictions hereafter created by any other means, by which the title or use of 
real property is affected, shall cease to be valid and operative 30 years after 
the date of the deed, or other instrument, or the date of the probate of the 
will, creating them; and after such period of time they may be wholly 
disregarded." (3) [Limits the period in which to assert right of re-entry to 
six years after happening of breach.] 
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imposed regardless of any stipulations of time by the 
parties.268 
Out of fear that these statutes cannot be given a retro-
active effect without unconstitutionally taking the property 
of the owners of existing possibilities of reverter and powers 
of termination, the statutes, with the exception of that of 
Illinois, have been made prospective in operation. The 
retroactive features of the Illinois statute, have not caused 
litigation as yet, but it is probable that they will do so.269 It 
268 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, c. 30, sec. 37e: "Neither possibilities of reverter 
nor rights of entry or re-entry for breach of condition subsequent, whether 
heretofore or hereafter created, where the condition has not been broken, 
shall be valid for a longer period than fifty years from the date of the 
creation of the condition or possibility of reverter. If such a possibility of 
reverter or right of entry or re-entry is created to endure for a longer period 
than fifty years, it shall be valid for fifty years." Sec. 37f: "If by reason of a 
possibility of reverter created more than fifty years prior to the effective 
date of this Act, a reverter has come into existence prior to the time of the 
effective date of this Act, no person shall commence an action for the 
recovery of the land or any part thereof based upon such possibility of 
reverter, after one year from the effective date of this Act. 
"If by reason of a breach of condition subsequent created more than fifty 
years prior to the effective date of this Act, a right of re-entry has come into 
existence prior to the time of the effective date of this Act, no person shall 
commence an action for the recovery of the land or any part thereof based 
upon such right of entry or re-entry after one year from the effective date 
of this Act, unless entry or re-entry has been actually made to enforce said 
right before the expiration of such year." 
269 See Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 30, sec. 3 7f quoted supra note 268. The restrictions 
imposed by sec. 3 7f in respect to the time in which actions must be brought 
raise serious questions concerning equal protection of the laws. The following 
comments appeared in 43 Ill. L. Rev. 90, 102, 103 (1948): "A more serious 
objection may be raised by the provision affecting remedies where such 
interests were more than fifty years old at the effective date of the act, since 
Sec. 3 7f restricts the time for bringing an action in that situation to one year 
from the date the act goes into effect. Where such an interest is a possibility 
of reverter, and the limiting contingency has in fact occurred, the grantor 
has an estate in fee upon which an action to recover would not previously 
have been barred by the Statute of Limitations for twenty years. Is there any 
policy reason sufficiently compelling to justify limiting the right to recover 
in that eventuality to a one year period where another whose interest was only 
forty-nine years old or less when the act became law would still have the 
full twenty-year period in which to seek his remedy if the reverter fell in? 
If not, the classification is clearly arbitrary." 
"The subsection further provide~ that where a right of entry has existed 
more than fifty years at the passage of the act, not only must the breach have 
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is often assumed that possibilities of reverter and powers of 
termination are property interests of which the owners can-
not be deprived by legislative act.270 One of the points of 
argument of early advocates of legislative control was that 
the legislature ought to restrict the creation of these interests 
while they are still comparatively rare, because the evils 
once existing might be difficult to remedy by subsequent 
legislation without violating the Constitution.271 
There is actually almost no case authority of any kind to 
support the view that these interests cannot be extinguished. 
Certain Illinois cases dealing with statutes relating to vaca-
tion of streets have been nearly the only cases where a court 
has been called upon to decide the constitutionality of stat-
utes which allegedly impair or extinguish possibilities of 
reverter or powers of termination. The point has several 
times been raised in that jurisdiction in regard to vacation 
of streets because the Supreme Court appears formerly to 
have taken the view that the dedication of a street or alley-
way creates in the city a determinable fee, which will last 
until the city abandons the use, and leaves an interest in the 
grantor very similar to a possibility of reverter.272 Since it 
occurred before that time to enable the holder to bring an action, the time 
for which is also limited to one year from the effective date of the act, but 
also there is a further stipulation that no such action may be maintained 
'unless entry or re-entry has been actually made to enforce such right before 
the expiration of such year.' As a practical matter this presents certain 
difficulties, since there is no agreement as to what actually constitutes 'entry' 
today." . . . 
"Here also the holder of a right of entry is being deprived of his right 
to pursue his remedy by limiting the period of recovery to a single year. 
Under modern conditions it is very possible that the holders of these now 
terminated interests might not know there had been a cessation of user or 
breach of condition, much less that there had been a statute which in effect 
amended the Statute of Limitations, until long after the year had passed." 
270 Kales, Estate, Future Interests, sec. 302 (2d ed.); Clark, "Limiting 
Land Restriction," 2 7 Am. Bar Assn. J. 7 3 7 ( I 94 I) . 
271 Frazer, "Future Interests in Property in Minnesota," 3 Minn. L. Rev. 
320, 339 (I9I8-I9)• 
272St. John v. Quitzow, 72 Ill. 334 (I874); Gebhardt v. Reeves, 75 Ill. 
30I (1874). 
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would be undesirable that the title to the strips of land 
should revert upon vacation to persons who had ceased to 
own the adjoining lots, as early as I 8 5 I, a statute was passed 
which provided that upon vacation of a street the city 
authorities shall convey any interest the city has in the street 
to the owners of lots next adjoining.273 Succeeding statutes 
have contained similar provisions.274 The Illinois Supreme 
Court has had some difficulty in making up its mind what 
effect these statutes have upon the interest retained by the 
dedicator. In an early case, the court averred: 
"The fee plaintiff had in the street and alley could not be 
divested and transferred to the adjacent lot owners by direct 
legislative action; nor could authority be given to any agency 
to do it for private purposes. An intention to take the prop-
erty of one man and transfer it to another, without compensa-
tion, ought not to be attributed to the legislature, where a 
different motive may be assigned for its action. A law that 
would have that effect, or that would authorize it to be done, 
would be palpably in violation of the constitution, as well 
as unjust." 275 
Yet in a comparatively recent case, Prall v. Burckhartt/16 
the court concluded that title must upon vacation go to 
adjoining property owners. In People ex rel. Franchere v. 
City of Chicago,271 decided a few years after the Prall case, 
this statement appears: 
273 Ill. Laws r85r, p. 112. 
274 Ill. Laws r865, p. qo, sec. r: Ill. Rev. Stat. r88r, c. 145; Laws 1923, 
p. 629, sec. 2. Sec. 2 is now substantially embodied in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, 
c. 24, sec. 69-12. 
Sec. 69-r 2 provides that upon abandonment of the street, highway, or 
alleyway, title shall vest in the owners of the adjoining lands, except in cases 
where the instrument dedicating the street, highway, or alleyway shall ex-
pressly provide for a specific devolution of title upon abandonment. 
275Gebhar.dt v. Reeves, 75 Ill. 301, 308 (r874). 
276 299 Ill. 19, 132 N. E. 28o (1921), noted 20 Mich. L. Rev. 778. 
277 People ex rei. Fabriel Franchere, Jr. v. City of Chicago, 32 r Ill. 
466, 152 N. E. 141 (r926). 
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"Prior to the act in question, after the executing and record-
ing of a statutory plat and its acceptance by the municipality, 
nothing remained in the dedicator but a mere possibility of 
reverter. This possibility of reverter was not an estate but 
only the possibility of having an estate at a future time. 
(Hart v. Lake, 273 Ill. 6o.) This possibility, not being an 
estate, was not protected by any constitutional limitation, 
and it was competent for the legislature to abolish this pos-
sibility of reverter or to change the devolution of the title 
upon the happening of the future contingency in any way 
it saw fit, . . . any legislative enactment to that end is 
not unconstitutional." 278 
Neither the Prall case nor the Franchere case afford sub-
stantial evidence that the Illinois Supreme Court would tol-
erate legislative abolition of all possibilities of reverter and 
powers of termination. The court did not overrule the 
earlier vacation cases. In these earlier cases 279 the dedication 
seems in each instance to have been made prior to the par-
ticular statute under which the street was vacated, but the 
facts are not altogether clear. Moreover, in one case, Helm 
v. Webster,280 the deed to the city contained an express pro-
vision that if the street should at any time be abandoned, 
the title to the land should revert to the grantor, his heirs 
and assigns as though the deed had never been made. The 
platting in Prall v. Burckhartt was made after the vacation 
act was in effect and the plattor did not expressly retain any 
interest.281 The court in Prall v. Burckhartt sought to recon-
cile the result which it reached with the prior holdings and 
strongly intimated that an express reservation made prior 
278 321 Ill. 466, 476, 152 N. E. 141, 144 (1926). 
279Helm v. Webster, 85 Ill. II6 (1877); St. John v. Quitzow, 72 Ill. 
334 (1874); Gebhardt v. Reeves, 75 Ill. 301 (1874). 
280 85 Ill. II6 (r877), supra note 279. 
281 In Franchere v. City of Chicago, the alleyway was dedicated about 62 
years before the enactment of the particular statute (Ill. Laws 1923, p. 629), 
under which the alley was vacated. However, the act of r865 containing 
similar provisions, was in force in 1 8 7 r. 
242 RETROACTIVE LAND LEGISLATION 
to the enactment of a vacation statute cannot be defeated or 
impaired by subsequent legislation. 
The prospective operation of the statute in the later cases, 
as opposed to the retroactive operation in the earlier, would 
be a completely satisfactory basis for a distinction between 
the holdings, except that the court did not clearly recognize 
this basis, or at least it did not use terminology which ade-
quately expressed the ratio decidendi. If the court in the 
Prall and Franchere cases had not spoken of the grantor's 
"possibility of reverter," which term has the technical 
denotation of a certain kind of interest in land, in describing 
the interest which a grantor retains when the grant is made 
after the statute, the court could have reached the desired 
result with a great deal less ambiguity. What the grantor 
in these cases retained was a possibility-a possibility that he 
might re-acquire title upon abandonment of the street, pro-
vided that he was still owner of the adjoining lot when that 
event occurred. 
The claim of a grantor at common law, who has conveyed 
land to a corporation, to a reversion in case of the dissolution 
of the corporation, is, like the interest of a dedicator in Illi-
nois, somewhat akin to a possibility of reverter. It has been 
held that any expectancy the grantor may have can be 
defeated by subsequent legislation.282 This result is not, 
however, inconsistent with the view that, in general, possi-
bilities of reverter are nondivestible property interests. The 
possibility that the corporation will be dissolved is generally 
remote. The grantor will normally not be injured in any 
way if the land is put to other uses. If he has been paid the 
value of the fee, he will suffer no loss if the title never 
reverts. Indeed, in most jurisdictions the notion has been 
282 Bass v. Roanoke Navigation and Water Power Co., r I I N. C. 439, 
r6 S. E. 402 (r892). 
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abandoned that the grantor retains by implication of law an 
interest in the land in case of dissolution.283 
In Kelso v. Steiger 284 land had been conveyed in trust 
for certain specified purposes. Subsequently the trustees 
procured a special act which authorized them to sell a por-
tion of the land no longer used for the specified purposes. 
It was held that when the land ceased to be used for the pur-
poses contemplated by the original grantor, a right of entry 
accrued to his heirs which could not be divested by the act. 
There is dictum in a Kentucky case, Evans v. Cropp/85 
that a deed reserving a possibility of reverter is a contract 
which the legislature is incompetent to impair by a subse-
quently enacted statute. The land in question was conveyed 
for school purposes upon condition that title would revert 
if the land were abandoned by the school authorities. A 
· subsequently enacted statute required school authorities to 
perfect the title to all lands dedicated for school purposes. 
Thereafter the school building on the lot was sold and the 
premises abandoned by the school trustees. The claim of 
the grantor's successor to the land was not seriously ques-
tioned. He brought an action for damages for the removal 
of the building. Recovery was denied because it was found 
that the school board did not abandon the lot until after 
the building was removed. 
Language might be taken from certain cases to support 
the contention that possibilities of reverter and powers of 
termination are not property interests which are constitu-
tionally protected. It is said frequently, for example, that 
neither interest is an estate in land but only the possibility 
of acquiring one.286 This is merely a question of definition. 
283 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, sec. 8134 (Perm. ed.). 
284 75 Md. 376, 24 Atl. 18 (1892). A similar result was reached on 
similar facts in Second Universalist Society v. Dugan, 65 Md. 46o, 5 Atl. 
415 (1886). 
285 141 Ky. 514, 133 s. w. 221 (1911). 
286 z Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 314 (3d ed.). 
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A contingent remainder has also been said not to be an estate 
but the possibility of acquiring one; 287 however, as we have 
seen, a contingent remainder is an interest which is constitu-
tionally protected. 
Sometimes in eminent domain cases it is said that possi-
bilities of reverter and powers of termination are mere 
expectancies which the courts cannot protect.288 The general 
rule is that when determinable fees or fees subject to a con-
dition subsequent are taken under eminent domain proceed-
ings, the owners of the possibilities of reverter and powers 
of termination are not entitled to any portion of the award.289 
This rule appears to be based, however, not upon the idea 
that these interests are not constitutionally protected (what-
ever may be occasionally remarked in the cases), but upon 
the matter of valuation. The value of the possibility of 
reverter or power of termination depends upon how you con-
strue the condition or limitation. Most courts assume that 
the limitation or condition does not include the taking by 
eminent domain.29° Consequently, unless the fee is likely 
to terminate or be terminated for some other reason, the 
possibility of reverter or power of termination is practically 
valueless.291 
287 2 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. po (3d ed.). 
288State ex rel. Sayers v. School District No. I, 79 Mo. App. 103 (I899). 
289 Orgel, Valuations Under Law of Eminent Domain, sec. I I 7, p. 404 
(I9J6). 
290 First Reformed Dutch Church of Gilboa v. Crosswell, 2 I o App. Div. 
294, 206 N. Y. S. 132 (3d Dept. 1924), appeal dismissed 239 N. Y. 625, 
147 N. E. 222 (1925); Comment, 34 Mich. L. Rev. 530, 532 (1936). 
291 Restatement, Property, sec. 53 ( 1936), sets forth rules, or perhaps 
more accurately stated, suggestions for the distribution of the award between 
the owners of the fee and the owners of the reversionary interest. The 
Restatement's rules (paraphrased) are: Where the event upon which the 
possessory estate is to end (not taking into account the effect of the con-
demnation) is an event, the occurrence of which, within a reasonably short 
period of time, is not probable, the future interest has no ascertainable value. 
But if the event upon which the possessory estate is to end (not taking into 
account any changes resulting from the condemnation) is likely to occur 
within a reasonably short period of time, then the award is to be divided 
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The improbability that the possibility of reverter or power 
of termination will ever vest in possession is also the basis 
for the courts' refusal to enjoin the owner of the fee from 
committing waste. 
"A court of chancery will interfere to enjoin equitable waste 
by the owner of a base or determinable fee only when the 
contingency which is to determine the estate is reasonably 
certain to happen and the waste is of a character to charge 
the owner with a wanton and unconscientious abuse of his 
rights." 292 
This is purely a problem of weighing interests and again 
does not indicate a belief that in general owners of possibili-
ties of reverter and powers of termination can expect no pro-
tection from the Constitution. In keeping with the spirit of 
American institutions which favors the vesting of estates, 
opposes entailments and endeavors to secure to the citizen 
the greatest immediate enjoyment of property consistent 
with the law, the owner of the fee must be accorded the 
privilege of using the land pretty much as he pleases.293 
The authorities are, as we see, inconclusive. Leaving the 
cases and attacking the problem on reason, what argument 
can be proposed against the constitutionality of a statute 
which retroactively destroys possibilities of reverter and 
powers of termination? One argument might be that 
destruction of the grantor's interest enhances the interests of 
the grantee. This windfall to the grantee, it may be claimed, 
constitutes a taking of private property for strictly private 
purposes. Yet, it is submitted, if public property does require 
between the owner of the possessory estate and the owner of the future interest 
in such shares as fairly represent the proportionate value of the present de-
feasible possessory estate and the future interest. If the condition has been 
broken prior to the commencement of the eminent domain proceedings, then 
the owner of the power of termination has the option to claim and to receive 
the entire award. 
292 Fifer v. Allen, 228 Ill. 507, 521, 81 N. E. II05, 1109 (1907). 
293Gannon v. Peterson, 193 Ill. 372, 62 N. E. :no (1901). 
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an abolition of existing possibilities of reverter and powers 
of termination, then the abolition may be accomplished, . 
benefit or not to the grantee. Someone will always be bene-
fited by any changes in the law. 
"A principle of broad public policy has intervened to the 
extent that modern progress is deemed to necessitate a sacri-
fice of many former claimed individual rights. The only 
obstacle met has been the rule of property or as termed the 
disinclination to disturb vested property rights. To some 
extent this, too, has yielded in the sense that many rights 
formerly labeled as property rights by a process of academic 
relation are now considered merely personal and have been 
subjected to the common good." 294 
There is some basis for distinguishing between the sus-
ceptibility of possibilities of reverter and powers of termina-
tion to legislative destruction in the greater transferability 
of possibilities of reverter and in the greater liability of 
powers of termination to destruction by acts of the grantor. 
But in the practical application of the statutes no distinction 
can be made. Either both interests must be subject to legis-
lative control or neither. From the point of view of the 
owners of the interests they are equally valuable. From the 
point of view of the owner of the fee, it can make little prac-
tical difference whether he has a determinable fee or a fee 
upon a condition subsequent. The same evils are produced 
by possibilities of reverter as by powers of termination. To 
distinguish between the interests in the application of the 
statutes would be an open invitation to litigation. 
It is really quite improbable that any legislature would 
prohibit absolutely the creation of possibilities of reverter 
or powers of termination or abolish entirely existing inter-
ests. The retention of such interests affords a useful control 
device for legitimate purposes.295 If the statutes which have 
294 Letteau v. Ellis, 12.2 Cal. App. 584, 589, 10 P. 2d 496, 497 ( 1932). 
295See Brake, "Fees Simple Defeasible," 28 Ky. L. J. 424 (1940) for an 
appraisal of the utility of fees simple defeasible. The author of this article 
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been enacted to date are any indication of what the legisla-
tures of the remaining states are likely to do, the legislation 
of the future will be aimed at controlling the abuses growing 
out of the courts' failure to apply the rule against perpetui-
ties and certain equitable doctrines to such interests. Setting 
a time limit for the duration of the interests is perhaps the 
easiest way of dealing with them. A period, say of thirty 
years, would be long enough to accomplish most objec-
tives.296 If this period is not long enough to achieve the 
grantor's objectives, he can employ other conveyancing 
devices more susceptible to control. A statute imposing a 
thirty year limit probably would not be unreasonable if 
made applicable to existing interests, provided the full 
period is allowed after the passage of the statute. The 
troublesome problem of existing interests might be met by 
providing that such interests shall lose their capacity to 
cause a forfeiture after a specified number of years from 
their creation (say the period of the rule against perpetui-
ties), but if circumstances still warrant they shall assume 
the character of covenants enforceable in equity.297 
enumerates, inter alia, the following uses: securing payment of annuities and 
of legacies, compelling grantee to support the grantor, restraining marriage, 
influencing moral conduct, prohibiting will contests. 
296 Thirty years is the period provided in the Uniform Act promulgated 
by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws called an "Act Relating to 
Reverter of Realty." This act, which has not yet been adopted in any 
jurisdiction, excludes any retroactive effect. 
297 See Cook, "Rights of Entry, Possibilities of Reverter, Resulting Trusts 
and the Rule Against Perpetuities," 15 Temple L. Q. 509 ( 1941). 
Like possibilities of reverter and powers of termination, restrictive covenants 
tend to cloud titles and restrain alienability. But unlike the case of possibilities 
of reverter and powers of termination, which in theory (at least) subsist 
even after conditions have so changed as to make forfeiture inequitable and 
after it can no longer be of any real concern of the grantor to what use the 
premises are put, many courts of equity have refused to enforce restrictive 
agreements where there has been such a change in the character of the 
neighborhood as to defeat the purposes of the restriction and to render the 
enforcement of the same unreasonable. 3 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 87 5 
(3d ed.). Since relief at law is usually either so inadequate as to make a suit 
useless or else is not available at all, the refusal of a court of equity to enforce 
a restrictive covenant has substantially the effect of extinguishing it. Restrictive 
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Terms for years and estates for life may also be created 
subject to limitations and to conditions subsequent.298 There 
would be little justification for legislation which retro-
actively extinguishes such limitations and conditions, because 
the creation of qualified estates for life or for years does not 
involve or lead to the same undesirable consequences as the 
practice of conveying fees upon limitations and upon condi-
tions subsequent. The happening of the event or the breach 
of the condition must occur within a determinate period of 
time. Social policy does not require that life estates and 
estates for years shall be freely alienable. Indeed, to the 
contrary, it may be good policy to allow the lessor, grantor, 
or testator to restrict the alienability of such estates. To 
destroy the conditions and limitations (thereby conferring 
an unqualified estate upon the lessee or life tenant) would 
work undue hardship upon the lessor or grantor in depriving 
him of the most effective means of obliging the lessee or 
life tenant to comply with agreements and restrictions. 
covenants may also be abandoned and waived by the parties concerned. 3 
Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 874 (3d ed.). None of these modes of extinguish-
ing restrictive covenants has the degree of certainty desirable in commercial 
transactions. Legislative attempts to fix more certain modes of extinguishing 
existing restrictive agreements have not fared very well with the courts. A 
Georgia statute, Laws 1935, p. 112 [Ga. Code Ann. 1936, sec. 29-301] 
providing that "covenants restricting lands to certain uses shall not run for 
more than twenty years in municipalities which have adopted zoning laws" 
(p. 113) was held not to have the effect of terminating a covenant that was 
already in existence as a valid and binding contract between the parties. 
Dooley v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 199 Ga. 353, 34 S. E. 2d 522 
( 194 5). Twenty years ought to be long enough to accomplish most purposes. 
The courts plainly do not like substitution of arbitrary standards for the 
flexible standards of the common law. See also Riverbank Improvement Co. 
v. Chadwick, 228 Mass. 242, 117 N. E. 244 (1917), supra Ch. 3, note 165. 
For a discussion of legislative proposals limiting the duration of restrictive 
covenants see Clark, "Limiting Land Restrictions," 27 A. B. A. J. 737 (1941). 
298 Conger v. Lowe, 124 Ind. 368, 24 N. E. 889 ( 1890); Southeastern 
Land Co. v. Clem, 239 Ky. 417,39 S. W. 2d 674 (1931); Gunsenhiser v. 





N many states a restraint on the alienation of the right 
of a beneficiary to receive the income under a trust 
created by a person other than the beneficiary himself 
is valid 1 and in some states it is held that a restraint on the 
alienation of the beneficiary's interest in the principal is 
effective.2 Trusts in which the interest of the beneficiary 
1 I Scott, Trusts, sec. Ip.I. The following is a summary of Scott's survey 
of spendthrift trusts in the various jurisdictions (through I95I). These 
jurisdictions recognize spendthrift trusts although no statute so provides: 
Ark., Colo., D. C., Fla., Me., Md., Mass., Miss., Mo., Neb., N.J., Pa., Tex., 
Hawaii, S. C., and Vt. There are dicta upholding spendthrift trusts in Iowa 
and Oregon. In several states there are statutes having a common origin in 
the legislation of New York in which it is provided that the right of a bene-
ficiary of an express trust to receive the income cannot be transferred by 
him; and it is provided that the surplus beyond the sum which may be 
necessary for the education and support of the beneficiary shall be liable 
to the claims of creditors: Mich., Minn., Mont., N. Y. In a few states there 
is legislation based on the California statute, in which it is provided that the 
settlor may impose a restraint on the voluntary assignment by a beneficiary 
of his right to the income; creditors are allowed to reach the income in excess 
of what may be necessary for the education and support of the beneficiary: 
Cal., N. D., S. D. The statutes of two states provide that the beneficiary 
cannot assign his right to the income unless the right to do so is conferred by 
the terms of the trust: Ind., Kan. There are statutes in a number of states 
which provide that a proceeding may be maintained to reach the interest of a 
beneficiary under a trust "except when such trust has been created by, or 
the fund so held in trust has proceeded from, some person other than the 
debtor himself": Ill., N. H., N. J., Tenn., Wash. In several other states 
there are statutes which permit spendthrift trusts to a limited extent: Ala., 
Ariz., Conn., Del., Ga., La., N. C., Nev., Okla., Va., W.Va. 
2 I Scott, Trusts, sec. I53.2, I53·3· Ant{)ne v. Snodgrass, 244 Ala. 501, 14 
So. 2d 506 (I943); Coughran v. First Nat. Bank, Io Cal. App. 2d I53• 64 P. 
2d Ioi3 (I937); Snyder v. O'Conner, roz Colo. 567, 8I P. 2d 773 (I938); 
Medwedeff v. Fisher, 179 Md. I92, I7 A. 2d I41 (I94I); In re Manley 
Estate, II2. Vt. 3I4, 24 A. 2d 357 (I942), The Restatement takes the view, 
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cannot be assigned by him or reached by his creditors are 
known as "spendthrift trusts." The recognition of spend-
thrift trusts is in a sense an anomaly, for disabling restraints 
on legal estates are generally held invalid.3 Probably the 
real reason why the courts have recognized spendthrift trusts 
lies in the fact that any trust is likely to impair alienability 
to some extent. Hence an express prohibition against aliena-
tion of the beneficial interest does not add materially to the 
restriction on alienability caused by the trust itsel£.4 How~ 
ever, the judicial explanation has usually been one of pure 
logic, that a donor of property ought to be able to dispose of 
his property as suits himself, provided that he does not vio-
late any principle of public policy. The courts have not felt 
there is anything anti-social in the spendthrift trust.5 
The process of reasoning by which the courts have justified 
the spendthrift trust has generally caused them to overlook 
the dubiousness of the policy of permitting the settlor to 
create a trust in which the beneficiary's interest is free from 
the claims of creditors, regardless of the beneficiary's needs 
or the size of the income.6 Can such an immunity from 
involuntary alienation be taken away? In Brearley School 
v. Ward/ the New Y ark Court of Appeals held that a life 
however, that a restraint on the voluntary or involuntary transfer of the 
beneficiary's right to the principal is invalid. Restatement, Trusts, sec. I 53 (b) 
(I935). 
3 2 Simes, Future Interests, sec. 44 7 ( I 9 3 6) . 
4 Simes, Future Interests, p. 340 (Hornbook). 
5 Ia Bogert, Trusts, sec. 222. 
6 Costigan, "Those Protective Trusts Which Are Miscalled 'Spendthrift 
Trusts' Reexamined," 22 Calif. L. Rev. 47I, 482 (I934). 
The statutes of a number of states permit spendthrift trusts only to the 
extent necessary to educate and support the cestui in the manner of life to 
which he has been accustomed or limit the size of the spendthrift trust as to size 
of corpus or purpose of trust. Supra note r. Generally see I a Bogert, Trusts, 
sec. 222. 
7 zor N.Y. 358, 94 N. E. Ioor (r9rr). The theory of the dissenting 
opinion in the court below was that the beneficiary of a trust fund whose 
income therefrom is wholly exempt from execution at the time of the creation 
of the trust has a constitutional right which prohibits the legislature from 
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beneficiary was not deprived of property without due process 
by a statutory amendment whereby the income from the 
trust was subjected to a judgment lien of a creditor. Several 
factors present in the case, however, relatively simplified 
the problem of the court in arriving at this conclusion. The 
trust was created by will; thus the impediment of supposed 
making any part of such income applicable to the payment of his debts. The 
Court of Appeals said this theory was tenable only upon the assumption that 
the state had entered into a contract with the cestui que trust to that effect, 
because there certainly was no such contract between the creator of the trust 
and the trustee. The trustee merely undertook to pay over the income as 
directed, provided the law of the land permitted him to do so. But the legisla-
ture did not enter into any contract with its citizens, nor did it offer to contract 
with them. The statute was enacted in the exercise of the plenary power of 
the state to regulate the tenure of real and personal property within its borders. 
The provision that the income of a trust fund may not be taken to satisfy 
the debts of the beneficiary is no inherent or necessary part of the trust. The 
exemption of the homestead of a debtor can be repealed. Why not the exemp-
tion of the income from a trust? "· .. a party has no vested right in a 
defense to a contract which he has actually made and which he is under a 
moral obligation to perform, though the law at the time makes such contract 
void. There is recognized in every civilized country the obligation of a man 
to pay his debts if he has property out of which they can be satisfied, and the 
failure to do so is moral dishonesty. No one has a moral right to be dishonest." 
(201 N.Y. 358, 372, 94 N. E. Iooi, 1006.) To sustain the position of the 
beneficiary that the amendment could not be applied as to trusts already in 
existence, said the court, it would be necessary to hold not only that he had 
a vested right to hold the income of the trust exempt from the claims of his 
creditors prior to the enactment of the law, but that he had a vested right to 
incur such debts as he might see fit in the future with a similar exemption. 
Such a result, the court considered, was rather too startling to be contemplated 
with equanimity. 
Gray, J., thought that to apply the statute retroactively deprived the ben-
eficiary of property without due process. The right to receive income is a 
valuable property interest. Before the amendment, this right was subject only 
to the right of creditors to reach the surplus beyond what was necessary for 
the beneficiary's support. If the legislature can validly change the statute 
so as, arbitrarily, to direct the application of ten per cent of the income to 
the claim of a creditor, it could as competently direct the application of any 
percentage, even ·of the whole. 
See King v. Irving, 103 App. Div. 420, 92 N.Y. S. 1094 (1st Dept. 1905) 
wherein doubt is expressed that the amendment could be applied where a trust 
had been created by will previous to the date of the amendment. The court 
said that the testator had a right to direct that a certain income should be 
paid to the beneficiary and that it was difficult to see how the legislature had 
power to direct payment in a different way. 
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contract rights was eliminated.8 There was no spendthrift 
provision in the will. The exemption was simply part of the 
Real Property Law as it stood at the time the trust was 
created.9 The case, therefore, seemed to the court to be 
governed by the well-established rule that a debtor can have 
no vested interest in an exemption statute. The third factor 
was that the change was not far reaching. Even before the 
amendment, the beneficiary could be compelled to apply 
all of the trust income which was not necessary for his educa-
tion and support to the payment of debts. The amendment 
merely measured the quantum which was to go for the 
payment of debts by a different standard. 
A California case holds, without discussion of the point, 
that a statute cannot make the interest of a beneficiary of 
an existing spendthrift trust subject to the reach of credi-
tors.10 In State v. Caldwell,11 a Tennessee decision involving 
an inter vivos rather than a testamentary trust, it was deter-
mined that there would be a violation of the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as a violation 
of the contracts clause, in the application to an existing trust 
of a statute whereby it was provided that the interest of a 
beneficiary under a spendthrift trust could be subjected to 
the judgment claims of the state of Tennessee.12 It was con-
8 That a will cannot be deemed a contract within the meaning of the con-
tracts clause of the federal Constitution was settled in Cochran v. Van Surlay, 
20 Wend. 365 (N.Y. 1838). 
9 Under N. Y. Real Property Law, sec. 98, only the surplus of rents and 
profits, beyond the sum necessary for the education and support of the benefi-
ciary is liable to the claims of his creditors. Laws 1908, c. 148, provided inter 
alia that income from trust funds due or owing to a judgment debtor to the 
amount of $ 12 or more per week is subject to execution, not to exceed ten 
per cent. 
10 Seymour v. McAvoy, 121 Cal. 438, 53 Pac. 946 (1898). 
11 181 Tenn. 74, 178 S. W. 2d 624 (1944). 
12 Tenn. Code 1932, sec. 10353 provided: "To subject trust property; 
exception.-The creditor whose execution has been returned unsatisfied, in 
whole or in part, may file a bill in chancery against the defendant in the execu-
tion, and any other person or corporation, to compel the discovery of any prop-
erty, including stocks, choses in action, or money due to such defendant, or held 
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tended by the state that the right of the beneficiary to have 
his interest free from the claims of creditors arose entirely 
out of statute 13 and not out of the provisions of the trust 
instrument and that this exemption privilege could unques-
tionably be taken away by the state. However, the court 
was of the opinion that spendthrift trusts had been recog-
nized by judicial decision in Tennessee prior to the enact-
ment of the statute referred to by the state as an exemption 
statute and that the statute and decision constituted a rule 
of property which was not at all an exemption for poor 
debtors. 
"We are therefore constrained to hold that these defendants 
having acquired a title and interest in property by virtue of 
judicial decisions, grounded on public policy, supplemented 
by legislative declaration, and declared to be a rule of prop-
erty, such title and interest must necessarily be adjudged a 
vested estate and beyond the reach of the Legislature. It 
is as much a vested estate as if there had been a conveyance 
to them of an estate in fee simple. The fact that it was 
inalienable and free from the claims of creditors would not 
alter the case." 14 
The court in the Caldwell case referred to Brearley School 
v. Ward but distinguished that decision from the situation 
under consideration in that here the instrument contained a 
in trust for him, except when the trust has been created by, or the property so 
held has proceeded from, some person other than the defendant himself, and 
the trust is declared by will duly recorded or deed duly registered." (Acts 
I832, c. II, sec. 1.) Pub. Acts I943> c. Io8, sec. I, amended sec. I0353 by 
adding: "Provided, however, that where the State of Tennessee shall be such 
judgment creditor, whether the debt be created before or after the effective 
date of this Act and whether or not the trust for the benefit of the debtor 
shall have been declared prior to or subsequent to the effective date of this 
Act, the Chancery Court shall have jurisdiction to subject such property to the 
satisfaction of the claims of the State of Tennessee despite the fact that 
the trust has been created or the property so held has proceeded from some 
person other than the defendant himself and the trust declared by will duly 
recorded or deed duly registered." 
13Tenn. Code I932, sec. I0353; Acts I832, c. II, sec. I, supra note u. 
14 181 Tenn. 74, 82, 178 S. W. 2d 624, 627. 
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provision against alienation (which was not so in Brearley) 
and that the exemption arose not only by virtue of a statute 
(as in Brearley) but also by sanction of the common law. It 
is submitted, nevertheless, that these are distinctions without 
difference. The spendthrift provision is in effect a kind of 
exemption 15 whether its source is in statute or in the common 
law. The law says to the testator or settlor: If you insert 
a provision in the trust instrument that the interest of the 
beneficiary shall be exempt from the creditor's reach, then his 
interest shall be exempt from creditor's claims. Now, there 
may be persuasive reasons why the law should permit the 
creation of spendthrift trusts. Incompetent and inexperi-
enced beneficiaries often need this sort of protection.16 How-
ever, this is a matter to be addressed to the discretion of the 
legislature. Certainly, it cannot be said that opinion 1s 
15 So far as the legislature's power to abolish the spendthrift provisiOn is 
concerned, the provision can properly be classified only as an exemption-an 
immunity from attachment by creditors. I do not wish to imply that there 
may not be instances where it would be inappropriate to treat the spendthrift 
provision as a mere personal exemption. For certain purposes, a spendthrift 
provision may be more appropriately treated as a restraint on alienation than 
as an exemption. For example, in a jurisdiction where the laws permit a 
person to set up a trust in which the beneficial interest is voluntarily alienable 
but cannot be reached by creditors, suppose the beneficiary of such a trust 
becomes bankrupt. The Federal Bankruptcy Act provides that the bankrupt 
shall be allowed the exemptions prescribed by the state law. I I U. S. C. A. 
sec. 24. On the other hand, the Act also provides that the trustee in bank-
ruptcy shall be vested with the title of the bankrupt to all property which 
the bankrupt could by any means have transferred. I I U. S. C. A. sec. IOo (a) 
(5). If the spendthrift provision in this example is classified as a personal 
exemption, the interest of the beneficiary will not pass to the trustee. It has 
been held, however, that the interest does pass to the trustee. Young v. Hand-
work, I79 F. 2d 70 (7th Cir. I95o), cert. den. and reh. den. Handwork v. 
Young, 339 U. S. 949 (I95o). The court held that it was not obliged to 
follow the state court decisions to the effect that such an interest does not pass 
to the trustee. "And to construe this section [of the state statute] so as to 
prevent such interest from passing to the trustee in bankruptcy while the state 
recognizes it as alienable property would present a serious challenge to the 
validity of the state provision. At any rate, such a construction places the state 
provision in direct conflict with the bankruptcy provision which Congress in 
the exercise of its paramount power has enacted." (I 79 F. 2d 70, 79.) 
16 Costigan, "Those Protective Trusts Which Are Miscalled 'Spendthrift 
Trusts' Reexamined," 22 Calif. L. Rev. 47I (I934). 
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unanimously in favor of permitting the creation of spend-
thrift trusts.17 The Caldwell decision appears to contradict 
the prevailing view that no one has a vested interest in an 
exemption. The court called the immunity from attachment 
"a rule of property," but this is a mere play on words. 
When the statute removes the restraint on the power of 
the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust to make a voluntary 
transfer (as distinguished from the involuntary transfers 
considered above), the beneficiary is scarcely likely to com-
plain, but the court may find that the statute as applied to 
an existing trust invades a constitutional privilege of the 
settlor or testator to dispose of his property on such terms 
as he saw fit. In In re Borsch's Estate/8 the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court declared that a statute/9 under which the 
17 The classic denunciation of spendthrift trusts was written by John 
Chipman Gray. Gray, Restraints on Alienation, Preface VII (2d ed. r895). 
Gray believed that everyone should pay his debts. One of the worst results 
of spendthrift trusts, he thought, was the encouragement they give to a 
plutocracy. The pros and cons of spendthrift trusts are discussed, ra Bogert, 
Trusts, sec. 222. 
18 362 Pa. 58r, 67 A. 2d rr9 (r949). Noted: 98 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 249 
(1949); 63 Harv. L. Rev. 714 (r95o); 48 Mich. L. Rev. 889 (1950); 23 
Temp. L. Q. 242 (r95o). 
The testator, who died twenty-four years before the enactment of the statute, 
devised his real estate to trustees subject to spendthrift provisions as to income. 
The life tenant, pursuant to the statute, delivered a release to the trustees, 
wherein she sought to renounce her life interest in the trusts thus terminating 
them and vesting a fee-simple absolute in her son, the remainderman, 
19 Pa. Act of 1945, P. L. 1337, amended by Act of 1947, P. L. roo; 
Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 20, sec. 301.3. Originally enacted, Act of 1943, 
P. L. 797· 
Sec. r of the Act of 1945 provided: "· . . any interest in, to, or over, real 
or personal property, or the income therefrom, held or owned outright, or in 
trust, or in any other manner which is reserved or given to any person by deed, 
will or otherwise howsoever, and irrespective of any limitation of such power 
or interest by virtue of any restriction in the nature of a so-called spendthrift 
trust provision, or similar provision, may be released or disclaimed, either 
with or without consideration, by written instrument signed by the person 
possessing the power or the interest and delivered as hereinafter provided." 
Sec. 2 contained the limitation that no power or interest, subject to a spend-
thrift trust provision, or similar provision, could be released or disclaimed 
except in favor of a remainderman. 
The Act of 1943 was prompted by a change in the federal tax laws by the 
Revenue Act of 1942, making property over which a decedent has at the time 
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beneficiary of a spendthrift trust was authorized to releastt 
his interest in favor of a remainderman, was unconstitutional 
when applied retroactively as it violated the right of the 
testator by whose will the trust was created to dispose of his 
property.20 
The Court declared that from I 8 3 8 to I 94 5, the decisions 
of the court had firmly established that the right of the 
testator or deceased donor to have his spendthrift provisions 
enforced is a "right of property." 
"When prior to the act, a beneficiary of income subject to 
spendthrift trust provisions accepted the gift, this Court 
consistently held that the beneficiary could not thereafter 
terminate the trust by releasing, renouncing and disclaiming 
his interest. The basis for this doctrine rested upon the 
ancient maxim: Cujus est dare, ejus est disponere: the 
bestower of a gift has the right to regulate its disposal. 
Spendthrift trusts are sustained not because of the law's 
concern for the donee, but because the testator or donor 
possessed an individual right of property in the execution 
of the trust. To permit a termination by agreement or 
release would be an invasion of the donor's property right." 21 
" 'The testator has no interest in the property after his 
death, which is subject to constitutional protection.' True, 
there are no pockets in shrouds. The Constitution, however, 
is not protecting present ownership of a property of a dece-
dent. What it does protect is the property right possessed 
of his death a power of appointment includable in his gross estate for computa-
tion of federal estate taxes. Int. Rev. Code, sec. 8 I I (f) (Sec. 403a, Rev. Act 
of I 942). This tax liability makes a complete or partial release or disclaimer 
of a power of appointment or other property interest often desirable. The 
purpose of the Act of I943 was to establish an orderly method by which 
releases and disclaimers could be evidenced. The federal tax law was amended 
in I95I to limit its import to general powers. See supra Ch. 4 note 256. 
20 Pa. Const., Art. I, sec. 9, providing that a man cannot be "deprived of 
his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law 
of the land." 
21 In re Borsch's Estate, 362 Pa. 58I, s86, 67 A. 2d II9, I2I. 
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by the testator or donor, to have enforced the limitations and 
restrictions affixed to the gift." 22 
True, in the absence of statute, once a beneficiary under 
a spendthrift trust has accepted, he cannot terminate the 
trust by releasing his interest since that would violate the 
donor's directions.23 But this general principle should not be 
used to overturn a statute. In spite of the insistence of the 
Pennsylvania court that the law's concern is with the donor, 
it would seem that it is rather the beneficiary's interests which 
are to be considered.24 As stated before, the donor has no 
natural right to create spendthrift trusts; if he may do so, 
it is because the law permits him this privilege. At any rate, 
the Pennsylvania statute did not impair the testator's jus 
disponendi. The beneficiary took cum onere. The situation 
in the Borsch case was analogous to the acceleration of a 
remainder by a widow's renunciation of the will. The statute 
provided that the release must be in favor of the remainder-
man; his interest was accordingly accelerated. 
While the court's position in respect to the constitutional 
rights of the donor would have been dubious even if the 
donor had been alive when the decision was rendered, the 
position is astounding when it is considered that the donor 
was dead. Of course, the wishes of the dead are honored so 
far as the law permits them to be. When the legislature 
changes the law, the courts listen sympathetically to the 
claims of the living and extend the arm of the judiciary to 
protect their interests, but ordinarily the courts are quite 
22 362 Pa. 581, 586, 67 A. 2d 119, 121. 
23 Matter of Caswell's Estate, 185 Misc. Rep. 599, 56 N. Y. S. zd 507 
(Surr. Ct. 1944), aff'g 269 App. Div. 8o9, 56 N.Y. S. 2d 407 (4th Dept. 
194 5) ; Malatesta's Estate, 2 9 Pa. Dist. 1 13 ( 19 20) ; Blackwell v. Virginia 
Trust Co., 177 Va. 299, 14 S. E. 2d 301 (1941). Restatement, Trusts, 
sec. 337, Comm. I (1935). 
24 See Costigan, "Those Protective Trusts Which Are Miscalled 'Spendthrift 
Trusts' Reexamined," 22 Calif. L. Rev. 471, 483 (1934) taking the view that 
the needs of the beneficiary should be the primary justification for such a 
dispositive scheme. 
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unmoved by claims that the rights of the dead have been 
invaded.25 
It is interesting to note that an inferior Pennsylvania court 
saw no unconstitutional impairment of a testator's rights in 
the application of a statute to an existing trust, although the 
testator's rights were necessarily modified thereby.26 The 
statute provides that an attachment may be issued against an 
interest in a spendthrift trust to satisfy a decree or judgment 
against the beneficiary for the support of his wife and 
children. 
TERMINATION OF TRUSTS 
Closely related to the problem at issue in the retroactive 
application of the Pennsylvania Spendthrift Statute is the 
question whether statutes authorizing the termination of 
trusts can be applied to existing trusts. If the termination 
will result in the involuntary extinguishment of future inter-
ests the statute probably cannot be so applied. However, 
if the effect of the termination is merely to convert the 
equitable future interests to legal future interests and the 
possessory tenant is not invested with any greater power over 
the disposal of the principal than was the trustee, there would 
seem to be no violation of due process in applying the statute, 
and no impairment of a contract obligation (assuming that 
a contract in the constitutional sense subsists between the 
remaindermen and the trustee). Likewise, the beneficiary 
with the present right to income or principal cannot be heard 
to complain of unconstitutional deprivation of property if 
25 Chapter 3 supra p. 96 et seq. 
26 Everhart v. Everhart, 87 Pa. Super. 184 (1926). Act of 1921, P. L. 
434; Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 48, sec. 136. 
Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. zo, sec. 301.12 provides: "Income of a trust 
subject to spendthrift or similar provisions shall nevertheless be liable for the 
support of anyone whom the income beneficiary shall be under a legal duty 
to support." 
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the effect of the statute is to invest him with the legal title 
to the property in which he had previously only a beneficial 
interest. On the other hand, if his right to income is 
destroyed and the principal distributed among the remain-
dermen, he will be deprived of property without due process. 
Ordinarily, the terms of the trust fix the period of its 
duration, and it will not be terminated until the expiration 
of that period.27 Termination of the trust before the time 
fixed is usually allowed only under certain conditions, such 
as where the accomplishment of the trust becomes impossible 
or illegal or the continuance of the trust will substantially 
impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust.28 
Even if all of the beneficiaries are desirous of terminating 
the trust, the courts are unwilling to allow it if such termina-
tion would run counter to the intention of the settlor in 
creating the trust.29 The judicial rationalization is that the 
wishes of the settlor must control unless they run contrary 
to some public policy. From this it may well be gathered that 
the settlor who is still living at the time of the attempted 
application of a statute which permits the termination of the 
trust against his wishes, would be in a good position to assert 
constitutional rights. But it is difficult to see how a settlor 
who is deceased at the time the statute becomes effective 
can be said to have any constitutional rights. Nor is it rea-
sonable to presume that a testator-donor can have any rights 
after his death, unless it be said, as in the Borsch case, that 
the termination of the trust would entail an impairment of 
27 3 Scott, Trusts, sec. 329A. 
28 When such circumstances obtain, the trust may be terminated prior to the 
time fixed for termination even though all of the beneficiaries do not consent. 
The settlor or his successor in interest may have the trust rescinded where 
the creation of the trust was induced by fraud, duress, or mistake. Where the 
trust is created inter vivos the settlor may retain a power of revocation. If he 
does not reserve expressly or by implication a power of revocation, and 
the failure to reserve the power is not due to mistake or fraud, he cannot 
revoke without the consent of the beneficiaries. 3 Scott, Trusts, sec. 329A. 
29 3 Scott, Trusts, sec. 3 3 7. 
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the testator's right while living to dispose of his property 
as he saw fit, but such reasoning is entirely fanciful. 
There remains to be considered whether the trustee has 
such an interest in the res that the termination of the trust 
would deprive him of property without due process or invade 
some other constitutional right. In 1893 and 1897, statutes 
were enacted in New York which permitted the beneficiary 
of income from a trust, who is entitled to the remainder, to 
release his interest in the income thereby causing a termina-
tion of the trust.30 In Metcalfe v. Union Trust Co.31 the 
life beneficiary of a trust created in I 892, who had acquired 
the interests of the persons entitled to the res after her death, 
requested that the defendant trustee pay to her the trust 
funds. The court held that the statute in question was not 
intended to have a retroactive effect. But it was strongly 
asserted by several of the judges that the statute would not 
have been unconstitutional if given retroactive effect; that 
it would not have impaired the obligation of contracts; and 
30 N. Y. Laws r893, c. 452. Laws r897, c. 417, § 3 provided: "· .. 
Whenever a beneficiary in a trust for the receipt of the income of personal 
property is entitled to a remainder in the whole or a part of the principal 
fund so held in trust, subject to his beneficial estate for a life or lives, or a 
shorter term, he may release his interest in such income, and thereupon the 
estate of the trustee shall cease in that part of such principal fund to which 
such beneficiary has become entitled in remainder, and such trust estate merges 
in such remainder." This statute took the place of Laws r 893, c. 452, which 
provided that a "person beneficially interested in the whole or any part of 
the income of any trust heretofore or hereafter created for receipt of the rents 
and profits of lands or the income of personal property," who "shall have 
heretofore become or may hereafter be or become entitled" to the remainder 
in a trust fund, can release to himself all his interest in the income of the trust 
estate and, thereafter, the estate of the trustee is to cease and determine. The 
words "to any trust heretofore or hereafter created" were omitted from 
the r897 statute. Laws r897, c. 417, was repealed by Laws 1903, c. 88. 
31 181 N.Y. 39, 73 N. E. 498 (1905). 
It is to be noted that the Metcalfe case is the converse of Borsch's Estate, 
362 Pa. 581, 67 A. 2d 119 (r949) supra note r8. In the former, the life 
beneficiary acquired the remainder and sought to bring about a merger of 
life interest and remainder and an extinguishment of the trust. In the latter, 
the life beneficiary sought to extinguish the life estate by what in effect 
amounted to an acceleration of the remainders. 
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that the constitutional guaranty against the deprivation of 
one's property without due process of law has no application 
to the case of the trustee because he has no property in the 
ordinary sense of that word.32 "Property," said Judge Gray, 
32 Gray, J~ whose opinion was concurred in by O'Brien, J. A similar view 
was expressed by Cullen, C. J. Bartlett, J., thought that the res was property 
in the hands of the trustee and that the legislature could not deprive him of it. 
He was also of the opinion that the testator had a constitutional right that 
the legal title should remain in the trustee for the period of time necessary to 
carry out the terms of the trust. Vance, J., concurred with Bartlett, J. The 
other three judges expressed no views on the constitutional issue. 
The inferior courts were in disagreement as to whether the statutes could 
be given retroactive effect. In In re Heinze's Estate, 20 Misc. Rep. 3 7 r, 46 
N.Y. S. 247, 248 (1897) it was said: "It is contended in behalf of the 
trustee that its effect is to permit the taking of property without due process 
of law. This contention cannot be sustained. The trustee has no beneficial 
interest whatsoever in the fund except the right to receive compensation for 
services rendered by way of commissions. If the constitutional provision cited 
has any application whatever,. it would apply to the rights of the parties 
having a beneficial property interest in the fund. The legislative enactment 
in question does not deprive such owners of any right of property or own-
ership in the fund without their consent. The owners in remainder have made 
an absolute assignment of their interest in the fund to the life beneficiary. 
The right of property of the cestui que trust to receive the income during her 
life has been changed by a compliance with the terms of the statute to an 
absolute ownership of the fund. So far from depriving her of property, the 
effect of the statute and proceedings thereunder has been to confer upon her 
additional rights of property." 
In Oviatt v. Hopkins, 20 App. Div. r68, 46 N.Y. S. 959 (4th Dept. 1897) 
it was held that when the defendant trustee entered upon the execution of 
his trust, he became invested with the legal title to the trust estate, and 50 
long as the trust thus created continued, the beneficiary's interest therein did 
not extend beyond the right to enforce the execution of the trust. Prior to 
the attempted modification of the rule by legislative enactment, an express 
trust could not be terminated or dissolved until the expiration of the time, 
or the fulfillment of the purpose, for which it was created, except in case 
of unforeseen exigencies which rendered the execution of a trust impossible 
or impracticable, in which case a court of equity might decree a dissolution. 
Hence it was declared that if the statute were applied to the trust in question, 
the trustee would be deprived of property without due process of law (N. Y. 
Const., Art. I, sec. 6). Since the legal title vested in the trustee, it thereby 
became property in his hands. 
In Newcomb v. Newcomb, 33 Misc. Rep. 191, 68 N.Y. S. 430 (19oo), 
the court held that it was constrained to follow Oviatt v. Hopkins, even though 
the court recognized that in spite of the peculiar provisions of the New York 
statutes as to the estate vested in the trustee, there is no property right in him 
in the true sense of the term. 
The peculiar statutory provision alluded to in Newcomb v. Newcomb is 
N. Y. Real Prop. Law, sec. roo which declares that "the legal estate" is vested 
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"suggests some unrestricted, or exclusive, right to that which 
has been created or acquired." A trustee exercises certain 
powers for the sole benefit of the cestui que trust. He has 
no beneficial interest and can be removed whenever, in the 
judgment of a court of equity, it becomes necessary. This 
is an exercise of the inherent power of the court a~d is inde-
pendent of the instrument of appointment. 
''Although the legal estate is in the trustee, he but possesses 
a naked right, which is to be exercised, not for his own bene-
fit, but for that of another. His estate is commensurate with 
the trust duties imposed upon him, and it ceases when they 
are performed, or when they are at an end. The whole bene-
ficial proprietorship, or interest, is in the cestui que trust, for 
whom he holds the estate and who has the right to enforce 
the performance of the trust." 33 
In Brearley School v. Ward 34 the New York Court of 
Appeals held that a contract relation does not exist between 
the trustee and the creator of the trust where the trust was 
created by will. If the trust had been created by an inter 
vivos transfer and the settlor had still been alive, possibly the 
New York Court would have permitted the trustee the pro-
tection of the contracts clause on behalf of the settlor. The 
Louisiana Supreme Court, on the other hand, concluded that 
a devise to a trustee for the use of designated persons for 
life creates a relationship between the trustee and the testator 
that is a contractual one within the meaning of the famous 
case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. W oodward,35 and 
being a contractual relationship within the meaning of that 
in the trustee. This statute is quoted infra note so. Professor Richard B. 
Powell of the Columbia Law School testified before the House of Lords, in 
a case involving the application of the English income tax law to the income 
of a New York trust, that under this statute the cestui of a trust has no interest 
in the trust property or its income as property, but merely a chose in action. 
Archer-Shee v. Garland, [1931] A. C. 212. 
33 Metcalfe v. Union Trust Co., 181 N.Y. 39, 44, 73 N. E. 498, 499· 
34 zor N.Y. 358, 94 N. E. roor ( 1911) supra note 7· 
85 r N.H. 111, rev'd 4 Wheat. 518 (U.S. 1819). 
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case, the trustee, upon accepting the trust, acquires substan-
tial rights of which he cannot be divested by a repeal of the 
law authorizing the creation of the trust.36 Private trusts 
were not recognized in Louisiana until the act of I920,37 
which authorized them but which provided that the duration 
of a trust shall be limited to ten years after the death of the 
donor, except when the beneficiary is a minor at the time of 
the death of the donor, in which case it shall not exceed ten 
years after the minor has attained majority. The I920 act 
was repealed in I 9 3 5, 38 and beneficiaries of trusts created 
under the I 920 act were declared to be entitled to a full 
accounting and immediate delivery of any property held by 
trustees appointed under the authority of that act. It was 
the repeal statute which occasioned the pronouncement of the 
Louisiana court. The exact situation is quite unlikely to be 
repeated in any other state, for it is inconceivable that the 
legislatures of the states with the common-law tradition 
would ever attempt to abolish trusts as such. The Louisiana 
decision is significant, however, because it expresses a point 
of view opposite to that of the Metcalfe case. The Louisiana 
court presupposed a contractual relationship out of the pro-
visions of the act of I 920 which showed that the trustee was 
not a free agent. He could not, of his own volition, termi-
nate a trust created under the act, nor could he resign his 
trusteeship except with the written consent of all the bene-
36 Succession of Manning, 185 La. 894, I7I So. 68 (1936). Accord, 
Hagerty v. Clement, I95 La. 230, I96 So. 330 (I940); Succession of Forstner, 
I86 La. 577, 173 So. I 1 I (1937 ). 
37 La. Acts I92o, No. Io7. 
38 La. Acts, 3d Ex. Sess. I935, No. 7· 
The use of the private trust device has again been made possible to a 
limited degree by the Trust Estates Act of 1938. La. Acts 1938, No. 8I; 
La. Rev. Stat. I950, Tit. 9, sees. I791-2212. This statute is based upon the 
general common law of express, private trusts in the United States as stated 
in the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Trusts, as modified 
and supplemented by the Uniform Trusts Act, the Uniform Principal and 
Income Act, and the proposed Uniform Spendthrift Trusts Act. Stubbs, 
"Louisiana Trusts for the Louisiana Lawyer," I La. L. Rev. 774, 777 (I939). 
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ficiaries or their legal representatives, or by order of the 
court after due notification, and for good cause shown. 
In the respects enumerated by the court, the position of 
a trustee under the statute was not materially different from 
that of a trustee in common-law states. In the absence of 
express grant of such power to the trustee, either by the 
settlor or by statute, the trustee has no power to modify 
the terms of the trust or to end it.39 The trustee can resign 
only with the permission of a proper court, in accordance 
with the terms of the trust or with the consent of all the bene-
ficiaries who are sui juris.40 
THE TRUSTEE AS HAVING A VESTED INTEREST 
Does the trustee have a property interest in the res of 
the trust which will enable him successfully to assail a retro-
active statute on the ground that it deprives him of constitu-
tional rights where the beneficiaries, remaindermen, and all 
other interested persons do not object to the statute? The 
better view is that he does not have such property interest. 
The trustee has a bare legal title to enable him to carry out 
the purposes of the trust. His interest is the right to receive 
compensation while the trust lasts.41 If those who have the 
beneficial property do not object to the application of the 
statute, it seems absurd to treat the trustee as if he were the 
owner of an absolute title. 
In nonconstitutional cases the courts certainly do not treat 
the trustee as absolute owner. His creditors cannot satisfy 
their claims from the trust property.42 He cannot use the 
land for his own purposes.43 His function is to tend to the 
39 4 Bogert, Trusts, sec. I ooo. 
40 I Scott, Trusts, sec. I o 6. 
41 Newcomb v. Newcomb, 33 Misc. Rep. I9I, 68 N. Y. S. 430 ( 1900); 
Heinze's Estate, 20 Misc. Rep. 371, 46 N.Y. S. 247 (r897). Supra note 32. 
42 Ia Bogert, Trusts, sec. 146. 
43 2 Scott, Trusts, sec. I 70. I 7. 
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trust property and apply its revenues as provided in the 
trust instrument.44 It is true that he may convey title to a 
bona fide purchaser for value and thus extinguish the inter-
ests of the beneficiaries, but this result is reached not on the 
supposition that the trustee is owner but that it is commer-
cially expedient to protect the third person who relies upon 
the appearance of ownership.45 When the sole trustee dies, 
the legal title may pass to his heirs or personal representa-
tives but they are not entitled to administer the trust, merely 
holding title to the property pending the appointment of a 
new trustee by the court.46 The trustee can be removed for 
proper cause by the court which has supervision over the 
administration of trusts.47 
This does not mean that the trustee ought never to be 
allowed to invoke the protection of the property guarantees 
of the state and federal Constitutions. If the trustee is also 
one of the beneficiaries, he may protect his beneficial inter-
est. If the case concerns a statute whose application would 
deprive the beneficiaries or remaindermen unconstitutionally 
of their interests, it would be appropriate, and might well 
be the duty, of the trustee as representative of the trust 
estate to demand the protection of the Constitution. Here, 
although ostensibly he may be protecting his interest in the 
res, he is really defending the interests of the beneficial 
owners. Or. the case may be one in which the trustee is 
threatened with removal without cause on account of some 
unjustifiable statute. Now it is possible that he may invoke 
in his own name a due process clause,48 or even the contracts 
clause where he was named trustee in an inter vivos transfer. 
44 4 Bogert, Trusts, sec. 961. 
45 1 Scott, Trusts, sec. 130. 
46 1 Scott, Trusts, sec, 104. 
47 1 Scott, Trusts, sec. 107. 
48 See Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa. 86 ( 1847). The trustees of a public trust 
were removed from office by special statute without cause. 
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Yet even here, if there is an unconstitutional invasion of 
interests it is not in the trustee's being deprived of the legal 
title to the res, but in the loss of privileges and emoluments 
which the trusteeship carries with it.49 
Statutes in a number of jurisdictions declare that the 
whole estate or interest in real property held in trust is 
vested in the trustee and that the beneficiary takes no estate 
or interest therein.50 This would seem to be a legislative 
adoption of the in personam theory. It would appear to make 
the beneficiary's interest merely a power to obtain a decree 
against the trustee to enforce the trust. Where such a provi-
sion obtains, the effect may conceivably be to induce the court 
to hold that the trustee has a constitutionally protected inter-
est, as such, in the real property which constitutes the res 
of the trust. Professor Richard B. Powell of the Columbia 
Law School testified before the House of Lords, in a case 
involving the application of the English income tax law to 
the income of a New York trust, that under the New York 
statute the cestui of a trust has no interest in the trust prop-
erty or its income as property, but merely a chose in action.51 
49 It would seem to be clear that, except possibly where the trustee is 
removed unjustifiably and without cause, the due process clause does not 
guarantee to the trustee the continued right to compensation. Certainly so 
far as trust law is concerned, a trustee has no vested right to compensation. 
He is subject at all times to being removed by the court for cause. 3 Bogert, 
Trusts, sec. 527. Where a trust is terminated by a court, it is the duty of 
the trustee to obey the terms of the decree. 4 Bogert, Trusts, sec. Ioo3. On 
the other hand, the trustee may in some instances have, as against the settlor, 
a contract right to compensation which would have constitutional protection. 
5° Cal. Civ. Code, sec. 863 (Deering 1949); Mich. Comp. Laws 1948, 
sec. 555.16; Minn. Stat. 1949, sec. 501.17; Mont. Rev. Codes 1947, sec. 86-
Io8; N.D. Rev. Code 1943, 59-0314; S.D. Code 1939, sec. 59.0311; Wis. 
Stat. 1951, sec. 231.16. 
The New York statute, N.Y. Real Prop. Law, sec. 100, reads: "Except as 
otherwise prescribed in this chapter, an express trust, valid as such in its 
creation, shall vest in the trustee the legal estate, subject only to the execution 
of the trust, and the beneficiary shall not take any legal estate or interest in 
the property, but may enforce the performance of the trust." 
51 Archer-Shee v. Garland, [1931] A. C. 212.. 
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However, this statute was in effect when the Metcalfe 
case was decided and, even so, part of the court was 
firmly convinced that there would have been no depriva-
tion of property without due process or impairment of 
the obligation of contract in the retroactive application 
of a statute permitting a termination of the trust.52 
This view seems correct. In spite of the apparent effect of a 
statute declaring the whole interest to be in the trustee, it 
would appear that the purpose is to restrict the beneficiary's 
power to deal with the trust property rather than to invest 
the trustee with a vested property interest in the res which 
he would not have had in the absence of the statute.53 
A trustee is not an officer of the court as is an administrator 
or executor, but nevertheless his management of the trust 
property is subject to control and supervision by the court.54 
He is subject to the statutes which the legislature may from 
time to time pass regulating the mode of administering the 
trusteeship. It has been held that a statute which requires 
trustees to make annual reports to the court does not violate 
any constitutional rights of a trustee who became vested with 
the title prior to the enactment of the statute. 55 
Obviously, the trustee of a dry legal trust (who holds his 
title merely because the rightful claimant has failed to take 
the necessary judicial steps to acquire it) has no substantial 
interest in the land or other thing. Such a situation may occur 
when a trust has been completely fulfilled and nothing 
52 The divergent views of the inferior New York courts prior to the deci-
sion in the Metcalfe case are discussed supra note 3 2. 
53 See the comments of Judge Gray in the Metcalfe case, supra p. 261. 
In most of the jurisdictions having this type of statute, it is recognized 
that the beneficiary does have some kind of estate or interest in the property. 
1a Bogert, Trusts, sec. 184~ 
54 See generally, 2 Scott, Trusts, Chapter 7· 
55 McManus v. Park, 287 Mo. 109, 229 S. W. 211 (1920) (Held: Does 
not violate the provision in the Missouri Constitution prohibiting restrospective 
laws because it is purely remedial); Greenamyre's Estate, 133 Neb. 693, 276 
N. W. 686 (1937). 
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remains but the conveyance of the title to the beneficiaries, 
or when title has been acquired under circumstances where 
equity imposes a duty to hold the title for another. A stat-
ute which declares title to be transferred to and vested in the 
one who previously had the power to compel such transfer 
by an application to the proper tribunal is not unconstitu-
tional on the ground that it invades any rights of the 
trustee.56 
Likewise, where the sole trustee of an active trust dies 
and title passes under the common law to his heirs, they 
hold as bare trustees pending the appointment of a new 
trustee by the court 57 and have no vested interest in the 
premises. Consequently, the heirs can claim no deprivation 
of constitutional rights if the legislature divests them of 
legal title.58 
STATUTES WHICH AUTHORIZE THE SALE, MORTGAGE, OR 
LEASING OF TRUST PROPERTY 
Courts of equity have sometimes authorized trustees to 
depart from the stipulations of the settlor, and even to act 
contrary to his expressed wishes, where exigencies have arisen 
which made departure from the directions of the settlor 
necessary to the carrying out of the purpose of the trust.59 
It is assumed that the settlor would have assented to the 
departure in preference to a frustration of the purpose of 
the trust. Courts of equity will direct the sale of the trust 
56 Trustees of Presbytery of Jersey City v. Trustees of the First Presbyterian 
Church of Weehawken, SoN. J. L. 572, 78 Atl. 207 (Sup. Ct. I9Io). 
57 I Scott, Trusts, sec. I 04. 
58 Reformed Protestant Dutch Church v. Mott, 7 Paige 77 (N.Y. I8J8). 
59 Marsh v. Reed, I84 Ill. 263, 56 N. E. 306 (I9oo). The settlor expressly 
provided in the will which set up the trusts that the trustees should not execute 
leases of the premises to run for periods exceeding ten years. It subsequently 
developed that rentals to be derived from such short term leases were inad-
equate to carry out the purposes of the trusts, but that ample income could be 
derived from the premises if the trustees might execute ninety-nine year leases. 
Held: Trustees could execute ninety-nine year leases. 
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lands when lapse of time or changes as to the condition of 
the property have made it prudent and beneficial to alienate 
the lands.60 The same power exists in the legislature. In 
instances where a sale of the trust lands would promote the 
interests of all parties concerned, and beneficiaries and 
remaindermen do not object, statutes authorizing sale are 
valid when applied to existing trusts.61 The purchaser takes 
free of the trust.62 The power to authorize a sale certainly 
includes the power to authorize the execution of a mort-
gage 63 or the execution of a lease.64 
The question might well be asked whether there can really 
be any serious doubt as to the constitutionality of a statute 
which retroactively authorizes a sale, mortgage, or lease if 
the settlor is dead (as is usual when the problem arises) and 
there is no dissent on the part of beneficiaries and remainder-
men. The courts have not speculated at this point about 
possible rights of the deceased. The cases sustaining such 
retroactive legislation where the beneficiaries and remainder-
men have assented are almost devoid of discussion. The 
assumption is simply made that the legislature is doing what 
the settlor would have done or would have authorized if he 
had anticipated that the necessity would arise. 
Restrictions in the trust instrument against sale, mortgag-
ing, or leasing do not prevent the trustee's taking advantage 
60Stanley v. Colt, 72 U.S. II9 (I866); 2 Scott, Trusts, sec. I90.4; 3 
Bogert, Trusts, sec. 741. 
61 Stanley v. Colt, 72 U. S. II9 (I866); Kerr v. Kitchen, I7 Pa. 433 
(I85I); Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. 277 (I845); In re Van Horne, Petitioner, 
I8 R.I. 389, 28 Atl. 34I (I893). 
On Jan. I, I 94 7, statutes providing for sale of the complete ownership of 
trust res for reinvestment existed in eighteen jurisdictions: Ala., Conn., Del., 
Ind., Ky., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mont., N. H., N. J., N. Y., Ohio, Ore., Va., 
W.Va., Wis., and Wyo. Restatement, Property, sec. I79> 1T d (I948 Supp.). 
62Kerr v. Kitchen, I7 Pa. 433 (I85I); Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. 277 
(I845); Sergeant v. Kuhn, 2 Pa. 393 (I845); In re Van Horne, Petitioner, 
I8 R. I. 389, 28 Atl. 34I (I893). 
63 Russell v. Russell, I09 Conn. I87, I45 Atl. 648 (I929); Long v. Sim-
mons Female College, 2I8 Mass. I35, I05 N. E. 553 (I9I4). 
64 See Freeman's Estate, I8I Pa. 405, 37 Atl. 59 I (I897). 
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of a statute authorizing any of those acts,65 provided that the 
limitations do not create a condition upon the happening of 
which the estate is to be forfeited.66 Indeed, the only reason 
why the trustee would need to take advantage of the statute 
would be on account of some supposed defect of power re-
sulting from a limitation expressed or implied in the trust 
instrument. 
It cannot be safely assumed, however, that in every in-
stance the courts will sustain retroactive legislation authoriz-
ing sales, mortgages, or leases, merely because the remainder-
men and beneficiaries do not object. In the more recent cases 
where such legislation has been sustained, necessity was 
shown,67 the trustees acted under court supervision, and the 
proceeds were devoted to trust purposes and held subject to 
the same conditions as the original res. Out of respect for 
stability of property interests, the courts would be unlikely 
to permit an unnecessary or merely capricious sale, or the 
65 Stanley v. Colt, 72· U. S. I I9 (I866) (restriction against sale); Russell 
v. Russell, I09 Conn. I87, I45 Atl. 648 (I929) (language of will indicated 
that the testator did not intend that any further encumbrances be placed on 
property). 
66 Stanley v. Colt, 72 U. S. I I9 ( I866). 
67 Russell v. Russell, I09 Conn. I87, I45 Atl. 648 (I929): Buildings 
dilapidated and partially destroyed. Trustees desired to mortgage premises 
to secure sufficient money to rebuild. 
Stanley v. Colt, 72 U. S. I I 9 (I 866): Buildings old and dilapidated and 
earning only small income. Tenants would not rebuild because trust instrument 
contained restriction that no lease in excess of thirty years could be executed. 
Cestui could not rebuild. Trustees desired to sell. 
Long v. Simmons Female College, 2I8 Mass. I35> I05 N. E. 553 (I9I4): 
Buildings destroyed by fire. Trustees desired to mortgage premises. 
In re Van Horne, I8 R.I. 389,28 Atl. 34I (I893): House and lot devised 
to church for parsonage became unsuitable for this purpose because of change 
in neighborhood. Trustees desired to sell and use money to acquire parsonage 
in a more suitable neighborhood. 
In the early Pennsylvania cases cited supra notes 6I and 62, the reason for 
the sale seems to have been more a matter of expediency than of necessity. 
The sales were authorized by special statutes. So common was this sort of 
legislation that the courts hesitated to strike it down for fear of the effect on 
titles. Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. 277 (I845). See Chapter 3, note 244, and 
Chapter 4, note 77 supra. 
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encumbrancing of the trust land with mortgages and long 
term leases unless this were reasonably expedient. 
The legislature cannot deprive the beneficiary of his in-
terest involuntarily by authorizing a sale of the land and 
application of the proceeds to other purposes.68 The validity 
of legislation authorizing the sale of land in which there are 
future interests, is discussed elsewhere.69 
STATUTES DESIGNED TO PROTECT BONA FIDE ALIENEES OF 
THE TRUST RES 
The legislature may apply as to existing trusts, reasonable 
legislation designed to protect third persons who deal with 
the trust res although the effect of such legislation may some-
what detrimentally affect the right of the beneficiary to re-
dress misconduct of the trustee. It has been held that where 
the grantee of the trustee continues to have the burden of 
showing that he is a bona fide purchaser for value, a statute 
is valid which provides that the grantor shall be presumed to 
be the owner in fee if the deed by which he holds title desig-
68 General Board of State Hospitals for the Insane v. Robertson, I I 5 Va. 
527, 79 S. E. I064 (I9I3). Land was devised to the trustees of the state 
hospital for the use of the inmates. Subsequently, by two acts of legislation 
the trustees were authorized to sell the lands in question and to use the proceeds 
for the purposes of an epileptic colony. Held: The proposed diversion would 
deprive inmates of property without due process. 
But see Freeman's Estate, I 8 I ·Pa. 40 5, 3 7 Atl. 59 I (I 8 9 7). The trust 
was created some two years after the enactment of a statute which authorized 
the court to decree a sale where property is held in trust and "one or more 
persons required to consent . . . unreasonably withhold consent." Act of 
I853, P. L. 503. The will provided that no sale of any part of the real estate 
held in trust should be made without the consent in writing of the several 
cestuis. The trustees desired to make a long term lease (which the court con-
sidered to amount to a sale). Held: Statute does not unconstitutionally divest 
estates of parties sui juris of their property without their consent. It is a 
regulation merely of joint rights where the joint owners cannot agree in the 
control and disposition of the property. It defeats or interferes with the 
individual rights or property no differently and no further than does any 
other mode of changing their rights to severalty or of regulating the man-
agement until that is done. Furthermore, added the court, the settlor was an 
experienced lawyer and knew that the powers of leasing and selling which he 
gave to the trustee could be supplemented by the court. 
69 Chapter 4, p. I63. 
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nates him merely as "trustee" and no beneficiary is named or 
indicated.70 
The Illinois Torrens Act requires that when an instrument 
is filed in the registrar's office for the purpose of effecting a 
transfer of an interest in registered lands, and it shall appear 
that such transfer is upon trust, the registrar shall, unless 
such instrument expressly directs to the contrary, note in the 
certificate the words "in trust." When such land is there-
after to be transferred, it is provided that the registrar shall 
not issue a new certificate nor register title except in pursu-
ance of the order of some court, or upon the written opinion 
of two examiners that such transfer is in accordance with the 
true intent and meaning of the trust. The registration is de-
clared to be conclusive in favor of the grantee and of those 
claiming under him in good faith and for a valuable consider-
ation that such transfer is in accordance with the true intent 
and meaning of the trust.71 In People ex rel. Deneen v. 
Simon,72 the Illinois Supreme Court stated that the statute 
did no more than to change the law as to notice and to abro-
gate the rule in equity requiring the purchaser of trust prop-
erty to see to the application of the purchase money, both of 
which alterations of the law are well within the legislative 
capacity. It might be added that even in the absence of stat-
ute, the modern position of the courts is that the buyer is 
under no duty to inquire as to the purpose to which the pro-
ceeds are to be applied or to act as a surety to the cestui that 
the terms of the trust will be adhered to. 73 
70 Heitkemper v. Schmeer, 130 Ore. 644, 275 Pac. 55, rev'd 130 Ore. 644, 
281 Pac. 169 (1929). Ore. Laws 191I, c, 436. 
The court inferentially upheld also sec. 2 of the statute, which provided in 
effect that if the title of the grantee of a trustee is not called into question 
within five years after the recording of the grantee's deed, the presumption 
shall become conclusive that the person designated as trustee is sole owner. 
This section appears clearly sustainable as a limitation statute. 
71 Ill. Laws 1897, p. 141; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, c. 30, sees. 112, 113. 
72 176 Ill. 165, 52 N. E. 910 (1898). 
73 3 Bogert, Trusts, sec. 7 4 7. 
CHAPTER 6 
Estates and Interests Arising From Marriage 
"THE marriage relation is one of the most important 
of those fundamental social facts or relations upon 
which both civilized society and government rest. 
The interest of the public in its preservation and in 
the fair and equitable enjoyment and control of property 
rights by the husband and wife respectively, to the end that 
the relation may be permanent and satisfactory, is very great; 
consequently there can be no doubt of the right of the public 
to control and regulate both the relationship itself and the 
property rights of the parties to the relation by such reason-
able and appropriate regulations as do not unnecessarily in-
terfere with those rights of person and property which both 
state and federal Constitutions were framed to protect." 1 
Hardly any area of legislative reformation of the common 
law has provoked so much constitutional litigation as the 
statutes modifying the common-law marital estates. Begin-
ning with the middle of the nineteenth century and extend-
ing past the start of the twentieth, there was a veritable flood 
of cases contesting one or the other aspect of the statutes 
which altered the property rights of husband and wife to 
accord with modern concepts of public policy. Much of this 
litigation concerned problems no longer likely to recur, but 
it is essential that it all be mentioned in order that the dis-
cussion shall be complete. 
The courts should always take into consideration the de-
gree to which the welfare of the state depends upon wise 
policies in respect to the marital relation and the property in-
1 Boehmer v. Kalk, 155 Wis. 156, 16o, 144 N. W. 182, 183 (1913). 
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terests arising therefrom. Consequently, it might be sup-
posed that the courts will sustain any legislation which is 
equitable and works an adjustment of the husband's and 
wife's property interests which most spouses would approve. 
However, the courts, at least in the past, have tended to ig-
nore the public interest and to concentrate exclusively on the 
problem of the "vested interests" of the spouses with the 
result that reasonable statutes have been invalidated when 
given retroactive force. Some of the earlier cases even found 
that modification of the marital estates would impair the obli-
gation of the marriage contract.2 However, since the United 
States Supreme Court declared in Maynard v. Hill/ that the 
marriage contract is not a contract within the constitutional 
prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts, the 
contracts clause has been rarely resorted to as a protection 
against the retroactive application of legislation affecting the 
marital estates. 
HUSBAND'S ESTATE JURE UXORIS 
The husband's common-law interest in his wife's real 
property (and personalty) has been abrogated or substantial-
ly abolished by the Married Women's Property Acts assur-
ing to the wife the control of her property as if she were 
unmarried.4 It is thus only of academic interest now whether 
2 Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Barb. 295 (N. Y. 1848); Shuler v. Bull, 15 S. C. 
421 (1881). 
The curtesy cases have almost always been made to turn on the question of 
"vested rights" or "due process." Impairment of the obligation of the marriage 
contract has rarely been injected into the discussion. However, in the dower 
cases the courts sometimes have held that marital rights are contractual in 
nature. See cases discussed infra note 42. 
3 125 U. S. 190 (r888). 
4 2 Powell, Real Property, ~ 214. For a list of the statutes see 3 Vernier, 
American Family Laws, pp. 171-185 (1935). For a history of the estate jure 
uxoris see Haskins, "The Estate by the Marital Right," 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 
345 ( 1949). Prof. Haskins suggests that an occasional relic of the old rules 
appears in those jurisdictions which require the wife to obtain her husband's 
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the husband's estate jure uxoris might be abolished by the 
legislature, but a century ago the question was vital. 
The common law gave to the husband a life estate during 
coverture in all the freehold estates of inheritance which his 
wife had at the time of the marriage and which she subse-
quently acquired during coverture.5 He was entitled ab-
solutely to the rents and profits; his right to possession was 
exclusive. He could convey his estate without the consent of 
his wife. He became the owner of her personalty.6 Forcer-
, tain purposes he also became owner of her chattels real.7 In 
brief, the husband's power over his wife's property was very 
considerable.8 The Married Women's Property Acts, when 
applied in case of existing marriages and property already 
acquired by the wife, were often held to be unconstitutional 
consent in order to make an effective conveyance of her separate real property. 
E.g., Ala. Code 1945, Tit. 34, sec. 73 ( 1951 Supp.); Griffing v. Griffing, 
120 Fla. 913, 163 So. 141 (1935); Burn's Ind. Stat. Ann. 1933, sec. 38-102. 
52 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 484 (3d ed.). 
6 2 Blackstone, Commentaries, sec. 434· He also had the power to bring 
suit in his own name to recover personalty to which his wife was entitled. 
Jackson's Adm'rs v. Sublett, ro B. Mon. 467 (Ky. 185o); Leete v. State 
Bank, II5 Mo. r84, 21 S. W. 788 (1892); Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 
202 (1854); Dilley v. Henry's Ex'r, 25 N.J. L. 302 (Sup. Ct. 1855). If he 
recovered, the property belonged to him absolutely. Leete v. State Bank, 
Westervelt v. Gregg. Only if he died before reducing the chattel to possession, 
his wife surviving him, could she claim the chattel. Leete v. State Bank; 
Dilley v. Henry's Ex'r; Westervelt v. Gregg. 
7 He could dispose of them during his lifetime without her consent. They 
were liable for his debts. The rents and profits belonged to him. After her 
death the chattels real became his absolutely. However, if she survived him, 
and he had not disposed of them during his life, they belonged to her. 2 
Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 484 (3d ed.). 
8 However, courts of equity permitted property of every kind to be settled 
upon the wife to her own separate use free from control by the husband, and 
free from liability for his debts. Although at one time it was thought that 
the legal title had to be vested in trustees for this purpose, it became settled 
that if property was given or devised to a married woman for her separate 
and exclusive use, even without the intervention of trustees, her interest would 
be protected from the claims of her husband and his creditors. 2 Tiffany, Real 
Property, sec. 485 (3d ed.). While at law the husband might have been 
deemed to have an estate in his wife's separate property, it is manifest that 
the legislature could have constitutionally abolished such an estate, inasmuch 
as the husband was a mere trustee, the beneficial interest being in the wife. 
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so far as they purported to deprive the husband of the valua-
ble privileges accorded him by the common law.9 It was held 
that to allow the wife to convey her land without her hus-
band's consent would deprive him of property without due 
process.10 The husband's privilege to sue in his own name to 
9 It was held that the husband had a vested property right in his wife's 
personal property where the marriage and acquisition occurred prior to the 
Married Women's Statute and that this interest could not be taken from him 
without his consent, except in violation of constitutional provisions against 
the taking of private property without due process. Buchanan v. Lee, 69 Ind. 
117 (1879); Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Barb. 295 (N.Y. 1848). 
The cases were not in accord as to whether the husband's power to reduce 
his wife's chattels to possession was a vested interest which could not be taken 
from him without his consent. Some cases proceeded on the theory that the 
marriage contract clothed the husband with the power to reduce his wife's 
chattels to possession and that therefore the Married Women's Act could not 
be applied where the marriage occurred prior to the statute. Sperry v. Haslam, 
57 Ga. 412 (1876); Jackson's Adm'rs v. Sublett, ro B. Mon. 467 (Ky. 
1850); Dunn v. Sargent, 101 Mass. 336 (1869); Leete v. State Bank, II5 
Mo. 184, 21 S. W. 788 (r892); Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 202 (1854); 
Norris v. Beyea, 13 N.Y. 273 (1855); O'Connor v. Harris, 8r N. C. 279 
(1879). 
The opposing line of cases was based upon the proposition that the marriage 
contract did not give the husband any interest in his wife's chattels; but all 
that he had before the statute took effect was a power which the common law 
gave him to acquire an interest by taking the necessary steps if he chose to 
do so. Price v. Sessions, 3 How. 624 (U. S. 1844); Percy v. Cockrill, 53 
Fed. 872 (8th Cir. 1893); Clarke v. McCreary, 12 Smedes & M. 347 (2o 
Miss. 1849); Dilley v. Henry's Ex'r, 25 N. J. L. 302 (Sup. Ct. 1855); 
Goodyear v. Rumbaugh, 13 Pa. 480 (185o); Mellinger v. Bausman, 45 Pa. 
522 (1863); Alexander v. Alexander, 85 Va. 353, 7 S. E. 335 (1888); 
Keagy v. Trout, 85 Va. 390, 7 S. E. 329 (1888); Trapnell v. Conklyn, 37 
W.Va. 242, 16 S. E. 570 (1890). 
Where the wife's title to the personalty accrued subsequent to the statute 
(although the marriage occurred prior thereto), the cases were in accord 
that the husband had no right to the chattel. Winn v. Riley, 151 Mo. 61, 52 
S. W. 27 (1899); Holliday v. McMillan, 79 N.C. 315 (1878). 
10 Hubbard v. Hubbard, 77 Vt. 73, 58 Atl. 969 ( 1904). The statute 
purported to authorize the court of chancery, in its discretion, upon the petition 
of a married woman, to empower her to convey her real estate by separate 
deed as effectively as if the deed were executed by herself and her husband. 
The petitioner was no longer living with her husband because of his fault, 
but they were not divorced. Held: Statute violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. "We are not aware of any instance where the law has attempted to 
subject the right of a person to retain his estate to the decision of a magistrate 
unguided and unregulated save by his own sense of fairness and justice. The 
grant of discretionary power in the legal sense apparently implies the existence 
of certain well-understood principles within which it should be exercised. 
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recover possession of real property of his wife was declared 
to be a vested right.11 The right to rents and profits was held 
not to be divestible by the legislature.12 One court even went 
so far as to hold that land which the wife owned at the time 
of marriage could not be regarded as her property within the 
meaning of the Married Women's Act; the land must rather 
be considered to belong to her husband by virtue of the mar-
riage and so not within the scope of the statute.13 
But when a statute declares that a husband's property may be taken from 
him and bestowed upon his wife in the discretion of the chancellor, what are 
the well-understood principles which are to govern him in the exercise of his 
discretion?" (77 Vt. 73, 78, 58 Atl. 969, 970.) 
Erwin v. Puryear, 50 Ark. 356, 7 S. W. 449 (1887). This was a suit 
brought by the husband and wife to recover land from a grantee of the hus-
band on the ground that the husband had no interest to convey because the 
common-law marital interest had been excluded. Held: Vested rights cannot 
be taken away. 
Beale v. Knowles, 45 Me. 479 (1858). But see Peck v. Walton, 26 Vt. 82 
(I 8 53). This was a bill to foreclose a mortgage upon land belonging to the 
wife, the mortgage being executed by the husband alone since the passage of 
a statute which provided inter alia that no conveyance made during coverture 
by the husband of any interest in real estate belonging to his wife shall be 
valid, unless the wife join in the deed. The statute was held to be applicable 
here and that it was not unconstitutional as so applied. "But we do not regard 
this statute as having deprived the husband of any rights, which were not 
clearly subject to the control of the legislature. The husband is not in any 
sense deprived of the estate, which he might have in any of his wife's property, 
or of the right to any estate in her prospective acquisitions. The statute only 
provides a special mode of conveying this particular estate. And of this no 
man can complain. The legislature may at all times prescribe the mode of 
conveying property, and especially real property." (26 Vt. 82, 86.) 
11 Arnold v. Willis, 128 Mo. 145, 30 S. W. 517 (1895); Vanata v. 
Johnson, 170 Mo. 269, 70 S. W. 687 (1902). 
12 Rose v. Rose, 104 Ky. 48, 46 S. W. 524 (1898); Tucker v. Tucker's 
Adm'r, 165 Ky. 306, 176 S. W. 1173 (1915); Van Note v. Downey, 28 
N.J. L. 219 (Sup. Ct. 186o). See also Starr v. Hamilton, 22 Fed. Cas. 1107, 
No. 13,314 (C. C. D. Ore. 1867). 
Rose v. Rose was an action brought by a wife against her husband, from 
whom she was separated, to recover possession of her land, which he refused 
to surrender. Held for the husband. 
13Van Note v. Downey, 28 N.J. L. 219 (Sup. Ct. 186o). This was an 
action for trespass for taking cranberries from plaintiff's land. Defendant 
relied upon a license from plaintiff's wife. The premises in question belonged 
to her at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. She was no longer living with 
him because of his cruelty, but was not divorced. 
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There were a few courts which held that the husband's 
right to future rents and profits from land owned by the wife 
at the time of the statute was a mere possibility or expectancy 
which might never accrue and hence which could be defeated 
by legislation any time before accrual.14 One of these cases, 
however, was decided in I 9 I 5, by which time several previ-
ous statutes in this state had left nothing of the husband's 
estate jure uxoris except the power as head of the family to 
rent out his wife's lands and to collect the rents for the bene-
fit of the family.15 In another of these cases, the person con-
testing the legislation was not the husband, but a creditor of 
the husband who sought to attach crops on the wife's land in 
satisfaction of the husband's debt.16 The court declared that: 
"Statutes of this class rest upon the right of the state to 
regulate the marriage relation, and are liable to be altered 
14 Parlow v. Turner, 132 Tenn. 339, 178 S. W. 766 (1915); Taylor v. 
Taylor, 12 Lea (8o Tenn.) 490 (1883); Niles v. Hall, 64 Vt. 453, 25 Atl. 
479 (1892). 
15 Parlow v. Turner: "We deem it unnecessary to consider how far the 
matter may properly rest upon the extraordinary power which the legislature 
possesses over the marriage relation and the property rights of the pair inter 
sese, for the public good . . . It may be that the husband, by living apart 
from his wife, without her fault, abandoned his powers and duties as governor 
of the family, and hence his right to either rent out the land, or to collect 
the rents; but we do not decide this question, preferring to rest our judgment 
upon the broader ground." (132 Tenn. 339, 348, 178 S. W. 766, 768 
(1915).) In the earlier case of Taylor v. Taylor, there was also grave doubt 
expressed that the husband had a vested right before the passage of the statute 
in question to the rents and profits of his wife's land. It was thought that 
an earlier statute had substantially destroyed the estate jure uxoris in the rents 
and profits. 
16 Niles v. Hall, 64 Vt. 453, 25 Atl. 479 (1892). 
The weight of authority was that the Married Women's Statutes exempting 
the wife's land from the debts and liabilities of the husband could not be 
applied in case of debts contracted by the husband before the passage of the 
statute. It was held that to do so would impair the obligation of the creditor's 
contract. Cunningham v. Gray, 20 Mo. 170 (1854); Bouknight v. Epting, 
1 I S. C. 7 1 ( r 8 7 8). But as to debts contracted subsequent to the statute, it 
was held that there was no impairment of the obligation of the creditor's 
contract to apply the statute. Hitz v. National Bank, 111 U. S. 722 (I 8 8 3); 
Peck v. Walton, 26 Vt. 82 (1853). ("A subsequent creditor acquires no such 
interest in the husband's vested rights in his wife's property, or future acquisi-
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whenever the good of that relation is thought to require it. It 
would seriously abridge this beneficent control of the state 
to hold that a creditor of the husband has an interest in the 
prospective products of the wife's realty which cannot be 
taken away by legislation." 17 
That the legislature might have a paramount interest in al-
tering some of the incidents of the common-law marital es-
tate, however, was rarely conceded in the jure uxoris cases. 
The decisions were in accord that the husband had no in-
terest by virtue of the marriage contract in the future acquisi-
tions of the wife. Hence, it was held that· the Married 
Women's Act could be. applied in case of land acquired 
by the wife subsequent to the statute although the marriage 
had occurred prior thereto.18 
CURTESY 
Upon the birth alive of a child capable of inheriting the 
land of which the wife is seized during coverture in fee sim-
ple or fee tail, the husband at common law acquires an estate 
for his own life in his wife's land known as curtesy initiate.19 
The estate jure uxoris terminates with the death of the wife, 
whereas the estate of curtesy initiate, upon the death of the 
tions as to enable him to assert them, on behalf of the husband, or to base any 
rights of his own upon them.") 
In a number of cases involving creditors' rights, the decisions have been 
made to turn upon the constitutional rights of the husband or wife rather 
than upon the constitutional rights the creditors have in their own account. 
Sutton v. Askew, 66 N. C. 172 (1872) (statute enlarging dower); Rose v. 
Sanderson, 38 Ill. 247 (1865) (Married Women's Property Act); George v. 
Ransom, 15 Cal. 322 (186o) (Community Property Statute); Gladney 
v. Sydnor, 172 Mo. 318, 72 S. W. 554 (1903) (statute depriving husband of 
the power to alienate or encumber the homestead without wife's consent). 
17 Niles v. Hall, 64 Vt. 453, 455, 25 Atl. 479 (1892). For language in 
a similar vein see Rugh v. Ottenheimer, 6 Ore. 231 (1877). 
18 Conn v. White, 189 Ky. 185, 224 S. W. 764 (1920); Sleight v. Read, 
r8 Barb. 159 (N.Y. 1854); Bloodv. Humphrey, 17 Barb. 66o (N.Y. 1854); 
Taft v. Cannon, 34 Atl. 148 (R. I. 1896); Alexander v. Alexander, 85 Va. 
353, 7 S. E. 335 (r888). 
19 2. Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 572. (3d ed.). 
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wife (the husband surviving), merely changes its name to 
curtesy consummate and continues to endure for his lifetime. 
Curtesy initiate as it existed at common law before the 
universal statutory modifications did not confer a very much 
greater power of control over the wife's property while she 
was alive than did the estate jure uxoris. The husband had 
by virtue of marriage quite ample powers of disposal as it 
was. But a distinction was made between the two estates. It 
was said that before the birth of issue the husband had an 
estate through the right of his wife, but that after the birth of 
issue he held in his own right as if his wife had conveyed the 
estate to him for a valuable consideration.20 
The courts would not allow the Married Women's Act to 
divest the husband of the valuable incidents of the estate by 
the curtesy initiate, which had vested before the passage of 
the Act/1 as depriving him of the sole power to bring suit 
to recover the wife's lands,22 or as depriving him of the right 
to the rents and profits.23 It was also held that creditors could 
not be divested of the right to look to the husband's estate 
by curtesy initiate for satisfaction of the husband's debts.24 
The husband's interests in the wife's land were protected to 
a truly remarkable degree. In White v. White 25 the plain-
tiff instituted proceedings against her husband to establish 
what she claimed were her rights in relation to certain land 
she had inherited prior to the Married Women's Act, and to 
restrain the defendant from interfering with the same. She 
alleged in her complaint that the defendant had ejected her 
from the premises by force and refused to allow her to re-
20 Shortall v. Hinckley, 31 Ill. 219 (1863); Rose v. Sanderson, 38 Ill. 247 
(1865); Wyatt v. Smith, 25 W.Va. 813 (1885). 
21 Junction R. R. Co. v. Harris, 9 Ind. 184 (1857). 
22 Noble v. McFarland, 51 Ill. 226 (1869). 
23 White v. White, 5 Barb. 474 (N.Y. 1849). 
24 Wyatt v. Smith, 25 W.Va. 813 (1885); Rose v. Sanderson, 38 Ill. 247 
(186 5). 
25 5 Barb. 474 (N. Y. I 849). 
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turn and that he was in possession enjoying the rents and 
profits. Nevertheless, it was held that the Married Women's 
Act could not be applied here for to do so would violate the 
Constitution of New York which says that no one shall be 
deprived of any rights or privileges unless by the law of the 
land.26 
"I do not hesitate, in conclusion, to declare that the people of 
the state of New York have never delegated to their legis-
lature the power to divest the vested rights of property legal-
ly acquired by any citizen of the state, and transfer them to 
another, against the will of the owner. The legislature of 
this state can only lawfully exercise such powers as have been 
confided to it by the sovereign will of the people; and when 
it usurps powers not intrusted to it by the sovereign power, its 
acts are as utterly void as those of the most inferior magis-
trate in the land, in a case where he has transcended his juris-
diction." 27 
However, since marriage, seizin of the wife, and birth of 
issue are all requisite to create an estate by the curtesy initiate, 
it was held that marriage and birth of issue alone could not 
vest the husband with an interest in the future acquisitions 
of his wife. Hence it was deemed to be permissible for the 
legislature to provide that all property thereafter acquired 
by a married woman shall constitute her separate estate free 
from control by her husband.28 
The Married Women's Acts have relegated to history the 
valuable common-law privileges which the tenant by the 
curtesy initiate enjoyed in his wife's land during her lifetime. 
The institution of curtesy itself has ceased to be a source of 
estates for life in a majority of states, and even in those states 
where curtesy is still recognized, statutes have made great 
26 N. Y. Const. 1 846, Art. I, sec. x. 
27 5 Barb. 474, 485 (N. Y. 1 849). 
28 Allen v. Hanks, 136 U.S. 300 (1889) (" ..• that such regulations do 
not take away or impair any vested right of the husband, is, in our judgment, 
a proposition too clear to require argument or the citation of authorities to 
support it." p. 31 o). 
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changes in the common law.29 The trend of legislation is 
definitely toward the abolition of curtesy. Can a statutory 
change be applied so as to affect the rights of a man whose 
wife dies subsequent to the effective date of the statute? 
The cases are in agreement that if no child has been born 
of the marriage at the time of the act abolishing curtesy, the 
husband has no vested right to an estate for life in the lands 
of his wife if he survive her. The statute is valid to the ex-
tent that it abolishes the right of curtesy and gives him a 
dower share or gives him curtesy subject to a power of his 
wife to will all of her property.30 
It is also held that the husband does not acquire any vested 
rights to a tenancy by the curtesy in lands acquired by the 
wife subsequent to legislation abolishing curtesy, although 
marriage and birth of issue occurred before the passage of the 
statute.31 
29 2 Powell, Real Property, ~ 2 I 8. Powell states (as of Jan. I, I 9 52) that 
curtesy has completely ceased to exist in twenty-nine states and Alaska. He 
groups these states as follows: eight community property states, Ariz., Cal., 
Idaho, La., Nev., N. M., Tex., Wash.; twelve states, including Alaska in 
which the surviving husband takes a distributive share in his wife's property, 
Colo., Ga., Mich., Miss., Mont., N.D., Okla., S. C., S. D., Utah, Vt., Wyo.; 
nine states in which the husband has an interest in land owned by the wife 
during coverture, but this interest is defined in terms of some fraction of fee 
ownership, Fla., Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Me., Minn., Neb., Pa. Four states 
are listed in which the institution of curtesy is only an indirect or infrequent 
source of life estates, Conn., Mo., N. H., N. Y. Seventeen jurisdictions remain 
in which the institution of curtesy is still a potential source of estates for life, 
Ala., Ark., Del., D. C., Hawaii, Ky., Md., Mass., N. J., N. C., Ohio, Ore., 
R. I., Tenn., Va., W .. Va., and Wis. In Del., N. J., Ore., and Va. the 
prerequisite of issue born alive has been abolished. In twelve of these j urisdic-
tions the estate given to the husband applies only to a fraction (usually one-
third) of the wife's lands, instead of to all of them, Ark., Del., Hawaii, Ky., 
Md., Mass., N. J., Ohio, Ore., Va., W. Va., Wis. In Tenn. and Hawaii the 
wife can bar curtesy by inter vivos conveyance, and by either inter vivos ot 
testamentary conveyances in Ark., D. C., and Wis. In the remaining eleven 
states, the husband's curtesy cannot be barred by either deed or will of the 
wife, without the husband's consent. 
30 Henson v. Moore, I04 Ill. 403 (1882); Phillips v. Farley, II2 Ky. 
837, 66 S. W. Ioo6 (I902); Hathon v. Lyon, 2 Mich. 93 (I85I); Richard-
son v. Richardson, I50 N.C. 549, 64 S. E. po (I909). 
31 Scaife v. McKee, 298 Pa. 33, 148 Atl. 37 (1929), appeal dismissed 
281 U.S. 771 (1929); Jackson v. Jackson, 144 Ill. 274,33 N. E. 51 (r893); 
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When we come, however, to the cases wherein the husband 
is a tenant by the curtesy initiate when the statute abolishing 
curtesy goes into effect (i.e., acquisition of the property by 
the wife and birth of issue occurred before the statute), we 
find the authorities in discord. Some cases hold that a tenant 
by the curtesy initiate cannot be deprived of curtesy consum-
mate.32 The dearth of reasoning in these cases makes it dif-
ficult for one to see how the expectancy of the husband to 
have a life estate in his wife's land if he should outlive her 
can be considered a vested right. The explanation must lie 
in the theory that upon birth of issue, the husband acquires 
a life estate for his life, an estate which is perfected without 
regard to the wife's death and in no way enlarged by her 
death. Yet this reasoning seems entirely too anachronistic to 
account for the holding in the New Jersey cases cited below, 
which, it will be observed, were decided quite recently. Cur-
tesy consummate was not abolished in that state until 1927, 
but the husband's estate of freehold during his wife's life-
time was abolished by the Married Women's Act of 1852.33 
By 1927, then, curtesy in New Jersey differed from dower 
only in the respect that the husband was entitled to a life 
estate in all the lands of which his wife died seized rather 
Mitchell v. Violett, 104 Ky. 77, 47 S. W. 195 (1898); Thurber v. Town-
send, 22 N.Y. 517 (186o); In re Curtis' Will, 61 Hun 372, 16 N.Y. S. 180 
(1891); Moninger v. Ritner, 104 Pa. 298 (1883). 
32 Anastasia v. Anastasia, 138 N.J. Eq. 26o, 47 A. zd 879 (Ch. 1946); 
Walker v. Bennett, 107 N.J. Eq. 151, 152 Atl. 9 (Ch. 1930). N.J. Pamph. 
Laws 1927, p. 128, as amended by Pamph. Laws 1928, p. 38o, provides that 
the husband of a woman who dies intestate, or otherwise, shall be endowed 
for life of one-half of the land of which his wife "was seized of an estate 
of inheritance, at any time during coverture" whether issue is born alive or not. 
N.J. Rev. Stat. 1937, 3:37-2. 
Jackson v. Jackson, 144 Ill. 274, 33 N. E. 51 (1893) (surviving husband 
given a life estate in one-third of land of which wife was seized during 
coverture); Mitchell v. Violett, 104 Ky. 77, 47 S. W. 195 (1898) (surviving 
husband given life estate in one-third of land which was seized during mar-
riage). 
33 Laws 1852, p. 407. 
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than in one-third. However, New Jersey is the only state 
in which it is held that inchoate dower is a constitutionally 
indivestible interest.34 New Jersey seems to have greater re-
gard for property interests emanating from the marital estate 
than do her sister states. 
An opposing line of cases maintains that the legislature 
may pass an act which will prevent the accrual of curtesy 
consummate on the wife's death. These holdings are based 
upon the proposition that the Married Women's Acts 
have divested curtesy initiate of all its valuable privileges, 
leaving only an uncertain interest, a bare expectancy, very 
much like dower.35 In Day v. Burgess 36 the Tennessee Su-
preme Court described the husband's right to curtesy as an 
heritage of the feudal age, having no basis in natural or moral 
right. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has concluded 
curtesy and dower are equally subject to legislative modifica-
tion.37 
34 Walker v. Bennett, Io7 N.J. Eq. I5I, I 52 Atl. 9 (Ch. 1930). 
35 McNeer v. McNeer, I42 Ill. 388, 32 N. E. 68I (1892) (surviving 
husband limited to dower); Hill v. Chambers, 30 Mich. 422 (I 874); Duncan 
v. Duncan, 324 Mo. I67, 23 S. W. 2d 91 (I929); Day v. Burgess, 139 Tenn. 
559> 202 s. w. 9II (I9I8). 
36 I39 Tenn. 559, 202 S. W. 91 I (I9I8) supra note 35· 
37 Moninger v. Ritner, I04 Pa. 298 (I883). This case concerned a statute 
which provided that a married woman, who has been deserted by her husband, 
and who has been decreed to have the privileges of a feme sole trader, may 
convey, without her husband's joining in the deed, a good title to her separate 
real estate which she acquires during coverture, free from any subsequent 
claim by her husband as tenant by the curtesy. Pa. Act of 1855, P. L. 430. 
The husband in the case, who deserted his wife in her lifetime, carne back 
after her death to claim his curtesy from the remote grantee of his wife. As 
a violator of the marriage contract he was not in a very good position to 
rely on the sanctity of the contract and the rights flowing from it. "It is, 
therefore, a curious travesty on the constitutional powers of this Common-
wealth to say that the legislature can make no provision for the support of an 
abandoned wife, if such provision happens to impinge upon some marital 
right of the derelict husband," said the court. 
In a decision rendered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1929, involv-
ing a constitutional problem similar to that in Moninger v. Ritner, it was 
declared that marriage is not such a contract as is contemplated by the con-
stitutional provisions, and that the property rights arising solely by reason 
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The problems in regard to the abolition of curtesy could 
be resolved without difficulty if the husband were held to 
take curtesy consummate by inheritance. However, it is 
firmly established at common law that the husband is not an 
heir of his wife.38 There is really no reason, even so, why a 
court today should have any difficulty in sustaining the stat-
ute abolishing curtesy. Conceding that the husband has a 
pres~nt interest in the expectancy of an estate in his wife's 
land upon her death, this interest stands no better in modern 
law than does dower, which the courts have always held to 
be subject to legislative control. Where the requirement of 
issue has been abolished (which is true in a number of juris-
dictions still recognizing curtesy) there is no difference at 
all between curtesy and dower except perhaps as to the por-
tion of the land of the decedent spouse subject to the respec-
tive estate. Curtesy has outgrown its usefulnes as an institu-
tion with the decline of the dominance of the male.39 
After the death of the wife, it is probably too late to apply 
the statute abolishing curtesy. Although there are no cases 
involving curtesy, this is the result indicated in the dower 
cases, where the husband's death preceded the effective date 
of the statute. 
DOWER 
Quite unlike the solicitude which the courts have felt for 
the common-law interests of the husband in his wife's land 
of marriage are within legislative control. Scaife v. McKee, 298 Pa. 33, 148 
Atl. 37 (1929), appeal dismissed 281 U. S. 771 (1929). 
ss Reese v. Stires, 87 N. J. Eq. 32, 103 Atl. 679 (Ch. 1917); Hopper v. 
Gurtman, 126 N.J. L. 263, 18 A. 2d 245 (Err. & App. 1941). 2 Tiffany, 
Real Property, sec. 552 (3d ed.). 
39 Professor Powell suggests that the states still having traces of curtesy 
would do well to substitute a distributive share in the wife's assets as the 
proper provision for the surviving husband, giving this share such protection 
against destruction by will of the wife as social policy may dictate. 2 Powell, 
Real Property,~ 219. 
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is their attitude towards dower. Dower, it is professed, is a 
sacred institution, yet it seems that only after the husband's 
death does dower rise to the dignity of a vested estate which 
cannot be divested by the legislature. Inchoate dower is sub-
ject to legislative diminution and may even be abolished 
without any estate at all allowed to the widow in her hus-
band's property. With almost monotonous uniformity, the 
cases declare that it is competent for the legislature to modify 
the law on the subject of dower in a manner unfavorably 
affecting the wife, even after the acquisition by the husband 
of the land in which dower is claimed. In doing so, the legis-
lature does not impair the obligation of a contract nor deprive 
the wife of any right of property vested in her.40 
40Randall v. Krieger, 23 Wall. 137 (U.S. 1874) (sustaining a curative 
statute which validated a void power of attorney); Adams v. Adams, 147 
Fla. 267, 2 So. 2d 855 (1941), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial 
federal question, 314 U. S. 572 (1941); Fletcher v. Felker, 97 Fed. Supp. 
755 (W. D. Ark. 1951); Boyd v. Harrison, 36 Ala. 533 (186o); Ware v. 
Owens, 42 Ala. 212 (1868); Steinhagen v. Trull, 320 Ill. 382, rsr N. E. 
250 (1926) (widow required to elect between dower and a statutory portion 
in lieu of dower); May v. Fletcher, 40 Ind. 575 (r872); Sturdevant v. 
Norris, 30 Iowa 65 (r87o); Buffington v. Grosvenor, 46 Kan. 730, 27 Pac. 
137 (r891); Magee v. Young, 40 Miss. 164 (r866); In re Lawrence's 
Will, r Redf. Sur. 310 (N.Y. 1848); Ruby v. Ruby, 112 W.Va. 62, 163 
S. E. 717 (1932); Bennett v. Harms, 51 Wis. 251, 8 N. W. 222 (r88r). 
In support of the proposition that dower is not an interest based on contracts 
see Skelly Oil Co. v. Murphy, r8o Ark. 1023, 24 S. W. zd 314 (1930); 
Scaife v. McKee, 298 Pa. 33, 148 Atl. 37 (1929), appeal dismissed 281 
U.S. 771 (1929); Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37 (r857); Lucas v. Sawyer, 17 
Iowa 5 r 7 ( r 8 64) . 
As of Jan. 1, 1952, dower has completely ceased to exist in twenty-six 
states and is of comparatively little significance in seven more. 2 Powell, 
Real Preperty, ~ 217. Powell groups the twenty-six states as follows: eight 
community property states, Ariz., Cal., Idaho, La., Nev., N. M., Tex., and 
Wash.; seven states in which the wife receives a distributive share in the 
assets owned by the deceased husband at death, which share is in no instance 
restricted to an estate for life, Colo., Miss., N. D., Okla., S. D., Vt., Wyo.; 
ten states in which the wife has a considerably protected "dower" interest 
in land owned by the husband during coverture, but this interest is defined in 
terms of some fraction of fee ownership, Fla., Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Me., 
Minn., Neb., Pa., and Utah. In five of the seven states wherein dower is of 
greatly lessened significance, the surviving spouse is given the power to 
elect an intestate share which in the vast majority of cases is so much more 
valuable than the dower estate for life that dower is seldom taken, Mich., Mo., 
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This postulate would not be astounding if in lieu of in-
choate dower the wife were always assured of at least some 
estate in her husband's land for support during widowhood, 
but in many cases the constitutionality of the statute was 
sustained even though the application to the given case de-
prived the wife of all interest whatsoever in her husband's 
estate.41 
Mont., N. H., and S. C. The nineteen jurisdictions in which dower is still 
significant are Ala., Alaska, Ark., Del., D. C., Ga., Hawaii, Ky., Md., 
Mass., N. J., N. C., Ohio, Ore., R. I., Tenn., Va., W. Va., and Wis. In 
eleven of these jurisdictions dower still consists (as at common law) of 
an estate for life in one-third of the lands in which the husband had an 
estate of inheritance during coverture, Ark., Del., D. C., Hawaii, Md., Mass., 
N. C., R. I., Va., W. Va., and Wis. In three jurisdictions the estate for life 
has been enlarged so as to exist in more than one-third of the husband's 
lands, Ala., N. J., Ore. In three jurisdictions the widow has an estate for 
life only in respect to land owned by the husband at time of death, Alaska, 
Ga., Tenn. 
41 In Strong v. Clem, 12 Ind. 37 (x859) the widow got neither dower nor 
the statutory interest which had been substituted for dower. The husband 
conveyed his land, the wife not joining, when common-law dower was still 
recognized in that state. The purchaser, of course, took subject to the wife's 
inchoate dower. The husband died after a statute which abolished dower 
and gave the widow instead a one-third interest in fee in the lands of which 
her deceased husband was seized during coverture. It was held that the 
legislature had abolished dower without preserving rights already existing 
and furthermore that the widow in the instant case could not claim a fee 
interest because when the land was sold it was encumbered only by the right 
of the wife to a life estate in one-third in case she should outlive her husband. 
The legislature could not enact that one-third of the fee purchased and paid 
for should be divested out of the purchaser and given to the widow of the 
deceased grantor. Accord, Wiseman v. Beckwith, 90 Ind. 185 (1883); Carr 
v. Brady, 64 Ind. 28 (1878); Frantz v. Harrow, 13 Ind. 507 (1859). 
Approved, Logan v. Walton, 12 Ind. 639 (1859); Giles v. Gullion, 13 Ind. 
487 (1859). 
The same result as in Strong v. Clem was reached on similar facts in 
Morrison v. Rice, 35 Minn. 436, 29 N. W. 168 (1886). The courts in other 
jurisdictions have avoided the result reached in Strong v. Clem by construing 
the statute as abolishing the name of dower merely but not the existing rights. 
Hilton v. Thatcher, 31 Utah 360, 88 Pac. 20 (1906). 
Strong v. Clem is not extraordinary in holding that there is no deprivation 
of constitutional rights in taking away the wife's inchoate dower and giving 
her nothing in return. The courts have sustained statutes which defined 
dower in terms of the land of which the husband died seized, thus extinguishing 
the inchoate interest of the wife in lands which her husband conveyed without 
her joinder at the time when dower was defined as at common law. Hatcher 
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Only a handful of cases are to be found in which it is held, 
or even intimated, that there is any inhibition upon the power 
v. Buford, 6o Ark. I69, 29 S. W. 64I (I895); Bates v. McDowell, 58 
Miss. 8I5 (r88I); Reeves v. Haynes, 88 N.C. 310 (I883). 
Also the following statutes have been sustained when retroactively applied: 
a statute providing that if lands held in joint ownership are sold in lieu of 
partition in kind, the wife's inchoate dower in her husband's undivided interest 
is wiped out, Turner v. Turner, I85 Va. 505, 39 S. E. 2d 299 (I946) (this, 
however, is the law in many jurisdictions even in the absence of statute, see 
infra note 49) ; a statute providing that the wife shall not have dower in 
lands divested by execution sale, or sale under decree of a court, or by deed 
of assignment for the benefit of creditors, or by insolvency or bankruptcy 
proceedings, Griswold v. McGee, I02 Minn. I I4, I I 2 N. W. I02o, aff>d 
II3 N. W. 382 (I907); Lucas v. Sawyer, I7 Iowa 5I7 (I864); a statute 
barring dower unless the widow perfect her right by filing within a 
designated time an instrument declaring her intention to take dower, Classen 
v. Heath, 389 Ill. I83, 58 N. E. 2d 889 (I945); a statute simply abolishing 
dower, Hamilton v. Hirsch, 2 Wash. Ter. 223, 5 Pac. 2I5 (I884); Richards 
v. Bellingham Bay Land Co., 54 Fed. 209 (9th Cir. I893); a statute denying 
dower to a wife who kills her husband, Hamblin v. Marchant, I03 Kan. 
so8, I75 P. 678, aff'd I04 Kan. 689, I8o P. 8rr (r919); a statute barring 
dower when the wife leaves her husband without such cause as would 
entitle her to divorce, Thornburg v. Thornburg, Adm'r, 18 W. Va. 522 
(I88r). 
In Skelly Oil Co. v. Murphy, I8o Ark. 1023, 24 S. W. 2d 314 (1930), 
the statute read: "The inchoate right of dower of any married woman in any 
real estate in the State of Arkansas is hereby barred in all cases when the 
husband has been barred of his title, or of any interest in said property for 
fifteen years or more, and also in real estate or interest therein conveyed 
by the husband, but not signed by his wife when such conveyance is made 
fifteen years ago or more. This act shall affect her inchoate right of dower irt 
real estate only when the husband has now been barred fifteen years or more, 
or, when a conveyance by him without her signature has been made fifteen 
years or more prior to the passage of this act." Ark. Acts r 92 3, p. 2 50; 
now, with modifications, Ark. Stat. 1947, sec. 6r-u6. The conveyance in 
question was made forty-five years prior to the statute so the wife's interest 
was immediately extinguished when the statute went into effect. Held: The 
statute did not violate any constitutionally protected interests in cutting off 
the interests of the non joining wife. 
In Ruby v. Ruby, II2 W. Va. 62, r63 S. E. 7I7 (1932), the statute 
provided: "If the owner of real estate contracts to sell the same, and the 
spouse of such owner refuses to release his or her dower interest therein, 
such owner, or the person contracting to purchase, may institute suit in 
chancery for the purpose of having the dower interest released and the contract 
consummated. The court on the hearing may, in its discretion, and if satisfied 
that the contract of sale was made in good faith and without design to 
force such spouse to part with his or her dower interest, approve the sale and 
price, and cause to be paid to such spouse such gross sum, . . . as shall 
represent the present value of his or her inchoate dower right. Upon such 
payment as aforesaid the court shall order a release of the dower interest, 
by such spouse, or if he or she refuses to execute the release, then by a special 
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of the legislature to abolish inchoate dower.42 Most of these 
cases, moreover, are contradicted by other cases in the same 
commission to be appointed by the court for the purpose, which release shall 
be effectual to pass the property to the purchaser free of such right of dower." 
W.Va. Rev. Code 1931, sec. 43-1-6; W.Va. Code 1949, sec. 4101 (1951 
Supp.). Held: The statute makes the inchoate dower more valuable. Formerly 
the value of such right was entirely contingent upon the wife surviving her 
husband. Now, its present value may be ascertained and decreed to her. 
In keeping with its broad powers over inchoate dower, the legislature need 
not treat all widows alike. Reasonable classifications may be made. The 
Florida Stepmother Act, Fla. Gen. Acts 1939, c. 18999, provided that when 
a decedent is survived by his widow and lineal descendants and none of such 
lineal descendants is the lineal descendant of such widow, dower shall be 
limited to a child's part. It was contended in Adams v. Adams, that this 
statute contravened the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
147 Fla. 267, 2 So. 2d 855 (1941), appeal dismissed for want of substantial 
federal question, 314 U.S. 572 (1941). The widow in this case was not 
the mother of the children of the decedent, of which there were several. The 
marriage occurred prior to the effective date of the statute; the death of the 
husband was subsequent thereto. Said the court: "Having been accustomed 
to think of dower in terms of one-third of the husband's estate, it is at first 
blush somewhat shocking to our traditional concepts to see it reduced to a 
child's part for the childless widow, but we :find no reaSon to hold that such 
a change violates any constitutional mandate. Neither can we say that 
such a classification is not based on a fair and reasonable economy. Since 
the basis of it is bread for the widow and children, it cannot be said that 
the needs of the childless widow are the equivalent of those of the widow 
on whom there are dependent children. There is no sounder basis for 
classification than economic considerations." ( 147 Fla. 267, 272, 2 So. 
2d 855, 857.) 
The statutes of a number of states limit the interest of the widow who was 
a nonresident of the state during coverture to the lands of which her husband 
died seized, while giving to the widow who was a resident during coverture 
an interest in all the real estate of which the husband was seized at any time 
during the marriage. E.g., Kan. Gen. Stat. 1949, sec. 59-505, infra note 59· 
Where such exceptions occur, the husband may transfer good title without the 
signature of the nonresident wife. The fact that the wife does not accompany 
her husband to the state, or has abandoned him and gone to another state, 
and may or may not have obtained a divorce elsewhere, thus leaving the 
status of the parties in doubt, and making it difficult to obtain a perfect transfer 
of title in many cases, may be deemed a sufficient reason for prescribing a 
different rule of conveyance where the wife is nonresident than where she is 
resident. Ferry v. Spokane, Portland and Seattle R. R. Co., 268 F. 117, aff'd 
258 U.S. 314 (1921); Thornburn v. Doscher, 32 Fed. 810 (C. C. D. Ore. 
1887); Buffington v. Grosvenor, 46 Kan. 730,27 Pac. 137 (1891). Statutes of 
this sort have been held applicable in cases where the marriage and acquisition 
of the land occurred before the statutes made any distinction between the 
rights of resident and nonresident wives. Miner v. Morgan, 83 Neb. 400, 
II9 N. W. 781 (1909); Bennett v. Harms, 51 Wis. 251, 8 N. W. 222 (1881). 
42 Walker v. Bennett, 107 N.J. Eq. 151, 152 Atl. 9 (Ch. 1930); In re 
Alexander, 53 N.J. Eq. 96, 30 Atl. 817 (Ch. 1894); Lawrence v. Miller, 
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state adhering to the majority view, that is, that the inchoate 
right of dower which a wife has in her husband's real estate 
in his lifetime is not a vested interest but a mere expectancy 
of property in the future and may be changed, modified, or 
2 Comst. 245 (N. Y. 1849) (intimates that a statute extinguishing dower 
right where marriage and seizin occurred prior to the statute would be invalid 
as impairing the obligation of the marriage contract) ; Williams v. Courtney, 
77 Mo. 587, 588 (1883) ("The right of a married woman to dower in 
the land of her husband rests on as secure a foundation as does the fee of 
the husband in such land. From the moment the facts of marriage and seisin 
concur, the right of the wife in this regard becomes a title paramount to that 
of any person claiming under the husband by subsequent act." "The Act of 
the legislature authorizing the guardian of plaintiff's deceased husband to 
sell the land in question, does not profess to confer any authority on such 
guardian to dispose of plaintiff's dower right, and if it did, it would violate 
that constitutional provision which forbids that any one be deprived of 
property 'without due process of law', and would be a legislative attempt to 
take the property of one person and bestow it upon another."); Russell v. 
Rumsey, 35 Ill. 362 (1864) (declaring unconstitutional a curative statute 
insofar as it purported to validate a defective release of dower) ; O'Kelley 
v. Williams, 84 N. C. 241 (1881); Grove v. Todd, 41 Md. 633 (1874) 
(declaring invalid a curative statute as applied to a defectively executed 
release of dower). 
O'Kelley v. Williams, 84 N.C. 241 (1881) supra was an action to recover 
land. The defendant acquired the fee in 1867 at which time the statute gave 
a widow dower in one-third in fee of all the land of which her husband 
was seized at any time during coverture. This statute was repealed in 1869. 
In 1876 defendant mortgaged the land, his wife not joining. The land was 
sold on default to plaintiff. Held: Wife is entitled to dower according to 
the statute in effect when the land was acquired. When defendant acquired 
the land he took it subject to the laws existing at the time, for laws which 
subsist at the time and place form part of the contract, as if they were 
expressly referred to or incorporated into its terms. The wife's dower was 
vested before the repealing statute and was not affected thereby, for a "vested 
right" cannot be destroyed by a subsequent repealing statute. "'We by no means 
subscribe to the doctrine that a right vested by operation of law is less 
inviolable than when it arises from contract; where it once exists, no matter 
how, it is inviolable.'" (84 N. C. 244, quoted from Reade, J. in Sutton v. 
Askew.) 
In Green v. Estabrook, 168 Ind. 123, 79 N. E. 373 (1907) it was remarked 
that " 'marriage is a valuable consideration, and a married woman is regarded 
as a purchaser for a valuable consideration of all property which accrues 
to her by virtue of the marriage.' " This case had to do with a statute 
providing that in cases of judicial sales of real property in which a married 
woman has an inchoate interest by virtue of her marriage, where the inchoate 
interest is not directed to be barred by virtue of such sale, such interest shall 
become absolute and vested in the wife in the same manner as if her husband 
were to die. 
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abolished by legislative action.43 Only the New Jersey courts 
have adhered consistently to the proposition that a statute 
unfavorably affecting the wife's inchoate dower may not be 
applied to cases where the marriage and the acquisition of the 
land by the husband occurred before the passage of the act.44 
In Russell v. Rumsey/5 the Illinois Supreme Court said: 
"Dower, although its enjoyment is contingent, is as much a 
vested right as a contingent remainder or reversion, and it 
would not be contended that they are not vested rights al-
though not vested estates. Although the estate is contingent 
the right to dower is vested and absolute." 46 
Why has not this view commended itself to more courts? In-
choate dower does in many respects resemble a contingent 
remainder. It is a present interest which may possibly vest 
in possession upon the happening of certain events. It at-
taches upon the husband's land upon marriage or as soon 
43 Classen v. Heath, 389 Ill. 183, 58 N. E. 2d 889 (1945); Steinhagen v. 
Trull, po Ill. 382, 151 N. E. 250 (1926); Choteau v. Missouri Pac. R. R. 
Co., 122 Mo. 375, 22 S. W. 458, 30 S. W. 299 (1894). 
44 In re Alexander, 53 N.J. Eq. 96, 30 Atl. 817 (Ch. 1894), supra note 42, 
the court refused to give retroactive application to a statute providing: "That 
whenever it shall appear to the satisfaction of the chancellor that any person 
entitled to an inchoate right of dower in any lands or premises is incapacitated, 
by mental infirmity or disease, from executing a valid release or relinquishment 
of the same, and that the interests of the owner of such lands and premises 
require and would be promoted by a sale of the same, it shall be lawful 
for the chancellor to direct such release or relinquishment to be made by any 
master of the court of chancery, whose deed or deeds executed in behalf of such 
person shall release and bar all the dower, or right, or estate in dower, to 
which such person may be entitled or would at any time succeed or become 
entitled to in the lands and premises therein mentioned." N. J. Laws 1878, 
p. 193; covered now, N.J. Rev. Stat. 1937, 3:40-r. 
45 35 Ill. 362 (1864), supra note 42. 
46 35 Ill. 362, 374 (1864). 
In Tatum v. Tatum, 174 Ark. IIo, 295 S. W. 720 ( 19:1.7) it was held, 
on the view that inchoate dower is very much like the interest of a contingent 
remainderman, that a wife's interest in oil and gas being extracted from land 
which the husband had conveyed without his wife's joinder would be pro-
tected by impounding a sufficient portion thereof. 
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thereafter as the husband becomes seized, and it cannot be 
discharged by the husband without his wife's concurrence.47 
It is true that at common law inchoate dower cannot be 
transferred to one having no interest in the land, or attached 
for the wife's debts, and that it entitles the wife to no control 
over her husband's land.48 But neither can a contingent re-
mainder generally be sold or attached for debts at common 
law, nor can the owner of a contingent remainder by virtue 
of his ownership exercise any extensive control over the land. 
Even so, a contingent remainder may not be divested by the 
legislature. 
In a number of respects inchoate dower is regarded as a 
valuable interest, which the law will recognize and protect at 
the instance of the wife.49 The cases which hold that inchoate 
47 2 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 507 (3d ed.). 
A conveyance by the husband before marriage will bar the wife's dower, 
since seizin or title during coverture is then wanting. But this general rule 
is subject to an exception in America in case the conveyance by the prospective 
husband is in fraud of dower, that is, intended to deprive the wife of dower, 
Then she is entitled to dower as if the deed had not been made. 2 Tiffany, 
Real Property, sec. 506 (3d ed.). 
48 See generally 2 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 53 3 (3d ed.); 2 Thompson, 
Real Property, sees. 894, 898 (Perm. ed.). 
49 See generally 2 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 533 (3d ed.). 
The wife's inchoate dower has been regarded as a sufficient interest to 
enable her to redeem from a mortgage. Tuller v. Detroit Trust Co., 259 
Mich. 670, 244 N. W. 197 ( 1932). When the husband fraudulently alienates 
his land in order to deprive her of dower, or by fraud induces her to release 
her right, the law will protect her rights at her instance. Clifford v. Kampfe, 
147 N.Y. 383,42 N. E. 1 (1895); Bonfoey v. Bayne, roo Mich. 82, 58 N. W. 
620 ( 1894). A wife has been granted an injunction against waste by an 
alienee of the husband. Brown v. Brown, 94 S.C. 492, 78 S. E. 447 (1913); 
Tatum v. Tatum, 174 Ark. no, 295 S. W. 720 (1927). The release of 
dower is a valuable consideration which will support a transfer to, or contract 
with the wife. Flynn v. Flynn, 171 Mass. 312, soN. E. 650 (r898); In re 
Alexander, 53 N.J. Eq. 96, 30 Atl. 817 (Ch. 1894). The husband's trustee 
in bankruptcy cannot sell the husband's property free of the wife's dower 
right without the wife's consent. In re Macklem, 28 F. 2d 417 (D. Md. 1928). 
On the other hand according to the weight of authority the inchoate dower 
interest of the wife of a cotenant is barred by a sale in partition proceedings. 
Lee v. Lindell, 22 Mo. 202 (1855); Holley v. Glover, 36 S. C. 404, 1.5 
S. E. 6os (1891); Turner v. Turner, 185 Va. sos, 39 S. E. 2d 299 (1946). 
This view is apparently not based upon any concept that inchoate dower is 
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dower is entirely within legislative control seem somewhat 
inconsistent with the regard which the courts generally have 
for the wife's interest. This apparent inconsistency would not 
be of any great significance, to be sure, if only the courts had 
not gone so far out of the way to protect the marital interests 
of the husband from legislative impairment. The marital 
estates, being conceived for the social welfare, should not be 
beyond reasonable legislative alteration. But in comparison 
with the husband, the wife has indeed been treated shabbily 
by the courts. Few courts have felt the necessity for examin-
ing into the reason why curtesy and the estate jure uxoris 
were frequently deemed to be "vested rights" while dower 
was, and is, treated as a mere encumbrance on the husband's 
power of alienation whenever the wife seeks to assert consti-
tutional rights in her marital estate. 
That dower is not within the protection of the constitu-
tional guarantees has usually been accepted without question. 
When the earliest of the cases dealing with the constitutional-
ity of legislation altering the marital property interests were 
decided, a married woman did not have a legal personality. 
Consequently, it was assumed that she could have no constitu-
tionally protected rights in the land of her husband. The 
pattern of the law having been established by those cases has 
carried under juridical inertia to the present. The law re-
flects the former predominance of the male. 
This is what some courts have said in rationalization of the 
doctrine that inchoate dower is not a constitutionally pro-
tected interest: 
"The wife has no property in the husband's lands, pending 
the coverture. Three things are necessary to the perfection 
not a property interest, but upon the broad ground that the right of the 
tenants to have partition of the common property is paramount to the rights 
of the wife. Unless the purchaser takes free of dower claims, a sale of the land 
at its actual value. will be difficult if not impossible. 
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of the right of dower. These three things are, marriage, 
seizin, and the husband's death. Before the husband's death, 
the wife has not a contingent right. Her attitude is that of 
a party in whose favor two prerequisites to the existence of a 
right have occurred, and a remaining one is wanting. She 
has a mere expectancy, resting upon the probability that the 
remaining requisite may, at some future time, come into 
existence." 50 
"Many reasons might be adduced to show the propriety and 
soundness of these decisions, as that marriage and the rights 
incident thereto are public matters, to be regulated and 
governed by law; that the obligations arising are, for the 
most part, created by the public law and subject to the public 
will, and not to that of the parties; that it is a connection of 
such a solemn character, and one upon which the public wel-
fare so greatly depends, that the society and the public have 
as great an interest in its regulation as the parties themselves; 
that its rights and obligations are derived rather from the 
law than from the contract itself; that it is not strictly a con-
tract, but a status, resembling rather the relation of father 
and child, than that of a contract between two parties; that, 
by the common law, the legal existence of one of the parties 
is merged into that of the other; that, as a status, it is essen-
tially dependent upon the sovereign will, and is not embraced 
in the constitutional interdict or acts impairing the obligations 
of contracts . . ." 51 
"In this light, marriage is more than a contract. It is not a 
mere matter of pecuniary consideration. It is a great public 
institution, giving character to our whole civil policy. Hence, 
as between husband and wife, there is no constitutional pro-
vision protecting the marriage itself, or the property incident· 
to it, from legislative control, by general law, upon such 
terms as public policy may dictate." 52 
"If marriage itself can be . . . dissolved at the discretion 
of the sovereign power, whether by general or special statute 
5° Boyd v. Harrison, 36 Ala. 533, 538 (x86o). 
51 Lucas v. Sawyer, 17 Iowa 517, 522 (1864). 
52 Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37, so (1857). 
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matters not, surely the mere incident of marriage-proper-
ty-is not higher or more sacred than the principal thing it-
self. The support of the wife is an incident of the marriage. 
The legislature can vary that at pleasure." 53 
"It is wholly given by law, and the power that gave it may 
increase, diminish, or otherwise alter it, or wholly take it 
away." 54 
Dower Consummate 
Upon the death of the husband the wife's inchoate dower 
matures and becomes a right to possession. The cases are in 
accord that the widow's dower right cannot be detrimentally 
affected by a statute enacted after her husband's death. 55 The 
widow's right is held not to be subject to legislative impair-
ment even though at the time the statute went into effect 
the widow had not yet been assigned her dower.56 The dif-
ference is merely between the right of possession, and the 
right to be in possession. 
THE STATUTORY MARITAL RIGHTS 
Many states have abolished curtesy and dower as they 
existed at common law.57 Where the statute which replaces 
curtesy or dower gives to the surviving spouse a distributive 
share in the real estate owned by the deceased spouse at 
53 Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37, 53 (1857). 
54 Ferry v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry. Co., 258 U.S. 314, 320 (1922). 
55Burke v. Barron, 8 Iowa 132 (1859); Swartz v. Andrews, 137 Iowa 
261, 114 N. W. 888 (1908); Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480 (r863) (statute 
validating voidable release of dower); McAllister v. Dexter & P. R. Co., 
ro6 Me. 371, 76 Atl. 891 (1910); Talbot v. Talbot, 14 R. I. 57 (1882) 
(statute provided that owner of fee subject to dower can be relieved of any 
dower charge by giving security for the payment to the widow of the annual 
value of the dower). 
06 Burke v. Barron, 8 Iowa 132 (1859); Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480 
( 1 8 6 3) . Supra note 55. 
57 For a general survey of the statutes, see 2 Powell, Real Property, 'lf'lf 217, 
218. Prof. Powell's analysis is set forth in notes 29 and 40 supra. 
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death, 58 it is not probable that the courts would recognize any 
kind of vested interest in the continued existence of such stat-
ute. The comparatively unlimited power of the legislature 
to change the course of descent of property at death and to 
restrict the testamentary power has been discussed in Chap-
ter 3· 
But when the statute confers upon the surviving spouse an 
interest (often termed "dower" or "curtesy") in the land of 
which the deceased spouse was seized at any time during 
coverture,59 how extensive is the legislative power to repeal 
such statute in relation to existing marriages and property 
already acquired? A present interest of some kind is clearly 
indicated under statutes of this sort upon marriage and ac-
quisition of land by the respective spouse. However, this 
interest does not carry with it any power of disposition over 
the property of the owning spouse during his or her lifetime. 
In one aspect, the marital right under the statute is merely 
a restraint on the power of alienation of the owning spouse 
58 E.g., Vt. Stat. Rev. 1947, sec. 3027: "A widow shall be entitled in 
fee to one-third in value of all the real estate of which her husband died 
seised, and if such husband left surviving him only orie heir and such heir 
is the issue of the widow or the heir by adoption of both the widow and 
husband, she shall be entitled to half in value of such real estate in fee, . • ." 
Vt. Stat. Rev. 1947, sec. 3040: "A widower shall be entitled in fee to one-
third in value of all the real estate of which his wife died seised. If the wife 
left surviving her only one heir and such heir is the issue of the husband 
or the heir by adoption of both the wife and husband, he shall be entitled to 
half in value of such real estate in fee, and his interest may be assigned and 
set out to him in the same manner as is provided for the severance of the 
interest of the widow in the real estate of her deceased husband . . ." 
59 E.g., Kan. Gen. Stat. 1949, sec. 59-505: "Also, the surviving spouse 
shall be entitled to receive one-half of all real estate of which the decedent 
at any time during the marriage was seized or possessed and to the disposition 
whereof the survivor shall not have consented in writing, or by a will, or by 
an election as provided by law to take under a will, except such real estate 
as has been sold on execution or judicial sale, or taken by other legal 
proceeding: Provided, That the surviving spouse shall not be entitled to 
any interest under the provisions of this section in any real estate of which 
such decedent in his lifetime made a conveyance, when such spouse at the time 
of the conveyance was not a resident of this state and never had been during 
the existence of the marriage relation." 
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or on his or her power of testamentary disposition. In its 
other aspect, that is from the point of the nonowning spouse, 
the right is primarily an expectancy not dissimilar to inchoate 
dower at common law, except as to the quantity and extent 
of the share which may be received. The distinction made 
in the cases between the divestibility of curtesy and of in-
choate dower has quite clearly no application under the stat-
utes. While under the particular statute, the share which the 
surviving husband receives may be greater or less than the 
share of the surviving wife, before the death of the owning 
spouse the statutory interest of the husband is not distinguish-
able in nature from the statutory interest of the wife. It is 
submitted that these interests (whether they are called dow-
er or curtesy and whether the surviving spouse receives his 
or her share for life or in fee) may, at any time before they 
are vested in possession or ownership by the death of the 
owning spouse, be abolished by the legislature to the same 
extent that inchoate dower may be abolished. The cases 
touching at all on this point indicate that statutory curtesy 
and dower stand on the same ground as common-law dower 
and that interests given by the statutes may always be altered 
or taken away in the public interest by the same power which 
gave them.60 
60 Adams v. Adams, 147 Fla. 267, 2 So. 2d 855 (1941), appeal dismissed 
for want of substantial federal question, 314 U. S. 572 (1941) (statutory 
dower); Scaife v. McKee, 298 Pa. 33, 148 Atl. 37 (1929), appeal dismissed 
281 U.S. 771 (1929) (statutory curtesy); Hamblin v. Marchant, 104 Kan. 
689, 18o Pac. 81r (1919) (statutory dower); Griswold v. McGee, 102 
Minn. 114, 112 N. W. 1020, aff'd 113 N. W. 382 (1907) (statutory dower); 
Lane v. St. Louis Trust Co., 356 Mo. 76, 201 S. W. 2d 288 (1947) (statutory 
curtesy); Ruby v. Ruby, 112 W.Va. 62, 163 S. E. 717 (1932) supra note 41. 
But see O'Kelley v. Williams, 84 N.C. 281 (1881) supra note 42, which holds 
that statutory dower cannot be extinguished. 
In Lane v. St. Louis Trust Co., 356 Mo. 76, 201 S. W. zd 288 (1947) 
supra, the decedent, Mrs. Wackwitz, set up a trust the income from which 
was to be paid to her for life, and if she should not survive her husband, the 
trustee at her death, upon receipt of an agreement in writing properly executed 
by the husband waiving all his marital rights in her estate, was to pay the trust 
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HOMESTEAD 
The courts are often prone to speak of the homestead ex-
emption as an "estate," but the homestead statutes and con-
stitutional provisions do not in any true sense create marital 
estates. The exemption may usually be enjoyed by an un-
married person if he is head of a family. Although the stat-
utes and constitutional provisions vary greatly from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction, it may be said that in general there are 
two aspects to the homestead: ( r) an exemption privilege to 
the householder, (2) an estate in the widow and children 
after the householder's death.61 
It is uniformly held that a debtor has no vested interest 
in a statute fixing exemptions, and that a retrospective effect 
fund to him. In case he should refuse to execute a waiver, then the trust 
fund was to go to her sons. Mr. Wackwitz abandoned his wife in I935 
and was not with her at death, but shortly after her death he executed a 
written agreement and delivered same to the trustee claiming the trust fund 
and relinquishing his marital rights. The decedent's sons sought to prevent 
Wackwitz from claiming the res. They contended that he lost all interest by 
virtue of Mo. Rev. Stat. I939> sec. 337 (Laws I9I9, p. 104, now Mo. Rev. 
Stat. I949, sec. 469.2Io) which provides that if a man leave his wife or 
abandon her without reasonable cause and shall continue to live apart from 
her for a period of one year next preceding her death, "he shall be forever 
barred from his inheritance, jointure, homestead, curtesy and statutory allow-
ances in the real and personal property of the wife" unless she voluntarily 
becomes reconciled. At the time when the trust instrument was executed, the 
statute did not provide for forfeiture of the husband's marital rights in his 
wife's estate. Held: The trust agreement gave Wackwitz no present interest. 
It merely amounted to an offer that if she failed to survive him, he could take 
the trust fund upon consideration that he waive his marital rights in her estate. 
In order for there to be a binding contract between the husband and the 
estate, there must have been a valid consideration upon which the contract 
could rest. But Wackwitz had forfeited his marital rights by abandoning his 
wife and consequently had nothing to offer as consideration for his acceptance 
of the fund. 
61 2 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 576 (3d ed.); 5 Tiffany, Real Property, 
sec. I 32 (3d ed.). 
During coverture the wife is usually accorded the power to prevent her 
husband from alienating the homestead. I Powell, Real Property, ~ I 2 I. But 
this power ought never to be referred to as an "estate." It is a mere veto 
power. Bushnell v. Loomis, 234 Mo. 37I, I37 S. W. 257 (19I I); Castlebury 
v. Maynard, 95 N.C. 281 (x886). 
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can be given to a statute which abolishes or diminishes the 
exemption without depriving the debtor of any constitutional 
right.62 As to the homesteader, the homestead is a mere 
privilege of exemption which the sovereign may recall.63 
"It seems absurd to say that a debtor can have a vested right 
to keep property against a debt contracted for its purchase, or, 
indeed a vested right in any exemption. As to him, the law 
grants the exemption as a boon, and because the state does 
not care to lend its aid to push an unfortunate to the wall. 
Its own public policy requires it, and that alone is the object. 
The exemption is not a right of the debtor." 64 
62Myers v. Field, I46 Ill. so, 34 N. E. 424 (I893); In re Ragan's 
Estate, 237 Iowa 6I9, 23 N. W. 2d 52 I (I946); Laird v. Carton, I96 
N. Y. I69, 89 N. E. 822 (I909); Myers v. Moran, II3 App. Div. 427, 
99 N.Y. S. 269 (1906); Chandler v. Horne, 23 Ohio App. I, 154 N. E. 748 
(1926); Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Morris, 25 Tenn. App. 272, 156 S. W. 
zd 350 (1941); Majors v. Carter, I75 Tenn. 450, I35 S. W. 2d 924 (I94o), 
One case holds contra to statement in text. Bridgman v. Wilcut, 4 G. 
Greene 563 (Iowa I 854). 
63 Noble v. Hook, 24 Cal. 638 (1864); Sparger v. Cumpton, 54 Ga. 356 
(1875); Harris v. Glenn, 56 Ga. 94 (I876); Mooney v. Moriarty, 36 
Ill. App. 175 (1889); Bramble v. State, Use of Twilly, 4I Md. 435 (1874) 
(but holds that under statute providing "when the whole shall be sold and the 
defendant whose property is so sold, shall have one hundred dollars of the 
proceeds in money" the right of the debtor becomes vested upon full con-
summation of the sale and cannot be taken from him by subsequent statute); 
Bushnell v. Loomis, 234 Mo. 371, I37 S. W. 257 (1911); Leak v. Gay, 
107 N.C. 468, 12 S. E. 31:1. (189o); Walkup v. Covington, I73 Tenn. 7, 
114 S. W. 2d 45 (1938). 
The homestead exemption is created by constitutional provision in some 
states. E. g., Tex. Const., Art. XVI, sees. so, 5 I, and 52; N. C. Const., Art. 
X, sec. 2. This does not have the effect of giving to the homestead exemption 
an indivestible quality which it would not have had if created by statute. 
A constitutional exemption may not ordinarily be repealed by a statute, but 
only for the reason that constitutional provisions are paramount to, and not 
amendable by, statute. Nolan v. Reed, 38 Tex. 425 (1873); Bassett v. 
Messner, 30 Tex. 604 (1868); Bull v. Conroe, I3 Wis. 260 (186o). Con-
stitutional exemptions may be terminated by the same power that created 
them-the people--expressing their sovereign will by amendment of the 
organic law. Harris v. Glenn, 56 Ga. 94 (1876). 
The exemption called a "homestead" must be distinguished from the property 
in which the exemption exists, also called a "homestead." Of course, the 
property in which the exemption exists cannot be arbitrarily taken from the 
owner. 
64 Sparger v. Cumpton, 54 Ga. 356, 360 (I875). 
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The homestead estate which vests in the widow and minor 
children on the death of the householder, under the provi-
sions of the usual statute, is still essentially an exemption 
from sale by creditors but it also has the aspect of an estate 
for the life of the widow and minority of the children (so 
long as the conditions prescribed in the statute for the exist-
ence of a homestead are complied with).65 It has been said 
that this homestead estate in the widow and minor children 
cannot, under the constitution, be detrimentally affected by a 
change in the statutes.66 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
Eight of our states have adopted from the Spanish-
Mexican jurisprudence the community property system_.67 
Not being a part of the English common law, the community 
property system is premised largely on legislation. Although 
there is some variation in the laws of the different states, 
65 E.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. 1949, sec. 513.495: "-r. If any such housekeeper 
or head of a family shall die and leave surviving him a widow or minor 
children, his homestead, to the value aforesaid, shall pass to and vest in such 
widow or children, or if there be both, to such widow and children, and 
continue for their benefit until the youngest child attains the age of twenty-
one years and until the remarriage or death of such widow; that is to say, 
the children of the deceased shall have the joint right of occupation with 
the widow until they shall arrive, respectively, at the age of twenty-one 
years, and the widow shall have the right to occupy such homestead during 
her life or widowhood, and upon her remarriage or death it shall pass to 
the heirs of the husband. 2. Such homestead shall not be subject to sale for 
the debts of the husband unless such debts be legally charged thereon during 
his lifetime, for which said debts the same may be sold free from the rights 
of such widow, children or heirs; provided, that if the heirs of the husband 
be persons other than his children, then such homestead may be sold for the 
payment of any debt or debts legally established against his estate, subject 
to the rights of the widow. Such sale in either case may be made at any 
time during the course of administration of the husband's estate, and to be 
conducted in like manner and the same proceedings had as is or may be 
provided by law for sales of other real estate for the payment of the debts 
of deceased persons." 
66 Sparger v. Cumpton, 54 Ga. 356 (1875); Bushnell v. Loomis, 234 Mo. 
37I> 137 S. W. 257 (1911); Balance v. Gordon, 247 Mo. 119, 152 S. W. 
358 (1912). 
67 Ariz., Cal., Idaho, La., N. M., Nev., Tex., and Wash. 
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basically the community property concept is that all prop-
erty acquired by either the husband or wife during marriage, 
except that which is acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or de-
scent by one or the other, shall be deemed t~e common prop-
erty of the husband and wife.68 
Most of the constitutional cases concerning community 
property have arisen out of attempts of the legislature to en-
hance the power of the wife over the disposition of the com-
munity property. Two lines of apparently conflicting cases 
have arisen, whose divergence stems from opposing views 
of the nature of the interests of the spouses in the community 
property prior to the statute. One line of cases takes the 
view that the property is an acquet of the community and 
not the sole property of the one in whose name it was bought, 
although by the law existing at the time, the husband was 
given the exclusive management, control, and power of sale 
of such property. This power was given him, not because 
he was the exclusive owner, but because by law he was cre-
ated the agent of the community. The power which he had 
was a simple power or agency to be exercised by him, not 
alone in his own interest, but also as a trustee for the interest 
of his wife. According to this line of cases, the husband is 
not deprived of property without due process when he loses 
the power to dispose of the community property without the 
consent of his wife,69 or when his absolute power of disposi-
tion is taken away and his wife is given the power of testa-
mentary disposition over one half of the community property 
681. Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 437 (3d ed.). 
69 Arnett v. Reade, 220 U. S. 311 (1911). Held: It is plain that the 
wife has a greater interest than the mere possibility of an expectant heir. 
It is conceded that she has a remedy for an alienation made in fraud of her 
rights by her husband. As she is protected against fraud already, we can 
conceive no reason why the legislature can not make that protection more 
effectual by requiring her concurrence in her husband's deed; Arnold v. 
Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S. W. 799 (1925); Mabie v. Whittaker, 10 
Wash. 656, 39 Pac. 172 (1895). 
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(in default of such testamentary disposition the share of the 
deceased wife to descend to her issue) ; 70 or when he is de-
nied control over the personal earnings of the wife and the 
rents and interests from her separate real and personal prop-
erty.71 
The opposing line of cases consists entirely of California 
decisions. In Spreckels v. Spreckels 72 it was held that an 
amendment to the Civil Code in I 89 I, forbidding the hus-
band to give away community property without the consent 
of the wife in writing,73 could not be construed retroactively, 
because prior to the amendment the code vested in the hus-
band all of the elements of absolute ownership of the com-
munity property 74 to the exclusion of the wife, whose in-
terest was a mere expectancy. 
70Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 484 (x9oo). At the time the community 
property was acquired, the statute provided that upon the death of the 
husband or wife the whole of the community property subject to the com-
munity debts shall go to the survivor. Held: The husband had no vested 
right to succeed to the whole upon his wife's death. 
71 Scott v. Scott, 170 S. W. 273 (Tex. App. 1914). 
72 n6 Cal. 339, 48 Pac. 228 (1897). The court said: "The community 
property, as a rule, constitutes the earnings, gains, and savings of a man 
during his whole lifetime. If he can make presents to his friends, provide for 
indigent relatives, make advancements to his children, it must be from this 
property. To deprive him of this power is certainly to divest him of a 
property right. This argument need not, however, be pursued further, because 
counsel admit that, if the husband is the owner of the property, then a statute 
which makes the exercise of the right to dispose of it subject to the will of 
another is unconstitutional." I x6 Cal. 339, 348, 48 Pac. 228, 23 r. Accord, 
Clavo v. Clavo, xo Cal. App. 447, 102 Pac. 556 (1909). In the Clavo case 
it was contended that the question was not necessarily involved in the 
Spreckels case, and what was there said was pure dictum. Held: "An exam-
ination of the reported case will show that the parties to the action treated the 
point decided as involved, and the opinion is devoted almost entirely to its 
consideration." 
73 Cal. Stats. 1891, p. 425. 
74Cal. Civil Code 1888, sec. 172: "The husband has the management and 
control of the community property, with the like absolute power of dis-
position (other than testamentary) as he has of his separate estate." 
The interest of the wife was described as a "mere expectancy" in Stewart 
v. Stewart, 199 Cal. 318, 249 Pac. 197 (1926). See Simmons, "Interests of a 
Wife in California Community Property," 22 Calif. L. Rev. 404 (1934). 
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The code was again amended in I 91 7 by the addition of 
the following section: 
"The husband has the management and control of the com-
munity real property but the wife must join with him in 
executing any instrument by which such community real 
property or any interest therein is leased for a longer period 
than one year, or is sold, conveyed, or incumbered " 75 
Prior to this amendment the code read: 
"The husband has the management and control of the com-
munity property, with the like absolute power of disposition, 
other than testamentary, as he has of his separate estate; pro-
vided, however, that he cannot make a gift of such com-
munity property, or convey the same without a valuable 
consideration, unless the wife, in writing, consent there-
to " 76 
The court also held that this amendment could not be ap-
plied where the community property had been acquired prior 
thereto.77 
The legislature of 1923 amended the California Civil 
Code to read as follows: 
75 Cal. Stats. 1917, sec. 1pa, p. 829; as amended, Cal. Civil Code Ann., 
sec. 172a (Deering 1949). 
76 Cal. Civil Code, sec. 172 (Kerr 1908). 
77Roberts v. Wehmeyer, 191 Cal. 6o1, 218 Pac. 22 (1923). The land 
in question was purchased after the effective date of Stats. 1917 but with 
community funds acquired prior to the effective date. A house was later 
built on the land, also with community funds. In 1920 Mrs. Roberts 
commenced divorce proceedings against her husband. She was granted an · 
interlocutory decree on Feb. 2o, 1920, and was awarded the real estate. 
However, in January, 1920, Roberts conveyed the premises to defendant 
Wehmeyer and received as consideration a promissory note. Mrs. Roberts 
did not join in this conveyance. Held: Prior to the adoption of the amendment 
the husband had the unqualified power to sell the community property and 
the wife had a mere expectancy and not any title or interest she could 
convey; hence to apply the amendment where the property had been acquired 
previous to the amendment and thus require the husband to obtain the consent 
of his wife to transfer realty would deprive him of vested rights. It is true, 
said the court, that the legislature may prescribe regulations concerning the 
method of transferring property and change them at will, but such regula-
tions may not contravene the constitutional guarantee that one may not 
be deprived of his property without due process. 
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"Upon the death of either husband or wife, one-half of the 
community property belongs to the surviving spouse; the 
other half is subject to the testamentary disposition of the 
decedent " 78 
In McKay v. Lauriston et al./9 where the wife predeceased 
the husband, the Supreme Court declined to give retroactive 
78 Cal. Stats. I923, p. 29, sec. I, amendi~g Cal. Civ. Code, sec. I40I; 
now, Cal. Probate Code Ann., sec. 20 I (Deermg I949). 
Prior to amendment in I923, Cal. Civil Code, sec. I40I provided that upon 
death of the wife the entire community property belongs to the surviving 
husband. Sec. I402 provided that upon death of the husband, one-half of the 
community property goes to the surviving wife, and the other half is subject 
to the testamentary disposition of the husband. 
79 204 Cal. 557, 269 Pac. 519 (I928). The land in question was acquired 
by Mr. and Mrs. McKay in I9I8. No change in the ownership of this 
property was made up to I 9 2 6 when Mrs. McKay died, leaving a will by 
the terms of which she sought to devise an interest in the said real property 
to her husband, the plaintiff, and to the defendants the other half. Held: 
\Vhen this land was acquired by the McKays, the law was that during the 
marriage the husband is the sole and exclusive owner of the community 
property and that the wife has no title thereto, nor interest or estate therein 
other than a mere expectancy as heir, if she should survive him. However, the 
interest of the wife during the life of her husband is somewhat greater than 
that of an ordinary heir, in that she is given access to appropriate legal 
remedies against fraudulent or inconsiderate acts of her husband in respect to 
the community property. 
In subsequent cases the courts have followed McKay v. Lauriston in 
declining to give retroactive effect to the amendment of I923. Sexton v. 
Daly, 95 Cal. App. 754, 273 Pac. I09 (1928); Williamson v. Kinney, 
52 Cal. App. 2d 98, I25 P. 2d 920 (I942). In Reeve v. Phillips, 2 Cal. 
zd 239, 70 P. 2d 6o7 (I937) it was held that community property acquired 
prior to the amendment of I923 vested absolutely in the husband upon the 
death of the--wife without the necessity of administration, although the death 
of the wife occurred subsequent to I923. 
While the husband's rights in the community property were held to be 
virtually that of a sole owner prior to the enlargement of the wife's rights by 
the statutes of I 9 I 7 and I 9 2 3, his rights were not immune from reasonable 
regulation for the enforcement of the duties owing to his wife and his 
family. It was contended in Goetting v. Goetting, So Cal. App. 363, 252 
Pac. 6 56 (I 9 2 7) that a statute granting the power to the court in actions for 
separate maintenance to make the same disposition of the community property 
as in actions for divorce, could not be applied when the property was 
acquired prior to the statute. Cal. Stats. I9I7, p. 35· The court rejected the 
contention and remarked that it was not necessary to discuss what force 
this contention might have if the action were based wholly on facts arising 
before the adoption of the amendment of I 9 I 7 as it impliedly appeared from 
the finding that the course of conduct on which the court below based its 
decree continued after I 9 I 7. 
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effect to the amendment on the ground that the interests of 
the husband and wife become fixed and determined by the 
law in force at the time the community property is acquired 
by them. Their rights therein, thus acquired, cannot be 
diminished, enlarged, or in any way affected by subsequent 
legislation. 
This case does not mean that the wife cannot be given the 
power of testamentary disposition over community property 
which has descended to her if it appears that the property was 
acquired by husband and wife prior to the amendment of 
1923. Here the wife was not the survivor and the exercise 
by her of the testamentary power would have invaded the 
vested province of the husband (so the case holds). The 
California cases are in accord with the holdings elsewhere 
that the law in force at the death of the owner of the prop-
erty determines who shall inherit it. The heirs of the hus-
band have no vested right to inherit a share of the community 
property. 80 
The California courts have been alone among the courts 
in the community property states in maintaining that the 
wife does not have an actual ownership of half the community 
property during marriage but has only an expectant interest 
which she takes upon the husband's death.81 But even when 
it is agreed that this was the law of California prior to the 
amendments of I 89 I and I 9 I 7, it is not altogether clear how 
80 In re Phillips' Estate, 203 Cal. ro6, 263 Pac. 1017 (1928). Prior to 
the amendment of 1923, upon the death of the husband, one-half of the 
community property went to the wife, and the other half was subject to his 
testamentary disposition. In the absence of such disposition, this half went 
to his descendants. After the amendment of 1923, if the husband failed to 
exercise his testamentary power, the one-half over which he had the power 
went to the surviving spouse. The decedent in this case died intestate in 
1925, leaving as his sole heirs, his wife and a daughter. The decedent and 
his wife were married in r 89 3. The bulk of his estate consisted of com-
munity property acquired before 1923. Held: The wife is entitled to all. 
81 De Funiak, "A Review in Brief of Principles of Community Property,'' 
32 Ky. L. J. 63, 67 (1943-44). 
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this legislation was any more unconstitutional than the legis-
lation sustained in other jurisdictions restricting the husband's 
power of disposition. The husband is injured whatever in-
terest the wife is considered to have in the property. 
The California adherence to the doctrine that legislation 
changing the rights of husband and wife in community prop-
erty cannot be made to operate as to property already ac.:. 
quired has been strongly condemned as a blind following of . 
Spreckels v. Spreckels, wherein the doctrine seems to have 
had no firmer foundation than an admission by counsel.82 
The attitude of the courts means that any reformation of 
community property law cannot go completely into effect 
until the existing generation has died. In the meanwhile there 
is bound to be considerable confusion as to which statute 
applies to any particular piece of property.83 
In 192 7 the legislature of California declared that during 
continuance of the marriage relation the respective interests 
of the husband and wife in community property are present, 
existing, and equal interests under the management and con-
trol of the husband.84 As to community property acquired 
since this legislation, it is recognized that the wife has a 
vested interest of which she cannot be involuntarily deprived 
without violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.85 A num-
82 Johnston, Note, "Community and Separate Property: Constitutionality of 
Legislation Decreasing Husband's Power of Control Over Property Already 
Acquired,". 27 Calif. L. Rev. 49, 56 (I938-39); Weseman, Note, "Community 
Property: Constitutionality of Giving Retroactive Effect to Amendments of 
Community Property Law," 32 Calif. L. Rev. I87 (I944). The California 
doctrine is also criticized, Armstrong, " 'Prospective' Application of Changes 
in Community Property Control-Rule of Property or Constitutional Neces-
sity?" 3 3 Calif. L. Rev. 4 76, 4 77 (I 945). 
83 The confusion which is possible under the California doctrine is well 
illustrated by hypothetical examples, Armstrong, " 'Prospective' Application 
of Changes in Community Property Control-Rule of Property or Con-
stitutional Necessity?" 33 Calif. L. Rev. 476, 477 (I945) supra note 82. 
84 Cal. Stats. I927, p. 484; Cal. Civil Code Ann., sec. I6Ia (Deering I949). 
85 Cooke v. Cooke, 65 Cal. App. 2d 26o, ISO P. 2d 514 (I944); Wissner 
v. Wissner, 20I P. 2d 837 (Cal. I949). Both of these cases involved insurance 
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ber of cases from various jurisdictions have held that com-
munity property rights existing at the time and place of mar-
riage and acquisition of the property cannot be taken away 
by subsequent legislation.86 
policies, the premiums on which were paid out of the husband's salary, which is 
community property. 
In Cooke v. Cooke it was contended that the policy had been granted to the 
husband in divorce proceedings held in Arkansas. An Arkansas statute provides: 
"In every final judgment for divorce from the bonds of matrimony granted 
to the husband, an order shall be made that each party be restored to all 
property not disposed of at the commencement of the action, which either 
party obtained from or through the other during the marriage and in con-
sideration or by reason thereof ... " Ark. Stat. 1947, sec. 34-12I4. It 
was held that the Fourteenth Amendment forbade the application of the 
statute to the facts of the case, since the wife had a vested property interest in 
the policy. 
Wissner v. Wissner was an action by the wife of a deceased insured to 
recover half of the proceeds of a National Service Life Insurance Policy. 
The husband apparently had become estranged from the plaintiff and without 
her knowledge and without her consent he made his parents, the defendants, 
beneficiaries. The defendants relied on 38 U. S. C. sec. 8o2 (g) (I946 ed.) 
which provides that the insured shall have the privilege of changing the 
beneficiary without consent of the beneficiary (but only within the class 
including parents and wife). The state court thought that the Fifth Amend-
ment prohibited Congress from giving to this statute the effect claimed by 
the defendants, that the wife had a vested right in one-half of the proceeds, 
which Congress could not take from her. The Supreme Court of the United 
States thought otherwise. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (I95o). That 
Court declared that the judgment below had frustrated the deliberate purpose 
of Congress, that no constitutional rights were involved because the statute 
expressly provides that "no person shall have a vested right" to those proceeds. 
38 U.S. C. sec. 8o2 (i) (I946 ed.). However "vested" the wife's right to 
the proceeds of nongovernmental insurance may be under California law, 
said Justice Clark, that rule could not apply to this insurance. 
It was held in Brunvold v. Victor Johnson & Co., 59 Cal. App. 2d 75, I38 
P. 2d 3 2 (I 943) that the legislature, in giving the wife a vested interest 
in the community property, can impose a condition that such property shall 
be liable for debts contracted by the husband. 
86 Dixon v. Dixon's Ex'rs, 4 La. I 8 8 (I 8 32) (held that a right to the 
community of acquets and gains, existing by the law of the place and time 
of marriage, is a right springing from contract and cannot, therefore, be 
taken away by subsequent legislation); Kearse v. Kearse (Tex. Civ. App.) 
262 S. W. s6r, aff'd 276 S. W. 690 (I925) (wife contended that the deed 
by which she conveyed certain community property without the joinder of 
her husband attached to the property the status of separate property, by virtue 
of a statute declaring that no person shall "be restrained from inserting any 
clause or clauses in conveyances thereafter to be made, that may be deemed 
proper and advisable by the purchaser and seller"); Guye v. Guye, 63 Wash. 
340, II5 Pac. 73I (I9II) (statute enlarging the class of separate property). 
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Five common-law states, Oregon, Nebraska, Michigan, 
Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania, experimented briefly with the 
community property system in the 1930's and 1940's and 
then repealed their statutes.87 Constitutional questions may 
well arise in respect to the community property acquired 
while the statutes were in effect. The devices by which the 
legislatures sought to return to status quo were: ( 1) It is 
presumed that property acquired during the existence of the 
community property law, and all property acquired after 
repeal but in exchange for (or with the proceeds, increase, or 
income from) property acquired prior to repeal, is not com-
munity property; 88 ( 2) Any claim that property is com-
munity property must be filed within a designated period to 
be available as a claim or defense by either husband or wife 
in any action, proceeding, or controversy; 89 (3) Third per-
sons relying on the record or apparent separate title of one 
spouse are protected against undisclosed community property 
There are also a number of Texas cases which hold invalid a· statute 
enlarging the wife's separate property, not, however, on the ground of due 
process or inipairment of the obligation of contract, but on the ground that 
the statute conflicted with a constitutional provision prescribing what shall 
be the wife's separate property. Tex. Const., Art. 16, sec. 15. Arnold v. 
Leonard, II4 Tex. 535, 273 S. W. 799 (I925); Gohlman, Lester & Co. 
v. Whittle (Tex. Civ. App.) 254 S. W. 595, rev'd I I4 Tex. 584, 273 
S. W. 8o8 (I925); Frame v. Frame (Tex. Civ. App.) I4 S. W. 2d 865, 
rev'd I20 Tex. 61, 36 S. W. 2d I52 (I93I). 
87 The reason for the adoption of the community property system was to 
allow taxpayers to take advantage of the federal income tax provisions whereby 
husband and wife in community property states were privileged to declare only 
half of their respective incomes, the other half being declared by the nonearning 
spouse as community income. After Congress, by the addition of the "split 
income" provision to the Internal Revenue Code in I948 (Int. Rev. Code, 
sec. I 2 (d)) extended to married persons everywhere the income tax 
advantages which had been enjoyed in the community property states, there 
was no longer any need for the community property acts adopted by the 
five states. They immediately repealed their legislation. See Chapter 3, 
p. 32 et seq. 
88 Neb. Laws I949, c. 129, sec. 2. 
89 Mich. Pub. Acts, 1st Ex. Sess. 1948, Act No. 39, sec. 31 Neb, Laws 
1949, c. u9, sec. 4; Okla. Sess. Laws 1949, p. 229, sec. 2. 
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rights; 90 ( 4) Where a spouse dies later than two years after 
the repeal takes effect, all property which would have been 
separate property of the decedent if the community property 
law had never been enacted shall pass by will or intestacy as 
separate property; 91 (5) Spouses are privileged to join in 
a written agreement changing their community holding to a 
tenancy in common, tenancy by entireties, or to separate prop-
erty.92 
Device ( 5) above presents no constitutional difficulties. 
( 4) is based upon the general view that legislation may con-
stitutionally alter or restrict testation and the laws of inherit-
ance.93 (3) may be sustained under the general principles 
relating to retroactive recording statutes, that is, that they 
are constitutional so long as a reasonable opportunity to re-
cord is accorded the person affected. 94 ( 2) is more doubtful. 
It has usually been held that one in possession of property 
and not made a party to a proceeding involving the title may 
not constitutionally be obliged to take affirmative steps to 
assert his interest on penalty of losing it if he does not act.95 
The exceptions have involved some degree of emergency 
where the public interest in certainty of titles greatly out-
weighed the individual prejudice. Perhaps the community 
property situation is one in which the courts would recognize 
a public interest sufficient to warrant the private inconven-
ience. (I) is probably constitutional. No one can be said to 
have a constitutional right that a court should not use a pre-
sumption against him. However, if the erection of a pre-
sumption greatly hampers the claimant in establishing his 
interest there may conceivably be a taking of property with-
90 Ore. Laws 1949, c. 349, sec. S· 
91 Ore. Laws 1949, c. 349, sec. 4· 
92 Ore. Laws 1949, c. 349, sec. 3· 
93 Supra Chapter 3, p. 90 et seq. 
94 Supra Chapter 3, p. 73· 
95 Supra Chapter 3, p. 48 et seq. 
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out due process. Statutory presumptions have been declared 
unconstitutional when unreasonable,96 but this presumption 
hardly appears to be that. 
96 There must be a rational connection between the facts proved and the 
facts presumed. Comparative convenience of producing evidence of the 
ultimate fact is also significant. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219 (1911); 
Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463 ( 1943). On the general subject: Morgan, 
"Federal Constitutional Limitations Upon Presumptions Created by State 
Legislation," Harvard Legal Essays, p. 323 (1934). 
CHAPTER 7 
Concurrent Ownership 
I. JOINT TENANCIES AND TENANCIEs IN CoMMON 
STATUTES AFFECTING THE INCIDENT OF SURVIVORSHIP 
T
HE common law was partial to joint tenancies, the 
principal characteristic of which is the element of sur-
vivorship by which the entire tenancy, on the decease 
of one tenant, remains to the survivors, and ultimately to the 
last survivor.1 This heritage of the feudal system, which was 
opposed to a division of tenures and consequently favored 
joint estates, was expressed in a rule of construction that the 
grantor or testator must be presumed to have intended to 
create a joint tenancy. Despite the disappearance of reasons 
for this presumption, it was generally held, until the policy 
of the law was changed by statute, that a grant or devise to 
two or more persons, not husband and wife, must ordinarily 
be construed as creating a joint tenancy in the absence of any 
indication that the grantees or devisees are to hold as tenants 
in common.2 The presumption that a joint tenancy is in-
1 4- Thompson, Real Property, sec. 177 5 (Perm. ed.). 2 Tiffany, Real 
Property, sec. 4-19 (3d ed.) states: "This doctrine of survivorship appears to 
be the result of, or at least associated with, the theory that the joint tenants 
together own but one estate, a theory which, rigidly applied, would recognize 
no distinct interest in one to pass on his death to his heirs or devisees, his 
claim being, as against the others, merely extinguished in that case. The 
survivor takes no new title by survivorship, but holds under the deed by 
virtue of which he was originally seized of the whole." That this theory is 
not rigidly applied is evident from the fact that the incident of survivorship 
can be defeated by the acts of the joint tenants. See infra note 5· 
2 4- Thompson, Real Property, sec. 1775 (Perm. ed.); 2 Tiffany, Real 
Property, sec. 4-2 x (3d ed.). Of course, the essential unities of time, interest, 
title, and possession had to be present. 
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tended (which could not usually be rebutted by evidence of 
the real intent of the grantor or testator but only by the words 
appearing on the face of the instrument) was not a presump-
tion based on probabilities. 
"When lands were conveyed to two persons and their heirs, 
few supposed that the heirs of the one who happened to die 
first would have none of it, and that they gave it to the sur-
vivor and his heirs." 3 
Yet the orthodox view required the application of the pre-
sumption whatever may have been the real intention of the 
grantor or testator.4 
The results of the rule were not inevitably pernicious, for 
joint tenants can at any time partition the lands and defeat 
the incident of survivorship.5 But sometimes grantees and 
devisees died without effecting a partition because they did 
not realize it was necessary. The common-law presumption, 
and the incident of survivorship resulting from its applica-
tion, has generally been felt to be unjust and contrary to the 
spirit of our institutions. 
As a result of hostility to survivorship, this feature of 
joint tenancy has been declared never to have existed in a 
few jurisdictions 6 and in all (or nearly all) of those which 
3 Boston Franklinite Co. v. Condit and Torrey, 19 N. J. Eq. 394, 397 
(Ch. 1869). 
4 Noyes v. Parker, 92 F. 2d 562 (D. C. Cir. 193 7). 
52 Tiffany, Real Property, sees. 425, 468 (3d ed.). The incident can be 
defeated in other ways such as alienation by one of the tenants of his interest, 
or leasing or mortgaging by one tenant of his interest, or levy and sale upon 
execution of the interest of one of the tenants. These acts destroy the unities, 
all of which are necessary to the existence of a joint tenancy. 2 Tiffany, 
op. cit., sec. 42 5. 
6 Connecticut: Phelps v. Jepson, 1 Root 48 ( 1769). Ohio: Sergeant v. 
Steinberger, 2 Hammond 305 (1826). In Sergeant v. Steinberger it was said: 
"The reasons which gave rise to this description of estate, in England, never 
existed with us. The jus accrescendi is not founded in principles of natural 
justice, nor in any reason of policy applicable to our society or institutions, 
But on the contrary, it is adverse to the understandings, habits, and feelings of 
the people." However, it is held in both states that although joint tenancies 
are not favored, yet where the instrument expressly declares or necessarily 
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once recognized it, the doctrine of survivorship has since been 
subjected to legislative reform. Some statutes provide that 
a conveyance or devise to two or more persons shall create a 
tenancy in common, and not a joint tenancy, unless a con-
trary intent is plainly apparent or is expressly declared.7 
Some explicitly purport to abolish the incident of survivor-
ship/ and others provide that joint tenancies shall not exist.9 
The statutes have been so long in effect in all of the juris-
dictions that the constitutional questions arising out of retro-
active application are now, in all probability, of only historical 
interest. However, completeness of treatment demands con-
sideration of the matter. 
The courts have not been able to agree whether these 
statutory changes could be made applicable to tenancies which 
by the law at the time of their coming into existence, were 
joint tenancies. 
Since the concept of survivorship is purely a survival of 
medieval law and an anomaly, it is surprising that so many 
courts have found constitutional impediment to the retro-
active application of statutes abolishing the incident of sur-
vivorship. While there is considerable divergence in the 
phraseology of the statutes, this factor does not seem in any 
way to have influenced the decisions. The courts have in no 
way indicated that they thought the wording of the statutes 
is significant. In fact, the decisions of one jurisdiction often 
conflict with the decisions of other jurisdictions which have 
an identical or closely similar statute. It is rather that some 
courts have conceived the possibility of acquiring the whole 
estate by survivorship as a property interest, which is pro-
implies an intention to create such estate, the court will give effect to that 
intent. Foraker v. Kocks, 41 Ohio App. ::uo, 180 N. E. 743 (1931); Peyton 
v. Wehrhane, 125 Conn. 420, 6 A. zd 313 (1939). 
7 E.g., N.J. Rev. Stat. 1937, 46:3-17, infra note 24. 
8 E.g., Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. zo, sec. 121, infra note 31. 
9 E.g., Ga. Code 1933, sec. 8s-1ooz, infra note 36. 
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tected from deprivation, while other courts have been able 
to see in the incident of survivorship nothing but a fortuitous 
circumstance. 
The proceedings which provoked the determination of the 
constitutionality of the statutes have generally been actions 
for partition brought by heirs of deceased tenants against 
the heirs or successors in interest of the surviving tenant, 10 or 
actions for partition or ejectment brought by the heirs of de-
ceased tenants against the surviving tenant.11 The question is 
identical in most of the cases: Did the survivor take the whole 
estate, notwithstanding the statute, because he· happened to 
outlive the other tenants? 
In every case, the tenancy was created before the statute, 
and all of the tenants died after the statute was enacted with-
out having effected a severance. If some of the joint tenants 
were dead before the statute was passed, their interests would 
not be revived. An estate already vested in the survivor 
could not be taken away.12 
None of the cases holding that the incident of survivor-
ship can be retroactively extinguished does so on the ground 
that survivorship is akin to heirship and therefore within 
the extensive power of the legislature to restrict the devolu-
tion of property at death. This would be a facile solution 
to the problem, except that the survivor does not take as 
heir. The historical concept is that the survivor does not 
take a new title by survivorship. The joint tenants together 
lODen ex dem. Berdan v. Van Riper, I6 N.J. L. 7 (Sup. Ct. 1837) 
(statute given prospective effect only); Miller v. Dennett, 6 N. H. 109 
( I833) (retroactive). 
11 Greer v. Blanchar, 40 Cal. I94 (I87o) (given prospective effect only); 
Cress v. Hamnett, I44 Kan. 128, 58 P. 2d 6I (I936) (given prospective 
effect only); Miller v. Miller, I6 Mass. 59 (I8I9) (retroactive); Bambaugh 
v. Bambaugh, II S. & R. I9I (Pa. I824) (retroactive); McKeever v. 
Patteson, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 304 (I886). 
12 Eisenhardt v. Lowell, IOS Colo. 4I7, 98 P. 2d 1001 (I94o); Annable 
v. Patch, 3 Pick. 360 (Mass. I825); Miller v. Dennett, 6 N.H. I09 (1833). 
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own but one estate. Hence the claims of deceased tenants 
are merely extinguished by their deaths.13 
I. Statutes Which Abolish the Common-Law Rule of Con-
struction 
The Massachusetts statute is one of those which provide 
that a conveyance or devise of land to two or more persons 
shall create an estate in common and not in joint tenancy, 
unless it clearly appears from the instrument that a joint 
tenancy was intended.14 The effect of such a statute is to 
substitute for the common-law presumption in favor of joint 
tenancies a rule of construction, or a presumption in favor 
of tenancies in common. The Massachusetts courts have held 
that the presumption created by the statute could (and 
should) be applied in construing conveyances and devises 
which were made when the common-law presumption still 
obtained. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in answer to claims that 
the incident of survivorship is property which cannot be taken 
by the legislature, said that since joint tenants can always 
sever the tenancy and destroy the right of survivorship, the 
statute very reasonably presumed that such tenancies were 
13 2 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 419 (3d ed.) supra note I. 
14By the Acts and Laws of 1786, c. xxiii, sec. 4, it was enacted: "That 
all gifts, grants, . . • of any lands, tenements, and hereditaments, which 
have been, or shall be made to two or more persons, whether for years, for 
life, in tail or in fee, shall be taken, deemed and adjudged to be estates in 
common, and not in joint-tenancy, unless it has been or shall be therein said, 
that the grantees, . . . shall have or hold the same lands, . . • jointly, 
or as joint tenants, or in joint tenancy, or to them and the survivor or 
survivors of them, or unless other words be therein used, clearly and man-
ifestly showing it to be the intention of the parties to such gifts, grants, • • • 
that such lands, . . . should vest and be held as joint estates, and not as 
estates in common." 
The contemporary statute, Mass. Gen. Laws 1932, c. 184, sec. 7, is a 
simplified restatement of the original statute. The only substantial difference 
is that the present statute, by virtue of an amendment made in 1885 (Mass. 
Acts 18 8 5, c. 2 3 7), applies to conveyances and devises made to husband and 
wife. 
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not intended.15 In another case/6 the court declared that the 
act, instead of depriving the joint tenants of property, gave 
them a more beneficial interest than they had before, because 
it is better to have a certain interest in a moiety than an 
uncertain right of succession to the whole. The court 
admitted that the legislature cannot impair the title to estates 
without the consent of the owners (except for public pur-
poses when adequate compensation is paid)/7 but concluded 
that there can be no objection to the retrospective operation 
of any act which enlarges or otherwise makes a title more 
valuable; the consent to the holder to such statutes may 
always be presumed. In Burghardt v. Turner 18 it was stated 
that there could be no objection to the application of the 
statute to existing joint tenancies, for the further reason that 
the operation of the statute was really prospective; it 
declared how a deed should be affected by events then 
future. 
The Supreme Court of California, on the other hand, 
ruled that a statute 19 similar in import to the Massachusetts 
statute above could not be given retroactive effect (even if 
that were the legislative intention) for the stated reasons that 
15Shaw v. Hearsey, 5 Mass. 521 (r8o9) (dictum). 
16Miller v. Miller, r6 Mass. 59 (r8r9). Accord, Holbrook v. Finney, 
4 Mass. 566 (r8o8). 
17 Mass. Canst. q8o, Art. x: "But no part of the property of any 
individual, can, with justice, be taken from him, or applied to public uses, 
without his own consent, or that of the representative body of the peo-
ple: . . . And whenever the public exigencies require, that the property 
of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a 
reasonable compensation therefor." 
18 12 Pick. 534 (Mass. r8p). 
19 Act of April 2 7, 18 55, c. cxl, sec. r. "Every interest in real estate, 
granted or devised to two or more persons, other than executors and trustees 
as such, shall be a tenancy in common, unless expressly declared in the grant 
or devise to be a joint tenancy." The present statute reads: "A joint interest 
is one owned by two or more persons in equal shares, by a title created by a 
single will or transfer, when expressly declared in the will or transfer to 
be a joint tenancy ... " Cal. Civil Code, sec. 683 (Deering 1949). 
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the legislature does not have authority to deprive joint ten-
ants of one of the essential elements of their tenure, i.e., the 
"right of survivorship," 20 nor the power to affect past con-
tracts, or to alter or destroy the nature of estates.21 We 
may surmise that the California court was much influenced 
by the name which it applied to the interest in survivorship. 
This is but another illustration of the danger in calling every 
interest a "right." 
In Miller v. Dennett, an old New Hampshire case, it 
was argued that: if a deed were made to two persons and 
the survivor of them and the heirs of the survivor, the legis-
lature could not declare that the land should not go to the 
survivor and his heirs but to the heirs of each. That being 
so, 
"Does it, then, make any difference whether this condition 
is expressed by the parties to the contract or by the law in 
force at the time when the contract was executed? 
The laws in force at the time the contract is made, constitute 
a part of the contract." 22 
20Greer v. Blanchar, 40 Cal. I94 (187o). The land was conveyed two 
years before the statute was enacted to a trustee "in trust for the use and 
benefit of Harriet M. Risley and S. Risley." Harriet died after the statute 
went into effect. Her heir sought to compel the trustee to convey the premises 
to him and to S. Risley and to make an accounting of rents and profits. It 
was held that the conveyance created a joint tenancy and that Harriet's 
interest was extinguished by her death. 
21 Dewey v. Lambier, 7 Cal. 347 (I857). This was an action of ejectment. 
The plaintiff established title to the premises by a deed from one H. to himself 
and W. Held: The deed to plaintiff and W. created a joint tenancy which 
was not destroyed by the Act of I 8 55. Since W. and plaintiff were joint 
tenants, they should have joined in the action in ejectment. Failure to do so 
was fatal to a recovery. 
22 6 N.H. Io9, II2 (I833). The heirs of the surviving tenant sought to 
have the court apply the common-law rule of construction to a deed, whose 
words did not indicate whether the grantor intended to create a tenancy in 
common or a joint tenancy. The deed was executed and delivered prior to 
the Act of June 2 I, I 8o9, which was almost exactly identical with Mass. 
Stats. I785, c. 6z, sec. 4, supra note I4. 
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The court was not impressed with the contention; it said: 
"The statute only changes a joint tenancy into a tenancy in 
common. The contract, which created the estate, is not 
altered or impaired. The deed conveyed an estate in joint 
tenancy, and that estate must now be considered as remaining 
until the statute of I 809 changed it into a tenancy in com-
mon. Such a change did not impair the obligations of any 
contract in the deed, but merely made the grantees tenants 
in common from the time the statute took effect." 23 ... 
However, it appears that the result might have been other-
wise (i.e., a holding that there was an impairment of the 
obligation of contract) had the deed expressly granted the 
estate to several persons for life, remainder to the survivor 
and his heirs. In the instant case the survivor could base his 
claim only upon the common-law presumption. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, concluded that 
any law which changes the legal effect of a deed as between 
the original joint tenants, or as between their successors, 
impairs the obligation of a contract.24 This court could see 
no merit in the argument that the power of joint tenants 
to destroy the incident of survivorship at any time during 
their lifetimes makes the interest in survivorship, on account 
of its tenuousness and uncertainty, subject to divestment by 
23 6 N. H. 109, I 15. 
24 Den ex dem. Berdan v. Van Riper, 16 N.J. L. 7 (Sup. Ct. 1&37). The 
court reflected that the possibility of survivorship might perhaps have been a 
motivating factor in the transaction involved in the case because of the 
condition of health or age of one of the grantees. However, it would seem 
that if these were the considerations which motivated the transaction, the 
instrument would have expressly created a joint tenancy. 
The statute in question (Act of Feb. 4, 1812) provided: "No estate after 
the passage of the act, shall in this state be considered and adjudged to be an 
estate in joint tenancy, except it be expressly set forth in the grant or devise 
creating such estate, that it is the intention of the parties to create an estate in 
joint tenancy and not an estate of tenancy in common, any law, usage or 
decision heretofore made to the contrary notwithstanding." The contemporary 
statute is N.J. Rev. Stat. 1937, 46:3-17. 
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the legislature.25 Also rejected was the proposition that this 
was one of those situations in which the rights of indi-
viduals come so injuriously in conflict with the interests of 
the public, that the legislature may interfere to prevent the 
evil, although private contracts may be affected thereby. 
"Whether men are joint-tenants or tenants in common," 
said the court, "is a· matter of total indifference to the 
public." 26 
Treating interests created by deed as contractual within 
the meaning of the contracts clause of the federal Constitu-
tion is probably a misapplication of the clause.27 And, of 
course, the New Jersey case reflects an outmoded attitude not 
in keeping with the prevailing concept that obligations of 
contracts are subject to some modification in the interests 
of the public welfare.28 
Assuming that the contracts clause was properly invoked 
in the New Hampshire and New Jersey cases above, the 
result reached by New Hampshire is the sounder. How can 
it be said that the existing law becomes part of the contract 
(in the sense that this law cannot be changed without impair-
ing the contract) unless the contracting parties are aware 
25 In Goff v. Yauman, 237 Wis. 643, 298 N. W. 179 (1941), it was held 
that one of the two joint tenants in the case had voluntarily terminated the 
joint tenancy by applying for and accepting old-age assistance under a statute 
which explicitly stipulated that assistance paid should become a lien on the 
property of the beneficiary and that consequently there could be no question 
of the retroactive application of the statute although it went into effect after 
the creation of the tenancy. 
26Den ex dem. Berdan v. Van Riper, 16 N.J. L. 7, 14 (Sup. Ct. 1837). 
Thirty-two years later a New Jersey court said this of the statute in question: 
"The object, no doubt, was to give to the words used the effect which most 
persons would suppose they had. When lands were conveyed to two persons 
and their heirs, few supposed that the heirs of the one who happened to die 
first would have none of it, and that they gave it to the survivor and his 
heirs." Boston Franklinite Co. v. Condit and Torrey, 19 N. J. Eq. 394, 397 
(Ch. 1869). 
27 See Chapter 2, p. 14 et seq. 
28 Consider in particular, Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 
U. S. 3 9 8 ( 19 34) sustaining the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law. 
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of the existing law and act in accordance therewith? This 
is especially true of presumptions or rules of construction 
which are but aids to legal reasoning, or devices by which the 
court arrives at the real or presumed intention of the parties. 
But the presumption that a grant to two or more persons 
creates a joint tenancy is highly artificial, and any need for 
such a presumption has long since disappeared. Even when 
the New Hampshire and New Jersey decisions were ren-
dered (in the I 8 30's), probably nine-tenths of the grantors 
did not know of the existence of the rule, and if they had 
known, they would have used appropriate words to create 
a tenancy in common. It is quite clear that when courts 
applied the common-law rule of construction they were 
really adding something to the deed which the parties did 
not themselves intend. The legislature could certainly take 
away this addition without impairing any obligations. 
In Miller v. Dennett it was also contended that the retro-
active reversal of the common-law presumption would vio-
late the Constitution of New Hampshire which prohibit~ 
retroactive legislation.29 The court relied upon the definition 
of retroactivity which does not conceive of legislation falling 
within the inhibition of the Constitution unless vested rights 
are impaired.30 There i!! no impairment of vested rights 
here, said the court, because the acquisition of the whole 
estate by survivorship would have been nothing more than a 
hope or expectation, like the expectation of a child to inherit 
the estate of a parent. 
2. Statutes Which Purport to Abolish the Incident of Sur-
vivorship 
The statutes of some states, instead of merely doing away 
with the common-law presumption, in terms purport to 
29 N. H. Const. 1 7 9 z, Bill of Rights, Art. xxiii: "Retrospective laws are 
highly injurious, oppressive, and unjust. No such laws, therefore, should be 
made, either for the decision of civil causes, or the punishment of offences." 
30 Supra Chapter z, p. 13. 
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abolish the incident of survivorship. The Pennsylvania stat-
ute is illustrative: 
"If partition be not made between joint tenants, whether 
they be such as might have been compelled to make partition 
or not, or of whatever kind the estates or thing holden or 
possessed be, the parts of those who die first shall not accrue 
to the survivors, but shall descend or pass by devise, and shall 
be subject to debts, charges, curtesy or dower, or transmissi-
ble to executors or administrators, and be considered to every 
other intent and purpose in the same manner as if such 
deceased joint tenants had been tenants in common: Pro-
vided always, That nothing in this act shall be taken to affect 
any trust estate." 31 
If this legislation were to be taken at its face value, joint 
tenancies as they are known at common law could no longer 
exist. But the quoted statute, and identical and similar legis-
lation in other jurisdictions, is construed not to prevent the 
creation of a joint tenancy (with the incident of survivor-
ship) if the grantor or testator expressly stipulates that it 
is his intention to create a joint tenancy.32 That is to say, 
the creation of a tenancy in common will be presumed to 
have been intended in the absence of any indication to the 
contrary, but if the intent to create a joint tenancy or estate 
of survivorship is clearly expressed, the expression will be 
given effect. The judicial deduction is that only the inad-
vertent creation of joint tenancies by operation of law is 
sought to be avoided by the legislatures, hence the statutes 
are not to be construed literally. Thus, the statutes which 
31 Act of March p, 1812, P. L. 259; now, Purdon's Pa. Stats. Ann., Tit. 20, 
sec. 12 r. 
32 Withers v. Barnes, 95 Kan. 798, 149 Pac. 691 (1915) ("Act only 
abolished joint tenancies and doctrine of survivorship by operation of law. 
The law does not prevent the grantor's purposely creating a joint tenancy"); 
Truesdell v. White, 13 Bush. 616 (Ky. 1878); Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N. C. 
396,42 S. E. 2d 468 (1947); In re Lowry's Estate, 314 Pa. p8, 171 Atl. 
878 ( 1934); McLeroy v. McLeroy, 163 Tenn. 124, 40 S. W. 2d 1027 
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purport to abolish the element of survivorship have come 
to have about the same effect as those which purport only 
to abolish the common-law rule of construction. 
The fact that the statute purports to abolish the incident 
of survivorship rather than the common-law presumption, 
or vice versa, seems not to have had any effect on these 
decisions. One finds that without regard to the form of the 
statute, the arguments in favor of permitting retroactive 
operation are all much on the sail:!e order, as are also the 
arguments against permitting retroactive operation. 
In Bambaugh v. Bambaugh 33 the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court assigned the following reasons for allowing the Penn-. 
sylvania statute to operate on a tenancy created by a deed 
executed and delivered some years before its enactment: 
"The truth is, that the doctrine of survivorship was so little 
known to people in general, and so abhorrent to their feel-
ings, when known, that it was thought best to get rid of it 
at once. The courts had been long struggling against it, but 
were unable, without a dangerous prostration of established 
principles, to go as far as they wished. The aid of the legisla-
ture was, therefore, necessary. There is no force in the 
argument, that the operation of the act on existing estates, 
was an invasion of vested rights. Who should be the sur-
vivor, was in contingency, and in the mean time, either 
joint tenant might have severed the estate, by legal means, 
without the consent of his companion. The act of assembly 
did for them, at once, and without expense, which ninety-nine 
in a hundred wished to be done. [sic] But if there were any 
joint tenants who desired the chance of survivorship, they 
might have it, by an agreement for that purpose. Now, 
should we undertake to put a limitation on the plain words 
of the law, we might do an irreparable injury to many, who 
reading the words as they are written, have supposed a parti-
tion unnecessary, and therefore, have died without effecting 
it. Something was said in the argument of this cause, against 
33 II S. & R. 19I (Pa. I824). 
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the constitutional power of the legislature, to pass an act 
affecting estates then in existence. But on this point we have 
no doubt. The act deprived no man of his property. Where 
a title had already accrued by survivorship, it remained 
untouched. The only effect of the law was, to place the 
parties on an equal and sure footing leaving nothing to 
chance; without depriving them, however, of the right of 
making any agreement between themselves, which they 
might think proper.34 
The Kansas Supreme Court, however, thought the statute 
of that state (which has since been replaced by a statute of 
the Massachusetts type) could not chat:J.ge the nature of 
existing joint tenancies. In Cress v. Hamnett 35 it was held 
that the nature of the interest each joint tenant would take 
34 II S. & R. I9I, I92 (Pa. I824). 
35 I44 Kan. 128, 58 P. 2d 6I (I936). 
A few days before the effective date of the statute, certain land was con-
veyed to one George S. Crary upon the express condition that if George died 
without issue then the remainder of the estate in fee simple should go to 
Martha Crary and Abigail Cress. Abigail died intestate in I933, leaving 
heirs. George Crary died without issue in I935· One of the heirs of Abigail 
brought an action against Martha, the survivor, for partition of the land. It 
was claimed by the plaintiff that the statute destroyed Martha's claim to sur-
vivorship. The deed was construed to have created in Martha and Abigail a 
joint tenancy in an executory interest after an estate in fee-simple defeasible. 
The statute in question, Laws I89I, c. 203, sec. I [Kan. Gen. Stat. I935, 
sec. 2 2-13 2] read: "If partition be not made between joint tenants or joint 
owners of estates in entirety, whether they be such as might have been com-
pelled to make partition or not, or whatever kind the estate or thing holden 
or possessed be, the parts of those who die first shall not accrue to the survivors, 
but shall descend or pass by devise, and shall be subject to debts or charges 
and be considered to every other intent and purpose as if such joint tenants 
or tenants of estate in entirety had been or were tenants in common; but 
nothing in this act shall be taken to affect any trust estate." 
In I 9 3 9 the statute was rewritten for clarification and so as to conform 
with the opinions of the Kansas Supreme Court construing the statute. The 
present reading is as follows: "Real or personal property granted or devised 
to two or more persons including a grant or devise to a husband and wife 
shall create in them a tenancy in common with respect to such property unless 
the language used in such grant or devise makes it clear that a joint tenancy 
was intended to be created: Except, That a grant or devise to executors or 
trustees, as such, shall create in them a joint tenancy unless the grant or devise 
expressly declares otherwise." Kan. Laws I 9 3 9, c. I 8 I, sec. I ; Kan. Gen. 
Stat. I949, sec. 58-sor. 
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was fixed by the deed creating the tenancy, and the legisla-
ture "was powerless by subsequent act to deprive either one 
of any element of the interest created by the deed." Justice 
Burch said this was not like the legislature's taking away 
the privilege of inheritance: what the legislature gives, the 
legislature can take away, but the legislature cannot, by sub-
sequent enactment, take away from the joint tenants what 
has previously been given them by deed, an instrument 
sounding in contract. 
3· Statutes Which Appear to Abolish Joint Tenancies as 
Such 
There is one other type of statute affecting the incident 
of survivorship to be found in a few states. This type of 
statute seems to go further than merely abolishing the inci-
dent of survivorship, and, prima facie, would appear to make 
the creation of a joint tenancy quite impossible even where 
the instrument of creation contains express words. The 
Georgia statute reads: 
"Joint tenancy shall not exist in this state, and all such 
estates, under the English law, shall be held to be tenancies 
in common." 36 
However, the words of this act are not taken literally by 
the courts. Survivorship as an incident of joint tenancy has 
been abolished; but where the deed or will, in express terms, 
or by necessary implication, provides for survivorship, the 
law allows the deed or will to be enforced.37 The same result 
has been reached in Oregon.38 These statutes present no con-
36 Ga. Laws 1828, p. 545 (Cobb); now, Ga. Code 1933, sec. 85-1002. 
37 Equitable Loan & Security Co. v. Waring, 117 Ga. 599, 44 S. E. 320 
(1903). 
38 Erickson v. Erickson, 167 Ore. 1, II5 P. 2d 172 (1941), The deed 
contained the following recital: "The Grantees herein do not take the title 
in common but with the right of survivorship; that is, that the fee shall vest 
in the survivor of the grantees." The court held that the survivor took the fee. 
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stitutional issues not already considered, but the courts of 
these states have never had to decide whether the statutes 
could be applied retroactively. 
4· The Effect of an Instrument Which Expressly Creates 
a Joint T errancy 
In the cases discussed, the joint tenancy arose because of 
the operation of the common-law presumption and not 
because express words were used. The courts have never 
had to decide whether a statute can retroactively destroy the 
incident of survivorship when the instrument which created 
the tenancy expressly provides that the grantees or devisees 
shall take as joint tenants. The writer suspects a great many 
courts would erroneously assume that the express declaration 
in the instrument automatically guarantees some kind of 
constitutional protection to the element of survivorship to 
which that element would not be entitled if the joint ten-
ancy were the product of the application of the rule of con-
struction. But really it should make no difference how the 
tenancy arises. In any case, the element of survivorship is 
quite a fragile thing, since it is generally within the power 
of any of the tenants to destroy the tenancy, and along with 
it the incident of survivorship.39 
It intimated that the deed did not create a technical joint tenancy but did 
not state just which of the attributes of a common-law joint tenancy could 
be read into the conveyance. The court did not decide the exact nature of 
the rights of the tenants inter vivos. It even refused to decide definitely 
whether the survivor took the fee by virtue of his survivorship or whether 
the deed should be construed as granting a life estate to the grantees as tenants 
in common with a contingent remainder to the survivor. 
The absence of an ascertainable ratione decidendi in the Erickson case is 
commented upon and criticized in O'Connell, "Are Joint Tenancies Abolished 
in Oregon?" 21 Ore. L. Rev. 159 (1942). 
The Oregon statute reads: "· .. and joint tenancy is abolished, and all 
persons having an undivided interest in real property are to be deemed and 
considered tenants in common." Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. 1940, sec. 70-205. 
39 2 Tiffany, Real Property, sees. 425, 468 et seq. (3d ed.). 
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Those ·courts which entertain the questionable doctrine 
that legislative impairment of interests created by a deed 
is ipso facto an impairment of the obligation of a contract 
would no doubt feel doubly obliged to protect the element 
of survivorship from impairment where a deed expressly 
created the joint tenancy. 
A distinction, however, must be made between an express 
creation of a joint tenancy and the express creation of a right 
of survivorship. When the instrument states that the 
grantees or devisees shall take as joint tenants, they take an 
estate which has the incidents of a joint tenancy, one of 
which is the power of the tenants to effect a severance. But 
where the right of survivorship is expressly provided for, it 
may be in keeping with the intent of the parties for the court 
to construe the instrument to create an indestructible right 
of survivorship rather than a common-law joint tenancy 
with the incident of severability. An eminent writer sug-
gests that a grant to two with right of survivorship might 
conceivably be construed to create a tenancy in common for 
life, with a contingent remainder in fee to the survivor.40 
Probably neither an indestructible right of survivorship nor 
a contingent remainder can be extinguished by the legisla-
ture.41 
Where also the tenants are precluded from exercising the 
power to compel partition, either by their own agreement, 
or by virtue of a valid prohibition against partition in the 
instrument/2 it is possible that the incident of survivorship 
would be deemed even by those courts which otherwise 
40 z Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 4:1.4 (3d ed.). 
41 See supra Chapter 4 for a discussion of the extent to which the legisla-
ture may extinguish or impair contingent remainders. 
42 The tenants may contract with each other not to compel partition; such 
agreements are enforceable. The creator of the tenancy may impose prohibi-
tions against compulsory partition for a reasonable period of time. z Tiffany, 
Real Property, sec. 4 7 4 (3d ed.) . 
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regard the incident as a mere expectancy, to be clothed with 
sufficient certainty to be a constitutionally protected interest. 
5. The Effect of Repeal of a Statute 
If any of the legislatures should repeal or amend the 
existing statutes so that the common-law presumption would 
again operate (an event which is unlikely to occur)/3 the 
objections on constitutional grounds to the retroactive opera-
tion of the repeal or amendatory acts would be much more 
cogent than the objections to the retroactive operation of 
the statutes which abolished the presumption. A real and 
substantial burden would be imposed on the tenants if the 
common-law presumption were allowed to operate on their 
estate to make into a joint tenancy what had been a tenancy 
in common under the statute. The living tenants would have 
just grounds for complaint if they were compelled to take 
steps to prevent the operation of the incident of survivorship, 
and the heirs of deceased tenants, whose interests were 
destroyed by the survivorship, would have even more rea-
son to complain of a deprivation of property without due 
process. 
There appears to be but one case in which the question of 
the retroactive effect of a statute which restored the common-
law presumption has been considered, and this only indi-
43 The statutes of several states provide that the making of a bank deposit 
in the form of .a joint tenancy shall, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, 
be conclusive evidence, in any action or proceeding to which either such bank 
or the surviving depositor is a party, of the intention of both depositors to 
vest title to such deposit and the additions thereto in such survivor. Cal. Fin. 
Code, sec. 852 (Deering 1951); N. Y. Banking Law, sec. 239 (3). These 
statutes have been sustained when applied prospectively on the ground that 
they are in the nature of statutes of limitation, by which the remedy for a 
claim to establish the real fact with reference to the account must be pursued 
before either of the depositors is dead or it will be barred. Heiner v. Green-
wich Savings Bank, 118 Misc. Rep. 326, 193 N. Y. S. 291 (1922); In re 
Conover's Estate, 163 Misc. Rep. 599, 297 N. Y. S. 577, aff'd 252 App. Div. 
917, 300 N.Y. S. 1357 (4th Dept. 1937); Hill v. Badeljy, 107 Cal. App. 
598, 290 Pac. 637 (1930). 
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rectly. In Boston Franklinite Co. v. Condit and Torrey,44 
the direct question was whether a surviving trustee acquired 
the entire title by survivorship so that he could convey the 
title without the joinder of the heir of the predeceased 
trustee. The premises were conveyed in trust in I 8 I 7 after 
the enactment of a statute in I 8 I 2 which declared that no 
estate shall be considered in joint tenancy, unless expressly 
stated to be such in the grant creating it.45 An act passed 
April I, I 868/6 provided"that "all estates heretofore or here-
after granted or devised to trustees shall be construed to have 
vested and to vest an estate in joint tenancy in such trustees 
. . ." The court decided that the surviving trustee did 
not take the whole title because the Act of I 8 I 2 made the 
trustees tenants in common; consequently, so far as the Act 
of I 868 affected estates vested before its passage, it must be 
held to be unconstitutional and inoperative. No reasons were 
assigned. 
The holding in Boston Franklinite Co. v. Condit and 
Torrey has nothing to recommend it. The decision of the 
court merely meant that a person who had no real interest 
had to be joined to make an effective transfer of title, or that 
the bare legal title had to be declared out of the heir of the 
decedent trustee by court action before the surviving trustee 
could continue to carry out the purposes of the trust. It has 
generally been held in other jurisdictions that, even where 
trust estates are not expressly exempted, the statutes do not 
prevent the application of the common-law presumption 
when a grant or devise is made to trustees/7 and the statutes 
frequently contain express exemptions of trust estates.48 The 
44 I9 N.J. Eq. 394 (Ch. I869). 
45 Supra note 2.4. 
46 Nixon's Digest of Laws of New Jersey (4th ed.) p. Ioo6. 
47 4 Thompson, Real Property, sec. I79Z (Perm. ed.). 
48 E. g., Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 20, sec. I 2 I, supra p. 3 2 I; Kan, Gen. 
Stat. I949, sec. sS-soi, supra note 35· 
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reason for holding that conveyances to trustees are not within 
the spirit, and consequently not within the scope of the stat-
utes, is to be found in the logical and natural assumption 
that grantors and testators want the title to go to the surviv-
ing trustee and not to the deceased trustee's heirs, who might 
well be persons unqualified to fulfill the duties of trustee-
ship.49 
PARTITION OF LAND HELD IN JOINT TENANCY AND IN 
COMMON 
At common law in England, joint tenants and tenants in 
common could not compel partition. The right to a writ of 
partition was extended to them by a statute enacted in the 
Reign of Henry Vlll.50 In this country it has been quite 
frequently declared that partition is a matter of right.51 It 
would appear that the power to compel partition exists inde-
pendent of statute as part of the common law of the United 
States.52 All of the states have statutes which authorize 
49 4 Thompson, Real Property, sec. I 792 (Perm. ed.). 
Also, in many states the statutes are held not to apply to conveyances in 
mortgage or in cases of property held in partnership, or to conveyances to 
husband and wife. 4 Thompson, op. cit., sec. I787. 
50 Stat. 3I Hen. VIII, c. I (I54o). Freeman, Cotenancy and Partition, 
sec. 42 r. 
5l 2 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 474 (3d ed.). Tiffany points out that this 
statement must be taken with some qualification. The power is subject to the 
power of the court under modern statutes to decree a sale instead of a partition 
in kind. The cotenant may preclude himself by agreement with his cotenants 
from asserting it. Where the devise or conveyance by which the cotenancy 
is created expressly prohibits partition during a period named or until a 
certain event, such prohibition is generally effective to prevent an involuntary 
partition in violation thereof. 
52 Richardson v. Monson, 2 3 Conn. 94 (I 8 54) ; Tiedeman, State and 
Federal Control of Persons and Property, p. 667: "The right of compulsory 
partition of all joint estates, as an invariable incident of these estates, except 
in cases of tenancies in entirety, has come down to us an inheritance from the 
mother country, and all joint estates in the United States have been created 
in actual or implied contemplation of the possibility of a compulsory partition. 
Consequently no question can arise as to the constitutionality of laws providing 
for compulsory partition." 
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courts to partition lands upon petition of interested parties 
having a present right to possession.53 
The validity of these statutes, so far as they authorize 
partition in kind of lands held in joint tenancy or in common, 
seems very rarely to have been questioned, probably because 
it is assumed that the statutes merely restate the pre-existing 
law and do not impose any new burdens or destroy any 
rights under the common law.54 However, statutes author-
izing partition have on occasion been attacked on procedural 
grounds.55 
In at least one instance, the power to compel partition in 
kind has been claimed to be a property interest of which the 
joint owners cannot be deprived without denying due process 
of law.56 The constitutionality of a statute was involved 
53 Restatement, Property, c. II, Topic r (1948 Supp.). 
54 In Baldwin v. Baldwin, 74 Hun 415, 26 N. Y. S. 579 (r893) it was 
held that a joint tenant may sue for partition of land acquired after the enact-
ment of a statute authorizing joint tenants to maintain such actions, though 
the right of survivorship will thereby be defeated, as the parties took their 
deed with notice of the statute. 
On the constitutionality of retroactive partition statutes affecting future 
interests see supra Chapter 4, p. 154 et seq. 
55 In Richards v. Rote, 68 Pa. 248 (r87r), it was held that the legislature 
could not validate proceedings in partition wherein a court, on the petition 
of one of the parties interested in the partition, appointed a "trustee" to 
represent one of the joint owners who was alleged to be a man of weak 
intellect. The latter was given no notice or opportunity to object. Affirmation 
of the validating act would, in the opinion of the court, have been a declara-
tion that the legislature can take one person's property and confer it on 
another. 
But in Biddle v. Starr, 9 Pa. 461 (1848), the court upheld a statute which 
retroactively authorized partition pending the contest of the will of a deceased 
joint owner, although prior to the statute a court could not have acted until 
the controversy concerning the will of the deceased tenant was settled. There 
was no injustice in the joinder of the adverse claimants and the executors, 
since the same notice, the same proof and proceedings, were otherwise adhered 
to. A court of equity, ordinarily, apart from statute, will not, in a proceeding 
for partition, undertake to settle questions as to legal title which may arise 
between the parties thereto. 2 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 478 (3d. ed.). 
But this is a mere procedural matter which can surely be altered by legislation 
even as to pending proceedings. , 
56 Hatch v. Tipton, 131 Ohio St. 364, 2 N. E. 2d 875 (1936). The statute 
was chailenged on the grounds that it is retroactive and in violation of Ohio 
Const., Art. II, sec. 28, which prohibits retroactive legislation (see supra 
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which provides that an executor or administrator of a 
deceased co-owner shall have (for purposes of administering 
the estate) the power to compel the sale of the entire tract 
in which the decedent's interest is fractional and undivided 
(the other owners, of course, to receive their just share of 
the proceeds).57 However, the alleged absolute power of 
the co-owners to compel partition in kind was found to be 
conditional: partition in kind could not be had where prop-
erty was incapable of physical partition or where any of the 
surviving co-owners elected to purchase the entire estate at 
an appraised value. The court declared that a right which 
is not absolute but is dependent for its existence upon the 
action or inaction of another is not basic or vested, and so 
not within the protection of the Constitution. Indeed, the 
court stated that the loss which the co-owners claimed to 
have sustained might be characterized as the loss of an undue 
advantage which they had over the interest of a deceased 
co-owner.58 But undue advantage can never ripen into a 
vested right, deprivation of which is constitutionally repug-
nant. 
Partition by Sale 
Some authority is given in all states to the courts to order 
a sale of the land where it cannot be divided equally or 
cannot be divided without prejudice to the interests of some 
Chapter 2, p. I 3); in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; and in violation of Ohio Const., Art. I, sec. 19, which provides 
that "private property shall ever be held inviolate." 
57 Page's Ohio Gen. Code, sec. 10 5 xo-xo. 
58 Prior to the enactment of the statute, any living co-owner had the power 
of partition, while the administrator or executor of a deceased co-owner did 
not have such power. It is the general rule that an administrator or executor 
has no such seizin of the land of the deceased co-owner as to entitle him to be 
made a party to partition proceedings. Marshall v. Marshall, 86 Ala. 383, 
5 So. 475 (1889); Throckmorton v. Pence, 121 Mo. so, 25 S. W. 843 
(1894); Garrison v. Cox, 99 N.C. 478, 6 S. E. 124 (1888). 
332 RETROACTIVE LAND LEGISLATION 
of the parties.59 In a few cases, it has been questioned 
whether the legislature can constitutionally authorize a court 
to sell the land in case partition in kind is impracticable. In 
Richardson v. Monson 60 a proceeding was instituted under 
a statute which gave authority to the court to order a sale of 
the land and to distribute the proceeds among all persons 
interested in the estate, in proportion to their interests, when-
ever a sale would, in the opinion of the court, promote the 
interests of all parties better than a partition would, and 
whenever the property could not conveniently be occupied 
in common.61 The tenancy in question had come into being 
prior to the enactment of the statute. Facts were stated in 
the bill to prove that partition was impracticable. The 
defendants argued that to give the statute a retroactive effect 
would impair the obligation of contracts and would authorize 
the taking of property from one person and the vesting of 
it in another. It was claimed that the statute in authorizing 
the court to compel a sale upon the application of one or 
more tenants in common, and representing in this case a 
small minority of interest, deprived some of the tenants of 
their property merely to accommodate others, and without 
reference to the public interests. The court replied that the 
power to compel a partition enters into the very nature of 
the title of estates held in common and the only question is 
how partition can best be made. The legislature had supplied 
the answer in this instance by providing for sale where parti-
tion could not be made to the best advantage of the parties. 
59 Restatement, Property, sec. 178, Comm. a, Spec. Note (r948 Supp.). 
The statutes vary somewhat in wording but agree in substance. Sales are 
allowed inter alia when partition in kind will operate "to the great prejudice" 
of the owners, or "to the manifest prejudice" of the owners, or where the 
property "cannot be equitably divided in kind," or divided without "great 
inconvenience" to the parties interested. 
60 23 Conn. 94 (r854). 
61 Conn. Pub. Acts of r 8 53, c. lviii; now embodied in Conn. Gen. Stat. 
1949, 5ec. 8236. 
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This statute, decided the court, introduced no new principle; 
it only provided for an emergency when a division could not 
be well made in any other way. 
In Metcalf v. H oopingardner 62 it was held that the power 
of the legislature to provide that the share of all parties shall 
be sold where a division of the lands cannot be made, had 
been too long acquiesced in to be any longer called in 
question.63 
"When parties, by contract, assume the relation of tenants in 
common in real estate, the law fixes their respective rights, 
one of which is that the partnership may be dissolved, so 
to speak, and that if necessary the common property may be 
sold and the proceeds divided." 64 
It is the general rule that when the circumstances desig-
nated by the statute are found to exist a sale will be ordered, 
even if a majority in interest, or the majority in numbers 
holding an interest in the property, request a, partition in 
kind.65 However, partition in kind ought to be made when-
ever possible, although it is difficult, and a sale will not be 
ordered unless a partition in kind would materially impair 
the value of the land or substantially prejudice the interests 
of the owners. 66 The compulsory sale of one's property 
62 45 Iowa 510 ( 1877). 
63 In Kluthe v. Hammerquist, 45 S. D. 476, 188 N. W. 749 (1922), it 
was contended that such procedure was in violation of sec. 2, art. 6, of the 
state Constitution in that it deprived the party of his legal title without due 
process of law, and deprived him of his right to freedom from forced or 
compulsory alienation of his property. Held: Statute is not violative of any 
constitutional right when properly construed and applied. 
64 45 Iowa 510, 512. 
65 Shepard v. Mt. Vernon Lumber Co., 192 Ala. 322, 68 So. 88o (1915); 
De Roulet v. Mitchel, 70 Cal. App. 2d 120, 160 P. 2d 574 (1945); Lyon v. 
Wilcox, 98 Conn. 393, II9 Atl. 361 (1923). 
66 "The generally accepted test of whether a partition in kind would result 
in great prejudice to the owners, is whether the value of the share of each 
in case of a partition, would be materially less than his share of the money 
equivalent that could probably be obtained for the whole." 20 R. C. L., 
p. 774, quoted in Kluthe v. Hammerquist, 45 S. D. 476, 479, 188 N. W. 
749, 750 (1922) supra note 63. 
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without his consent is warranted only in clear cases.67 If the 
judgment does not provide for distribution of the proceeds 
of sale to the tenants in proportion to their interests in the 
land, the sale is void.68 
MISCELLANEOUS STATUTES RELATING TO TENANCIES 
IN COMMON AND JOINT TENANCIES 
Where the pre-existing law recognizes the privilege of 
one cotenant in a mine to enter without the consent of the 
other and take away ores, although the value of the land 
might be lessened thereby, this privilege has been held to 
be a substantial property interest which cannot be taken away 
by the legislature.69 The rights created by a statute which 
takes away this privilege have also been held to be valuable 
property interests which cannot constitutionally be divested 
by an act which purports to restore the privilege.70 Of 
course, the legislature has no power to convert ownership in 
severalty into joint ownership.71 
II. TENANCIES BY ENTIRETIES 
Tenancy by entireties is the tenancy by which husband 
and wife at common law hold land conveyed or devised to 
them by a single instrument.72 This form of joint owner-
ship, although differing from a joint tenancy in some 
respects, is essentially a form of joint tenancy. Survivorship 
67 4 Thompson, Real Property, sees. 2015, 2016 (Perm. ed.); Williams v. 
Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 56 Cal. App. 2d 645, 133 P. 2d 73 
(1943). 
68 See Mead v. Mitchell, 17 N.Y. 210 (1858). 
69 Butte and Boston Consol. Min. Co. v. Montana Ore Purchasing Co., 25 
Mont. 41, 63 Pac. 825 (1901). 
70 Ibid. 
71Shell v. Matteson, 81 Minn. 38, 83 N. W. 491 (1900) supra Chapter 3, 
note 104. . 
72 2 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 430 (3d ed.). 
CONCURRENT OWNERSHIP 335 
is also the predominant characteristic of tenancies by entire-
ties. The survivor of the marriage, whether husband or wife, 
is entitled to the whole, and this right cannot be defeated by 
a conveyance of the· other, nor by a sale under execution 
against the other, nor can the tenants partition the estate.73 
It appears that this form of joint ownership has not expe-
rienced such hostility on the part of the courts as has the 
institution of joint tenancy. Certainly, the courts have not 
seized at the opportunity to be rid of tenancies by entireties 
by broadly applying and construing the various statutes 
affecting the incident of survivorship in joint tenancies and 
the various "Married Women's Property Acts." These stat-
utes have usually been held to allow tenancies by the entire-
ties to exist in one form or the other. 74 
73 2 Tiffany, op. cit. However, the tenants can destroy the estate by a joint 
conveyance. Maxwell v. Sullivan, 123 Fla. 263, r66 So. 575 (1936); Beihl 
v. Martiny, 236 Pa. 519, 84 Atl. 953 (r9r2). 
74 2 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 433 (3d ed.). 
The reasons usually assigned that statutes affecting the incident of survivor-
ship in joint tenancies are not applicable to tenancies by entireties are: ( r) 
these statutes encompass only joint tenancies or conveyances to two or more 
persons, but in contemplation of law, husband and wife are but one person 
and do not take as joint tenants; ( 2) the incident of survivorship is not an 
evil in the case of tenancies by entireties and it cannot be assumed that the 
legislatures intend to abolish the incident of survivorship except where it is 
productive of harmful results. 
In Hiles v. Fischer, 144 N.Y. 306, 39 N. E. 337 (1895) it was held that 
the Married Women's Property Act simply takes away the husband's usufruct 
of the wife's separate property. The right of the husband to the rents and 
profits and use of the land held by entireties is not an incident of this estate 
but is a right enuring to him from the general principle of the common law 
which vests him jure uxoris with the rents and profits of all his wife's lands, 
whether held by a sole or joint title, during their joint lives. The effect of 
the statutes is to take the husband's exclusive right to the usufruct of the lands 
held in entirety. By virtue of the statute, husband and wife are now tenants 
in common or joint tenants of the use, each being entitled to one-half of 
the rents and profits during their joint lives. Upon the death of one, the 
survivor takes the whole estate. 
The courts which take the opposite view, i.e., that the Married Women's 
Acts have abolished tenancies by entireties, generally do so on the ground that 
the theoretical unity of the spouses with respect to rights of property being 
done away with, it would be inconsistent to retain any of the incidents of 
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The legislatures have also shown a greater reluctance to 
alter the incidents of the tenancy by entireties than they 
have to change the incidents of the joint tenancy. The com-
mon-law rule that a conveyance of land to husband and wife 
during coverture ordinarily creates an estate by the entirety, 
is still in effect in many jurisdictions.75 
This judicial and legislative acquiescence in, or approval 
of, the common-law rule is very likely a realization that as 
a matter of fact grantors and devisors to husband and wife 
may often really intend that the survivor shall take all. 
Certainly, many married persons desire to hold their land 
as tenants by the entirety for the purpose of saving costs of 
administration. 
Legislation affecting the incident of survivorship has been 
enacted in a number of jurisdictions. Some statutes purport 
to abolish the incident; 76 some provide that conveyances 
and devises to husband and wife shall be presumed to create 
estates in common; 77 in some states the tenants are given 
it. See: Wilson v. Wilson, 43 Minn. 398, 45 N. W. 710 (1890); Swan v. 
Walden, 156 Cal. 195, 103 Pac. 931 (1909). 
A third view is expressed by a few courts that estates by entireties still 
exist as at common law, entirely unaffected by the Married Women's Act. 
Arrand v. Graham, 297 Mich. 559, 298 N. W. 281 (1941). 
For a detailed analysis of the impact of Married Women's Acts on the 
estate of tenancy by entireties, see Phipps, "Tenancy by Entireties," 2 5 Temp. 
L. Q. 24, 27 (1951). 
75 In twenty jurisdictions tenancies by entireties still exist, Ark., Del., D. C., 
Fla., Ind., Ky., Md., Mass., Mich., Mo., N.J., N. Y., N. C., Ore., Pa., R. 1., 
Tenn., Vt., Va., and Wyo. Phipps, "Tenancy by Entireties," 25 Temp. L. Q. 
24, 46 et seq. (r95r). 
76 E.g., the Kentucky statute, infra note 79· 
77 E.g., Mass. Gen. Laws 1932, c. 184, sec. 7: "A conveyance or devise 
of land to two or more persons or to husband and wife, except a mortgage or 
a devise or conveyance in Trust, shall create an estate in common and not in 
joint tenancy, unless it is expressed· in such conveyance or devise that the 
grantees or devisees shall take jointly, or as joint tenants, or in joint tenancy, 
or to them and the survivor of them or unless it manifestly appears from 
the tenor of the instrument that it was intended to create an estate in joint 
tenancy." 
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the power to partition.78 The courts have consistently held 
that such legislation cannot be applied to existing tenancies. 
The basis of the courts' refusal to allow the statutes to 
be given a retroactive effect has generally been the theory 
that when land is conveyed or devised to husband and wife, 
they do not take title as individuals but as one legal person, 
or, as the proposition is sometimes quaintly stated, they take 
per tout et non per my. 
In Elliott v. Nichols 79 it was said: 
". . . all the books agree, una voce, that husband and wife 
not only cannot compel each other to make partition, but 
even if they concur in the wish, they have not the power to 
sever the tenancy. It is a sole, and not a joint tenancy. They 
have no moieties. Each holds the entirety. They are one in 
law, and their estate one and indivisible. If the husband 
alien; if he suffer a recovery; if he be attainted, none of these 
will affect the right of the wife, if she survive him. Nor is this 
by the jus accrescendi. There is no such thing between them. 
That takes place where, by the death of one joint tenant, the 
survivor receives an accession-something which he had not 
before-the right of the deceased. But, as between husband 
and wife, the survivor takes nothing from the decedent; 
acquires no new title nor interest nor estate thereby; but 
takes by the original conveyance the whole, because invested 
thereby with the entire estate. The survivor gets the entire 
estate by virtue of the title being in him or her by the 
original conveyance, but rid of the possible contingency of 
78 E.g., the New York statute, infra note 86. 
79 67 Ky. 502 (1868). Land was conveyed to Mr. and Mrs. N. in 1837. 
Mr. N. mortgaged same in 1865. Mrs. N. died in x86I, leaving children 
and heirs who resisted the foreclosure of the mortgage on one-half of the land, 
claiming that a statute enacted in I 8 5o had abolished the incident of survivor-
ship in estates by entireties, and that consequently their parents held as tenants 
in common. 
2 Stanton's Ky. Rev. Stat. 1852, c. 47, Art. iv, § 14, provided: "Where 
any real estate or slave is conveyed or devised to husband and wife, unless 
a right of survivorship is expressly provided for, there shall be no mutual 
right to the entirety by survivorship between them; but they shall take as 
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the other's surviving and retaining the estate, because like-
wise so invested in that party." 80 
"As the entire title and estate was vested in both husband 
and wife, the Legislature could not have diverted any por-
tion of the title, and we must presume did not intend to do so, 
but that, as a rule of property and a declaration of the legal 
effect of such deed subsequently made, and the legal rights 
of the parties thereunder, said statute was enacted." 81 
Similar reasoning has been used by other courts in refusing 
to allow a retroactive effect to statutes of their respective 
jurisdictions. 82 
An Arkansas statute, enacted in I 94 7, provides that courts 
of equity shall have the power to dissolve estates by the 
tenants in common, and the respective moieties be subject to curtesy or dower, 
with all other incidents to such a tenancy." (Now, with the omission of "or 
slave" and immaterial modifications, Ky. Rev. Stat. I948, sec. 38I.o5o.) 
80 67 Ky. soz, 505. 
The same might be said of the element of survivorship in joint tenancies. 
2 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 4I9 (3d ed.). Supra note I. 
8167 Ky. 5oz, 506 (r868). 
82 Holmes v. Holmes, 70 Kan. 892, 79 Pac. I63 ( I905). In 1876 a tract 
of land was conveyed to Mr. and Mrs. H. In I 896 after the statute abolishing 
survivorship had been passed (supra note 35), Mrs. H. died, leaving her 
husband surviving her, and the question arose whether the heirs of Mrs. H. 
inherited any interest in the land. Held: No. 
Au opposite view was adopted in an earlier case, Stewart v. Thomas, 64 
Kan. 5II, 68 Pac. 70 (I902), wherein it was held that the statute was 
intended to apply to existing tenancies by the entirety and that consequently 
the children of the deceased wife (husband surviving) were necessary parties 
to foreclosure proceedings on a mortgage executed by husband and wife. The 
concept of the estate by entireties was characterized as out-moded. 
Pease v. Whitman, I82 Mass. 363, 65 N. E. 795 (1903). This was an 
action in tort for flowing plaintiff's land, which had been conveyed to Mr. 
and Mrs. L. in I883. Mr. L. conveyed the premises to defendant. Mrs. L. 
did not join in the deed. After Mr. L.'s death his widow conveyed the prem-
ises to the plaintiff. In I885 the statute relating to construction of conveyances 
and devises to two or more persons (supra note 14) was amended by inserting 
after the word "persons" the words "or to husband and wife." Mass. Acts 
I 8 8 5, c. 2 3 7 (for the statute as it now reads see supra note 77). Held: The 
statute of 18 8 5 could not affect this case because the rights of the wife became 
vested in 18 8 3 before the statute was enacted and therefore defendant took 
nothing under the deed from Mr. L. 
Myers v. Reed, 17 Fed. 401 (C. C. D. Ore. 1883). 
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entirety, upon the rendition of a final decree of divorcement, 
and in the division of the property, so held by the parties, 
shall treat the parties as tenants in common.83 It has been 
held that the statute cannot be constitutionally applied to an 
entirety estate, which was created prior to the passage of the 
statute.84 In Pennsylvania a like result was reached under 
a similar statute.85 
In Zorntlein v. Bram 86 it was declared that the legislature 
cannot retroactively bestow authority upon either the hus-
band or wife separately to convey to a third party. 
To be sure, the una persona theory is not the only factor 
inducing the courts to hold that a statute cannot retroactively 
destroy the incident of survivorship in tenancies by the 
entireties. Whether or not it is accurate to ascribe the 
inability of either husband or wife to sever the tenancy to 
a doctrine of the common law which forbade the recognition 
of the separate existence of the spouses, the fact remains 
that the incident of survivorship cannot be defeated by a con-
veyance by one tenant, as in the case of a joint tenancy, nor 
by a sale under execution. Since the incident cannot be 
destroyed ordinarily except by the joint conveyance of the 
83 Ark. Acts 1947, No. 340; now, Ark. Stats. 1947, sec, 34-121S. 
84 Jenkins v. Jenkins, 219 Ark. 219, 242 S. W. 2d 124 (t9SI). 
It is generally held that divorce terminates the tenancy. 2 Tiffany, Real 
Property, sec. 436 (3d ed.). Arkansas is one of the few states in which it is 
denied that the tenancy ceases upon divorce. 
85 Clements v. Kandler, 9 Pa. Dist. & Co. 310 (1925); Ebersole v. Good-
man, 7 Pa. Dist. & Co. 6os (192s); Cooper v. Niemeyer, so Pa. Dist. & Co. 
634 (1944). Pennsylvania is another state in which it has been held, contrary 
to the prevailing view, that divorce does not sever the tenancy by the entirety. 
Pa. Act of 192s, P. L. 649 provided that whenever a husband and wife, 
now or thereafter holding property as tenants by entireties, have been divorced, 
either of such tenants may bring suit to have the land sold and the proceeds 
divided between them. Pa. Act of 1949, P. L. 1394 provides that if title 
is acquired after Sept. 1, 1948, upon divorce, the property will automatically 
be owned as a tenancy in common. The Act of 1949 is now Purdon's Pa. 
Stat. Ann., Tit. 68, sec. sot ( I9SI Supp.). 
86 too N.Y. 12, 2 N. E. 388 (t88s). In 1878 the land was conveyed to 
Mr. and Mrs. B. On Sept. 23, 1881, Mrs. B. executed a deed purporting to 
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spouses, the interest of each spouse, while both are living, 
in the possibility of getting the whole estate, is something 
more than a mere expectancy. It may therefore seem ques-
tionable whether the legislatures can extinguish such an 
interest without the consent of both tenants. The constitu-
tional immunity from legislative impairment which ought 
to be afforded the incident of survivorship in tenancies by 
entireties, it seems, should be very much the same as that 
immunity which is afforded to contingent remainders.87 
When a court thinks only of the una persona theory, how-
ever, it is likely to lose sight of the fact that there may be 
valid policy reasons for extending to tenants by entireties 
some of the privileges enjoyed by tenants in common and 
joint tenants. In Zorntlein v. Bram 88 for example, the court 
seems to have thought there was something in the nature of 
tenancies by entireties which deprives the legislature of 
authority to allow either of the spouses to sever the estate, 
although the other spouse does not object. While the legis-
lature probably ought not to be allowed to take away from 
a nonconsenting spouse the chance of getting the whole 
estate by survivorship, it is absurd to hold that even if the 
spouses concur in the wish, they cannot take advantage of 
a statute to sever the tenancy. 
convey an undivided one-half of the premises to plaintiff. On Sept. 30, r88r, 
Mr. and Mrs. B. joined in a deed of the premises to defendant. N. Y. Laws 
x88o, c. 472 (now incorporated inN. Y. Dom. Rei. Law, sec. 56) provided: 
"Whenever husband and wife shall hold any lands or tenements as tenants in 
common, joint tenants, or as tenants by entireties, they may make partition 
or division of the same between themselves, and such partition or division, 
duly executed under their hands and seals, shall be valid and effectual. • • ." 
Plaintiff brought this action for partition. Held: The deed executed by Mrs. 
B. to the plaintiff conveyed no title and he could not maintain an action for 
partition. 
87 For the constitutional protection afforded contingent remainders see supra 
Chapter 4· 
88 roo N.Y. 12, 2 N. E. 388 (r885), supra note 86. 
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The idea that the spouses do not have separate legal per-
sonalities is altogether outdated and is not likely to recom-
mend itself to many present day courts. One could expect 
such a theory to be the deciding factor in cases arising prior 
to I 8 so.89 The modern view is that there is nothing in the 
relationship of husband and wife to prevent their acquiring 
property as joint tenants or as tenants in common.90 While 
it is true that a conveyance or devise to a husband and wife 
still creates in many jurisdictions a tenancy by entireties, this 
result is reached upon the presumption that the alienor 
intended to create a tenancy by entireties unless the instru-
ment clearly expresses the intention that the alienees shall 
take as tenants in common or as joint tenants.91 
The change in view from the proposition that the courts 
are dealing with a rule of law to the proposition that the 
issues turn on the application of a rule of construction ought 
to have some effect on the constitutionality of the retrospec-
tive operation of the type of statutes under discussion. But 
the change is not reflected in the cases previously cited, and 
they are therefore of doubtful authority for future decisions. 
The rule of law on which these cases are based has in the 
course of time become a rule of construction and may well 
disappear altogether from the law. Even without the influ-
ence of statutes, the courts in a number of jurisdictions have 
repudiated the institution of tenancy by the entireties as not 
89 There are American cases decided in the first half of the nineteenth 
century which go so far as to hold that husband and wife suffer "a legal 
incapacity to take in severalty, arising from a legal identity; and a grantor 
cannot remove that incapacity without the intervention of a trustee." Dias v. 
Glover, 1 Hoff. Ch. 71 (N.Y. 1839); Stuckey v. Keefe's Ex'rs, z6 Pa. 397 
(1856). Freeman, Cotenancy and Partition, sec. 72, states that it is doubtful 
whether any reported case prior to the publication of Mr. Preston's "Treatise 
on Estates" ever supported the doctrine that, as between themselves, husband 
and wife can take an estate other than by entireties. 
90 2 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 43 I (3d ed.). 
91 z Tiffany, op. cit. 
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in harmony with the usages of the community, or as based 
on a concept of marriage relation which no longer obtains.92 
The courts in the future are not likely to treat husband and 
wife as different from any other grantees. 
92 2 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 433 (3d ed.). 
In Kerner v. McDonald, 6o Neb. 663, 84 N. W. 92 (1900) it was said: 
"Many principles of law have changed with the passing of time, through the 
gradual change of thought on the part of society and the flux and change 
of social organization. Many others have ceased because the reason which 
called them into existence has ceased, and it seems to us that to this last-named 
principle may be referred the law of estates by entirety." ( 6o Neb. 663, 670, 
84 N. W. 92.) 
In VanAusdall v. VanAusdall, 48 R. I. 106, 135 Atl. 850 (1927), the 
court remarked: "On the facts before us at early common law a presumption 
would exist in favor of construing this deed as creating a tenancy by entirety. 
This was only a presumption, i.e., an aid to legal reasoning. It arose because 
grantees were husband and wife and legal policy favored a holding 'per tout 
et non per my'. It was employed in English law at a time when a married 
woman had few property rights. It was created for what was conceived to 
be the wife's protection. If she now has full property rights and needs no 
such protection, the reason for its employment has disappeared and a court 
properly may decline to be guided by it. One of the glories of the common 
law has been that it is not static. It grows as new conditions arise. \Vhen the 
basis for a presumption has gone, tl!ere is small reason for a court longer 
to act upon that presumption. If nothing has taken the place of such basis, 
perhaps the presumption may continue to be applied. Where for that basis has 
been substituted an entirely altered conception of the property relation of 
husband and wife, the imputation of intent, as if no alteration had been made, 
is not sound. There is no legal requirement that such a common law presump-
tion must remain unaffected until expressly altered by statute. A presumption 
is not evidence. It is an aid to legal reasoning applied to particular subjects. 
It is grounded on 'experience, probability, policy and convenience'. When the 
grounds change so should the presumption." (48 R. I. 106, 109, 135 Atl. 
85o, 851.) 
Table of Cases 
PAGE 
Adams v. Adams, I47 Fla. 267, 2 So. 2d 855 (I941), app. 
dismissed 3I4 U.S. 572 (I94I) .... I02, I04, 286, 289, 297 
Adamsv. Palmer, 51 Me. 480 (I863) .................. 295 
Albee v. May, I Fed. Cas 296, No. I34 (C. C. D. Vt. 1834) 58 
Albertson v. Landon, 42 Conn. 209 (I 87 5). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198 
Alexander, In re, 53 N.J. Eq. 96, 30 Atl. 817 (Ch. 1894) .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289, 291, 292 
Alexander v. Alexander, 85 Va. 353, 7 S. E. 335 (1888) .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276, 279 
Allen v. Hanks, I36 U.S. 300 (I889) .................. 28I 
Allen v. Weber, So Wis. 531,50 N. W. 5I4 (I89I)....... 70 
Allison v. Davidson, 39 S. W. 905 (Tenn. 1896)......... 72 
Alter's Appeal, In re, 67 Pa. 34I (I87I) ................ 118 
American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 2I9 U.S. 47 (I9II) ... 85, 89, 134 
Ames v. Department of Labor and Industries, I76 Wash. 509, 
30 P. 2d 239 ( 1934)............................ 43 
Anastasia v. Anastasia, I38 N.J. Eq. 260, 47 A. 2d 879 (Ch. 
1946) ......................................... 283 
Anderson v. Shepard, 285 Ill. 544, I2I N. E. 2I5 (1918)... 88 
Anderson v. Wilkins, I42 N.C. I54, 55 S. E. 272 (I906) .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 67, I 69, I 7 0 
Anderson-Tully Co. v. Murphree, 153 F. 2d 874 (8th Cir. 
I946) .... ·..................................... 6I 
Annable v. Patch, 3 Pick. 360 (Mass. 1825) ............. 3I4 
Antone v. Snodgrass, 244 Ala. soi, I4 So. 2d 506 (I943) ... 249 
Archer-Shee v. Garland, [I931] A. C. 2I2 .............. 266 
Arizona Commercial Min. Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co., 27 
Ariz. 202, 232 Pac. 545 (1925) .................... 151 
Armstrong v. Armstrong, I Ore. 207 (I855) ............. 116 
Armstrong v. Jackson, I Black£. 374 (Ind. I825)......... s6 
Arnett v. Reade, 220 U. S. 3 I I ( 19 II). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301 
Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S. W. 799 (1925) .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30I, 308 
Arnold v. Willis, 128 Mo. 145, 30 S. W. 517 (1895) ...... 277 
343 
34-4 TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Arrand v. Graham, 297 Mich. 559,298 N. W. 281 (1941) .. 336 
Arrowsmith v. Burlingim, I Fed. Cas. I I87, No. s63 (C. c. 
D. Ill. I848)................................... 41 
Ashton-Jenkins Co. v. Bramel, 56 Utah 587, I92 Pac. 375 
(I920) ........................................ ISI 
Atchafalaya Land Co., Ltd. v. F. B. Williams Cypress Co., 
258 u.s. 190 (I92I)............................ 42 
Attorney General v. Revere Copper Co., 152 Mass. 444, 25 
N. E. 6os (I89o)................................ 37 
Aubert's Appeal, I09 Pa. 447, I Atl. 336 (1885) ........ 235 
Austin v. Stevens, 24 Me. 520 (I845) .................. I99 
Ayer v. Chapman, 147 Ga. 715, 95 S. E. 257 (I9I8)...... 57 
Bacon v. Callender, 6 Mass. 303 (I8Io) .......... ·57, s8, I99 
Bailes v. Daly, I46 Ala. 628,40 So. 420 (I906) .......... I22 
Bailey v. Alabama, 2I9 U.S. 219 (1911) ............... 3IO 
Baker v. Baker, 284 Ill. 537, !20 N. E. 525 (I918) ...... I62 
Baker v. Kelley, II Minn. 480 (I86s) ................. 49 
Balance v. Gordon, 247 Mo. 119,152 S. W. 358 (I912) ... 300 
Baldwin v. Baldwin, 74 Hun 415, 26 N.Y. S. 579 (I893) .. 330 
Ball v. Boston, I 53 Wis. 27, 141 N. W. 8 (I9I3)......... 93 
Bambaugh v. Bamgaugh, I I S. & R. I9I (Pa. I824). ,-
..................................... ·3I4, 322, 323 
Bamforth v. Bamforth, I 23 Mass. 280 (I 877). . . . . . . . . . . I69 
Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley's Lessee, 2 Pet. 492 (U. S. 
1829) .......... · · ............................. 128 
Bank of Minden v. Clement, 256 U.S. 126 (I92I)....... 17 
Barker v. Owen, 93 N. c. I98 (I88s)................ s6 
Barnes v. Luther, 77 Hun 234, 28 N.Y. S. 400 (I894) .... I67 
Barnett v. Sanders, I2I Okla. I4, 247 Pac. 55 (I926)..... 29 
Barringer's Estate, In re, 29 Misc. 457, 6I N. Y. S. I090 
(I899) ....................................... I22 
Bartlett v. Ligon, 135 Md. 620, I09 Atl. 473 (I920) ..... I IS 
Bass v. Roanoke Navigation and Water Power Co., I I I N. 
c. 439· I6 s. E. 402 (I892) ....................... 242 
Bassett v. Messner, 30 Tex. 604 (I 868). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299 
Bates v. McDowell, s8 Miss. SIS (I88I) ............... 288 
Baumeister v. Silver, 98 Md. 4I8, 56 Atl. 825 (I904)...... 42 
Bazzuro'sEstate, I6I Cal. 71,118 Pac. 434 (I9II) ....... I26 
TABLE OF CASES 345 
PAGE 
Beal v. Nason, J4. Me. 344 (1837).................... 42 
Beale v. Knowles, 45 Me. 479 (1858) .................. 277 
Beals v. State, 139 Wis. 544, 121 N. W. 347 (1909) .. ·. ·. 94 
Beardv.Dansty,48Ark.183,2S.W.70I (x886) .. 55, 58, I99 
Beardsley's Lessee v. Chapman, I Ohio St. I I 8 (I 8 53) . . . . . . I 99 
Beauchamp v. Bertig, 90 Ark. 351, I I9 S. W. 75 (1909) ... 186 
Beck's Estate, In re, 44 Mont. 561, 121 Pac. 784 (1912) .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101, 102 
Beecher's Estate, In re, II3 Mich. 667, 72 N .W. II (1897) 123 
Beihlv. Martiny, 236 Pa. 519,84 Atl. 953 (I912) ....... 335 
Belfield v. Findlay, 389 Ill. 526, 6o N. E. 2d 403 (I945) ... 198 
Beliveau v. Beliveau, 2I7 Minn. 235, I4 N. W. 2d 360 
(I944) · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 163 
Bennettv. Harms, 51 Wis. 251,8 N. W. 222 (1881) .. 286, 289 
Benvenuto, In re Estate of, I83 Cal. 382, I91 Pac. 678 
(I920) ........................................ 127 
Bertrand v. Taylor, 87 Ill. 235 (I877)................. 89 
Bevilacqua, In re Estate of, 3 I Cal. 2d 5 So, I 91 P. 2d 7 52 
(I948) ........................................ 115 
Bickford v. Stewart, 55 Wash. 278, I04 Pac. 263, 106 Pac. 
I I I 5 (I 909) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 24 
Biddle v. Starr, 9 Pa. 46I (1848) ..................... 330 
Bigelow v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 206 Iowa 
884, 22I N. W. 66I (I928)....................... 53 
Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal. I (I857) ............. 41, 59, 6o, 199 
Bishop v. Bishop, 4 Hill I38 (N. Y. 1843) .............. I 15 
Blackbourn v. Tucker, 72 Miss. 735, 17 So. 737 (1895) .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101-103, 147 
Blackwell v. Virginia Trust Co., 177 Va. 299, 14 S. E. 
2d301 (1941) .................................. 257 
Blakely v. Calder, 13 How. Prac. 476, a:ff'd 15 N. Y. 617 
(1857) ....................................... 158 
Blood v. Humphrey, 17 Barb. 66o (N.Y. 1854) ......... 279 
Bloom v. Strauss, 70 Ark. 483, 69 S. W. 548 (1902) ..... 198 
Blume v. Pearcy, 204 S.C. 409,29 S. E. 2d 673 (1944) .... 211 
Board of Com'rs, etc. v. Sperling, 8 So. 2d 380 (La. 1942)... 31 
Board of Education v. Blodgett, 155 Ill. 441, 40 N. E. 1025 
(1895) . . . .. . . .. .. .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 38 
Boehmer v. Kalk, I 55 Wis. 156, 144 N. W. 182 (1913) ... 273 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Bofil v. Fisher, 3 Rich. Eq. I (S.C. I85o) .............. I67 
Bonard's Will, I6 Abb. Prac. (N. S.) 128 (N.Y. 1872) .... 121 
Bonfoey v. Bayne, IOO Mich. 82, 58 N. W. 620 (1894) .... 292 
Borsch's Estate, In re, 362 Pa. 58 I, 67 A. 2d I I9 ( 1949) .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255-257· 260 
Boston and Gunby v. Cummins, 16 Ga. 102 (1854), 6o 
Am. Dec. 717 ......................... · ·.....•. 74 
Boston Franklinite Co. v. Condit and Torrey, 19 N. ]. Eq. 
394 (Ch. x869) ......................... 312, 319, 328 
Bottorff v. Lewis, 121 Iowa 27, 95 N. W. 262 (1903) .... 122 
Bouknight v. Epting, II S.C. 71(1878) ............... 278 
Bowen v. Preston, 48 Ind. 367 (I 87 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
Bowman v. Cockrill, 6 Kan. 3II (I87o)................ 48 
Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay (IS. C. L.) 252 (1792) ... 10, 122 
Boyd v. Harrison, 36 Ala. 5 33 (I 86o) .............. 286, 294 
Bracket v. Norcross, I Greenl. 89 (Me. 1820) ......... 58, 199 
Bradshaw v. Rodgers, 20 Johns. Rep. 103 (N.Y. 1822).... 10 
Bramble v. State, Use of Twilly, 41 Md. 435 (I874) ....... 299 
Brasko v. Duchek, I27 N.J. Eq. 567, I4 A. 2d 477 (Prerog. 
I940) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
Brearley School v. Ward, 201 N. Y. 358, 94 N. E. IOOI 
(I9II) .................. ; ........ 250, 251, 253> 262 
Brenham v. Davidson, 51 Cal. 352 (I876) ............. 174 
Brenham v. Story, 39 Cal. 179 (I87o) ...........•...•. 126 
Brettun v. Fox, 100 Mass. 234 (1868) ......... 32, 92, 102 
Brevoort v. Brevoort, 70 N.Y. I36 (I877) ............. 161 
Brevoort v. Grace, 53 N.Y. 245 (I873) ............... 172 
Brickell v. Trammell, 77 Fla. 544, 82 So. 22I (1919)..... 66 
Bridgman v. Wilcut, 4 Greene 563 (Iowa I854) ......... 299 
Brierley v. Brierley, 8I N.H. I33, 124 Atl. 31 I (1923) .... 178 
Bright v. Boyd, 4 Fed. Cas. 127, No. I,875 (C. C. D. Me. 
I84I) • ...... • ........... • ........ • ... • ... • •.. 54 
Bronson v. Kinzie, I How. 3I I (U.S. I843)............. 3I 
Brookman v. Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 90 Pac. 9I4 (1907)... 36 
Brown v. Brown, 94 S.C. 492, 78 S. E. 447 (1913) ...... 292 
Brown v. Brown, 83 W.Va. 415, 98 S. E. 428 (1919) .... 173 
Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa. 86 (I847) ................... 265 
Brown v. Storm, 4 Vt. 37 (183I)...................... 56 
Bruce v. Strickland, 81 N. C. 267 (1879).............. 25 
TABLE OF CASES 347 
PAGE 
Bruggemeyer's Estate, In re, I IS Cal. App. S2S, 2 P. 2d 
534 (I93I).................................... 3S 
Brundage v. Knox, 279 Ill. 450, I I7 N. E. I23 (I9I7).... 63 
Brunvold v. Victor Johnson & Co., 59 Cal. App. 2d 75, 138 
P. 2d 32 (I943) ................................. 307 
Buchanan v. Lee, 69 Ind. II7 (I879) ................. 276 
Buffington v. Grosvenor, 46 Kan. 730, 27 Pac. I37 (1891) .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286, 289 
Bull v. Conroe, I 3 Wis. 260 (I 86o) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299 
Bull v. Nichols, IS Vt. 329 (I843) .................... 123 
Bullard v. Holman, I84 Ga. 788, I93 S. E. 586 (1937).... 13 
Bump, Estate of, I52 Cal. 274, 92 Pac. 643 (I907)...... 32 
Burchell, Matter of, 299 N. Y. 35 I, 87 N. E. 2d 293 
(I949) ....................................... 207 
Burghardt v. Turner, I2 Pick. S34 (Mass. I832) ......... 316 
Burke v. Barron, 8 Iowa I 32 (I 859). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29S 
Burlingham v. Vandevender, 47 W. Va. 804, 3S S. E. 83S 
( I900) ....................................... 169 
Burrows, Estate of, I 36 Cal. I I 3, 68 Pac. 488 (I 902). . . . . 3S 
Burrows v. Delta Transp. Co., 106 Mich. s82, 64 N. W. 
SOI (1895) ......................... , ...• , .... , 10 
Bushnell v. Loomis, 234 Mo. 37I, I37 S. W. 2S7 (1911) .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29, 30, 298-300 
Butte and Boston Consol. Min. Co. v. Montana Ore Purchas-
ing Co., 2S Mont. 4I, 63 Pac. 825 (I90I) ............ 334 
Butterfield v. Sawyer, I87 Ill. 598, s8 N. E. 602 (1900) .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200, 20I 
Buty v. Goldfinch, 7 4 Wash. 532, I 33 Pac. I057 ( I91 3). . . . 49 
Cabin Valley Min. Co. v. Mary Hall, 53 Okla. 760, ISS 
Pac. 570 (I9I6) ................................ 186 
Cagle v. Schaefer, I ISS. C. 35, I04 S. E. 321 (1920) .. 180, 199 
Cahen v. Brewster, 203 U.S. S43 (I906) ............... 121 
Cahill v. Benson, I9 Tex. Civ. App. 30, 46 S. W. 888 
(I898) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . s6 
Cameron v. Goebel & Bettinger, 20 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 268 
(I900) ....................................... 122 
Camp v. Stark, 8I Pa. 235 (I87S) ..................... uS 
Campau v. Campau, 25 Mich. I27 (I872) ............... 128 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Campbell v. California, 200 U. S. 87 (I 906) ...... 94, 95, I I 3 
Campbell v. Holt, II5 U.S. 62o (I88s) ............. ·37, 38 
Campbell v. Kawananakoa, 34 Haw. 333 (I937) ......... 171 
Cargile v. Fernald, 63 Mo. 304 (I876) ................ 125 
Carneal v. Lynch, 9I Va. I I4, 20 S. E. 959 (I895) ........ 161 
Carr v. Brady, 64 Ind. 28 (I878) ..................... 287 
Carroll v. Olmsted's Lessee, I6 Ohio 25I (I847) .......... 2I8 
Carter v. Tyler and Others, I Call. I6S (Va. I797) ....... 220 
Castlebury v. Maynard, 95 N.C. 28I (I886) .......... 30, 298 
Caswell's Estate, Matter of, ISS Misc. Rep. 599· s6 N.Y. s. 
2d 507 (Surr. Ct. I944), aff'd 269 App. Div. 8o9, 56 
N.Y. S. 2d 407 (4th Dept. I945) ................... 257 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Peabody, 190 Misc. 
66, 68 N.Y. S. 2d 256 (1947) ..................... 120 
Central Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Skillin, 154 App. Div. 227, 
I38 N.Y. S. 884 (2d Dept. I912) .................. 200 
Chandler v. Horne, 23 Ohio App. I, I54 N. E. 748 (I926) .. 299 
Chapal's Will, Matter of, 269 N. Y. 464, I99 N. E. 762 
(I936) .................................... 190, I9I 
Charbonnet v. State Realty Co., ISS La. 1044, 99 So. 865 
( I923) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 
Charlotte Consol. Const. Co. v. Ada W. Brockenbrough, 
I87 N.c. 6s, I2I s. E. 7 (I 923) .................. 125 
Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (I94S), 
reh. den. 325 U. S. 896 ......................... 38, 42 
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Porter, 72 Iowa 426, 34 N. W. 
286 (Iss 7) .................................... 6s 
Childs v. Shower, IS Iowa 26I (I86s)................. 57 
Choteau v. Missouri Pac. R. R. Co., 122 Mo. 375, 22 S. W. 
458, 30 s. w. 299 (I894) ........................ 291 
Christenson v. Wikan, 254 Wis. I4I, 35 N. W. 2d 329 
(I948) ·····································37· 53 
City of New Port Beach v. Fager, 39 Cal. App. 2d 23, 102 
P.2d438(1949) ................................ 66 
Clark v. Clark, IIO Ohio St. 644, 144 N. E. 473 (1924) ... 169 
Clark's Estate, In re, IOO Vt. 2I7, 136 Atl. 389 (1927)..... 93 
Clarke v. Cordis, 4 Allen 466 (Mass. I862) .......... J48, 150 
Clarke v. Hayes, 9 Gray 426 (Mass. I857) .......... 167, 171 
Clarke v. McCreary, I2 Smedes & M. 347 (20 Miss. I849) .. 276 
TABLE OF CASES 349 
PAGE 
Clarke v. Van Surlay, IS Wend. 436 (N. Y. I836) .... IS, I74 
Classen v. Heath, 389 Ill. I83, s8 N. E. 2d 889 (I945) .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288, 291 
Clavo v. Clavo, IO Cal. App. 447· I02 Pac. ss6 (1909) .... 302 
Claypoole v. King, 2 I Kan. 434 (I 879) ..... · · · · · · · · · · · 57 
Clements v. Kandler, 9 Pa. Dist. & Co. 310 (1925) ....... 339 
Clemons v. City of Los Angeles, 222 P. 2d 439 (Cal. 1950).. 2I 
Clifford v. Kampfe, I47 N.Y. 383, 42 N. E. I (1895) ..... 292 
Clusky v. Burns, I2o Mo. 567, 25 S. W. 585 (I893) .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125, I66, IJ4 
Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365 (N. Y. I838) .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IS, I74· IJS, 252 
Cockrill v. People of State of California, 268 U. S. 258 
(I925) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
Colbert's Estate, In re, 44 Mont. 2 59, I I 9 Pac. 7 9 I (I 9 I I) . . I 24 
Cole v. Van Ostrand, 131 Wis. 454, IIO N. W. 884 
(1907) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
Coleman v. Coleman, 51 Ohio App. 221, 200 N. E. I97 
(1935) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
Collier v. Smaltz, 149 Iowa 230, 128 N. W. 396 ( 1910)... 43 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Harmon, 323 U. S. 
44, 8 I 7 (I 944) · · • · · · · · · · · · • · · · · · · · · · · · · • · · • · · · · 33 
Comstock v. Comstock, 23 Conn. 349 (I854) ............ 217 
Comstockv. Gay, 51 Conn. 45 (1883) .............. 2I6, 2I8 
Conger v. Lowe, I24 Ind. 368, 24 N. E. 889 (1890) ..... 248 
Conn v. White, I89 Ky. 185, 224 S. W. 764 (1920) ..... 279 
Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Talbot, I 13 Ind. 373, 
14 N. E. 586 (r887) ... · ·. · · · · · .. · · · · · ... · · .. ·74• 75 
Conover's Estate, In re, 163 Misc. 599, 297 N. Y. S. 577, 
aff'd 252 App. Div. 917, 300 N. Y. S. 1357 (4th Dept. 
I937) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327 
Cooke v. Cooke, 65 Cal. App. 2d 26o, ISO P. 2d 514 
(1944) ............................... ·97· 306, 307 
Cooper v. Niemeyer, 50 Pa. Dist. & Co. 634 (1944) ....... 339 
Coovert v. O'Conner, 8 Watts 470 (Pa. 1839)........... 70 
Copeland v. Wheelwright, 230 Mass. I3I, I I9 N. E. 667 
( I9I 8) · .. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · • · · · · · · · · · · · ....... I40, I47 
Corbin v. Healy, 20 Pick. 514 (Mass. 1838) ............ 217 
Cordova v. Folgueras y Rijos, 227 U.S. 375 ( 1913) ... I 12, 1 I4 
350 TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Coughran v. First Nat. Bank, 10 Cal. App. 2d 153, 64 P. 
2d 1013 (1937) ................................. 249 
Cox v. Berry, 13 Ga. 306 (1853)..................... 41 
Cox v. Von Ahlefeldt, 105 La. 543, 30 So. 175 (1900)..... 43 
Craig v. Dunn, 47 Minn. 59,49 N. W. 396 (1891) · · · · · · · · 57 
Craig v. O'Rear, 199 Ky. 553, 251 S. W. 828 (1923)..... 10 
Crawford's Estate, In re, 362 Pa. 458, 67 A. 2d 124 
(1949) .................................... 193> 194 
Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 6 Rand. 245 (27 Va. 1828)... 72 
Cress v. Hamnett, 144 Kan. 128, 58 P. 2d 61 (1936) .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 314, 323 
Crowell v. Akin, 152 Ga. 126, 108 S. E. 791 (1921) ...... 86 
Crowell v. Seelbinder, 185 Ark. 769, 49 S. W. 2d 389 
(1932) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 
Crump v. Guyer, 6o Okla. 222, 157 Pac. 321 (1916) .... 19, 23 
Culbertson v. Coleman, 47 Wis. 193, 2 N. W. 124 (1879) .. 125 
Cummings v. Wildman, II6 Md. 307, 81 Atl. 610 (19II).. 77 
Cunningham v. Gray, 20 Mo. 170 (1854) ............... 278 
Curtis v. Hiden, II7 Va. 289, 84 S. E. 664 (I915) .... 176, 178 
Curtis' Will, In re, 6I Hun. 372, 16 N.Y. S. 180 (I89I) ... 283 
Cusic v. Douglas, 3 Kan. I23 (I865) .................. 31 
Custer and Lantz v. Commonwealth, 25 Pa. 375 (1855) .... 127 
Dammert v. Osborn, I40 N.Y. 30, 35 N. E. 407 (1893) ... 121 
Daniel v. Thigpen, 194 La. 522, I94 So. 6 (I940)........ JI 
Darnell v. Williams, 17I Ga. 65I, IS6 S. E. 584 (I93I) ... 198 
Davenport v. Young, 16 Ill. 548 (I855) ............... 125 
Davidson v. Koehler, 7 6 Ind. 398 (I 88 I) ........... I 7 4, I 7 5 
Davidson v. Richardson, 50 Ore. 323, 9I Pac. ro8o (1907).. 27 
Davis, Estate of, I 5 I Cal. 3 I 8, 86 Pac. I 8 3 (I 907) . . . . . . . . I 35 
Davis v. Hayden, 9 Mass. SI4 (I8I3) .................. 217 
Davis v. Helbig, 27 Md. 452 (r867) ................... 174 
Davis v. O'Ferrall, 4 Greene I68 (Iowa I853).......... 26 
Davisv.Smith,sGa.274(I848) ...................... 54 
Davison v. Johonnot, 7 Mete. (48 Mass.) 388 (I884) ..... 175 
Dawson v. Grow, 29 w. Va. 333> Is. E. 564 (I887)..... 54 
Day v. Burgess, 139 Tenn. 559, 202 S. W. 9I I (1918) .... 284 
Day v. Day, 18o Minn. 151, 230 N. W. 634 (1930) ...... 198 
De Camp v. Dix, 159 N.Y. 436, 54 N. E. 63 (1899)..... 72 
TABLE OF CASES 351 
PAGE 
Deihl v. Jones, I70 Tenn. 2I7, 94 S. W. 2d 47 (I936) .. I3, 114 
Delaware River at Stilesville, In re, I 3 I App. Div. 403, I IS 
N.Y. S. 74S (I909)............................. 72 
Del Drago's Estate, Matter of, 287 N. Y. 6I, 38 N. E. 2d 
I3I (1941).................................... 93 
De Mill v. Lockwood, 7 Fed. Cas. 4S3, No. 3,782 (C. C. 
S. D. N. Y. r8s3) ............................... 215 
Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U. S. 36 
(1944) ..................................... ·7· 192 
Den ex dem. Berdan v. Van Riper, 16 N. J. L. 7 (Sup. Ct. 
1837) .......................... IS, 22I, 3I4, 318, 319 
Denegre v. Walker, 214 Ill. I 13, 73 N. E. 409 (I905) .... I84 
Denver, etc., Ry. Co. v. Woodward, 4 Colo. I62 (I878)... 13 
De Peyster v. Clendining, 8 Paige 29S (N.Y. I 840)....... 103 
De Roulet v. Mitchel, 70 Cal. App. 2d 120, I6o P. 2d 574 
(I945) ....................................... 333 
Dewey v. Lambier, 7 Cal. 347 (1857) .................. 3I7 
De Witt v. Comm., I84 Ky. 437, 2I2 S. W. 437 (I9I9) .... 121 
Dias v. Glover, I Hoff. Ch. 71 (N.Y. I839) ............ 34I 
DI1lard v. New Mexico State Tax. Comm., 53 N. M. 12, 
201 P. 2d 345 (1949). · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 93 
Dilley v. Henry's Ex'r, 25 N. J. L. 302 (Sup. Ct. 1855) .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275, 276 
Dixon v. Dixon's Ex'rs, 4 La. 188 (1832) ............... 307 
Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N.Y. 30s, I22 N. E. 22I (1919) ... 207 
Dodge v. Detroit Trust Co., 300 Mich. S7S, 2 N. W. 2d 
S09 (1942) ................................. 141, 146 
Dodin v. Dodin, 16 App. Div. 42, 44 N. Y. S. 8oo (2nd 
Dept. 1897), aff'd 162 N. Y. 635, 57 N. E. 1108 
( 1900) ....................................... I I4 
Doe ex dem. Chandler v. Douglass, 8 Black£. IO (Ind. 1846). 125 
Donaldson v. State, 67 N. E. 1029 (Ind. 1903), new trial 
awarded, I67 Ind. 5S3, 78 N. E. 182 (1906) ......... IIS 
Dooley v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., I99 Ga. 3S3, 34 S. 
E. 2d S22 (194s) ................................ 248 
Dorseyv. Gilbert, II Gilland]. 87 (Md. I839) .......... 174 
Downs v. Blount, I70 Fed. IS (sth Cir. I909)........... I3 
Doyle v. Gleason, I52 Misc. 64I, 274 N.Y. S. I83 (1934) .. 115 
Drake v. Merkle, I53 Ill. 3I8, 38 N. E. 6s4 (I894) ....... 158 
352 TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Drishaus' Estate, In re, I 99 Cal. 369, 249 Pac. 5 I 5 (I 926) · · 35 
Duncan v. Duncan, 324 Mo. 167, 23 S. W. 2d 91 (1929) .. 284 
Dungan v. Kline, 81 Ohio St. 371, 90 N. E. 938 (1910) .... 2I3 
Dunkum v. Maceck Bldg. Corp., 256 N.Y. 275, I76 N. E. 
392 (I93I).................................... 50 
Dunlavy v. Lowrie, 372 Ill. 622, 25 N. E. 2d 67 (I940) .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200, 227 
Dunn v. Sargent, IOI Mass. 336 (I869) ................ 276 
Dunn v. Stevens, 62 Minn. 380, 64 N. W. 924 (1895)..... 31 
Ebersole v. Goodman, 7 Pa. Dist. & Co. 605 (1925) ........ 339 
Ebling v. Dreyer, 149 N.Y. 460,44 N. E. 155 (1896) .... 174 
Eden Irrig. Co. v. District Court, 61 Utah 103, 2I I Pac. 
957 (I922) .................................... 89 
Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595 ( I877 J.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3I 
Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 26 Pac. 539 (I89I).... 63 
Eisenhardt v. Lowell, 105 Colo. 417, 98 P. 2d IOOI (I940). 3I4 
Elcock's Will, In re, 4 McCord 39 (S. C. 1826) ..... I03, I04 
Eliason v. Wilburn, 335 Ill. 352, 167 N. E. IOI (I929), 
aff'd 281 U.S. 457 (1930) .................. 86, 90, 153 
Elliott v. Nichols, 67 Ky. 502 (I868) .............. ·337• 338 
Emerson's Estate, In re, 191 Iowa 900, I83 N. W. 327 
(I92I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9I 
Equitable Loan & Security Co. v. Waring, I I 7 Ga. 5 99, 44 
S. E. 320 (I903) ................................ 324 
Ericksonv. Erickson, 167 Ore. I, II5 P. 2d I72 (I94I) .... 324 
Ervine's Appeal, I6 Pa. 256 (1851) ............ I75, 176, 182 
Erwin v. Puryear, 50 Ark. 356,7 S. W. 449 (1887) ....... 277 
Evan's Will, In re, 193 Iowa I240, I88 N. W. 774 (I922).. 91 
Evansv. Cropp, I41 Ky. 514,133 S. W. 221 (1911) ...... 243 
Everhart v. Everhart, 87 Pa. Super. 184 (1926) .......... 258 
Ewingv. Nesbitt, 88 Kan. 708,129 Pac. 113I (1913) ..... 217 
Farmer's Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Berks County R. E. Co., 
333 Pa. 390, 5 A. 2d 94 (1939) · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·. · 74 
Fee v. Cowdry, 45 Ark. 410 (1885) ......... 56, 58, 198, 199 
Fenwick v. Gill, 38 Mo. 510 ( 1886)................ . . . 54 
Ferguson v. Gentry, 206 Mo. 189, 104 S. W. 104 (1907) .. 100 
TABLE OF CASES 353 
PAGE 
Ferrie v. Public Administrator, 3 Brad£. Sur. 249 (N. Y. 
I8Ss) ........................................ Il6 
Ferry v. Spokane, Portland and Seattle R. R. Co., 268 F. 
II7, aff'd 2S8 U.S. 3I4 (1921) ............... 289, 29S 
Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co. v. Williams, 268 Ky. 67 I, 
IOS s. w. 2d 814 (1937) ......................... 207 
Field, In re, I3I N.Y. I84, 30 N. E. 4-8 (1892) ......... I69 
Fifer v. Allen, 228 Ill. so7, 81 N. E. IIOS (I907) ........ 24-S 
First Reformed Dutch Church of Gilboa v. Crosswell, 2 I o 
App. Div. 294, 206 N.Y. S. 132 (3d Dept. 1924), appeal 
dism. 239 N.Y. 62s, 147 N. E. 222 (192s) ........... 24-4-
Fisher v. Fisher, 2S3 N.Y. 260, I70 N. E. 9I2 (1930) .. I38, I46 
Fletcher v. Felker, 97 Fed. Supp. 7SS (W. D. Ark. I9SI) ... 286 
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (U.S. I809) ........... IS, 16 
Flewwellin v. Jeter, I38 Fla. S40, 189 So. 6SI (1939) .. 23, I75 
Florentine v. Barton, 2 Wall. 210 (U.S. 1864) .......... 125 
Flynn v. Flynn, 17I Mass. 312, soN. E. 6so (1898) ...... 292 
Flynn v. Lemieux, 4-6 Minn. 4-S8, 4-9 N. W. 238 (1891).... 57 
Folsom v. Clark, 72 Me. 4-4 (188o) .................... I98 
Foraker v. Kocks, 4-1 Ohio App. 210, I8o N. E. 743 (I93I). 3I3 
Forstner, Succession of, I86 La. S77, I73 So. I I I (I937) ... 263 
Fortune v. Watkins, 94- N.C. 304- (I886)............... 25 
Fotheringham's Estate, In re, 183 Wash. S79, 49 P. 2d 4-80 
(I93S) ....................................... I21 
Frame v. Frame (Tex. Civ. App.) I4- S. W. 2d 865, rev'd 
I20 Tex. 6I, 36 S. W. 2d 152 (I93I) ............... 308 
Franklin et al. v. Margay Oil Corp. et al., I94 Okla. 5 I9, 
I 53 P. 2d 486 (I94-4) ............................ I89 
Frantz v. Harrow, 13 Ind. S07 (I8S9) ................. 287 
Freeman's Estate, I8I Pa. 40S, 37 Atl. S91 (I897) .... 269, 271 
Frees' Estate, In re, 187 Cal. ISO, 20I Pac. II2 (I921) .... 35 
Frost's Will, In re, I92 App. Div. 206, 18 N. Y. S. 559 
(I920) .................................... 114, 202 
Fujii v. State, 24-2 P. 2d 6I7 (Cal. I9S2)............... 22 
Gaar, Scott & Co. v. Collins, IS N. D. 622, I IO N. W. 8I 
(I907) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
Gaffer's Estate, In re, 2S4 App. Div. 448, s N. Y. S. 2d 
671 (3rd Dept. I938) ............................ I8I 
354 TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Ga:ffken's Will, In re, I97 App. Div. 257, I88 N. Y. S. 852 
(2d Dept. I92I) ................................. 103 
Gallewski v. H. Hentz and Co., 30I N. Y. 164, 93 N. E. 
2d62o(I950) .................................. 38 
Gamble's Estate, 9 Dist. 691 (Pa. 1900) ................ 169 
Gannett v. Leonard, 47 Mo. 205 (I87I) ................ 174 · 
Gannon v. Peterson, 193 Ill. 372,62 N. E. 2IO (1901) ..... 245 
Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. 1816)..... 10 
Garrison v. Cox, 99 N.C. 478, 6 S. E. 124 (1888) ........ 331 
Garrison v. Hecker, 128 Mich. S39, 87 N. W. 642 (1901) .. I69 
Gavin v. Curtin, I7I Ill. 640,49 N. E. 523 (I898) ....... I67 
Geary v. Butts, 84 W. Va. 348, 99 S. E. 492 (I919) .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I67, 169, 170 
Gebhardt v. Reeves, 7S Ill. 30I (I874) ........ · .... 239, 241 
Gedney v. Marlton Realty Co., 258 N. Y. 3S5, 179 N. E. 
766 (I932) .................................... 173 
General Board of State Hospitals for the Insane v. Robertson, 
I IS Va. S27, 79 S. E. 1064 (I9I3) .................. 27I 
George v. Ransom, IS Cal. 322 (I86o) ................. 279 
Gerhardt v. Sullivan, I07 N.J. Eq. 374, IS2 Atl. 663 (Ch. 
1930) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
Gheen v. SummeJ, SoN. C. I87 (I879)................ 3I 
Gibson v. United States, I66 U.S. 269 (I897)........... 66 
Giddings v. Smith, IS Vt. 344 (I843) .................. 217 
Giddings v. Turgeon, 58 Vt. I06, 4 Atl. 7 I I (I 886). . . . . . . II8 
Gilesv. Gullion, I3 Ind. 487 (r8s9) ................... 287 
Gillespie v. Allison, I IS N.C. S42, 20 S. E. 627 ( I894). 157, I63 
Gilliam v. Guaranty Trust Co., I86 N.Y. I27, 78 N. E. 697 
( I906) .................................... 200, 20I 
Gilmore v. Bright, IOI N.c. 382, 7 s. E. 7SI (I88r) .... rs, 30 
Gilpin v. Williams, 2S Ohio 283 (I 87 4) .... I 7 5, I 76, 2 I4, 220 
Giordano's Estate, In re, 8s Cal. App. 2d s88, I93 P. 2d 77I 
(1948) ....................................... II6 
Girard Trust Co. v. Pa. R. Co., 71 Pa. D. & C. S53 (C. P. S 
Phila.), a:ff'd 364 Pa. s76, 73 A. 2d 37I (I9SO) ....... 229 
Girard Trust Co. v. Schmitz, I29 N.J. Eq. 444, 20 A. 2d 21 
(Ch. I94I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 
Gladney v. Sydnor, 172 Mo. 318,72 S. W. SS4 (1903) ..... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28, 29, 97· 279 
TABLE OF CASES 3SS 
PAGE 
Gleeson's Heirs v. Scott, 3 Hen. & M. 278 (Va. I809) ...... 2I7 
Goetting v. Goetting, So Cal. App. 363, 2S2 Pac. 656 (I927) 304 
Goff v. Yauman, 237 Wis. 643, 298 N. W. I79 (I94I) .... 3I9 
Gohlman, Lester & Co. v. Whittle (Tex. Civ. App.) 2S4 
s. W. S95, rev'd I I4 Tex. s84, 273 s. w. 8oS (I92S) ... 308 
Goldberg's Estate, In re, 275 N. Y. I86, 9 N. E. 2d 829 
(I937) ....................................... I04 
Goodyear v. Rumbaugh, I3 Pa. 480 (I85o) .............. 276 
Gossom v. McFerran, 79 Ky. 236 (I88I) ............... 178 
Graff v. Rankin, 250 F. ISO (7th Cir. I9I8) ............. I67 
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (I9I4) ............... 136 
Gray v. McLendon, 134 Ga. 224,67 S. E. 859 (I9IO)..... IO 
Green v. Biddle, 8 ·wheat. I (U. S. I823).............. 54 
Green v. City of Asheville, I99 N. C. SI6, I54 S. E. 852 
(I930) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
Green v. Edwards, 3I R.I. I, 77 Atl. ISS (I9IO) ......... 221 
Green v. Estabrook, I68 Ind. I23, 79 N. E. 373 (I907) .... 290 
Greenamyre's Estate, I33 Neb. 693, 276 N. W. 686 (I937). 267 
Greencastle Southern Turnpike Co. v. State, 28 Ind. 382 
(I867) ······································· 122 
Greenough v. Greenough, I I Pa. 489 (I 849) .......... 28, II 8 
Greenway Homes v. Borough of River Edge, I37 N. J. L. 
453, 6o A. 2d 8I I (Sup. Ct. I948).................. 22 
Greer v. Blanchar, 40 Cal. I94 ( I87o) ............. 314, 3I7 
Grenawalt's Appeal, In re, 37 Pa. 95 (I 86o). . . . . . . . . . . . . I69 
Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (I945) ................. I32 
Griffing v. Griffing, I20 Fla. 9I3, I63 So. I4I (I935) ...... 275 
Griswold v. Bragg, 48 Fed. 5I9, 48 Conn. 577 (I88o)..... 56 
Griswold v. McGee, I02 Minn. I I4, I I2 N. W. 1020, aff'd 
II3 N. W. 382 .............................. 288, 297 
Groesbeck v. Seeley, I3 Mich. 329 (I86s) .............. 49, so 
Grove v. Todd, 4I Md. 633 (I874) .................... 290 
Gunn v. Barry, IS Wall. 6Io (U.S. 1872).............. 31 
Gunsenhiser v. Binder, 206 Mass. 434,92 N. E. 7os (1910). 248 
Guthrie's Appeal, 3 7 Pa. 9 (I 86o) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 I 7 
Guye v. Guye, 63 Wash. 340, IIS Pac. 731 (191I) .... ·97, 307 
Haas v. Haas, 182 La. 337, I62 So. S ( 193S)............. 13 
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)............ 8 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Hagerty v. Clement, I95 La. 230, I96 So. 330 .( I940) ..... 263 
Hall v. Hall, 2I9 N.C. 8os, ISS. E. 2d 273 (I941) ...... I98 
Hamblin v. Marchant, I03 Kan. soS, I75 P. 678, aff'd I04 
Kan. 689, I8o P. Su (I9I9) ................... 288, 297 
Hamilton v. Hirsch, 2 Wash. Ter. 223, 5 Pac. 2I5 (I884) .. 288 
Hamilton and Wife v. Flinn, 2 I Tex. 7 I 3 (I 8 58) . I 03, I I 2, I I 5 
Hamilton County v. Rosche, 50 Ohio St. I03, 33 N. E. 408 
( I893) ................. • ................... •. I3 
Hannon v. Southern Pac. R. R. Co., I2 Cal. App. 350, I07 
Pac. 335 (I 909) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I If 
Hansberry v. Lee, 3II U.S. 32 (I940) ................. I32 
Hanson v. Ingwaldson, 77 Minn. 533, SoN. W. 702 (I899) ISS 
Hardeman v. Downer, 39 Ga. 425 ( I869)............... 3I 
Hardgrove v. Bowman, IO Wash. 2d I36, I 16 P. 2d 336 
(I 94 I) · · · · • · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ' · ' ' ' · ' ' ' ' 55 
Hardy v. Burroughs, 25I Mich. 578, 232 N. W. 200 (I930) 53 
Hardy v. Dunlap, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 339, 26 S. W. 8 52 (I 894) 52 
Harmon v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, I89 Okla. 475, II8 
. P. 2d 205 (I94I) ........... · .... · .. · .. · · · · · · · · · · 33 
Harper v. Durden, 177 Ga. 216, I70 S. E. 45 (I933) ...... I98 
Harriett v. Harriett, I 8 I N. C. 7 5, 106 S. E. 22 I (I 92 I) . . . I 99 
Harris v. Glenn, 56 Ga. 94 (I876) .................... 299 
Harrisv. Whiteley, 98 Md. 430,56 Atl. 823 (I9o4) ..... 24, 25 
Hartson v. Elden, soN. J. Eq. 522, 26 Atl. 56I (Ch. I892) 
.......................................... I2I, 203 
Hartvedt v. Maurer, 359 Mo. I6, 220 S. W. 2d 55 ( I949).. 42 
Hatch v. Tipton, I3I Ohio St. 364, 2 N. E. 2d 875 (1936) .. 330 
Hatcher v. Buford, 6o Ark. I69, 29 S. W. 64I (I895) ...... 288 
Hathon v. Lyon, 2 Mich. 93 (I8SI) .................... 282 
Havillv.Havill,332Ill. II, I63N.E.428 (I928) .... II7, I45 
Hayes v. McReynolds, IH Mo. 348,46 S. W. I6I (I898) .. I58 
Hearn v. Camp, IS Tex. 545 (1857)................... 58 
Heath v. Hazelip, 159 Ky. 555, I67 S. W. 905 (1914)..... 42 
Hegarty's Appeal, 75 Pa. 503 (I874) ...... 125, 126, 175, 176 
Heiner v. Greenwich Sav. Bank, 118 Misc. 326, 193 N.Y. S. 
29I (I922) .................................... 327 
Heinze's Estate, In re, 20 Misc. 371,46 N.Y. S. 247 (1897) 
.......................................... 261, 264 
TABLE OF CASES 357 
PAGE 
Heitkernper v. Schrneer, I30 Ore. 644, 275 Pac. 55, rev'd I30 
Ore. 644, 28I Pac. I69 (I929) ..................... 272 
Helm v. Webster, 85 Ill. u6 ( I877) ................... 241 
Henson v. Moore, I04 Ill. 403 (I882) .................. 282 
Herrington v. Godbee, I 57 Ga. 343, 121 S. E. 312 (1924).. 31 
Hertzv. Abrahams, IIO Ga. 707,36 S. E. 409 (1900) ..... 223 
Hiles v. Fischer, I44 N.Y. 306, 39 N. E. 337 (I 895). · · . · · 335 
Hillv. Badeljy, 107 Cal. App. 598,290 Pac. 637 (1930) ... 327 
Hill v. Chambers, 30 Mich. 422 (I874) ................. 284 
Hill v. Sangarnon Loan & Trust Co., 302 Ill. 33, 134 N. E. 
112 (I922) .................................... 156 
Hilton v. Thatcher, 31 Utah 360,88 Pac. 20 (I906) ....... 287 
Hinton v. Hinton, 6r N.C. 410 (r868) ................. 123 
Hitz v. National Bank, I I I U.S. 722 ( I883) ............. 278 
Hobbsv. Lenon, I9I Ark. 509,87 S. W. 2d (I935) ....... I34 
Hoffman v. Hoffman, 26 Ala. 535 (1855) ............... 115 
Holbrook v. Finney, 4 Mass. s66 ( r8o8) ............. ISO, 3I6 
Holley v. Glover, 36 S.C. 404, ISS. E. 6os (1891) ....... 292 
Holliday v. McMillan, 79 N.C. 3I5 (I878) ............. 276 
Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Barb. 295 (N.Y. 1848) ......... 274, 276 
Holmes v. Holmes, 70 Kan. 892, 79 Pac. 163 (1905) ...... 338 
Horne Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 
(I934) ..................................... 17, 319 
Horne for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 202 Mass. 422, 
89 N. E. 124 (I909)............................. 71 
Hood's Estate, 206 Wis. 227, 239 N. W. 448 (1931) ..... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93, 113, 114 
Hopper v. Gurtrnan, 126 N.J. L. 263, r8 A. 2d 245 (Err. & 
App. I94I) .................................... 285 
Hopping v. Burnam, 2 Greene 39 (Iowa I 849) .......... 74-76 
Horbach v. Miller, 4 Neb. 3I (I875)................... 42 
Horwitt v. Horwitt, 90 F. Supp. 528 (D. Conn. 1950) ...... 120 
Hoskinsv. Hutchings, 37 Ind. 324 (I871) ............... 27 
Hubbard v. Hubbard, 77 Vt. 73, 58 Atl. 969 (I904) ....... 276 
Hubbell v. Hubbell, I35 Iowa 637, II3 N. W. 512 (1907) .. 184 
Huebschrnan v. Von Cotzhausen, 107 Wis. 64, 82 N. W. 720 
(1900) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 
Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 190 F. 2d 191 
(sth Cir. 195I) ................................. 63 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE; 
Inman's Estate, In re, 101 Ore. 182, 199 Pac. 615 (1921).. 93 
Invest.ment Co. v. Hambach, 37 Wash. 629, 8o Pac. 190 
(1905) ...................... : ................ 59 
Ireland v. Mackintosh, 22 Utah 296,61 Pac. 901 (1900).... 38 
Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U. S. 556 ( 1941) ......... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91, 102, 104, 107, 108 
Jackson v. Jackson, 144 Ill. 274,33 N. E. 51 (1893) ... 282, 283 
Jackson v. Rutherford, 23 Ohio App. 506, 155 N. E. 813 
(1926), pet. dismissed II5 Ohio St. 709, 156 N. E. 217 
(1926) ....................................... 122 
Jackson ex dem. Hart v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280 (U.S. I 830 ).73, 90 
Jackson's Adm'rs v. Sublett, IO B. Mon. 467 (Ky. 1850 ).275, 276 
Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U.S. 261 (1912) .............. 85, 134 
James v. Dubois, 16 N.J. L. 285 (Sup. Ct. 1837) ......... 223 
Jefferson v. Fink, 247 U.S. 288 (1917) ............. 113, 114 
Jenkins v. Jenkins, 82 N.C. 208 (186o)................ 25 
Jenkins v. Jenkins, 219 Ark. 219, 242 S. W. 2d 124 (1951). 339 
Jennings v. Capen, 321 Ill. 291, 151 N. E. 900 (1926) .... 208 
Jensen v. Jensen, 54 Wyo. 224, 89 P. 2d 1085 (1939) ..... 215 
Jewell v. Warner, 35 N.H. 176 (1857) ................ 212 
Johns v. Gillian, 134 Fla. 575, 184 So. 140 (1938)........ 55 
Johnson v. Brauch, 9 S.D. II6, 68 N. W. 173 ( 1896) ..... 126 
Johnson v. Sanger, 49 W.Va. 405, 38 S. E. 645 (1901).... 20 
Johnson, Inc. v. Warden, 173 P. 2d 838 (Cal. 1946)....... 86 
Jones v. Prairie Oil and Gas Co., 273 U.S. 195 (1927) ..... 186 
Jones' Heirs v. Perry, 10 Yerg. 59 (Tenn. 1836) ... 54, 125, 126 
Junction R. R. Co. v. Harris, 9 Ind. 184 (1857) .......... 280 
Keagy v. Trout, 85 Va. 390, 7 S. E. 329 (1888) .......... 276 
Kearse v. Kearse (Tex. Civ. App.) 262 S. W. 561, aff'd 276 
s. w. 690 (1925) ............................. 97> 307 
Keene's Appeal, 64 Pa. 268 (I 870) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 28 
Keith v. Keith, 26 Kan. 26 (1881)..................... 41 
Kelso v. Steiger, 75 Md. 376, 24 Atl. 18 (1892) .......... 243 
Kener v. LaGrange Mills, 231 U.S. 215 (1913).......... 31 
Kenji Namba v. McCourt, I 85 Ore. 579, · 204 P. 2d 569 
( 1949) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
TABLE OF CASES 359 
PAGE 
Kennebec Purchase, etc. v. Laboree, 2 Green}. 275 (Me. 
1823) ...................................... ·44, 45 
Kennedy, In re, 2 S.C. 216 (1870).................... 31 
Kenyonv.Stewart,44Pa.179 (1863) .................. 117 
Kepler v. Larson, 131 Iowa 438, I08 N. W. 1033 (1906) ... 211 
Kerner v. McDonald, 6o Neb. 663, 84 N. W. 92 (1900) ... 342 
Kerrv. Kitcher, I7 Pa. 433 (I85I) .................... 269 
Kerr v. Nicholas, 88 Ala. 346, 6 So. 698 (I 889). . . . . . . . . . 54 
Key v. Key, I34 Md. 4I8, 106 Atl. 744 (1919) ....... IOI, 103 
Kibby v. Chitwood's Adm'r, 4 T. B. Mon. 91 (Ky. I826) ... 125 
Kicey v. Kicey, I 14 N.J. Eq. 116, I68 Atl. 424 (Err. & App. 
1933) ................................ ·9I, III, 114 
King v. Foscue, 9I N.C. 116 (I884) ................... I83 
King v. Irving, 103 App. Div. 420, 92 N.Y. S. I094 (Ist 
Dept. I 90 5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 1 
Kingsbury, In re, 230 N.Y. 580, 130 N. E. 901 (I920) .II4, 202 
Kirk v. Turgerson, 6 Cold. 479 (Tenn. 1869) ............ 222 
Kluthe v. Hammerquist, 45 S.D. 476, 188 N. W. 749 (I922) 333 
Kneass's Appeal, In re, 31 Pa. 87 (1855) ............ I75, I76 
Knowles' Estate, In re, 295 Pa. 571, 145 Atl. 797 (1929) · · · 93 
Knox v. Cleveland, I 3 Wis. 245 (I 86o). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 
Knutzen, In re Estate of, 3I Cal. 2d 573, I9I P. 2d 747 
(I948) ....................................... IIS 
Kraemer v. Kraemer, 52 Cal. 302 (I877) .............. · 35 
Kutzner v. Myers, I82 Ind. 669, I08 N. E. II5 (1915) .. 23, I75 
Laird v. Carton, I96 N.Y. 169,89 N. E. 822 (1909) ...... 299 
Lambert v. Slingerland, 25 Minn. 457 (1879)............ 4I 
Lane v. St. Louis Trust Co., 356 Mo. 76, 20 I S. W. 2d 288 
(1947) ....................................... 297 
Lane v. Travelers Ins. Co., 230 Iowa 973, 299 N. W. 553 
(194I) ....................................... 230 
Lanes v. Bank, etc., 3 N. ]. Sup. 593, 67 A. 2d 925 ( I949) .. 126 
Langdon v. Appelgate, 51 Ind. 327 (1875) .............. 122 
Langdon v. Strong, 2 Vt. 234 (1829) ................... I25 
Langley v. Langley, I8 R.I. 6I8, 30 Atl. 465 (I894) ...... 114 
Lawrence v. Miller, 2 Comst. 245 (N.Y. I849) ....... 289, 290 
Lawrence E. Tierney Coal Co. v. Smith's Guardian, I8o Ky. 
8I5, 203 S. W. 73I (I9I8) ..................... I I, I85 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Lawrence's Will, In re, I Red£. Sur. 310 (N.Y. 1848) ..... 286 
Leach v. Leach et al., 72 N.J. Eq. 571, 66 Atl. 595 (Ch. 
1907) ..................................... 195, 196 
Leak v. Gay, 107 N.C. 468, 12 S. E. 312 (1890) ......... 299 
Leavenworth v. Claughton, 197 Miss. 6o6, 19 So. 2d 815, 20 
So. 2d 821 (1944) .............................. 48-so 
Lee v. Albro, 91 Ore. 211,178 Pac. 784 (1919) .. 136, 167, 169 
Lee v. Lindell, 22 Mo. 202 (1855) ..................... 292 
Leete v. State Bank, 115 Mo. 184,21 S. W. 789 (1893) ... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 275, 276 
Leffler v. Leffler, 15 I Fla. 455, IO So. 2d 799 ( 1942) ... 102, 104 
Leighton v. Young, 52 Fed. 439 (3d Cir. 1892) ......... 56, 57 
Leininger v. Reichle, 317 Ill. 625, 148 N. E. 384 (1925) ... 198 
Leitch v. Sanitary District of Chicago, 369 Ill. 469, I 7 N. E. 
2d 34 (1939) · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · • · · · · · · · · · • · · • • • • • 71 
Leland v. Wilkinson, 10 Pet. 294 (U.S. 1836) ........... 125 
Leslie, Matter of Estate of, 92 Misc. 663, 156 N. Y. S. 346 
(1915) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
Lessley v. Phipps, 49 Miss. 790 (1874).................. 31 
Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App. 584, ro P. 2d 496 (1932) ... 246 
Levy's Succession, 115 La. 377,39 So. 37 (1905) ......... 121 
Levystein Bros. v. O'Bryan, 106 Ala. 352, 17 So. 550 (1895) 133 
Lichter v. Thiers, 139 Wis. 481, 121 N. W. 153 ( 1909) .... 200 
Lillard v. Lillard, 63 Ohio App. 403, 26 N. E. 2d 933 (I 939) 224 
Linn v. Collins, 77 W.Va. 592, 87 S. E. 934 ( 1916). . . . . . . 133 
Linsley v. Hubbard, 44 Conn. 109. (1876) ........ 12, 169, 172 
Littleton's Estate, Re, 129 Misc. 845, 223 N. Y. S. 470 
(1927) ....................................... 128 
Livington's Lessee v. Moore, 7 Pet. 469 (U.S. 1833) ...... 125 
Loeb v. Conley, I6o Ky. 91, I69 S. W. 575 (1914) · · .. ·... 55 
Logan v. Walton, 12 Ind. 639 (1859) .................. 287 
Long v. Simmons Female College, 218 Mass. 135, 105 N. E. 
553 (1914) ................................ 269, 270 
Longv. Zook, 13 Pa. 400 (1850) ...................... 115 
Loring v. Hildreth, 170 Mass. 328, 49 N. E. 652 ( 1898) .. . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86, 87, 135 
Louisville, N. 0. & T. Ry. Co. v. Blythe, 69 Miss. 939, I I So. 
III (1892) . · .... · .. · .. · .. · .. • · · · · · · · · · · · · · · • • · 174 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Love v. McDonald, 20I Ark. 882, I48 S. W. 2d 170 (194I) 
... · · · · · ..... · ................. : . ......... 185, 188 
Lovern v. Lamprey, 22 N.H. 434 (1858) ........... II2, 1I5 
Lowry's Estate, In re, 314 Pa. 5I8, I7I Atl. 878 (I934) .... 321 
Lucas v. Sawyer, I7 Iowa SI7 (r864) .......... 286, 288, 294 
Ludwig v. Stewart, 32 Mich. 27 (I875)................. 42 
Luhrs v. Eimer, SoN. Y. 171 (r88o) .................. 122 
Lyon v. Wilcox, 98 Conn. 393, I I9 Atl. 36I (I923) .... · ·. 333 
McAllister v. Dexter & P.R. Co., I06 Me. 37I, 76 Atl. 891 
(I9IO) ....................................... 295 
McAuliff v. Parker, IO Wash. 14I, 38 Pac. 744 (I894).... 42 
McCafferty v. McCafferty, 8 Black£. 2 I 8 (Ind. I 846). . . . . . 26 
McCarthy v. Lane, 30I Mass. I25, I6 N. E. 2d 683 (I938). 87 
McClure v. Crume, I41 Ky. 36I, I32 S. W. 433 (1910) ... 169 
McConnell v. Bell, I21 Tenn. I98, I 14 S. W. 203 (1908) 
.......................................... 167, I75 
McCormick v. Blaine, 345 Ill. 46I, I78 N. E. 195 (I931) .. 134 
McCoy v. Grandy, 3 Ohio St. 463 (1854)............... 56 
McCreary v. Coggeshall, 74 S. C. 42, 53 S. E. 978 (1906) 
.......................................... 208, 209 
McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, Io8 So. 820 (I926). I33• 151 
·McDowell v. Beckham, 72 Wash. 244, I30 Pac. 350 (19I3). 227 
McEldowney v. Wyatt, 44 W.Va. 711,30 S. E. 239 (1898) 38 
McFadden v. McNorton, 193 Va. 455, 69 S. E. 2d 445 
(1952) ....................................... 114 
McFadin v. Simms, 309 Mo. 312, 273 S. W. 1050 (I925) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86, 87, 152 
McGillis v. McGillis, 154 N. Y. 532, 49 N. E. 145 (1898) 
.......................................... 200, 20I 
McGlone, Matter of the Will of, 284 N.Y. 527, 32 N. E. 2d 
539 (I940) .................................... 106 
McKay v. Lauriston et al., 204 Cal. 55 7, 269 Pac. 5 I 9 
(I928) ....................................... 304 
McKeever v. Patteson, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 304 (I 886) . . . . . . 314 
McLeroy v. McLeroy, 163 Tenn. I24, 40 S. W. 2d 1027 
(1931) ....................................... 321 
McManus v. Park, 287 Mo. 109, 229 S. W. 21 I ( 1920) .... 267 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
MacMillan v. Branch Banking and Trust Co., 22I N.C. 352, 
20 S. E. 2d 276 (I942) ........................... 225 
McNeer v. McNeer, I42 Ill. 388,32 N. E. 68I (1892) ..... 284 
McQueen v. Connor, 385 Ill. 455,53 N. E. 2d 435 (1944) .. 117 
Mabie v. Whittaker, IO Wash. 656, 39 Pac. I72 (1895) .... 301 
Macklem, In re, 28 F. 2d 4I7 (D. Md. 1928) ............ 292 
Madland v. Benland, 24 Minn. 372 (I878) ............ · 57 
Magee v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 256 Mass. 512, 
I53 N. E. I (I926) .............................. 121 
Magee v. Young, 40 Miss. 164 (I866) .................. 286 
Mahaffey's Estate, In re, 79 Mont. Io, 254 Pac. 875 (I927). 102 
Mahood v. Bessemer Properties, Inc., I 54 Fla. 7 IO, I 8 So. 
2d 775 (I944).................................. 78 
Majors v. Carter, I75 Tenn. 450, I35 S. W. 2d 924 (1940). 299 
Malatesta's Estate, 29 Pa. Dist. II3 (1920) .............. 257 
Manley Estate, In re, I I2 Vt. 3I4, 24 A. 2d 357 (I942) ... 249 
Manning, Succession of, I 8 5 La. 894, I 7 I So. 68 (I 936). . . . 263 
Manry v. Robinson, I22 Tex. 2I3, 56 S. W. 2d 438 (I932) 
............................................ 63, 67 
Marclay v. Love, 25 Cal. 367 (I864) .................. 19 
Marsh v. Reed, I84 Ill. 263,56 N. E. 306 (I9oo) .... 184, 268 
Marshall v. Marshall, 86 Ala. 383, 5 So. 475 (1889) ....... 331 
Marx v. Hanthorn, I48 U.S. I72 (I893)............... 50 
Masin v. Bassford, 38I Ill. 569,46 N. E. 2d 366 (I943) .... II7 
Massey v. Womble, 69 Miss. 347, II So. I88 (189I)....... 29 
Maxwell v. Sullivan, I23 Fla. 263, 166 So. 575 (I936) ..... 335 
May v. Fletcher, 40 Ind. 575 (I872) ................... 286 
Maynard v. Hill, I25 U.S. I90 (I888) ................. 274 
Mead v. Mitchell, I7 N.Y. 210 (I858) ............. 161, 334 
Medwedeff v. Fisher, I79 Md. I92, I7 A. 2d I4I (1941) ... 249 
Mellinger v. Bausman, 45 Pa. 522 (1863) ............... 276 
Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37, 3 S. W. 249 
(I887) . . . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
Mennig v. Howard, 2I3 Iowa 936, 240 N. W. 473 (1932) 
...................................... ISS, 159-161 
Merchants Nat. Bank v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 3I8 Mass. 563, 
62 N. E. 2d 83I (I945) ........................... 120 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Merchants' Nat. Bank of Bismark v. Braithwaite, 7 N. D. 358, 
75 N. w. 244 (1898)............................ 51 
Mercy v. Miller, 25 Tenn. App. 621, 166 S. W. 2d 628 
(1942) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 
Mersereau, Re, 233 N.Y. 540, 135 N. E. 909 (1922) .. 171, 173 
Metcalfv. Hoopingardner,45 Iowa510 (1877) .. 155, 159,333 
Metcalfe v. Union Trust Co., 181 N. Y. 39, 73 N. E. 498 
(1905) ............................... 260, 262, 267 
Middleton v. Flat River Booming Co., 27 Mich. 533 (1873). 72 
Miller v. Dennett, 6 N.H. 109 (1833) ......... ·314·• 317, 318 
Miller v. Miller, 16 Mass. 59 (18I9) ............... 3I4, 3I6 
Miller v. Miller, IO Met. 393 (Mass. 1845) .......... 122, 150 
Miller v. Town of Corinna, 42 Minn. 39I, 44 N. W. 127 
(I890) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 
Miller's Appeal, 52 Pa. I I 3 (I 866). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 
Mills v. Geer, III Ga. 275· 36 s. E. 673 (1900) ... ·57· s8, 199 
Miner v. Morgan, 83 Neb. 400, I 19 N. W. 781 (1909) .... 289 
Mingev.Gilmour, I Hay279 (N.C. 1796) .............. 216 
Minge v. Gilmour, 17 Fed. Cas. 440, No. 9,631 (C. C. D. 
N. C. 1798) ................................ 210, 215 
Mitchell v. Violett, 104 Ky. 77,47 S. W. I95 (I898) ...... 283 
Monarque v. Monarque, So N. Y. 320 ( I88o) ....... 162, 167 
Moninger v. Ritner, I04 Pa. 298 (1883) ............ 283, 284 
Montgomery v. Gilbertson, I34 Iowa 29I, III N. W. 964 
(1907) ....................................... 121 
Montoya v. Gonzales, 232 U.S. 375 (1914) .......... · ·. 44 
Mooney v. Miller, I 19 Misc. 134, 195 N.Y. S. 437 (1922). 45 
Mooney v. Moriarty, 36 Ill. App. 175 (1889) ............ 299 
Moore v. Bradley, 3 N.C. 142 (I8oi) ............. 220, 221 
Moore v. Chalmers-Galloway Live Stock Co., 90 Colo. 548, 
zo P. 2d 950 (1932) ........................... ·74• 76 
Moore v. Maxwell, 18 Ark. 469 (1857) ................. 126 
Morgan v. King, 35 N.Y. 454 (1866)................. 72 
Morrison v. Rice, 35 Minn. 436,29 N. W. 168 (1886) .. 26, 287 
Moynahan's Estate, 158 Misc. 821,287 N.Y. S. 106 (1936). 122 
Muldrow v. Caldwell, 173 S.C. 243, 175 S. E. 501 (1934). 122 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 
(1950) ....................................... 135 
Mulligan v. Hilton, 305 Mass. 5, 24 N. E. 2d 676 ( 1940)... 38 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Mullock v. Souder, 5 Watts & S. I98, (Pa. I843) ......... 103 
Munford v. Pearce, 70 Ala. 452 (I88I) ................. 174 
Municipality No. 2 v. Orleans Cotton Press, I 8 La. I 22 
(I84I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 
Murphy v. Los Angeles Farmers' Bank, I3I Cal. II5, 63 Pac. 
36 8 ( I 900) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 2 7 
Murrison v. Fenstermacher, I66 Kan. s68, 203 P. 2d I60 
(I949) ..................................... 84, 229 
Myers v. Field, I46 Ill. so, 34 N. E. 424 (I893) .......... 299 
Myers v. Moran, II3 App. Div. 427,99 N.Y. S. 269 (I906) 299 
Myers v. Reed, I 7 Fed. 40I (C. C. D. Ore. I 883) ......... 338 
Myers v. Wheelock, 6o Kan. 747,57 Pac. 956 (I899)...... 77 
Neafsey v. Chincholo, 225 Mass. I2, II3 N. E. 65I (I9I6) .. 140 
Nelson's Heirs v. Lee, Io B. Mon. 495 (Ky. I85o) ........ 174 
Newcomb v. Newcomb, 33 Misc. 191, 68 N. Y. S. 430 
( I900) .................................... 261, 264 
Newlove, Estate of, I42 Cal. 377,75 Pac. 1083 (I904) ..... 126 
Newton v. Thornton, 3 N. M. (Gild) 287, 5 Pac. 257 
(I88s) ...................................... 59, 6o 
Niccolls, In re Estate of, I64 Cal. 368, I29 Pac. 278 (I912). 35 
Nickolay's Estate, In re, 249 Wis. 57I, 25 N. W. 2d 451 
(I936) ....................................... 106 
Niles v. Hall, 64 Vt. 453,25 Atl. 479 (I892) ......... 278, 279 
Nimmons v. Westfall, 33 Ohio St. 2I3 (I877) ............ 178 
Noble v. Hook, 24 Cal. 638 (I864) ................... 299 
Noble v. McFarland, 51 Ill. 226 (1869) ................ 280 
Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37 (I857) ...... 27, II4, 286, 294, 295 
Nolan v. Reed, 38 Tex. 425 (I873) .................... 299 
Norfolk & W. R. Ry. Co. v. Boyle, I2 Fed. Supp. 522 (N.D. 
Ohio I935) . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 17 
Norman v. Heist, 5 Watts and S. I7I (Pa. I843) .......... 122 
Norris v. Beyea, I3 N.Y. 273 (I855) .................. 276 
Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. 277 (I845) ............ I66, 269, 270 
Nossen's Estate, In re, I I I Mont. 40, I62 P. 2d 2I6 ( 1945) 
.......................................... 116, 122 
Noyes v. Parker, 92 F. 2d 562 (D. C. Cir. I937) .......... 312 
Noyes' Estate, In re, 40 Mont. 17 8, I o 5 Pac. I o I 3 (I 909) . . 93 
Nunnemacher v. State, I29 Wis. 190, 108 N. W. 627 (I9o6) 
· · · · • · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · IO, 93-95 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
O'Brien v. Ash et al., I69 Mo. 283, 69 S. W. 8 (1901) .... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IOO, IOI, I I2, I 13 
O'Connor v. Harris, 8I N.C. 279 (I879) ............... 276 
O'Donnell v. Mathews, 22I Mo. App. 657, 284 S. W. 204 
(I926) ....................................... I98 
O'Kelley v. Williams, 84 N. C. 24I (I 881) .......... 290, 297 
Olive v. State, 86 Ala. 88, 5 So. 653 (1888).............. 72 
Orman v. Van Arsdell, I2 N. M. 344, 78 Pac. 48 (I904)... 38 
Orndoff v. Turman, 2 Leigh, 200 (Va. 1830) .... 2I7, 218, 220 
Ostrander v. Preece, 129 Ohio St. 625, 196 N. E. 670 
(1935), app. dismissed 269 U.S. 543 (1935) ......... . 
.............................. 92, 1II-I13, 115, 147 
Otis' Will, Matter of, 276 N. Y. 101, I I N. E. 2d ss6 
( 1937) ........................................ I90 
Outlaw v. Barnes, 108 S.C. 4SI, 94 S. E. 868 (I9I7)...... 25 
Oviatt v. Hopkins, 20 App. Div. 168, 46 N. Y. S. 959 (4th 
Dept. 1897) .................................... 26I 
Oyama v. State of California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948)........ 22 
Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 24 I U. S. 440 (I 9 I 6) .... 88, 89 
Packer, Estate of, I25 Cal. 396, 58 Pac. 59 (1899) ........ I26 
Paine v. Sackett, 27 R.I. 305, 6I Atl. 753 (1905) ......... 222 
Pakulski v. Ludwiczewski, 29I Mich. 502, 289 N. W. 231 
(1939) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 
Paragould v. Lawson, 88 Ark. 478, IIS S. W. 379 (1908).. 41 
Parham v. The Justices, 9 Ga. 341 (I8SI)............... IO 
Parkham v. Vandeventer, 82 Ind. 544 (1882) ............ 27 
Parlato v. McCarthy, I 36 Conn. I 26, 69 A. 2d 648 (I 949) 
..................................... II6, 118, 120 
Parlow v. Turner, I32 Tenn. 339, 178 S. W. 766 (1915) ... 278 
Patterson, In re Estate of, ISS Cal. 626, I02 Pac. 941 (1909) II8 
Patton v. City of Asheville, I09 N.C. 685, I4 S. E. 92 (189I) 27 
Patton v. Patton, 39 Ohio St. 590 (I883) ............. 92, 101 
Payne v. Buena Vista Extract Co., I24 Va. 296, 98 S. E. 34 
( I 9 I 9) · · · · • • · · · • · · · · · · · • · · · · · · · • · • • • • · · · • • • • 7 4> 7 5 
Pease v. Whitman, 182 Mass. 363,65 N. E. 795 (1903) .... 338 
Peck v. Alfred Olsen Construction Co., 2 I 6 Iowa 5 I 9, 245 
N. W. 131 (I932) ............................. 66, 67 
Peck v. Walton, 26 Vt. 82 (I853) ................. 277, 278 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
People v. Chase, I6S Ill. 527,46 N. E. 454 (I895)........ 86 
People v. Economy Light and Power Co., 24 I Ill. 290, 89 
N. E. 760 (I909), app. dismissed 234 U.S. 497 (I9I4).. 72 
People v. Oyama, 29 Cal. 2d I64, I73 P. 2d 794 (I946).... 22 
People v. Platt, I7 Johns. Rep. I95 (N.Y. I8I9) ........ IO, 72 
People v. Simon, 176 Ill. I65, 52 N. E. 9IO (I898)........ 86 
People ex rei. Deneen v. Simon, I76 Ill. I65, 52 N. E. 9IO 
(I898) ....................................... 272 
People ex rei. Fabriel Franchere, Jr. v. City of Chicago, 321 
Ill. 466, I52 N. E. I4I (1926) .................. 240, 241 
People ex rei. Griffin v. Ryder, 65 Hun I75, I9 N.Y. S. 977 
(I892) ....................................... 122 
People ex rei. Phinney v. Superior Ct., 2I Wash. I86, 57 Pac. 
337 (I899) .................................... I29 
People ex rei. Western New York & P. Ry. Co. v. State Tax 
Commission, 244 N.Y. 596, ISS N. E. 9II (I927)...... 72 
People's Loan & Exchange Bank v. Garlington, 54 S. C. 4I3, 
32 S. E. 513 ( 1899) .......................... 208, 209 
Percy v. Cockrill, 53 Fed. 872 (8th Cir. I893) ........... 276 
Pew's Estate, In re, 362 Pa. 468,67 A. 2d 129 (I949) ..... I93 
Peyton v. Wehrhane, I25 Conn. 420,6 A. 2d 3I3 (I939) ... 3I3 
Pfaffenberger v. Pfaffenberger, 189 Ind. 507, I27 N. E. 766 
(1920) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 
Phelps v. Jepson, I Root 48 (I 769) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 I 2 
Phillips, In re Estate of, 203 Cal. 106, 263 Pac. IOI7 (I928) 
....... • . • .. • • . • • .. • .......... • ... • .. • • • • . I I4, 305 
Phillips v. Farley, II2 Ky. 837,66 S. W. roo6 (1902) ..... 282 
Phillips v. Phillips, 213 Ala. 27, I04 So. 234 (I925) · ·...... 93 
Pilkington v. Ford, IS Ill. 503 (I857).................. 48 
Pinkham v. Unborn Children, 227 N. C. 72, 40 S. E. 2d 690 
(I946) ·····················'················· 226 
Plimpton v. Plimpton, I2 Cush. 458 (Mass. I853) ......... I98 
Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. IOI (1930).................. 32 
Pollock v. Speidel, 27 Ohio St. 86 ( 187 5) ........ 214, 215, 218 
Porter, Estate of, I29 Cal. 86,61 Pac. 659 (I900) ........ 124 
Porter v. Union Trust Co. of Indianapolis, 182 Ind. 637, 108 
N.E.II7(I915) ................................ 93 
Posey's Lessee v. Budd, 21 Md. 477 (r863) .............. 212 
Post, In re, I3 R.I. 495 (x882) ................... 174, 175 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Powers v. Bergen, 6 N.Y. 358 (1852) ................. 173 
Prall v. Burckhartt, 299 Ill. 19, I32 N. E. 280 (1921) .240, 241 
Price v. Hopkin, I 3 Mich. 3 I 8 (I 865). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 
Price v. Sessions, 3 How. 624 (U.S. I844) ... : .......... 276 
Priddy and Co. v. Sanderford, 221 N. C. 422, 20 S. E. 2d 341 
(I942) ....................................... 158 
Pritchard v. Citizens' Bank, 8 La. I 3 o ( I 8 3 5) . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7 
Pritchett v. Hibbler, 126 Miss. 379, 88 So. 882 (I921)..... 55 
Ragan's Estate, In re, 237 Iowa 6I9, 23 N. W. 2d 521 
( I946) ....................................... 299 
Rains v. Moulder, 338 Mo. 275, 90S. W. 2d 8I (I936).... 55 
Randall v. Krieger, 23 Wall. I37 (U.S. I874) ........... 286 
Realty Co. v. McDonald, I68 La. I72, I2I So. 613 (I929), 
cert. den. 280 u.s. ss6 (I929)..................... 8 
Ream v. Wolls, 6I Ohio St. I3I, 55 N. E. 176 (1899) ..... 175 
Reed v. Barkley, I23 Misc. 635, 205 N.Y. S. 803 (1924) ... 224 
Rees, In re, I82 Wis. 239, I96 N. W. 239 (I923) ........ 169 
Reese v. Stires, 87 N.J. Eq. 32, I03 Atl. 679 (Ch. 1917) ... 285 
Reeve v. Phillips, 2 Cal. 2d 239, 70 P. 2d 607 (I937) ...... 304 
Reeves v. Haynes, 88 N. C. 3IO ( I883) ................ 288 
Reformed Protestant Dutch Church v. Mott, 7 Paige 77 (N. 
Y. I838) ...................................... 268 
Remington v. Metropolitan Sav. Bank, 76 Md. 546, 25 Atl. 
666 (1893) ............................. 28, 116, II8 
Renwick v. Martin, 126 N. J. Eq. 564, IO A. 2d 293 (Ch. 
1940) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 
Reynolds v. Love, I91 Ala. 2I8, 68 So. 27 (I9IS) ......... 205 
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 24 Wend. I93 (N.Y. I840)........ 27 
Ricardi v. Gaboury, I IS Tenn. 484, 89 S. W. 98 (I905) .... 186 
Rice v. Parkman, I6 Mass. 326 (I82o) ................. 174 
Richards v. Bellingham Bay Land Co., 54 Fed. 209 (9th Cir. 
I893) ........................................ 288 
Richardsv. Rote, 68 Pa. 248 (I87I) ................... 330 
Richards v. Stone, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N. W. 657 ( I938)... 143 
Richardson v. Monson, 23 Conn. 94 (I854) ............. . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ISS, IS6, I59, 329, 332 
Richardson v. Richardson, I 50 N. C. 549, 64 S. E. 510 
(1909) ....................................... 282 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Richardson's Adm'r v. Borders, 246 Ky. 303, 54 S. W. 2d 676 
(I932) .................................... 113, 114 
Richmond v. Ashcraft, 137 Mo. App. I9I, 117 S. W. 689 
( I909) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 
Rider v. Regan, II4 Cal. 667, 46 Pac. 820 (1896) ........ 175 
Riggs v. Sally, I5 Me. 408 ( I839) ..................... 218 
Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, so Utah 114, 167 Pac. 
24I (I9I7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Chadwick, 228 Mass. 242, I I 7 
N. E. 244 (I917) ............................. 87, 248 
Robb v. Bowen, 9 Pa. 71 (1848)...................... so 
Roberts v. Wehmeyer, I9I Cal. 6o1, 218 Pac. 22 (I923) ... 303 
Robinson v. Blankinship, I I6 Tenn. 394, 92 S. W. 854 
(1906) ....................................... 207 
Robinson v. Kerrigan, I 5 I Cal. 40, 90 Pac. I 29 ( I907) .... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85, 86, x53 
Roe v. Journegan, 175 N.C. 261,95 S. E. 495 (I9I8) ..... 224 
Roe v. Journigan, I81 N.C. 180, ro6 S. E. 68o (I92I) .... 224 
Rogers v. Smith, 4 Pa. 93 (I 846). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 71 
Rorick v. Board of Com'rs, 57 F. 2d 1048 (N.D. Fla. 1932). 17 
Rose v. Rose, I04 Ky. 48, 46 S. W. 524 (I898) .......... 277 
Rose v. Sanderson, 38 Ill. 247 (r86s) ............... 279, 280 
Rossv.Irving, I4Ill. I7I (r8s2) .................... ss, s6 
Rowland v. Warren, IO Ore. 129 (1881) ............... 211 
Rowlettv. Moore, 252 Ill. 436,96 N. E. 835 (19I1) .... 28, II8 
Rozier v. Fagan, 46 Ill. 404 (1868) .................... 125 
Rubalcava v. Garst, 53 N. M. 295,206 P. 2d I 154 (1949) .. I IS 
Rubyv. Ruby, 112 W.Va. 62,163 S. E. 717 (I932) ..... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286, 288, 297 
Rudkin v. Rand, 88 Conn. 292, 91 Atl. 198 (1914) ....... 212 
Rugh v. Ottenheimer, 6 Ore. 231 (1877) ................ 279 
Russell v. Rumsey, 35 Ill. 362 (1864) ............... 290, 291 
Russell v. Russell, 109 Conn. 187, 145 Atl. 648 (1929). 269, 270 
Rutherford v. Rutherford, 116 Tenn. 383, 92 S. W. I I 12 
( 1906) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I6I 
Sage v. N.Y., 10 App. Div. 294, 41 N.Y. S. 938 (1st Dept. 
1 s96) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 
St. Clair County v. Lovington, 23 Wall. 46 (U.S. 1874).... 63 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
St. John v. Quitzow, 72 Ill. 334 (I874) ............. 239, 24I 
Salmon v. Huff, 9 Tex. Civ. App. I64, 28 S. W. IOH (1894) 76 
Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Comptroller, 177 U. S. 318 
(I899) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . so 
Sauder's Lessee v. Morningstar, I Yeates 313 (Pa. I793) .... 217 
Saunders v. Wilson, I9 Tex. I94 (I857)................ 56 
Saxton v. Mitchell, 78 Pa. 479 (I875) .................. 12I 
Sayles v. Christie, I87 Ill. 420,58 N. E. 480 (I900) .... 112, 114 
Scaife v. McKee, 298 Pa. 33, 148 Atl. 37 (I929), app. dism., 
281U.S.77I (1929) ................ 282, 285,286,297 
Scales v. Otts, I27 Ala. 582, 29 So. 63 (I900)........... 52 
Schafer v. Eneu, 54 Pa. 304 (I867) .................... 20I 
Schauble v. Schultz, I37 Fed. 389 (8th Cir. I905) ....... 41, 42 
Schmitt v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co., I87 Ind. 623, 120 N. E. 
I9 (I9I8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
Schnitzler's Estate, In re, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 554 (Surr. Ct. 
I943), aff'd, Re Schnitzler's Will, 290 N.Y. 885, 50 N. E. 
zd 293 (I943) .............................. 191, 192 
Schoenberger v. School Directors, 32 Pa. 34 (I858)........ 13 
Scott v. Jenkins, 46 Fla. 5I8, 35 So. IOI (I902) .......... 128 
Scottv. Mather, 14 Tex. 235 (1855) ................... 56 
Scott v. Scott, I70 S. W. 273 (Tex. App. I9I4) ........... 302 
Scranton v. Wheeler, I 79 U. S. I4 I (I 900) ............ 66, 7 I 
Second Universalist Society v. Dugan, 6 5 Md. 460, 5 Atl. 4 I 5 
(I886) ....................................... 243 
Sederquist v. Brown, 225 Mass. 2 I 7, I I4 N. E. 365 (I 9 I 6). . 87 
Sergeant v. Kuhn, 2 Pa. 393 (I845) .................... 269 
Sergeant v. Steinberger, 2 Hammond 305 (I 826). . . . . . . . . . 312 
Sewall v. Roberts, I I 5 Mass. 262 (I 87 4) ............ 200, 20 I 
Sexton v. Daly, 95 Cal. App. 754, 273 Pac. 109 (1928) .... 304 
Seymour v. McAvoy, I2I Cal. 438, 53 Pac. 946 (1898) .... 252 
Shapter v. Pillar, 28 Colo. 209, 63 Pac. 302 (I900) ..... 23, 175 
Sharp v. Sharp, 213 Ill. 332, 72 N. E. 1058 (1904) ........ 117 
Sharp's Estate, In re, 133 Fla. 802, I83 So. 470 (1938)..... 93 
Shaw v. Arnett, 226 Minn. 425,33 N. W. 2d 609 (I948) ... 207 
Shaw v. Beers, 84 Ind. 528 (I822) ..................... 161 
Shaw v. Hearsey, 5 Mass. 521 (1809) .................. 316 
Shawv. Robinson, III Ky. 7I5, 64 S. W. 620 (I901)...... 49 
Sheaffer's Estate, 24 Pa. Dist. 570 (1914) ............... 122 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGI' 
Sheets v. Walsh, 2I7 N.C. 32,6 S. E. 2d SI7 (I940)...... 52 
Sheffer's Will, In re, I39 Misc. 519,249 N.Y. S. 102 (1931) 
..................................••..•••• 200, 20J 
Shehan's Heirs v. Barnett's Heirs, 6 T. B. Mon. 592 (Ky. 
IS2S) ........................................ "125 
Shell v. Matteson, S1 Minn. 3S, S3 N. W. 491 (1900) ... 62, 334 
Shepard v. Mt. Vernon Lumber Co., I92 Ala. 322, 6S So. S8o 
. (1915) ....................................... 333 
Sherman, Petition of, ro6 Misc. 244, 175 N. Y. S. 627 
(1919) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Morris, 25 Tenn. App. 272, I56 S. 
w. 2d 350 (1941) ............................... 299 
Sherwood's Estate, In re, I 22 Wash. 64S, 2 I I Pac. 7 34 
(1922) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 
Shinkle v. Crock, I7 Pa. 159 (rSsr) ................... uS 
Shipp v. Klinger, 54 Mo. 23S (IS73) ................... 125 
Shoenberger v. School Directors, 32 Pa. 34 (ISSS). I76, 232, 235 
Shortall v. Hinckley, 3I Ill. 219 (rS63) ................. 2So 
Shuler v. Bull, 15 S.C. 421 (rSSI) .................... 274 
Sidebotham, In re, 12 Cal. 2d 434, Ss P. 2d 453 (193S), 
cert. den. 307 U.S. 634 (I93S)..................... 21 
Sidman's Estate, In re, I 54 Misc. 675, 27S N.Y. S. 43 (I935) 139 
Simon v. Town of Needham, 3I I Mass. s6o, 42 N. E. 2d 5I6 
( I942) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
Skelly Oil Co. v. Murphy, ISo Ark. 1023, 24 S. W. 2d 3I4 
(1930) .................................... ·47> 2S6 
Sleight v. Read, IS Barb. 159 (N.Y. IS54) .............. 279 
Sluder v. Wolf Mountain Lumber Co., ISI N. C. 69, 106 
s. E. 2I5 (I92I) ................................ IIS 
Smith's Estate, 207 Pa. 604, 57 Atl. 37 (I904) ........... 17S 
Smith's Estate, In re, ISS Okla. xsS, I07 P. 2d ISS (1940) 
.......................................... 113, 114 
Snider v. Brown, 48 S. W. 377 (Tenn. IS9S)............ 52 
Snowhill v. Snowhill, 3 N. ]. Eq. 20 (Ch. 1S34) ....... 174, 175 
Snyder v. O'Conner, I02 Colo. 567, Sx P. 2d 773 (193S) ... 249 
Society for the Propagation, etc. v. Wheeler et al., 22 Fed. Cas. 
756, No. 13,I56 (C. C. D. N.H. rSr4) ........ 14, 59, I99 
Sohier v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 3 Cush. 4S3 (Mass. 
1S49) . · · · · · · • · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·. · ·. · .... I67, 169, I70 
TABLE OF CASES 37I 
PAGE 
Soper v. Lawrence Bros. Co., 20I U.S. 359 (I906) ..... ·44• 45 
Soule v. Soule, 5 Mass. 6 I (I 809) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 I 7 
Southard v. Central Railroad Co., 26 N. J. L. I3 (Sup. Ct. 
I856) ........................................ 121 
Southeastern Land Co. v. Clem, 239 Ky. 417, 39 S. W. 2d 
674 (1931) .................................... 248 
Spain's Estate, In re, 327 Pa. 226, 193 Atl. 262 (1937) ..... 114 
Sparger v. Cumpton, 54 Ga. 356 (I875) ............ 299, 300 
Sparks v. Clay, 185 Mo. 393, 84 S. W. 40 (1904) ......... I6I 
Sperry v. Haslam, 57 Ga. 4I2 (I876) ................... 276 
Spreckels v. Spreckels, I I 6 Cal. 339, 48 Pac. 228 (I 897). . . . 302 
Springs v. Scott, I32 N.C. 548, 44 S. E. II6 (I903) ..... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134, 167, 169 
Spurlock v. Burnett, I83 Mo. 524, 81 S. W. I22I (1904) ... IOO 
Stabel v. Gertel, I I N. J. Misc. 247, 165 Atl. 876 (Sup. Ct. 
I933), aff'd I I I N.J. L. 296, I68 Atl. 645 (Err. & App. 
I933) ....................................... 25, 27 
Stafford v. Lick, 7 Cal. 4 79 (I 85 7) ... · ... · .. · . · · · · · · · 74, 75 
Stanback v. Citizens Nat. Bank, I97 N.C. 292, 148 S. E. 3I3 
(I929) ....................................... 225 
Standard Metallic Paint Co. v. Prince Mfg. Co., 133 Pa. 474, 
19 Atl. 4I1 (1890) .............................. I82 
Stanleyv.Colt,72 U.S. (5Wall.) II9 (I866) ... I82, 269,270 
Starr v. Hamilton, 22 Fed. Cas. I I07, No. I3,3I4 (C. C. D. 
Ore. I 867) .................................... 277 
State v. Beardsley, 108 Iowa 396, 79 N. W. I38 (1899).... 72 
State v. Brace, 36 N. W. 2d 330 (N.D. 1949)............ 70 
State v. Caldwell, 181 Tenn. 74, 178 S. W. 2d 624 (1944) 
.......................................... 252, 253 
State v. Glen, 52 N.C. 321 (1859).................... 72 
State v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575,47 N. E. 551 (I897) ... 85, 86 
State v. Hirabayashi, 133 Wash. 462, 233 Pac. 948 (1925), 
aff'd White River Gardens, Inc. v. State, 277 U. S. 572, 
( 1928) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
State v. Register of Deeds, 26 Minn. 521, 6 N. W. 337 
(I88o) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . 79 
State v. Standard Oil Co., 5 N.J. 281, 74 A. 2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 
1950) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 
State v. Warren, 28 Md. 338 (I 867). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 2 I 
372 TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
State v. Westfall, Ss Minn. 437,89 N. W. I7S (1902) ..... 153 
State v. Woodruff, 170 Miss. 744, ISO So. 760 (1933) · ·. · · 133 
State ex rei. Baldwin v. Moore, 7 Wash. 173, 34 Pac. 461 
(1893) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . So 
State ex rel. Bier v. Bigger, 3S2 Mo. so2, I78 S. W. 2d 347 
(I944) .....................................•. 102 
State ex rel. King v. Sherman, I04 Ohio St. 3I7, I3S N. E. 
625 (I922) . . . . . .. . .. . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IO 
State ex rel. McClintock v. Guinotte, 27S Mo. 298, 204 S. W. 
8o6 (I9I8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 
State ex rel. Rankin v. District Court, 70 Mont. 322, 225 Pac. 
804 (I924) .................................... 121 
State ex rel. Sayers v. School District No. I, 79 Mo. App. 103 
(!899) ....................................... 244 
State ex rei. Squire v. City of Cleveland, So Ohio App. 83, 74 
N. E. 2d 438 (1947) ............................. 71 
State of Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U. S. so8 
(1941) ................................ • .. • • •. 71 
Stearns v. Gittings, 23 Ill. 387 (rS6o) ................ 4S, so 
Steinberg v. Salzman, 139 Wis. IIS, I20 N. W. 1005 (I909) 38 
Steinhagen v. Trull, 320 Ill. 3S2, ISI N. E. 250 (1926).2S6, 291 
Stevens v. Arnold, 262 U.S. 266 (I922) .............. 63, 65 
Stewart v. Griffith, 33 Mo. 13 (IS62) .................. 174 
Stewart v. Keyes, 295 U.S. 403 ( I934) · ....... · ·. · · ·. · · 37 
Stewart v. Stewart, I99 Cal. 3IS, 249 Pac. I97 (I926) ..... 302 
Stewart v. Thomas, 64 Kan. 5 I I, 6S Pac. 70 ( 1902) ....... 338 
Stratton's Claimants v. Morris, S9 Tenn. 497, IS S. W. S7 
(1S9o) ....................................... 109 
Strauss v. State, 36 N.D. S94, I62 N. W. 90S (I9I7) .... 95, 99 
Strong v. Clem, I 2 Ind. 37 (IS 59) .................. 26, 287 
Stuber's Road, 2S Pa. 199 (rSs7). · .. · ....... · · ..... ·. 37 
Stuckey v. Keefe's Ex'rs, 26 Pa. 397 (I S56). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341 
Stump v. Hornback, 94 Mo. 26 (I 887). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . s6 
Sturdevant v. Norris, 30 Iowa 65 (1S7o) ................ 286 
Sturgis et al. v. Ewing, IS Ill. I76 (IS56) ............ ·99• IOO 
Sutton v. Askew, 66 N.C. I72 (IS72) ........... 25, 279, 290 
Sutton v. Hancock, I IS Ga. 436,45 S. E. S04 (I903) ...... 117 
Swan v. Walden, rs6 Cal. 195· I03 Pac. 931 (I909) ...... 336 
Swanson v. Pontralo, 23S Iowa 693,27 N. W. 2d 2I (I947). 50 
TABLE OF CASES 373 
PAGE 
Swartz v. Andrews, I37 Iowa 26I, I I4 N. W. 888 (1908). 295 
Swetland v. Swetland, 100 N.J. Eq. 196, I34 Atl. 822 (Ch. 
1926) ........................................ 115 
Symmes v. Moulton, 120 Mass. 343 (1S76) .............. 169 
Tack's Estate, In re, 325 Pa. 545, I9I Atl. ISS (I937) · · · · · 93 
Taft v. Cannon, 34 Atl. 14S (R.I. 1S96) ............... 279 
Talbot v. Talbot, 14 R.I. 57 (1SS2) ................... 295 
Tatum v. Tatum, 174 Ark. I 10, 295 S. W. 720 (I927) .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291, 292 
Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359, I7 So. 2d 615 (1944) .... 
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · .. ·...... 92, 10I 1 I02 
Taylor v. Sample, 5 I Ind. 423 (I S7 5). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
Taylor v. Taylor, I2 Lea (So Tenn.) 490 (1SS3) ......... 27S 
Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. R. Co. v. McDowell, IOO Tenn. 
s6s, 47 s. w. 153 (1S9S)......................... 37 
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923)............. 22 
Terrill v. Hoyt, 149 Kan. 51, S7 P. 2d 23S ( 1939)........ 37 
Theobald v. Smith, 103 App. Div. 200,92 N.Y. S. IOI9 (Ist 
Dept. 1905) .................................... II4 
Thistle v. Frostburg Coal Co., IO Md. 129 (1S56) ....... 45, 46 
Thomasv. Williams, 51 Fla. 332,40 So. S31 (1906) ....... 102 
Thompson v. Adams, 205 Ill. 552, 69 N. E. I (1903) ...... I8o 
Thompson v. Illinois C. R. R. Co., 75 Ind. App. 410, 129 
N. E. 55 (1920)................................. 53 
Thompson's Ex'rs v. Norris, 20 N.J. Eq. 4S9 (Err. and App. 
IS69) ........................................ 232 
Thornburg v. Thornburg, Adm'r, IS W.Va. 522 (1S8I) ... 2SS 
Thornburn v. Doscher, 32 Fed. S1o (C. C. D. Ore. IS87) .. 289 
Thornton's Estate, I Cal. 2d I, 33 P. 2d I (I934)......... 34 
Thramm's Estate, In re, So Cal. App. 2d 756, 1S3 P. 2d 97 
( 1947) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 16 
Throckmorton v. Pence, 121 Mo. so, 25 S. W. S43 (1S94). 331 
Thurberv. Townsend, 22 N.Y. SI7 (1S6o) ............. 283 
Todd v. Flournoy's Heirs, s6 Ala. 99 (I S76). . . . . . . . . . . . . I 7 4 
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (I943) .............. 310 
Townsend v. Shipp's Heir's, Cooke 294 (Tenn. I8I3)...... 59 
Towson v. Denson, 74 Ark. 302,86 S. W. 661 (I905) ... 44, 50 
Trapnell v. Conklyn, 37 W.Va. 242, I6 S. E. 570 (1890) .. 276 
374 TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Truesdell v. White, I3 Bush. 6I6 (Ky. IS7S) ............ 321 
Truman, In re, 27 R.I. 209, 6I Atl. 59S (I905) ......... 200 
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, I N. H. I II, 
reversed 4 Wheat. SIS (U.S. ISI9) ................. 262 
Trustees of Presbytery of Jersey City v. Trustees of the First 
Presbyterian Church of Weehawken, So N. J. L. 572, 7S 
Atl. 207 (Sup. Ct. I 9 I o) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26S 
Tucker v. Tucker's Adm'r, I6S Ky. 306, I76 S. W. I I73 
(I9IS) ....................................... 277 
Tuller v. Detroit Trust Co., 259 Mich. 670, 244 N. W. I97 
(I932) ....................................... 292 
Turner v. Gregory, 203 S. W. 6IS (Tex. I9IS).......... 37 
Turner v. Turner, 1S5 Va. 505, 39 S. E. 2d 299 (1946) 
........................................... 2SS, 292 
Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, I 7 5 Mass. 7 I, 55 N. 
E. S12 (I900) ........................... S6, 136, 153 
Tyrrell's Estate, In re, I7 Ariz. 4IS, 153 Pac. 767 (1915).. 93 
United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U. S. 
377 (1940) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 
United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 156 F. 2d 769 (10th 
Cir. 1946) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 209 U. 
s. 447 (I90S).................................. 3S 
United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U. S. 3S6 
( I945) • • · · • • · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · • · · · · · · • · • • · · • • 7 I 
UnitedStatesv.Fox,94 U.S.315 (IS76) ............... 102 
United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U. S. 799 
(I950) ............................. : ......... 71 
United States v. Nebo Oil Co., 90 F. Supp. 73 (W. D. La. 
I9SO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
United States v. Perkins, I63 U.S. 625 (1S96)........... 91 
United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U. S. 
4II (1926) . . . . . .. . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 71 
Upham v. Plankinton, 152 Wis. 275, 140 N. W. 5 (I913) .. 1S4 
Vail, In re, 99 N.J. Eq. 59S, 133 Atl. S66 (1926) ........ 169 
Valle's Heirs v. Fleming's Heirs, 29 Mo. 152 (1S59)....... 54 
Vanata v. Johnson, 170 Mo. 269,70 S. W. 687 (I902) ..... 277 
TABLE OF CASES 375 
PAGE 
Van Ausdall v. Van Ausdall, 4S R. I. 106, 135 Atl. Sso 
(1927) ....................................... 342 
Vance v. Vance, 10S U.S. 514 (1SS3). · .. · .... · · · ·43, 74, 77 
Van Horne, In re, IS R.I. 3S9, 2S Atl. 341 (1S93) .... 269, 270 
Van Husen v. Reames, 96 Mich. 504,56 N. W. 22 (1S93).. 79 
Van Note v. Downey, 2S N.J. L. 219 (Sup. Ct. 1S6o) ..... 277 
Van Sandt v. Alvis, 109 Cal. 165 (1S95)................ 31 
VanValkenburg v. Ruby, 6S Tex. 139, 3 S. W. 746 (1SS7). 56 
Varick's Ex'rs v. Briggs, 22 Wend. 543 (N.Y. 1S39)...... 74 
Vaught v. Williams, 177 N.C. 77,97 S. E. 737 (191S) ..... 127 
Vestal v. Pickering, 125 Ore. 553, 267 Pac. S21 (192S)..... 93 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 
(1926) ....................................... s, 22 
W acht's Estate, In re, 3 2 N. Y. S. 2d S7 I (Surr. I 942) . . . . . I 92 
Wadsworth v. Brigham, 125 Ore. 45S, 266 Pac. S75 (192S) IIS 
Wakefield v. Phelps, 37 N.H. 295 ( 1S5S) ....... 103, 104, I 12 
Walker v. Bennett, 107 N. J. Eq. 15 I, 152 Atl. 9 (Ch. 
I 930) . · . · · . · · .. · .. · · . · · . · · ........... 2S3, 284, 289 
Walker v. Nix, 196 Okla. 365, 165 P. 2d 37S (1946)...... 79 
Walker v. The Board of Public Works, 16 Ohio 540 (1847). 72 
Walkup v. Covington, 173 Tenn. 7, 114 S. W. 2d 45 (193S) 299 
Wallace v. Stearns, 96 N.H. 367, 77 A. 2d 109 (1950) .. 13, 155 
Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 4S4 (1900) .............. 302 
Ward v. Leche, 1S9 La. I 13, 179 So. 52 (193S).......... IO 
Ward v. Meredith, 186 Iowa IIo8, 173 N. W. 246 (1919). 229 
Ware v. Owens, 42 Ala. 212 (1S6S) ................... 286 
Warfield v. Ravesies and Wife, 3S Ala. SIS (1S63)........ 20 
Watkins v. Ford, 123 Va. 26S, 96 S. E. 193 (191S) .... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . !62, 176, 178 
Watkins v. Holman's Lessee, 16 Pet. 25 (U.S. 1842) ...... 125 
Watson v. Oates, 58 Ala. 647 (1877) .................. 125 
Waugh v. Riley, 6S Ind. 4S2 (1S79) .................. 122 
Weaver's Ex'rs v. Weaver's Creditors, 23 Ala. 789 (1S53) .. 128 
Webster v. Cooper, 14 How. 4S8 (U.S. 1852) ........ ·45> 227 
Weeks, Estate of, 154 Kan. 103, I 14 P. 2d S57 (1941) ... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102, 103, 105, .147 
Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U.S. 314 (1894) ............. 151 
Welles v. Bailey, 55 Conn. 292, IO Atl. 565 (ISS7)....... 65 
TABLE OF CASES 
PAGE 
Wellings, In re Estate of, I97 Cal. I89, 246 Pac. 21 (1925). 128 
Wernke v. Hazen, 32 Ind. 431 (I869) ............... ·. 54 
Wesson v. Johnson, 66 N.C. I89 (1872)............... 24 
West, Matter of, I75 Misc. I044, 26 N.Y. S. 2d 622 (1941) I91 
West Point Water Power and Land Improvement Co. v. State, 
49Neb.2I8,66N.W.6 (1896) .................... 72 
Western Pacific R. R. Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., I51 Fed. 
376 (9th Cir. I907) ............................ 63, 64 
Westervelt v. Gregg, I2 N.Y. 202 (I854) ........... 275, 276 
Whitcomb v. Taylor, I22 Mass. 243 (I877) ............. 169 
White v. Ainsworth, 62 Colo. 5 I 3, I63 Pac. 959 ( I9I 7) .. 87, 88 
White v. White, 5 Barb. 474 (N.Y. I849) .............. 280 
White River Gardens, Inc. v. State, 277 U.S. 572 (I928)... 22 
Whitney v. Richardson, 3I Vt. 300 (I858) .............. 199 
Whitney v. Wegler, 54 Minn. 235, 55 N. W. 927 (1893) .50, 51 
Wilcoxen v. Owen, 237 Ala. I69, 185 So. 897 (I938) ..... 207 
Wilderman v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore, 8 Md. SSI (1855). 121 
Wilkins, Estate of, I92 \Vis. III, 2II N. W. 652 (I927) ... 94 
Wilkins' Estate, In re, 54 Ariz. 2I8, 94 P. 2d 774 (I939) · · · 93 
Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627 (U.S. I829) ............ 125 
Willcox v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 58 I, 55 A. 2d 
52I (I947) ................................. ·33> 36 
Willhite v. Rathburn, 332 Mo. I2o8, 61 S. W. 2d 708 
(1933) · · · · · · · · • · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · I4, I7I, I94> 219 
Williams v. Courtney, 77 Mo. 587 (I883) .............. 290 
Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 56 Cal. 
App. 2d 645, I33 P. 2d 73 (1943) ................... 334 
Williamson v. Kinney, 52 Cal. App. 2d 98, 125 P. 2d 920 
(1942) ....................................... 304 
Williamson v. Williamson, 57 Ky. (I8 B. Mon.) 329 (r857) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 
Williamson v. Williamson, 3 Sm. & M. 715 (Miss. I844) .... 125 
Wills v. Lochnane, 72 Ky. (9 Bush.) 547 (1873) .. II8, 123, 145 
Wilson v. Brown, 58 Ala. 62 (1877)................... 31 
Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N.C. 396, 42 S. E. 2d 468 (1947) ... 321 
Wilson v. Greer, 50 Okla. 387, 151 Pac. 629 (I915) ...... 115 
Wilson v. Iseminger, ISS U.S. 55 (I90I) ............. 39, 43 
Wilson v. Red Wing School District, 22 Minn. 488 (1876) 
........................................... 59> 199 
TABLE OF CASES 377 
PAGE 
Wilson v. Wilson, 43 Minn. 398,45 N. W. 7IO (IS9o) .... 336 
Winn v. Riley, ISI Mo. 61,52 S. W. 27 (IS99) .......... 276 
Wiseman v. Beckwith, 90 Ind. ISS (ISS3) ............ 26, 2S7 
Wissel v. Ott, 34 App. Div. I 59, 54 N.Y. S. 6os (2nd Dept. 
1S9S) ........................................ 122 
Wissner v. Wissner, 201 P. 2d S37 (Cal. 1949) .... 97, 306, 307 
Withers v. Barnes, 95 Kan. 79S, I49 Pac. 69I (19I5) ...... 321 
Wolford v. Morgenthal, 9I Pa. 30 (IS79) .............. 167 
\Vood v. Chase, 327 Ill. 9I, ISS N. E. 470 (I927) .... 2oS, 209 
Wood v. Roach, I25 Cal. App. 63I, I4 P. 2d I70 (1932) ... 126 
Woodville v. Pizzati, I I 9 Miss. 442, S I So. I 2 7 (I 9 I 9) . . . . . 93 
Woolever v. Stewart, 36 Ohio St. I46 (ISSo)............ 37 
Wyatt v. Smith, 25 W.Va. SI3 (ISSs) ................. 280 
Wynne's Lessee v. Wynne, 2 Swan (32 Tenn.) 404 (1S52) 
.......................................... 112, 115 
Yates v. Milwaukee, IO Wall. 497 (U.S. IS7o).......... 71 
Yates v. Yates, I04 Neb. 67S, I7S N. W. 262 (I920) ...... 2II 
Young v. Handwork, I79 F. 2d 70 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. den. 
and reh. den. Handwork v. Young, 339 U.S. 949 (I950). 254 
Young v. Wolcott, I Iowa I74 (1S55).................. 26 
Zeigner's Estate, In re, 146 Wash. 537, 264 Pac. 12 (1928) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103, 104, 147 
Zorntlein v. Bram, IOO N.Y. I2, 2 N. E. 3SS (ISSs) .. 339, 340 
Index 
[References are to pages unless otherwise indicated] 
Access to navigable water, 66. 
Accretion, 6o ff. 
existing accretions, 61. 
future accretions, 62 ff. 
shifting of non-navigable 
streams, 6S; c. 3, n. 99· 
Administrators 
interest in decedent's estate, 
12S. 
regulation of duties, 12S. 
Adopted children 
conferring rights of inheritance 
upon, 122; c. 3, n. 222. 
enabling them to take under 
deed or will, 200 ff. 
inheritance from, c. 3, n. 221. 
Adverse possession, 36 ff. 
see also Limitations, statute 
of. 
changing character of acts nec-
essary to acquire· title, 43, 
52. 
interest acquired by, 36 ff. 
necessity of actual possession, 
47· 
After-acquired property (wills) , 
c. 3, n. 222. 




adoption of community 
property system, 32 ff. 
enlargement of marital es-
tate of nonowning spouse, 
24 ff. 
recording acts, 7 3 ff. 
restricting alienation of 
homestead, 2S ff. 
Aliens 
conferring rights of inheritance 
upon, 122. 
inheritance, right of, I 24. 
lease of land to, 22. 
sale of land to, 22. 
Allocation of benefits between life 




Antenuptial contracts, I05 ff. 
Betterment acts, 53 ff, 197 ff. . . ' executiOn agamst owner s 
property for value of im-
provements, c. 3, n. 9 I. 
improvements made before 
adoption of statute, 5 S ff. 
improvements made by life 
tenant or by grantee of 
life tenant, I97 ff. 
option of occupant to purchase 
land, 56. 
option of owner to sell land to 
occupant, c. 3, n. 90. 
reimbursing occupant for pur-
chase money, 57· 
submitting question of payment 
for improvements to arbi-
trators, c. 3, n. 93· 
Boat locks, 72. 




adoption of community prop-
erty systems, 3 2 ff. 
restriction on power of alien-
ation of previously ac-
quired property, 3 2 ff. 
effect of bringing property into 
community property state, 
34· 
interest of heirs of spouses, 
305. 
interest of husband, 30 I ff. 
interest of wife, 305, 306. 
repeal of community property 
statute, 308 ff. 
testamentary power over, 304 
ff. 
wife's control over disposition 
of, 30 I ff. 
Compromise 
of claims against decedent's es-
tate, I 2 3· 
of claims against trust estates, 
I48 ff. 
of claims as to validity or effect 
of a will, I37 ff. 
Concurrent ownership 
see Joint tenancies; Tenan-
c!es ?Y entireties; Tenan-
Cies m common. 
Construction 
of instruments, 7. 
of statutes, 6. 
Contest of will, I I 7. 
incompetents, opportunity to 
contest, c. 3, n. 226. 
Contingent remainders 
see also Future interests. 
as constitutionally protected in-
terests, I 36, I 87. 
destructibility rule, abolition of, 
208 ff. 
Contract to make will, I I 5. 
Contracts, obligations of, I4 ff. 
deed as a contract in the con-
stitutional sense, I4 ff. 
will as a contract in the con-
stitutional sense, I 5. 
Corporations, devises to, c. 3, n. 
195· 
Creditor's rights 
enlargement of homestead ex-
emption, 3 I. 
enlargement of marital estate, 
26. 
Married Women's Property 
Acts, 278, 280. 
Curative statutes, 3· 
Curtesy 
curtesy initiate, 2 7 9 ff. 






rights of wife's grantees 
and mortgagees, 26. 
wife's power of alien-
ation, 24 ff. 
wife's power of testamen-
tary disposition, 2 7, 
100; C. 3, n. I95, n. 
1 99· 
Married Women's Property 
Acts, 280 ff. 
statute of limitations, operation 
against, c. 3, n. 69. 
statutory curtesy, 295 ff. 
deserting husband, c. 6, n. 
6o. 
Dams, 72; c. 3, n. I19, n. I25, 
n. I26. 
Dead, rights of, 97 ff, I o8 ff, 
255 ff, 259· 
INDEX 
Death taxes 
see Estate taxes; Inherit-
ance taxes. 
Decedents' estates 
see also Devisees; Heirs. 
sale of, I 24 ff. 
Deeds 
as contracts in the constitution-
al sense, 14 ff. 
construction of, 7. 
Descent 
see also Heirs. 
changing course of descent, c. 
3, n. 222. 
of personal property, c. 3, n. 
224. 
repeal of statute of descents 
and distributions, 90 ff. 
Deserting husband, c. 6, n. 6o. 
Deserting wife, c. 6, n. 4 I. 
Destroyed instruments 
Burnt Record Acts, 89. 
re-recordation, 7 6. 
Destructibility rule, abolition of, 
208 ff. 
Devisees 
see also Heirs. 
adopted children, 200 ff. 
compromise of claims against 
decedent's estate, I 2 3· 
compromise of claims as to va-
lidity or effect of a will, I 3 7 
ff. 
contest of will, I I 7. 
corporations as, c. 3, n. I95· 
enlargement of share of sur-
viving spouse, 99 ff. 
exoneration, c. 3, n. 222. 
federal estate taxes, proration, 
I I 9 ff. 
homestead, restrictions on dis-
position of, 3 I, 32; c. 3, 
n. I95· 
illegitimate children, 200 ff; 
c. 3, n. 222. 
probate of will, I I 7 ff; c. 4, 
n. 30. 
property acquired by testator 
after execution of will, c. 3, 
n. 222. 
reducing formalities necessary 
for will, I I 7; c. 3, n. 222. 
reducing restrictions on testa-
mentary disposition, c. 3, n. 
222. 
religious organizations as, c. 3, 
n. I95· 
rights of devisees after death of 
testator, I I 6 ff. 
rights of devisees before death 
of testator, I I I ff. 
rule in Shelley's Case, 204 ff. 
sale of decedent's estate, I 24 
ff. 
Dower 
compelling release of dower, 
c. 6, n. 41. 
deserting wife, c. 6, n. 4 I. 
dower consummate, 295· 
enlargement of dower interest 
effect on 
antenuptial contracts, 
I 05 ff. 
husband's power of alien-
ation, 24 ff. 
husband's power of testa-
mentary disposition, 
27, 99; c. 3, n. I95, 
n. 199· 
postnuptial contracts, I05 
ff. 
rights of husband's gran-
tees and mortgagees, 
26. 
inchoate dower, 285 ff. 
INDEX 
Dower (continued) 
judicial sales, c. 6, n. 41. 
nonresident widow, c. 6, n. 
41. 
partition by sale, c. 6, n. 4 I. 
statute of limitations, operation 
against marital interest, c. 3, 
n. 69; c. 5, n. 41. 
statutory dower, 295 :ff. 
widow's election, c. 6, n. 4 I. 
wife who kills husband, c. 6, 
n. 4I. 
Due process, I2. 
Duty, defined, 5· 
Easements 
acquired by prescription, c. 3, 
n. 45· 
changing character of acts nec-
essary to acquire prescriptive 
right, 53· 
loss of, by nonuser, c. 3, n. 77. 
Entireties 
see Tenancies by entireties. 
Equal protection, I 8. 
Erosion, loss of title by, 6 I, 67. 
Estate taxes, 9 5. 
proration of federal taxes, I I 9 
:ff. 
retroactive, I 20. 
Executors 
interest in decedent's estate, 
I28. 
nonintervention will, I 2 8. 
regulation of duties, I 28. 
Executory interests, I 36 :ff. 
see Future interests. 
Exemptions 
see Homestead; Trusts. 
Exoneration, c. 3, n. 222. 
Fee tail estate, abolition of, 2 I o 
:ff. 
conferring fee simple upon 
tenant in tail, 2I9, 222. 
heirs of the body, 2I4 :ff. 
power of tenant to bar entail-
ment, 2 I 8, 220, 22 I. 
repeal of statute abolishing fee 
tail, 223. 
reversions and remainders 
after fee tail, 2 I 9 :ff. 
Fishways, 72. 
Forced heirship, I I2. 
Fourteenth Amendment, I 2. 
Future interests, I30 :ff. 
adoption statutes, 200 :ff. 
allocation of benefits between 
life tenant and remainder-
men, I 88 :ff. 
compromise of claims against 
trust estates, I 4 8 :ff. 
compromise of claims as to va-
lidity or effect of a will, I 3 7 
:ff. 
contingent remainders 
as constitutionally protected 
interests, I 36, I 87. 
destructibility rule, abolition 
of, 208 :ff. 
destructibility rule, 208 :ff. 
executory interests, I 36 :ff. 
fee tail estate, abolition of, 2 I o 
:ff. 
conferring fee simple upon 
tenant in tail, 2 I 9, 222. 
heirs of the body, 2 I 4 :ff. 
power of tenant to bar en-
tailment, 2I 8, 220, 22 I. 
repeal of statute abolishing 
fee tail, 223. 
reversions and remainders 
after fee tail, 2 I 9 :ff. 
improvements and repairs 
made by life tenant or his 
grantee, I 97 :ff. 
incompetents, future interests 
of, 133, I 37 :ff; c. 4, n. 93· 
INDEX 
Future interests (continued) 
infants, future interests of, 
I33, I37 ff; c. 4, n. 93· 
legitimation statutes, 200 ff. 
limitation, statute of, 2 2 7 ff. 
long term leases, execution by 
life tenant, I 82 ff. 
Marketable Title Acts, 227 ff. 
mineral and gas leases, execu-
tion by life tenant, I 8 5 ff. 
mortgage of land by life ten-
ant, 163 ff. 
partition by sale 
liability to, I 58 ff. 
power to compel, 163. 
partition in kind 
liability to, I 54 ff. 
power to compel, I 56 ff. 
possibilities of reverter, 236 ff. 
powers of appointment, 23 I ff. 
powers in trust, 233· 
prospective appointees, in-
terest of, 232 ff. 
release of powers, 234· 
takers in default, interest of, 
235· 
powers of termination, 236 ff. 
probate of will, c. 4, n. 30. 
proceedings involving future 
interests 
in personam, 132. 
in rem, 134, ISI ff. 
necessary parties, 132 ff. 
notice, I 32 ff. 
notice by publication, I 34, 
I 5 I ff. 
virtual representation, c. 4, 
n. 7· 
quiet title proceedings, I 5 I ff. 
remainders, I 36 ff. 
reversions, 136 ff. 
revocation of grants of future 
interests, 224 ff. 
rule against perpetuities, 202 
ff. 
rule in Shelley's Case, 204 ff. 
sale of land in fee simple, 1 6 3 
ff. 
commutation of contingent 
future interests, I68, 
!69 ff. 
commutation of vested fu-
ture interests, I 7 3 ff. 
judicial supervision, c. 4, n. 
77· 
land held in trust, I79 ff. 
power of owner of future 
interest to compel sale, 
165. 
power of possessory owner 
to compel, I6S ff. 
restrictions in instrument 
against sale, I 8 I ff. 
showing of need for, c. 4, 
n. 78. 
Torrens Acts, IS I ff. 
trust, termination of, 258. 
unborn persons, I 33, I 34, I 37 
ff, I48 ff, 169 ff, 224 ff, 
228; c. 4, n. IO. 
unknown persons, I 3 3, 134, 
137 ff, 148 ff, lSI ff, 228. 
"vested" defined, I 36. 
Worthier Title Doctrine, 206 
ff. 
Grantees 
enlargement of marital interest 
of nonjoining spouse, 26. 
Hearing 
proceedings involving future 




conferring rights of inherit-
ance upon, I 2 2; c. 3, n. 
222. 
inheritance from, c. 3, n. 
221. 
changing course of descent, c. 
3, n. 222. 
compromise of claims against 
decedent's estate, I 2 3· 
compromise of claims as to va-
lidity or effect of a will, I 37 
ff. 
contest of will, I I 7. 
enlargement of share of sur-
viving spouse, 2 7, I 2 2; c. 
3, n. 222. 
exoneration, c. 3, n. 222. 
Federal estate taxes, proration, 
I I 9 ff. 
forced heirship, I I 2. 
homestead, modification of, 
32. 
illegitimate children 
conferring rights of inherit-
ance upon, I 22; c. 3, n. 
222. 
probate of will, I I 7 ff. 
property acquired by testator 
after execution of will, c. 4, 
n. 222. 
reducing formalities necessary 
for will, II7; c. 3, n. 222. 
reducing restrictions on testa-
mentary power, c. 3, n. 
222. 
rights after death of ancestor, 
I I6 ff, 203, 235· 
rights before death of ancestor, 
I I I ff. 
rule in Shelley's Case, 204 ff. 




alienation of, 28 ff. 
creditors' rights, 3 I. 
homesteader's interest, 298 ff. 
homestead estate which vests 
in widow and children, 
300. 
owner's power of testamentary 
disposition, 32; c. 3, n. I95· 
rights of heirs and devisees, 3 I. 
Husband 
see also Curtesy; Dower. 
alienation, restricting power of, 
24 ff. 
antenuptial contracts, I o 5 ff. 
homestead, restricting power 
to alienate, 28 ff. 
postnuptial contracts, I o 5 :ff. 
testamentary disposition, re-
stricting power of, 2 7, 99; 
c. 3, n. I95, n. I99· 
Illegitimate children 
conferring rights of inheritance 
upon, I22; c. 3, n. 222. 
enabling them to take under 
deed or will, 200 ff. 
Immunity, defined, 5· 
Improvements 
see also Betterment acts. 
improvements made by life 
tenant or his grantee, I 97 
ff. 
Incompetents 
alienation, power of, 22. 
appointment of guardian ad 
litem, c. 4, n. 6. 
future interests of, I 33, 137 
ff. 
compromise of claims as to 
validity or effect of a 
will, 13 7 :ff. 
INDEX 
Incompetents (continued) 
representation by guardian, 
133· 
mineral and gas leases, c. 4, 
n. 122. 
opportunity to contest will, c. 
3, n. 226. 
sale of lands of, c. 4, n. 93· 
statutes of limitations, exemp-
tion in favor of, 43· 
Infants 
alienation, power of, 23. 
appointment of guardian ad 
litem, c. 4, n. 6. 
future interests of, 133, 137 
ff; c. 4, n. 93· 
compromise of claims as to 
validity or effect of a 
will, I 37 ff. 
representation by guardian, 
I33· 
long term leases of infant's 
lands, c. 4, n. I 22. 
mineral and gas leases, c. 4, 
n. I22. 
sale of lands of, I 2 7, c. 4, n. 
93· 
statutes of limitations, exemp-
tions in favor of, 43· 
Inheritance, right of 
see Descent; Heirs. 
Inheritance taxes, 95· 
retroactive, I 20. 
Intestate succession 
see also Descent; Heirs. 
disposition of property by, 108 
ff. 
rights of decedent owner, I08 
ff. 
Joint tenancies 
bank deposits, c. 7, n. 43· 
partition 
by sale, 33 I ff. 
in kind, 329 ff. 
power of executor or ad-
ministrator of deceased 
owner to compel, 33 I. 
privilege of co-owner to take 
ores, 334· 
survivorship, incident of, 3 I I 
ff. 
in case of joint trustees, 328. 
repeal of statute abolishing 
common-law incident of 
survivorship, 327 ff. 
statutes abolishing common-
law rule of construction, 
3 I 5 ff. 
statutes purporting to abol-
ish incident, 320 ff. 
statutes purporting to abol-
ish joint tenancies as such, 
324. 
where instrument expressly 
creates joint tenancy, 
325 ff. 
where instrument expressly 
creates right of survivor-
ship, 326. 
where tenants cannot com-
pel partition, 326. 
Jure uxoris 
Married Women's Property 
Acts, 2 7 4 ff. 
wife's personal property, c. 6, 
n. 9· 
Land registration acts 
see Torrens Acts. 
Lease 
see also Future interests; 
Life tenants; Trusts. 
long term leases of infant's 
lands, c. 4, n. I 22. 
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Lease (continued) 
of land to aliens, 22. 
of subdivided land, 20. 
Legitimation 
see Illegitimate children. 
Life tenants 
see also Trusts. 
allocation of benefits between 
life tenant and remainder-
men, 188 ff. 
improvements and repairs 
made by life tenant or 
his grantee, I97 ff. 
long term leases, I 82 ff. 
mineral and gas leases, I 8 5 ff. 
mortgage of land, I63 ff. 
partition by sale 
liability to, I63. 
power to compel, I 6 I. 
partition in kind 
liability to, I 58. 
power to compel, I 54· 
power to destroy contingent 
remainders, 208 ff. 
sale of land in fee simple, I 6 3 
ff. 
restriction in instrument 
against sale, I 8 I ff. 
where there are contingent 
future interests, I68, I69 
ff. 
where there are vested fu-
ture interests, I 7 3 ff. 
Limitations, statute of, 36 ff, 
227 ff. 
changing character of acts 
which will cause running 
of the statute, 43, 52. 
creating cause of action, 48. 
extinguishment of marital In-
terest, c. 3, n. 69. 
future interests, operation 
against, 2 2 7 ff. 
nature of interest acquired by 
running of statute, 36 ff. 
necessity of actual possession 
to cause period to begin to 
run, 47· 
preservation of nonpossessory 
interests, 228. 
raising bar of statute, 36 ff. 
repeal of exceptions in favor of 
persons non sui juris, 43· 
requiring owners of possessory 
interests to take affirmative 
steps, 48. 
shortening period, 42. 
suspending operation of stat-
ute, 41. 
transfer of title by statute, 40, 
227· 
Logs, floating of, 72. 
Long term leases 
execution of, by life tenant, 
I 82 ff. 
of infants' lands, c. 4, n. I 2 2. 
Marital estates 
see also Community proper-






interest of owning 
spouse's grantee or 
mortgagee, 26. 
owning spouse's power of 
alienation, 24 ff. 
owning spouse's power of 
testamentary disposi-
tion, 27, 99, 100; c. 




Marital estates (continued) 
jure uxoris, 2 7 4 :ff. 
statute of limitations, operation 
against, c. 3, n. 69. 
statutory estates, 295 :ff. 
Marketable Title Acts, So :ff, 
227 :ff. 
future interests, application to, 
22 7 :ff. 
necessity of actual possession, 
8 3 :ff. 
preservation of existing old in-
terests, 82 :ff, 229 :ff. 
Married women 
conveyance of separate prop-
erty, c. 3, n. 2, n. 3· 
Property Acts, 274 :ff, 280 :ff; 
c. 7, n. 74· 
Mortgage, power to 
see Future interests; Life 
tenants; Trusts. 
Mortgagees 
enlargement of homestead ex-
emption, 3 I. 
enlargement of marital inter-
est of nonjoining spouse, 26. 
Natural rights, doctrine of, I o, 
II. 
Navigability, definitions of, 69 :ff. 
Navigable water 
access to, 66. 
accretion, 6o :ff. 
definitions of navigability, 69 
:ff. 
erosion, 6 I, 67. 
improvements for navigation, 
66; c. 3, n. 120. 
reliction, c. 3, n. Ioo. 
Necessary parties 
proceedings involving future 
interests, 132 :ff. 
Notice 
proceedings involving future 
interests, I 3 2 :ff. 
Obligations of contracts, I 4 :ff. 
deed as a contract in the con-
stitutional sense, 14 :ff. 
will as a contract in the con-
stitutional sense, I5. 
Occupying claimants acts 
see Betterment acts. 
Parties 
proceedings involving future 
interests, I 3 2 :ff. 
Partition 
future interests 
partition by sale 
liability of owner to, I 58 
:ff. 
power of owner to com-
pel, I63. 
partition in kind 
liability of owner to, I 54 
:ff. 
power of owner to com-
pel, I 56 :ff. 
joint tenants and tenants in 
common 
partition by sale, 33 I :ff. 
partition in kind, 329 :ff. 
life tenants 
partition by sale 
liability to, I63. 
power to compel, I 6 I. 
partition in kind 
liability to, I 58. 
power to compel, I 54· 
power of executor or admin-
istrator of deceased owner 
to compel, 331. 
tenants by entireties, 339· 
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Personal property 
descent of, c. 3, n. 222. 
jure uxoris, c. 6, n. 9· 
Possibilities of reverter, 236 :ff. 
Postnuptial contracts, I05 :ff. 
Power, defined, 5· 
Powers of appointment, 23I :ff. 
powers in trust, 233· 
prospective appointees, interest 
of, 232 :ff. 
release of powers, 234· 
takers in default, interest of, 
235· 
Powers of termination, 236 :ff. 
Prescription 
acquisition of interests by, c. 3, 
n. 45· 
changing character of acts nec-
essary to acquire prescriptive 
right, 53· 
Privilege, defined, 5. 
Probate of will, I I 7 :ff; c. 4, n. 
30. 
Property, defined, 5· 
Quiet title proceedings, 8 5 :ff. 
where future interests are in-
volved, I 5 I :ff. 
Recording acts, 7 3 :ff. 
see also Marketable Title 
Acts. 
changing conditions of record-
ing, 79· 
destroyed instruments, 76. 
elimination of stale claims, 7 7 
:ff. 
payment of taxes as condition 
to recording, 79· 
recordation made necessary for 
legal effectiveness of instru-
ment, 76 :ff. 
Reliction, c. 3, n. roo. 
Remainders, 136 :ff. 
see Fee tail estate; Future 
interests. 
Residential lots, sale of, 2 I. 
Restrictive covenants, c. 3, n. 
I65; c. 4, n. 297. 
Retroactive legislation 
constitutional prohibitions 
against, I 3 :ff. 
defined, I, 2. 
historical bias against, 9· 
Reversions 
see Fee tail estate; Future 
interests. 
Revocation of grants of future 
interests, 2 2 4 :ff. 
Right, defined, 5· 
Right of re-entry (power of ter-
mination), 236 :ff. 
Riparian rights 
see Accretion; Navigable 
water. 
Rule against perpetuities, 202 :ff. 
Rule in Shelley's Case, 204 :ff. 
Sale of land 
see also Future interests; 
Incompetents; Infants. 
residential lots, 2 I. 
subdivided land, 20. 





Statutory dower, 295 :ff. 
Streams 
see Accretion; Navigable 
water. 
Subdivided land, lease or sale of, 
20. 
Survivorship 
see also Joint tenancies. 
tenancies by entireties, 336 :ff. 
INDEX 
Taxes, payment of, as condition 
of recording, 79· 
Tenancies by entireties, 334 ff. 
divorce, 338. 
Married Women's Property 
Acts, c. 7, n. 74· 
partition, 339· 
separate conveyances by 
spouses, 339· 
survivorship, incident of, 336 
ff. 
Tenancies in common 
partition, 329 ff. 
by sale, 33I ff. 
in kind, 329 ff. 
power of executor or ad-
ministrator of deceased 
owner to compel, 331. 
privilege of co-owner to take 
away ores, 334· 
Testamentary disposition, power 
of 
see also Devisees; Heirs. 
abrogation of power, 90 ff, 96 
ff. 
creation of spendthrift trusts, 
249 ff. 
devises to corporations, c. 3, 
n. I95· 
devises to religious organiza-
tions, c. 3, n. I95· 
effect of enlargement of mari-
tal estates, 2 7, 99 ff; c. 3, 
n. I95, n. I99· 
formalities necessary for will, 
96, I I 7 ff. 
homestead, restrictions on dis-
position of, 32; c. 3, n. I95· 
husband's power of testamen-
tary disposition, 2 7, 9 9 ff; 
c. 3• n. I95, n. I99· 
nature of power, 97. 
reducing restrictions on power, 
c. 3, n. 222. 
wife's power of testamentary 
disposition, 2 7, I oo; c. 3, 
n. I95, n. I99· 
Title 
proceedings for determination 
of, 85 ff, I5I ff. 
Torrens Acts, 85 ff, I5I ff. 
compulsory registration of title, 
88. 
delegation of legislative power, 
c. 3, n. I64. 
elimination of restrictive cove-
nants, c. 3, n. I65. 
future interest, application to, 
I 5 I ff. 
Trusts 
allocation of benefits between 
life beneficiary and remain-
dermen, I 88 ff. 
bona fide alienees of the trust 
res, 2 7 I ff. 
compromise of claims against 
trust estate, I48 ff. 
long term leases of res, I 8 3 ff, 
268 ff. 
revocation of trust, 225 ff. 
sale or mortgage of trust res, 
I79 ff, 268 ff. 
spendthrift trusts, 249 ff. 
involuntary transfer of ben-
eficiary's interest, 249 ff, 
258. 
rights of settlor, 255 ff. 
termination of trust by ben-
eficiary, 255 ff. 
voluntary transfer of bene-
ficiary's interest, 255 ff. 
termination of trust, 2 58 ff. 
extinguishment of benefici-
ary's interest, 258. 
extinguishment of future in-
terests, 258. 
rights of settlor, 259· 
rights of trustee, 260 ff. 
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Trusts (continued) 
trustee as having a vested in-
terest, 264 ff. 
trustee of dry legal trust, 267. 
Unborn persons, 133, 134, 137 
ff, I 48 ff, I 69 ff, 224 ff, 
228; c. 4, n. 10. 
Unknown persons, I 33, I 34, 
I37 ff, I48 ff, 15I ff, 228. 
Vested future interests 
see also Future interests. 
defined, I 36. 
Vested rights 
defined, 6, IO. 
doctrine of, IO. I I. 
Virtual representation, c. 4, n. 7. 
Wife 
alienation, restricting power 
of, 24 ff. 
antenuptial contracts, 105 ff. 
homestead, restricting power 
to alienate, 28 ff. 
postnuptial contracts, I05 ff. 
testamentary disposition, re-
stnctmg power, 27, IOO; 
c. 3, n. I95 1 n. I99· 
Wills 
see also Devisees; Heirs; 
Testamentary disposi-
tion. 
as a contract in the constitu-
tional sense, I 5. 
compromise of claims as to va-
lidity or effect of, 137 ff. 
contest of, I I 7. 
contract to make, II 5. 
formalities necessary for valid-
ity, 96, I I 7 ff; c. 3, n. 222. 
probate, admission to, 1 I 7 ff; 
c. 4, n. 30. 
reducing restrictions on testa-
mentary power, c. 3, n. 
222. 
rule in Shelley's Case, 204 ff. 
Worthier Title Doctrine, 206 ff. 
